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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
In the Matter of the Estate of ) 
ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON and ) 
HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON, Deceased ) SUPREME COURT NO. --------- ~------
JADIGWA MELTON, Personal Representative 











______ D_e_fe_n_d_a_nt_-R_e_s~p_on_d_e_n_t ___ ) 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
44768 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the 
County of Boundary. 
MARY W . CUSACK ISB #5332 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
HON. JOHN R. STEGNER 
District Judge 
BRENT FEATHERSTON ISB #4602 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
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New Case Filed - Informal Estate Justin W. Julian 
Filing: A6 - Application for informal probate Paid by: Bruce H. Greene Justin W. Julian 
Receipt number: 0002858 Dated: 8/30/2013 Amount: $96.00 (Check) For: 
Melton, Jadwiga B. (other party) 
Other party: Melton, Jadwiga B. Appearance Bruce H. Greene Justin W . Julian 
Petition for Summary Administration of Estate Where Surviving Spouse is Justin W . Julian 
Sole Beneficiary 
Inventory 
Decree Vesting Estate In Surviving Spouse 
STATUS CHANGED: Closed 
Civil Disposition entered for: Melton, Jadwiga B., Other Party; Melton, 
Robert Ernest, Subject. Case Close date: 8/30/2013 
Reopen (case Previously Closed) 
Justin W. Julian 
Quentin F. Harden 
Justin W . Julian 
Quentin F. Harden 
Justin W. Julian 
Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other than the plaintiff or Justin W. Julian 
petitioner Paid by: Linda O'Fallon Receipt number: 0002979 Dated: 
9/6/2013 Amount: $66.00 (Check) For: Alt, Heinz (other party) 
Filing: J1 b- Probate, Demand for notice Paid by: Linda O'Fallon Receipt Justin W. Julian 
number: 0002979 Dated: 9/6/2013 Amount: $9.00 (Check) For: Alt, Heinz 
(other party) 
Motion To Convert Proceedings To Supervised Administration And To Justin W . Julian 
Determine Testacy 
Demand For Notice Justin W . Julian 
Lis Pendens Justin W . Julian 
Other party: Alt, Heinz Appearance Brent C. Featherston Justin W. Julian 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/15/2013 03:00 PM) to Set Aside Decree & 0 . Lynn Brower 
Convert 
Motion to Set Aside Decree and Notice of Hearing Justin W. Julian 
Notice Of Hearing Justin W. Julian 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 10/15/2013 03:00 PM: Interim 0 . Lynn Brower 
Hearing Held to Set Aside Decree & Convert 
Court Minutes 
Hearing type: Motions 
Hearing date: 10/15/2013 
Time: 3: 17 pm 
Courtroom: 002 
Minutes Clerk: Jamie Wilson 
Party: Heinz Alt, Attorney: Brent Featherston 
Party: Jadwiga Melton, Attorney: Bruce Greene 
0. Lynn Brower 
Order Justin W. Julian 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 03/17/2014 09:30 AM) to Convert to Formal Justin W. Julian 
Estate 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 03/17/2014 09:30 AM: Hearing Justin W. Julian 
Vacated to Convert to Formal Estate 
Hearing Scheduled (Petition 05/19/2014 10:00 AM) for summary Adm. Justin W. Julian 
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Supoena Duces Tecum for Production or Inspection of Documents, 
Electronically Stored Information, Or Tangible Things 
(Panhandle State Bank) 
Subpoena Duces Tecum for Prodcution or Inspection of Documents, 
Electronically Stored Information, Or Tangible Things 
(Mountain West Bank) 
Subpoena Duces Tecum for Production or Inspection of Documents, 
Electronically Stored Information, Or Tangible Things 
(Wells Fargo Bank) 
Notice Of Filing Petition And notice Of Hearing 
Notice Of Deposition And Subpoena Duces Tecum 
Affidavit Of Service 
Notice Of Deposition And Subpoena Duces Tecum 
Amended Notice of Deposition and Subpoena Duces Tecum 
Stipulation to Vacate Hearing 
Hearing result for Petition scheduled on 05/19/2014 10:30 AM: Hearing 
Vacated for Summary Adm. 
Order Vacating Hearing 
Subpoena Duces Tecum For Production Or Inspection Of Documents, 
Electronically Stored Information, Or Tangible Things 
Affidavit Of Service 
Motion To Strike Petition For Summary Administration Filed August 29, 
2013 and Motion To Convert Proceedings To Formal Administration and 
Notice Of Hearing 
Memorandum In Support Of Motions To Convert Proceedings And To 
Strike Petition For Summary Administration 
Notice Of Hearing Re: Motion To Convert Proceedings To Supervised 
Administration And To Determine Testacy 
Affidavit Of Counsel 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 09/09/2014 09:00 AM) to convert 
proceedings to supervised administration and to determine testacy. 
Amended Notice Of Hearing 
Motion and Objection 
Judge 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W . Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W . Julian 
Justin W . Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W . Julian 
Justin W . Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W . Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Second Amended Notice of Hearing Re: Motion to Strike Petition for Justin W . Julian 
Summary Administartion Filed Augsut 29, 2013 and Motion to Convert 
Proceedings to Formal Administration and Determine Testacy 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 09/09/2014 09:00 AM: Continued Justin W . Julian 
to Convert Proceedings to Supervised Administration and Determine 
Testacy 
One hour 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/17/2014 09:30 AM) to Strike, Convert and Justin W. Julian 
Determine 
Stipulation to Mediate and Reset Hearing 
Order to Mediate and Reset Hearing 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W . Julian 
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Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 11/17/2014 09:30 AM: Continued Justin W. Julian 
to Strike, Convert and Determine 2 hours 
Hearing Scheduled (Motions 12/22/2014 09:30 AM) to Convert and Strike Justin W. Julian 
Substitution Of Counsel 
Other party: Melton, Jadwiga B. Appearance Mary W. Cusack 
Acknowledgment Pursuant to Rule 16(k)(7) I.R.C.P. Regarding Case 
Status/ Mediation 
Hearing Scheduled (Status 12/09/2014 09:30 AM) Cusack request. 
Cusack appear telephonic 
Motion To Appear Telephonically 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Notice Of Hearing Justin W. Julian 
Stipulation And Motion For Entry Of Order For Status Conference Hearing Justin W. Julian 
Order Granting Entry Of Order For Status Conference Hearing 
Order Denying Motion To Appear Telephonically- Featherston 
Order Denying Motion To Appear Telephonically- Cusack 
Objection to Motion to Convert to Supervised Administration 
Hearing result for Status scheduled on 12/09/2014 09:30 AM: Interim 
Hearing Held 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Court Minutes Justin W. Julian 
Hearing type: Status 
Hearing date: 12/9/2014 
Time: 9:30 am 
Courtroom: 001 
Minutes Clerk: Jamie Wilson 
Party: Heinz Alt, Attorney: Brent Featherston 
Party: Jadwiga Melton, Attorney: Mary Cusack 
Hearing result for Motions scheduled on 12/22/2014 09:30 AM: Hearing Justin W. Julian 
Vacated 
Motion to Continue Hearing 
Motion To Shorten Time 
Order To Shorten Time and Order To Continue Hearing 
Petition for Formal Probate Of Will and Formal Appointment Of Personal 
Representative 
Acceptance Of Appointment 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Claim Against Estate For Homestead Allowance and For Exempt Property Justin W. Julian 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/22/2015 01 :30 PM) to determine validity of Justin W. Julian 
will 
Notice Of Hearing 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel 01/13/2015 09:30 AM) 
Motion To Compel Answers To Request For Production 
Notice Of Hearing 
Notice Of Service Of Discovery 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
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Subpoena Duces Tecum For Production Or Inspection Of Documents, 
Electronically Stored Information, Or Tangible Items 
Notice To Vacate Motion (Cusack) 
Judge 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Hearing result for Motion to Compel scheduled on 01/13/2015 09:30 AM: Justin W. Julian 
Hearing Vacated 
Claim Against Estate Justin W. Julian 
Notice Of Service Justin W. Julian 
Subpoena issued - Annie Swift Justin W. Julian 
Subpoena issued - Kristina Scholten Justin W. Julian 
Memorandum Of Points And Authorities Regarding Formal Probate Of Will Justin W. Julian 
Hearing result for Petition scheduled on 01/22/2015 01 :30 PM: Justin W. Julian 
Disposition With Hearing for Formal Probate 
Half day 
Court Minutes 
Hearing type: Petition for Formal Probate 
Hearing date: 1/22/2015 
Time: 2:06 pm 
Courtroom: 002 
Minutes Clerk: Kristina Westbrook 
Petitoner: Jadwiga Melton, Atty: Mary Cusack 
Respondent: Heinz Alt, Atty: Brent Featherston 
Affidavit Of Service-A. Swift 
Affidavit Of Service-D. Anderson 
Affidavit Of Service-A. Olson 
Affidavit Of Service-L. Robinson 
Notice Of Service 
Order For Formal Probate Of Will And Formal Appointment Of Personal 
Representative 
Letters Testamentary 
Information To Heirs 
Notice To Creditors - Known 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Notice To Creditors - Unknown Justin W. Julian 
Notice Of Disallowance Of Claim Justin W. Julian 
Affidavit Of Publication Justin W. Julian 
Petition To Allow Claims Justin W. Julian 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/27/2015 09:30 AM) Summary Judgment. Justin W. Julian 
Cusak request 2 hours. 
Notice Of Hearing and Motion For Summary Judgment To Deny Creditor Justin W. Julian 
Claim 
Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Summary Judgment To Deny 
Creditor Claim 
Affidavit Of Mary W. Cusack 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
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Hearing Scheduled (Motions 07/14/2015 11 :00 AM) To Vacate and 
Continue and Motion to shorten time. Featherston request 
Judge 
0. Lynn Brower 
Claimant's Motion To Vacate and Continue Estate's Motion For Summary Justin W. Julian 
Judgment, Motion To Shoten Time and Notice of Hearing 
Affidavit Of Counsel In Support Of Motion To Vacate and Continue Estate's Justin W. Julian 
Motion For Summary Judgment 
Notice Of No Objection To Vacate And Continue Hearing Justin W. Julian 
Notice Of Hearing Justin W. Julian 
Hearing result for Motions scheduled on 07/14/2015 11 :00 AM: Hearing 0 . Lynn Brower 
Vacated To Vacate and Continue and to shorten time. 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment scheduled on 07/27/2015 Justin W. Julian 
09:30 AM: Continued To Deny Creditor Claim - 2 hours 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Judgment 08/24/2015 09:30 Justin W. Julian 
AM) two hours 
Stipulation To Vacate Hearing 
Creditor's Response To Estate's Motion For Summary Judgment 
Affidavit Of Counsel 
Reply Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Summary Judgment To 
Deny Creditor Claim 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Notice Of Disallowance Of Claim Justin W. Julian 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment scheduled on 08/24/2015 Justin W. Julian 
09:30 AM: Interim Hearing Held two hours 
Court Minutes 
Hearing type: Motion for Summary Judgment 
Hearing date: 8/24/2015 
Time: 9:31 am 
Courtroom: 001 
Minutes Clerk: Della A Armstrong 
Affidavit Of Mary W. Cusack In Support Of Sur-Reply Memorandum In 
Support Of Motion For Summary Judgment To Deny Creditor Claim 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Sur-Reply memorandum In Support of Motion For Summary Judgment To Justin W. Julian 
Deny Creditor Claim 
Creditor's Post Hearing Memorandum in Response to Estate's Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
Memorandum And Opinion 
Judgment I.R.C.P. 54(b) 
STATUS CHANGED: closed 
File #2 created 
Filing: L2 - Appeal, Magistrate Division to District Court Paid by: 
FEatherston Law Receipt number: 0000090 Dated: 1/13/2016 Amount: 
$81.00 (Check) For: Alt, Heinz (other party) 
Notice of Appeal 
Appeal Filed In District Court 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
John Stegner 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
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STATUS CHANGED: Reopened 
Order of Reassignment 
Order Assigning Judge 
Formal Estate 
Change Assigned Judge - John Stegner 
Amended Notice of Appeal 
Estimate Of Transcript Cost 
Bond Posted for Transcript (Receipt 587 Dated 3/9/2016 for 120.25) 
Transcript Filed (Motion For Summary Judgment August 24th, 2015) 
Judge 
Justin W. Julian 
Lansing L. Haynes 






Notice Of Lodging Transcript On Appeal John Stegner 
Bond Converted (Transaction number 29 dated 3/15/2016 amount 120.25) John Stegner 
Receipt Of Transcript John Stegner 
Order Setting Briefing Schedule and Scheduling Oral Argument John Stegner 
Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument 08/19/2016 10:00 AM) Judge to place John Stegner 
call 
Appellant's Statement Of Issues On Appeal 
Appellant's Brief 
Order Vacting and Resetting Oral Argument 






Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument 08/26/2016 09:30 AM) Judge to place John Stegner 
call 
Respondent's Brief On Appeal 
Appellant's Reply Brief 
Hearing result for Oral Argument scheduled on 08/26/2016 09:30 AM: 
Hearing Held Judge to place call 
Court Minutes 
Hearing type: Oral Argument 
Hearing date: 8/26/2016 
Time: 9:27 am 
Courtroom: Nez Perce County 
Court reporter: Sheryl Engler 
Minutes Clerk: Nez Perce County Clerk 
Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal 10/07/2016 10:00 AM) 
Order Setting Briefing Schedule and Rescheduling Oral Argument 
Appellant's Brief Re Jurisdiction 
Personal Representative's Response Brief 
Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal scheduled on 10/07/2016 
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Court Minutes John Stegner 
Hearing type: Oral Argument on Appeal 
Hearing date: 10/7/2016 
Time: 10:00 am 
Courtroom: Latah County 
Court reporter: Sheryl Engler 
Minutes Clerk: Terry Odenborg 
Party: Heinz Alt, Attorney: Brent Featherston 
Party: Jadwiga Melton, Attorney: Mary Cusack 
Opinion on Appeal John Stegner 
Appellant's Memorandum of Fees and Costs Pursuant to IAR 40 John Stegner 
Order Denying Appellant's Request for Attorney's Fees on Appeal John Stegner 
Respondent's Objection To Appellant's Memorandum Of Fees and Costs John Stegner 
Pursuant To IAR 40 and Motion To Disallow 
Memorandum In Support Of Respondent's Objection To Appellant's John Stegner 
Memorandum Of Fees and Costs Pursuant To IAR 40 and Motion To 
Disallow 
Appellant's Reply To Respondent's Objection To Memorandum Of Fees John Stegner 
and Costs 
Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Supreme Court Paid John Stegner 
by: Cusack, Mary W (attorney for Melton, Jadwiga B.) Receipt number: 
0000112 Dated: 1/11/2017 Amount: $129.00 (Check) For: Melton, 
Jadwiga B. (other party) 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 113 Dated 1/11/2017 for 100.00) 
Bond Posted for Transcript (Receipt 114 Dated 1/11/2017 for 100.00) 
Appealed To The Supreme Court 
STATUS CHANGED: Inactive 
Notice of Appeal 
Order Conditionally Dismissing Appeal 
Amended Judgment 
Order to Withdraw Conditional Dismissal and Reinstate Appeal 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/27/2017 10:00 AM) Re Amended 
Judgment 
Motion Regarding Amended Judgment 
Notice Of Hearing 
Motion To Shorten Time 
Motion To Appear Telephonically 
Order To Shorten Time 
Order Re: Telephonic Appearance - Denied 
Notice Of Joinder In Motion 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 02/27/2017 10:00 AM: Hearing 







Justin W. Julian 
John Stegner 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 
Justin W. Julian 




Justin W. Julian 
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2/27/2017 Court Minutes Justin W . Julian 
3/10/2017 
Hearing type: Motion For Amended Judgment 
Hearing date: 2/27/2017 
Time: 10:00 am 
Courtroom: 001 
Minutes Clerk: Jamie Wilson 
Party: Jadwiga Melton, Attorney: Mary Cusack 
Second Amended Judgment 
Amended Notice of Appeal 
John Stegner 
John Stegner 
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BRUCE H. GREENE, P.A. 
Attorney at Law 
320 North Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
(208) 263-1255 
Fax (208) 265-2451 
I.S.B. # 1817 
rn ] ,~UG 2 9 P I: 0 0 
STATE Of' IDAHO 
COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
GLENDA PQSTON. CLERK 
BY \;,LA,, LY":\ 
DE:P:.!TY CLERK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
IN THE MA TIER OF ESTATE OF 












) __________________ ) 
CASE NO. CV13- b \ '3:, 
PETITION FOR SUMMARY 
ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATE 
WHERE SURVIVING SPOUSE 






PETITIONER, JADWIGA. MELTON, STA TES AND REPRESENTS TO THE COURT THAT: 
1. Petitioner's interest in this matter is that of the surviving spouse of the decedent. 
2 . The decedent, Robert Ernest Melton died on July 4, 2013. 
3. Venue is proper because at the time of death the decedent was domiciled in this 
county. 
4. The decedent and Jadwiga B. Melton were duly married at Bonners Ferry, Idaho on 
June 7, 2010, and remained married until the date of decedent's death. 
5. Testacy status: The decedent died testate leaving a will in which the surviving 
spouse is named as the sole divisee. The original of the decedent's will, dated 
December 17, 2010, accompanies this petition. AS s I G N E D T 0 
JUDGE 9J:, 1 .. .:.o 
PETITION FOR SUMMARY ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATE WHERE SURVIVING SPO~SOLE 
1 
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6. The schedule of property attached to this petition is a full and complete inventory of 
the property owned by the decedent. The nature of the property 
(community/separate) is set forth in the schedule. 
7. The surviving spouse of the decedent is the sole devisee or heir of the decedent and 
is therefore entitled to have all of the interest and estate of the decedent distributed 
to and vested in the surviving spouse, free and clear of the claims of any person or 
persons claiming or attempting to claim under the estate of the decedent as heir, 
devisee, or otherwise, except as a proper creditor. 
WHEREFORE, PETITIONER REQUESTS THAT: 
I. The Court fix a time and place of hearing and that notice be given as required by 
law. 
2. That the Court enter its Decree that the decedent and the surviving spouse were duly 
married and that the surviving spouse is the sole heir and devisee of the decedent 
and vested with all of the interest and estate of the decedent, free of claims of any 
person or persons c1aiming or attempting to claim under the estate of the decedent as 
heir, devisee, or otherwise, except as a proper creditor 
f1.--. 
DATED this ~ day of a.~ , , 2013. 
~ 
BRUCE H. GREENE 
Attorney for Petitioner 
VERIFICATION 
ST A TE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF Bonner ) 
The petitioner, being sworn, having read the foregoing says that the facts set forth herein 
are true, accurate, and complete to the best of petitioner's knowledge and belief. 
~ 17:nl> #{&;IA 
OTARYP~ 
Residing at: , J~ :r./) 
My Commission Expires: 7- 0/ ~col'f 
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LAST WILL AND TEST AMENT 
OF 
ROBERT MELTON 
I, Robert Melton, a resident of Bonners Ferry, Idaho declare this to be my Last Will and 
revoke all former Wills and Codicils. 
ARTICLE I 
Identification of Family 
In making this Will I have in mind my wife, Jadwiga Melton, but does not include any 
children hereafter born to or adopted by my wife and me. 
ARTICLE II 
Appointment of Fiduciaries 
A. Appointment of Personal Representative. I appoint my wife as Executor of 
my estate. 
B. Bond; Court Supervision. My Executor shall have the right to serve without 
bond and to administer and settle my estate without the intervention or supervision of any court, 
except to the extent required by law. Nothing herein shall prevent my Executor from seeking 
the assistance of the court in any situation where my Executor deems it appropriate. 
ARTICLE III 
Disposition of Residue 
A. Provision for Wife. I give all of the rest and residue of my estate, wherever 
located (hereafter referred to in this Article as "residue"), to my wife if she survives me. 
1. Provision for Others. If I am not survived by my wife, I give the entire 
residue to my heirs. 
ARTICLE IV 
Alternative Methods of Distribution 
A. Purpose of Article. Recognizing that under certain circumstances the terms of 
this Will may direct that property be distributed outright to a person who is under age twenty-one 
(21) or under a legal disability; I make the following provisions to facilitate the distribution of 
property to such persons. 
Will of Robert Melton Page I of5 InitialsE /Y} Date: /-:9.- 11 -I <3 
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B. Alternative Methods. Whenever the terms of this Will direct my personal 
representative (referred to in this Article as the "fiduciary") to distribute property outright to a 
person who is then under age twenty-one (21) or under a legal disability, the fiduciary may retain 
pursuant to Paragraph C. of this Article or distribute all or any portion of that property in any one 
or more of the following ways: 
1. Delivery directly to the beneficiary; 
2. Delivery to the parent or stepparent of the beneficiary; 
3. Delivery to the guardian of the beneficiary's person or property; 
4. Delivery to any Custodian for the beneficiary under the Uniform Gifts to 
Minors Act; 
5. Delivery to any then existing trust created for the beneficiary; 
6. Deposit in a financial institution in an account established in the name of 
the beneficiary alone pursuant to the laws of the State of Idaho; 
7. Storage of any tangible personal property in safekeeping with the costs of 
storage to be borne by the beneficiary; or 
8. Sale of any tangible personal property and delivery of the proceeds in any 
manner permitted by this Article. 
Provided the fiduciary acts in good faith, upon delivery of any property in accordance 
with the provisions of this Article, the fiduciary shall be discharged from all responsibilities in 
connection with the property. 
C. Discretionary Trust. Any property not distributed as provided in Paragraph B. 
of this Article shall be retained by the fiduciary in trust for the beneficiary on the folJowing terms 
and conditions: During any period in which the beneficiary is under a legal disability or under 
twenty-one (21) years of age, the fiduciary shall pay to or apply for the benefit of the beneficiary 
so much of the income and principal of the trust as the fiduciary, in its sole and absolute 
discretion, determines is advisable for the beneficiary's health, support, education and general 
welfare. At such time as the beneficiary is neither under a legal disability nor under age 
twenty-one (21 ), the fiduciary shalJ distribute any remaining trust assets to the beneficiary. If 
the beneficiary dies before alJ of the trust assets have been distributed, the fiduciary shall 
distribute any remaining trust assets to the beneficiary's estate. 
ARTICLEV 
Administrative Provisions 
A. Powers and Duties of Personal Representative. My personal representative 
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shall have all of the powers and duties granted to or imposed upon personal representatives 
serving with non-intervention powers pursuant to the laws of the State ofldaho. 
B. Debts and Expenses. All expenses of administration chargeable to principal, the 
expenses of the disposition of my remains, and all my legitimate debts, if and when paid, shall be 
paid from the principal of my residuary estate. No debt need be paid prior to its maturity in due 
course and except as otherwise provided in this Will no interest in any property passing under 
this Will need be exonerated. 
C. Taxes. All estate, inheritance or other similar death taxes, together with any 
interest or penalties thereon, arising by reason of my death with respect to any property 
includable in my taxable estate, and any adjusted taxable gifts, whether passing under or outside 
of this Will, shall be paid from the principal of my residuary estate without reimbursement from 
the recipients or beneficiaries of such property, provided, however, that in the event any 
proceeds of insurance upon my life or any property over which I held a power of appointment 
are included in my estate for purposes of determining the federal estate tax liability of my estate, 
then the residue of my estate shall be entitled to receive from the recipients of any such proceeds 
or property the portion of such federal estate tax liability attributable to such proceeds or 
property determined in accordance with IRC §§ 2206 and 2207. 
ARTICLE VI 
Miscellaneous 
A. Number and Gender. Unless the context indicates a contrary intent, the plural 
and singular forms of words shall each include the other, and every noun and pronoun shall have 
a meaning that includes the masculine, feminine and neuter genders. 
B. Survival. To "survive" me, as that term is used in this Will, a person must 
continue to live for thirty (30) days after my death. 
C. Descendants. The "descendants" of an individual include only the following: 
1. All such individual's biological descendants, except any person not born in 
lawful wedlock and his descendants, unless the biological parent who 
would otherwise cause him or her to be a descendant has acknowledged 
paternity or maternity in legitimation proceedings, or in an unambiguous 
signed writing identifying such person by name, or by raising such person 
in the same household; and 
2. Persons adopted by such individual or one of his or her descendants, and 
their descendants. 
If the parent, who would cause a person to be a descendant as defined above, is replaced in an 
adoption proceeding, such person shall remain a descendant unless such parent voluntarily 
consents to the relinquishment of his or her status as parent in connection with such adoption 
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proceedings. 
D. Heirs. The term "heirs" shall mean those persons entitled to inherit under the 
then-applicable laws of the State of Idaho governing the descent of an intestate's separate estate. 
They shall inherit in their statutory proportions. If the provisions of this Will call for a 
distribution of property to my heirs or the heirs of any other person and the event giving rise to 
the requirement for such distribution takes place at a time later than my death or the death of 
such person, the determination of the identity of such heirs shall be made as if I ( or such other 
person) had died on the date of the event giving rise to such requirement for distribution. 
E. Exclusion of Pretermitted Heirs. Other than as set forth in this Will, I make no 
provision for any child of mine or descendant of a deceased child of mine. I specifically make 
no provision for any person (whether now living or hereafter born), other than a child named or 
referred to in Article I or a descendant of mine as defined in this Will, who may be entitled to 
claim an interest in my estate under the laws of the State of Idaho. 
F. Legal Disability. A person is under a legal disability if my personal 
representative determines, in good faith, that the person is incapable of managing his property or 
of caring for himself, or both, or is in need of protection or assistance by reason of physical 
injury or illness, mental illness, developmental disability, senility, alcoholism, excessive use of 
drugs, or other physical or mental incapacity. 
G. Title to Real Property. Upon my death, title to any real property passing under 
this Will shall vest in my personal representative in his :fiduciary capacity and shall remain so 
vested until my personal representative distributes or sells that property, at which time title shall 
vest in the distributee or purchaser. 
H. Disclaimer. Except as may be otherwise specifically provided in this Will, in the 
event that any beneficiary disclaims an interest arising out of this Will or any trust created herein 
it is my intention that the interest disclaimed shall be distributed in the same manner and at the 
same time as if the disclaiming beneficiary had died immediately preceding the event pursuant to 
the laws of the State ofldaho. 
I. Governing Law. The provisions of this Will shall be interpreted in accordance 
with and in light of the laws of the State ofldaho. 
J. Corporate Successors. Whenever a corporation or other business entity is 
referred to herein, the reference shall include any successor organization. 
K. References to Statutes. In this Will, the abbreviation "IRC" shall refer to the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as amended. 
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I have initialed and dated for identification purposes all pages of this, my Last Will, and 
have executed the entire instrument by signing this page on the 12- day of DEC , 20 J__Q_, 
at B d~l\lc:R.s Pts:-~i<Z-1 , Idaho. 
Robert Melton 
Attestation and Statement of Witnesses 
Each of us declares under penalty of perjury under the laws of Idaho that Robert Melton, 
the Testator, signed this instrument as his Last Will in our presence, all of us being present at the 
same time, and we now, at the Testator's request, in the Testator's presence, and in the presence 
of each other, sign below as the witnesses, declaring that the Testator appears to be of sound 





'3:roaecs krcu, .IchJ,o 
2:ot,,1 ndo ~ Ca..Lb+e~ 
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SELF-PROVING AFFIDAVIT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF _Ji& wn j ~ 
} 
} ss. 
} a We, Robert Melton and / / 14 /1/1. £; h 'E1.s ,:7 ,rv and 
lJ7tll{ (51-111J;f- ,'tii'e 'Testator and the witnesses, whose names are signed to 
the attached or foregoing instrument in those capacities, personally appearing before the 
undersigned authority and being first duly sworn, declare to the undersigned authority under 
penalty of perjury that: 1) the Testator declared, signed and executed the instrument as his last 
will; 2) he signed it willingly or directed another to sign for him; 3) he executed it as his free and 
voluntary act for the purposes therein expressed; and 4) each of the witnesses, at the request of 
the Testator, in his hearing and presence, and in the presence of each other, signed the will as 
witness and that to the best of his knowledge the Testator was at that time of full legal age, of 
sound mind and under no constraint or undue influence. 
Robert Melton 
dJ, /,$1, &ee-s,>rv 
[Witness Signature] 
A1/ 4, 41 £: /us~ 
[Print Name] 




Jl _ Resit at Q-J 
,1)-fLtll-Y> ~, l / I 
Section for Notary Public: 
Subscribed, sworn and acknowledged before me IS ert Melton, Testator, and by the 
said /4.,//q_ /If. ~ ,l 'tr_s ~ Y]..,, , and -"-d:_=f4-..JI.L-..l"'l,,,-"l~-4.-"-"'--1,,.j.....,.._ _ _,, witnesses, this 
J1dayof :I&,__c_. . ,20/D. 
---~ 
/fr; sfr il<iU.'KLf.D s eel 
[Print or stamp name ofNotary] 
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BRUCE H. GREENE, P.A. 
Attorney at Law 
320 North Second A venue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
(208) 263-1255 
Fax (208) 265-2451 
I.S.B. #1817 
FJL .. ED 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
IN THE MATTER OF ESTATE OF 









CASE NO. CV13- 3 13 
DECREE VESTING EST A TE IN 
SURVIVING SPOUSE 
(I.C.15-3-1205) 
Upon consideration of the Petition for Summary Administration of Estate of Which 
Surviving Spouse is Sole Beneficiary filed by Jadwiga B. Melton on ~ . ~ q 1!), 2013 the 
Court finds that: 
1. The facts set forth in the petition are true. 
2. The required notice has been given or waived. 
3. The decedent, Robert Ernest Melton died on July 4, 2013, domiciled in Boundary 
County. 
4. Venue is proper. 
5. The decedent and Jadwiga B. Melton were duly married at Bonners Ferry, Idaho on 
June 7, 2010, and remained married until the date of decedent's death. 
6. The surviving spouse, Jadwiga B. Melton, is the sole heir or devisee of the decedent. 
DECREE VESTING ESTATE IN SURVIVING SPOUSE - PAGE I 
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7. The decedent died testate, leaving a will dated December 17, 2010. The will was 
validly executed and is the last will of the decedent and properly characterizes the 
property as community or separate property. 
THEREFORE, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed as follows: 
1. Jadwiga B. Melton is the surviving spouse of the decedent and is the sole heir or 
devisee of the decedent. 
2. The property of the decedent described on the schedule attached to this Decree is 
hereby vested in and distributed to Jadwiga B. Melton free and clear of all right, 
title, claim or demand of any person or persons claiming or attempting to claim 
under the estate of the decedent as heir, devisee, or otherwise, except as a proper 
creditor. 
3. The surviving spouse shall assume and be liable for any and all indebtedness that 
might be a claim against the estate of the decent. 
4. There shall be no administration of the estate of the decedent. 




DECREE VESTING ESTATE IN SURVIVING SPOUSE-PAGE 2 
Page 21 of 438
FFATHERSTON [Aw OiJD. 
A-TTORHt'YS AT lA 
Daniel P. Featherston 
Brent C. Featherston• 
Jeremy P. Featherston 
Jeremi L. Ossman 
113 S. Second Ave. 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Phone (208) 263-6866 
Fax (208) 263-0400 
*Licensed in Idaho & Washington 
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, Chtd. 
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON #4602 
Attorney at Law 
113 South Second A venue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
Phone: (208) 263-6866 
Fax: (208) 266-0400 
Attorney for Heinz Alt 
r~:· -- """I • • .. !..) 
~ I., - . ---- ., .,. ' • 
:-_q ,_ ... !") -6 °,- u: 31 
1..~1 J " · .... , • 
STATE Cf IOAHO 
COU Of BOUND ARY 
GLE DA OS TOH. CLERK 
8 Y-4,-;:;;,.:;.;,~...,,.i,..~-:--
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON, 









CASE NO. CV-2013-0313 




TO DETERMINE TESTACY 
COMES NOW, Brent C. Featherston, for and on behalf of the Petition herein, and 
hereby informs the Court as follows: 
1. Heinz Alt is the son of Hedwig ''Hedy" Melton, who died testate on 
Augustl 1, 2008. 
2. The decedent Robert Ernest Melton died on July 41\ 2013, at the age of 81 
years of age. The marital community of the decedent and Hedwig Melton was dissolved by the 
death of Hedwig Melton on 08-11-2008. 
3. Venue is proper because at the time of death the decedent was domiciled in this 
county and owned property located in this county. 
4. Robert and Hedwig Melton received a loan of funds from Petitioner herein in 
excess of One Hundred Five Thousand Dollars ($105,000.00) on condition and in reliance 
upon a promise by Robert and Hedwig Melton to execute a Last Will and Testament leaving 
their entire estate to Petitioner. The funds were received by Robert and Hedwig Melton from 
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.-.TToRNEY.5 "TI.AW 
Daniel P. Featherston 
Brent C. Featherston• 
Jeremy P. Featherston 
Jeremi L . Ossman 
113 S . Second Ave. 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Phone (208) 263-6866 
Fax (208) 263-0400 
*Licensed in Idaho & Washington 
Petitioner during the period from 1996 onward and were primarily used for the purchase and 
improvement of the real property which is described as follows: 
Lot 4, BLUME HILL SUBDIVISION, according to the Plat 
thereof recorded in Book 2 of Plats, Page 41, records of 
Boundary County, Idaho. 
5. In exchange for Petitioner's loan, Robert Melton and Hedwig Melton executed 
their Last Will and Testament leaving the entirety of their estate to the Petitioner. True and 
accurate copies of said Last Will and Testament are attached hereto as Exhibits A and Band 
incorporated herein in their entirety by reference. 
6. Following Hedwig Melton's death in 2008, Robert remarried in June 2010 to 
Jadwiga Melton. Jadwiga Melton has submitted what she claims to be the Last Will and 
Testament of Robert Melton which purports to be executed on December 1 i\ 2010. The 
Petitioner alleges on information and belief that the 2010 Last Will and Testament is invalid 
and that the 1998 Last Will and Testament of Robert and Hedwig Melton, attached hereto, are 
the true and valid Last Will and Testament. 
7. The names and addresses of the spouse, children, heirs, and devisees of the 
decedents and other persons entitled to notice pursuant to J.C. 15-3-403, and the ages of those 
who are minors so far as known or ascertainable with reasonable diligence by petitioner are: 
NAME 
Jadwiga B. Melton 
Gerald Melton 




Wolfgang J. Alt 








19.1.1956 strindberggasse 1/27/18. 
1110 Vienna, Austria Stepson 
Hasenleitengasse 5/8/2. 
1 110 Vienna. Austria 
Stepson 
MOTION TO CONVERT PROCEEDINGS TO SlJPERVISED ADMINISTRATION 
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lnomllis ~TV.• ~ 
Daniel P. Featherston 
Brent C. Featherston• 
Jeremy P. Featherston 
Jeremi L. Ossman 
113 S. Second Ave. 
Sandpoint , ID 83864 
Phone (208) 263-6866 
Fax (208) 263-0400 
•Licensed in Idaho & Washington 
Andreas J. Bruckner Karl-lowelgasse 17-19/20/12. 
1120 Vienna, Austria 
Stepson 
8. Prior to the Petitioner learning of this proceeding, the attorney for Heinz Alt 
was preparing documents for a formal probate ofthis matter, which included probating the Last 
Will and Testament of Hedwig Melton, which Will has not yet been probate. 
9. The time limit for formal probate and appointment has not expired because not 
more than three years have passed since the decedent Robert Melton's death. The three year 
provision applies only to the death of the decedent Robert Melton and not to the death of 
Hedwig Melton, pursuant to LC. 15-3-111. 
10. The original of the decedent's will is lost, destroyed, or otherwise unavailable, 
but its contents are described in the exhibits attached hereto. In 2007, attorney for the 
Petitioner closed the Bonners Ferry offices of Featherston Law Firm, Chtd., and returned most 
original Wills to the client. The Petitioner believes that the original Last Will and Testament 
of Robert Melton and Hedwig Melton were delivered to the decedents at that time. Following 
Hedwig Melton's death, Robert Melton remarried Jadwiga Barbara Donifacy. 
11. The Court is asked to convert these proceedings to a supervised administration 
and add the estate of Hedwig Melton to these proceedings and to enter orders that Jadwiga 
Melton is not permitted to sell, convey encumber or dispose of any assets of the estate until 
further court order and until the testacy of Robert and Hedwig Melton are determined. 
Dated this 6th day of September, 2013. 
MOTION TO CONVERT PROCEEDINGS TO SUPERVISED ADMINISTRATION 
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Fl:ATHERSrON lAWFlRM,Oflu 
ATTO RN AT(>.W 
Daniel P. Featherston 
Brent C . Featherston* 
Jeremy P. Featherston 
Jeremi L. Ossman 
113 S. Second Ave. 
Sandpoint. ID 83864 
Phone (208) 263-6866 
Fax (208) 263-0400 
*Licensed in Idaho & Washington 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of September, 2013, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following manner: 
Bruce Greene 
Attorney at Law 
320 North 2nd Ave. 
Sandpoint, ID 83 864 
[o<J U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand delivered 
[ ] Facsimile 
[ ] Other: _______ _ 
By<fil??da) 04z/b/)1 
MOTION TO CONVERT PROCEEDINGS TO SUPERVISED ADI\IINISTRA TION 
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OF 
HEDWJ.6 "HEDYP' MELTON 
I, HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON, of Bonners Ferry, Boundary County, Idaho, being of 
sound and disposing mjnd and memory and not acting under duress, menace, fraud or undue 
influence of any person whomsoever, do hereby make, publish and declare this to be my Last Will 
and Testament in manner and form following: 
L 
1 hereby expressly revoke and cancel any and all other former Wills and Codicils to Wills 
made by me. 
IL 
There are the following persons whom I wish to be remembered in this my Last Will and 
Testament: ROBERT ERNEST MELTON 
HEINZ ALT 
DL 
I direct that my Personal Representative hereinafter named pay the expenses of my last 
illness, funeral expenses and just claims against my estate as soon after my death as is practical. 
However, this does not mean that my Personal Representative shall be required to pay time 
obligations which are not yet due at the time of my death nor shall this clause in any way be 
interpreted to accelerate the due date of any debt. 
IV. 
J hereby nominate and appoint my husband, ROBERT ERNEST MELTON, as my 
Personal Representative or Executor of this, my Last Will and Testament, but if for any reason he is 
wiable to so act, then I nominate and appoint my attorney, DANIEL P. FEATIIBRSTON and/or 
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, to appoint a person or bank, including himself, to so act My 
Personal Representative shall act as such without intervention of any court and this Will shall be 
' ,/ , 
Paget 
.E~BIT B 
• I • .. ._ -
, ' r- . .. f ' · -
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probated in the manner allowed for by a nonintervention will. The Personal Representative herein 
named shall have the full power to sell, convey and encumber without notice or confirmation any 
assets of my estate, real or personal, at such prices and tenns as to my Personal Representative seem 
just, whether or not such acts are necessary for the best interest of my estate and which I mjght or 
could do if I were living. 
V. 
1 hereby give, devise and bequeath all that I have, whether real, personal, or mixed property 
wherever situated, to my husband, ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON. 
VI. 
Should my husband, ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON, fail to survive me, or should we both 
die as the result of a common accident, or so closely together from the standpoint of time that it is 
difficult to determine which one predeceased the other, then I hereby give, devise an.d bequeath all 
that 1 have, whether real, personal, or mixed property wherever situated, to my son, HEINZ ALT, 
presently residing in Vienna, Austria, per stirpes, to be divided equally between his wife and 
children. 
VIL 
I have deliberately made no provision herein for the benefit of my sons, WOLFGANG J. 
ALT, MICHAEL F. BRUCKNER, AND ANDREAS J. BRUCKNER 
VIII. 
I specifically reserve, pursuant to the provision of 15-2-513, Idaho Code, the right to make 
apportionment of my personal effects pursuant to the authority of such statute. 
IX. 
1f any legatee, devisee or taker under this Will shall interpose objections to its probate or in 
any other way contest it, such person shall forfeit his entire interest under this Will and the gift, 
bequest or devise made to such person shall pass as part of the residue of my estate; provided, 
however, that if such person is a residuary beneficiary, his or her interest shall be divided 
proportionately among the remaining residuary beneficiaries. 
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i-i,, ::ri11 'I'_ • IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal this2/1: day of~
1998, at Bonners Ferry, Idaho, in the presence of two (2) witnesses who attest the same at my 
request. ¾(lfi~ 
HEDWIG" ~D~ MELTON 
Testatrix 
I, HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON, the Testatrix, sign my name to this instrument this~ 
day of OU ,Q_& , 1998, and being first duJy sworn, do hereby declare to the undersigned 
authority that I sign and execute this instrument as my last will and that I sign j,t willingly ( or 
willingly direct another to sign for me, that I execute it as my free and voluntary act for the purposes 
therein expressed, and that I am eighteen (18) years of age or older, of sound mind, and under no 
constraint or undue influence. 
HEDWIG "![EDY" MELTON 
Testatrix 
and &.vr:x>-:YRJ3o..yho,-; the witnesses, sign our 
names to this instrument, being first duly sworn, and do hereby declare to the undersigned authority 
that the testatrix signs and executes this instrument as her last will and that she signs it willingly (or 
willingly directs another to sign for her), and that each of us, in the presence and hearing of the 
testatrix, hereby signs this will as witness to the testatrix's signing, and that to the best of his/her 
knowledge the testatrix is eighteen ( 18) years of age or older, of sound mind, and under no constraint 
or undue influence. 
Page J 
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State of Idaho ) 
) ss 
County of Boundary ) 
Subscribed, sworn to and acknowledged before me by HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON .. 
the testatrix and subscribed and sworn 1o before me by l ,i rd~~l.i( and 
&Mm, PAY b.( v: , witnesses, this -=7)-4], day of , 1998. 
r¢~~1JL~ 
N;taryi>;- State ofI~ 
Residing at 80n Vlt r:k½r r ~ 
My Commission expires: 3- [?.>~ ~&> 2.., 
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OF 
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON 
I, ROBERT ERNEST MELTON, of Bonners Ferry, Boundary County, Idaho, being of 
sound and disposing mind and memory and not acting under duress, menace, fraud or undue 
influence of any person whomsoever, do hereby make, publish and declare this to be my Last Will 
and Testament in manner and fonn following: 
L 
I hereby expressly revoke and cancel any and all other fonner Wills and Codicils to Wills 
made by me. 
IL 
There are the following persons whom J wish to be remembered in this my Last Will and 
Testament HEDWIG "HEDr' MELTON 
HEINZ ALT 
Ill. 
l direct that my Personal Representative hereinafter named pay the expenses of my last 
illness, funeral expenses and just claims against my estate as soon after my death as is practical. 
However, this does not mean that my Personal Representative shall be required to pay time 
obligations which are not yet due at the time of my death nor shall this clause in any way be 
interpreted to accelerate the due date of any debt. 
IV. 
I hereby nominate and appojnt my wife, HEDWIG "HEDY'' MELTON, as my Personal 
Representative or Executor ofthis, my Last Will and Testament, but if for any reason she is unable to 
so act, then I nominate and appo.int my attorney, DANIEL P . FEATIIBRSTON and/or 
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, to appoint a person or bank, including himself, to so act. My 
Personal Representative shal1 act as such without intervention of any court and this Wil1 ~hall be 
-. _ - ~ . ... ~ 
J>.gel 
EXRIBIT ~ --
, , , :-L\· 
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probated in the manner allowed for by a nonintervention will. The Personal Representative herein 
named shall have the full power to sell, convey and encumber without notice or confinnation any 
assets of my estate, real or personal, at such prices and terms as to my Personal Representative seem 
just, whether or not such acts' are necessary for the best interest of my estate and which l might or 
could do ifI were living. 
v. 
I hereby give, devise and bequeath an that l have, whether real, personal, or mixed property 
wherever situated, to my wife, HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON. 
VL 
Should my wife, HEDWIG "HEDY'' MEL TON, fail to survive me, or should we both die as 
the result of a common accident, or so closely together from the standpoint of time that it is difficult 
to determine which one predeceased the other, then I hereby give, devise and bequeath all that I 
have, whether real, personal, or mixed property wherever sjtuated, to my step-son, HEINZ ALT, 
presently residing in Vienna, Austria, per stirpes, to be divided equally between his wife and 
children. 
VII. 
l have deliberately made no provision herein for the benefit of my children, GERALD 
MEL TON, ERNEST S. MELTON, DOUGLAS MEL TON, DEBRA (MEL TON) NAKKULA, and 
CAROL (MEL TON) SOUCIE. 
VIlI. 
I specifically reserve, pursuant to the provision of 15-2-513, Idaho Code, the right to make 
apportionment of my personal effects pursuant to the authority of such statute. 
IX. 
If any legatee, devisee or taker under thjs Will shall interpose objections to its probate or in 
any other way contest it, such person shall forfeit his entire interest under this Will and the gift, 
bequest or devise made to such person sha11 pass as part of the residue of my estate; provided, 
however, that if such person is a residuary beneficiary, his or her interest shall be divided 
proportionately among the remaining residuary beneficiaries. 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal this~~l\iay of~ 
1998, at Bonners Feny, ldaho, in the presence of two (2) witnesses who attest the same at my 
request. 
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON 
Testator 
I, ROBERT ERNEST MELTON, the Testator, sign my name to this instrument this~ 
day of ctuJ..zt , 1998, and being first duly sworn, do hereby declare to .the undersigned 
authority that I sign and execute this instrument as my last will and that I sign it willingly ( or 
wilJingly direct another to sign for me), that I execute it as my free and vo]unta.Jy act for the purposes 
therein expressed, and that I am eighteen (18) years of age or older, of sound mind, and under no 
constraint or undue influence. 
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON 
Testator 
and e~rbo..v-a. Bu.ch.fr, the witnesses, sign our 
names to this instrument, being first du.1y swom, and do hereby declare to the undersigned authority 
that the testator signs and executes this instrument as his last will and that she signs it willingly (or 
willingly directs another to sign for hls), and that each of us, in the presence and hearing of the 
testator, hereby signs this will as witness to the testator's signing, and that to the best of his/her 
knowledge the testator is eighteen (18) years of age or older, of sound mind, and under no constraint 
or wtdue influence. 
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State of Idaho ) 
) ss 
County of Boundary ) 
Subscribed, sworn to and acknowledged before me by ROBERT ERNEST MELTON~ 
the testator and subscribed and sworn to before me by L, yy;lg, ., ID ryj tQ.c.d;'. and 
1?,1xloo YCL- f){.Lfb.r lf • witnesses, tbiscJ9flday of 3 1 ,;iJ , 1998. 
,~ili-111-~ 
NotaryPlic - State of!~ 
Residing at BoY\'(\t' r:'") ~ n~ ... 
My Commission expires: - ~ c!Jacb 
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LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT 
OF . 
J{OBERT MELTON 
I, Robert Melton, a resident of Bonners Ferry, Idaho declare this to be my Last Will and 
revoke all fonner Wills and Codicils. 
ARTICLE I 
Identification of Family 
In making this Will I have in mind my wife, Jadwiga Melton, but does not include any 
children hereafter born to or adopted by my wife and me. 
ARTICLEil 
Agqointment of Fiduciaries 
A. Appointment of Personal Representative. I appoint my wife as Executor of 
my estate. 
B. Bond; Court Supenrision. My Executor shall have the right to serve without 
bond and to administer and settle my est.ate without the intervention or supervision of any court, 
except to the extent required by law. Nothing herein shall prevent my Executor from seeking 
the assistance of the court in any situation where my Executor deems it appropriate. 
ARTICLE III 
Disposition of Residue 
A. Provision for Wife. I give all of the rest and residue of my est.ate, wherever 
located (hereafter referred to in this Article as "residue"), to my wife if she survives me. · 
1. Provision for Others. If I am not survived by my wife, I give the entire 
residue to my heirs. 
ARTICLE IV 
Alternative Methods of Distribution 
A. Purpose of Article. Recognizing that under certain circwnstan~es the terms of 
this Will may direct that property be distributed outright to a person who is under age twenty-one 
(21) or under a legal disability; I mak~ the following provisions to facilitate the distribution of 
property to such persons. 
Will of Robert Melton Page 1 of S Initials~ Date: /~ - L1 - I 'lJ -
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B, Alternative Methods. Whenever the tenns of this Will direct my personal 
representative (referred to in this Article as the "fiduciary") to distribute property outright to a 
person who is then under age twenty-one (21) or under a legal disability, the fiduciary may retain 
pmsuant to Paragraph C. of this Article or distribute all or any portion of that property in any one 
or more of the following ways: 
1. Delivery directly to the beneficiary; 
2. Delivery to the parent or stepparent of the beneficiary; 
3. Delivery to the guardian of the beneficiary's person or property; 
4. Delivery to any Custodian for the beneficiary wider the Unifonn Gifts to 
Minors Act; 
5, Delivery to any then existing trust created for the beneficiary; 
6, Deposit in a financial institution in an account established in the name of 
the beneficiary alone pursuant to the laws of the State of Idaho; 
7. Storage of any tangible personal property in safekeeping with the costs of 
storage to be borne by the beneficiary; or 
8. Sale of any tangible personal property and delivery of the proceeds in any 
manner permitted by this Article. 
Provided the fiduciary acts in good faith, upon delivery of any property in accordance 
with the provisions of this Article, the fiduciary shall be discharged from all responsibilities in 
connection with the property. 
C. Discretionary Trust. Any property not distributed as provided in Paragraph B. 
of this Article shall be retained by the :fiduciary in trust for the beneficiary on the following tenns 
and conditions: During any period in which the beneficiary is under a legal disability or under 
twenty-one (21) years of age, the fiduciary shall pay to or apply for the benefit of the beneficiary 
so much of the income and principal of the trust as the :fiduciary, in its sole and absolute 
discretion, detennines is advisable for the beneficiary's health, support, education and general 
welfare. At such time as the beneficiary is neither under a legal disability nor under age 
twenty-one (21 ), the fiduciary shall distribute any remaining trust assets to the beneficiary. If 
the beneficiary dies before all of the trust assets have been distributed, the fiduciary shall 
distribute any remaining trust assets to the beneficiary's estate. · 
ARTICLEV 
Administrative Provisions 
A. Powers and Duties of Penonal Representative. My personal representative 
wm of Robert Melton Page 2 of S Initials: ~(M Date: l i- 11- I :Q 
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shall have all of the powers and duties granted to or imposed upon personal representatives 
serving with non-intervention powers pursuant to the laws of the State ofldaho. 
P.00~/006 
B. Debts and Expenses. All expenses of administration chargeable to principal, the 
expenses of the disposition of my remains, and all my legitimate debts, if and when paid, shall be 
paid from the principal of my residuary estate. No debt need be paid prior to its maturity in due 
course and except as otherwise provided in this Will no interest in any property passing under 
this Will need be exonerated. 
C. Taxes. All estate, inheritance or other similar death taxes, together with any 
interest or penalties thereon, arising by reason of my death with respect to any property 
includable in my taxable estate, and any adjusted taxable gifts, whether passing under or outside 
of this Will, shall be paid from the principal of my residuary estate without reimbursement from 
the recipients or beneficiaries of such property, provide~ however, that in the event any 
proceeds of insurance upon my life or any property over which I held a power of appointment 
are included in my estate for purposes of detennining the federal estate tax liability of my estate, 
then the residue of my estate shall be entitled to receive from the recipients of any such proceeds 
or property the portion of such federal estate tax liability attributable to such proceeds or 
property determined in accordance with IRC §§ 2206 and 2207. 
ARTICLE VI 
Miscellaneous 
A. Number and Gender. Unless the context indicates a contrary inten~ the plural 
and singular forms of words shall each include the other, and every noun and pronoun shall have 
a meaning that includes the masculine, feminine and neuter genders. · 
B. Survival To "survive" me, as that term is used in this Will, a person must 
continue to live for thirty (30) days after my death. 
C. Descendants. The "descendants" of an individual include only the following: 
1. All such individual's biological descendants, except any person not bom in 
lawful wedlock and his descendants, unless the biological parent who 
would otherwise cause him or her to be a descendant has acknowledged 
paternity or maternity in legitimation proceedings, or in an unambiguous 
signed writing identifying such person by name, or by raising such person 
in the same household; and 
2. · Persons adopted by such individual or one of his or her descendants, and 
their descendants. 
If the parent, who would cause a person to be a descendant as defined above, is replaced in an 
adoption proceeding, such person shall remain a descencµmt unless such parent voluntarily 
consents to the relinquishment of his or her status as parent in connection with such adoption 
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proceedings. 
D. Heirs. The tenn "heirs" shall mean those persons entitled to inherit under the 
then-applicable laws of the State of Idaho governing the descent of an intestate's separate estate. 
They shall inherit in.their statutory proportions. If the provisions of this Will call for a 
distribution of property to my heirs or the heirs of any other person and the event giving rise to 
the requirement for such distribution takes place at a ti.me later than my death or the death of 
such person, the determination of the identity of such heirs shall be made as if I ( or such other 
person) had died on the date of the event giving rise to such requirement for distribution. 
E. Exclusion .of Pretermitted Heirs. Other than as set forth in this Will, I make no 
provision for any child of mine or descendant of a deceased child of mine. I specifically make 
no provision for any person (whether now living or hereafter born), other than a child named or 
referred to in Article I or a descendant of mine as defined in this Will, who may be entitled to 
claim an interest in my estate under the laws of the State of Idaho. 
F. Legal Disability. A person is under a legal disability if my personal 
representative determines, in good faith, that the person is incapable of managing his property or 
of caring for himself, or both, or is in need of protection or assistance by reason of physical 
injury or illness, ment.al illness, developmental disability, senility, alcoholism, excessive use of 
drugs, or other physical or mental incapacity. 
G. Title to Real Property. Upon my death. title to any real property passing under 
this Will shall vest in my personal representative in bis fiduciary capacity and shall remain so 
vested until my personal representative distributes or sells that property, at which time title shall 
vest in the distributee or purchaser. 
· H. Disclaimer. Except as may be otherwise specifically provided in this Will, in the 
event that any beneficiary disclaims an interest arising out of this Will or any trust created herein 
it is my intention that the interest disclaimed shall be distributed in the same manner and at the 
same time as if the disclaiming beneficiary had died immediately preceding the event pursuant to 
the laws of the State ofldaho. 
I. Governing Law. The provisions of this Will shall be interpreted in accordance 
with and in light of the laws of the State of Idaho. 
J. Corporate Successors. Whenever a corporation or other business entity is 
referred to herein, the reference shall include any successor organization. 
K. References to Statutes. In this Will, the abbreviation °1RC11 shall refer to the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as am.ended. 
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I have initialed and dated for identification purposes all pages of this, my Last wni and 
have executed the entire instrument by signing this page on the J.2_ day of DEC , 20 J..!:!., 
atfl11J'llt'll!:Rs. Fl!:,~121, Idaho. · 
Robert Melton 
Attestation and Statement of Wi1J!esses 
Each of us declares under penalty of perjury under the laws of Idaho that Robert Melton, 
the Test.ator, signed this instrument as his Last Will in our presence, all of us being present at the 
same time, and we now, at the Testator's request, in the Testator's presence, and in the presence 
of each other, sign below as the witnesses, declaring that the Testator appears to be of sound 
mind and under no duress, fraud, or widue influence. 
[Print Name J 
Residing at 
'B:roaecs ferct.t, .L:;k:....'ao 
2:a,;.odo.~ CCAJ...q-k 1 
wm of Robert Melton Page 5 of 5 
;;6. j,., lfi. _/1,.·;,s ~ 
\ ess Signarure] 
6,//q_ /fl /, ~us-rv 
[Print Name) 
Residing at 
.L "'J 71·1 
¥4 "tUU:1-> T~ I u 
Initiats:'K£m Date: Iv· t 7 - 1c) 
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SELF-PROVING AFFIDAVIT 
STATE OF IDAHO 





iJn We, Robert Melton and J / /a 111, Lt l>ets, 11?.r/'f/ and 
nl{. ,Su 1 ,it: ,'the Testator and the witnesses, whose names are signed to 
P.006/006 
the attached or f9regoing instrument in those capacities, personally appearing before the 
undersigned authority and being first duly swom, declare to the undersigned authority under 
penalty of perjury that: 1) the Testator declared, signed and executed the instrument as his last 
will; 2) he signed it willingly or directed another to sign for him; 3) he executed it as his free and 
voluntary act for the purposes therein expressed; and 4) each of the witnesses, at the requesi of 
the Testator, in his hearing and presence, and in the presence of each other, signed the will as 
witness and that to the best of his knowledge the Testator was at that time of full legal age, of 
sound mind and under no constraint or undue influence. 
oi/4~~ 8~ffveu 
Lil~ £/. ~ ku.s~ 
[Print Name] 
Residing at 
-.ti~i/Qt'df ;z,,*1-ff,· .T() 
Section for Notary Public: 
. Robert Melton 
4n.uJ c5u.rz:u, 
[Print Name] 
r& Resit at Qd 
'tJ:t1NJr5 5'lfff I I, ' 
Subscribed, sworn and acknowledged before me ert.Melton, Testator, and by the 
said L, 1/12, &I· <, /, t.r..r ~a.- , and ~~£L.J,.~~...,4-4.,,l..~ic:::;...---' witnesses, this 
J:1_ day of ~. , 20.LQ. 
[Print or stamp oa.me of Notary] 
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D~nid P. Featherston 
Brent C. Peathcnton"' 
Jeremy P. Featherston 
Jeremi L. Ossman 
113 S. Second Mc. 
Sandpoint, lb 83864 
Phone (208) 263-6866 
Pax (208) 263-0400 
•Lioooscd in ld.,.o & Yh11lini,\10n 
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, Chtd. 
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON #4602 
Attorney at Law 
113 South Second A venue 
Sandpoint. Idaho 83864 
Phone: (208) 263-6866 
.. .. Fax: . (208) 266-0400 
Atton1ey for Heinz Alt 
Ftl_ED 
20 13 OCT 21 A 8: 59 
ST,!,TE F IDAHO 
COUHTY OF POU!D ARY 
GLD!D.~ FO~ TO. !. CLERK 
LA,,C,\. 0 -BY- . -... 
r:: 1· I ITY r LERK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
In the Matter of the Estate of 









CASE NO. CV-2013-0313 
ORDER 
This matter having come before the Court on the 151h day of October, 2013> at the time 
and place scheduled for hearing on the heir/petitioner's Motion to Set Aside Decree and his 
Motion to Convert Proceedings to Supervised Administration and to Dete1mine Testacy. The 
surviving spouse, Jadwiga Melton, was present and represented by her attorney of record, 
Bruce Green. The Petitioner Heinz Alt did not attend but was represented by his attorney of 
record, Brent C. Featherston. 
The Court. having heard testimony, and upon evidence and good cause showiug: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. That the Decree Vesting Estate in Surviving Spouse entered on the matter 
herein on or about the 30th day of August, 2013, be vacated and set aside. 
2. That the surviving spouse Jadwiga Melton shall not encumber or dispose of any 
assets of the Decedent herein and shall preserve the same pending fhrther order of this Court. 
ORDER- I 
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10-17- '13 10 :12 FROM-FEll"'"l:RSTON LA\J/ FIRM 2082630400 T- 022 P0003/0003 F-502 
D~iel P. F'eatherston 
Brent C, Peather~IOn~ 
J~my I:'. Poathen;ton 
Jeremi L. OssmRn 
113 s. SecQnd Ave. 
S3lldiioint, ID 83864 
Phone (208) 263-6866 
Fax (208) 263-0400 
3. The Petitioner Heinz Alt1s Motion · to Convert Proceedings to Supervised 
Administration and to Determ_ine Testacy is neither denied nor granted but any ruling on this 
Motion is reserved pending further discovery and hearing regarding said Motion. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
T 
Dated thi~ day of October, 2013. 
~/~ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on th~ ay of October, 2013, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document to be served upon the following person( s) in the following manner: 
Bruce Greene 
Attorney at Law 
320 North 2nd Ave. 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Brent C. Featherston, Esq. 
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD. 
113 S. Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
ORDER - 2 
[ ] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand delivered 
[,(] Facsimile 208-265-2451 
[ ] Other: ______ _ 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand delivered 
[o(f Facsimile No. 208-263-0400 
[ ] Other: ______ _ 
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MARY W. CUSACK 
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC 
610 W. Hubbard, Suite 205 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
(208) 667-0640 
(208) 667-0708 FAX 
ISB #5332 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF lDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of the Estate of: ) 
) 
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and ) 
HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON, ) 
) 
) 
Deceased. ) ______________ ) 
CASE NO. CV 13-0313 
PETITION FOR FORMAL PROBATE 
OF WILLAND 
FORMAL APPOINTMENT OF 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
(1.C. 15-3-402) 
PETITIONER, JADWIGA B. MELTON, STATES AND REPRESENTS TO THE 
COURT THAT: 
1. Petitioner's interest in this matter is that of the spouse of the Decedent. 
2 . (a) The person whose appointment as Personal Representative is 
sought is the Petitioner and is qualified to act as such and has priority because there is no 
person with a higher or equal priority for appointment. 
(b) The status in which such person seeks appointment is as the person 
nominated in Decedent ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON's Will . 
3. The Decedent, ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON, died on July 4, 2013, at the 
age of 81 years, and at the time of his death he owned property in Boundary County, 
State of Idaho. 
4. The marital community of ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON and HEDWIG 
"HEDY" MEL TON was dissolved by the death of HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON on the 11 th 
1. PETITION FOR FORMAL PROBATE OF WILL AND 
FORMAL APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
{MJT00135667. DOCX; 1/20397.100} 
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day of August, 2008. HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON died testate, and it is the Petitioner's 
understanding the original Will of HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON is in the possession of 
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd. On September 6, 2013, Featherston Law Firm, Chtd ., filed 
a Motion to Convert Proceedings to Supervised Administration and to Determine 
Testacy and said Motion contained a true and accurate copy of the Will. At her death, 
ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON was entitled to all the property of HEDWIG "HEDY" 
MEL TON by operation of law because all property owned by HEDWIG "HEDY" 
MEL TON was community property, and ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON died before any 
proceeding had been commenced for the probate of HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON. 
Pursuant to I.C. 15-3-111 , the estates of both ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON and 
HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON may be joined for probate in this proceeding. 
4. Venue is proper because at the time of death the Decedents were domiciled 
in Boundary County. 
5. The names and addresses of the spouse, children, heirs, and devisees of 
the Decedents and other persons entitled to notice pursuant I.C. 15-3-403, and the ages of 
those who are minors so far as known or ascertainable with reasonable diligence by 
Petitioner are: 
NAME & ADDRESS AGE 
Jadwiga 8. Melton Legal 
38 Lilac Place 
Bonners Ferry, Idaho 83805 
Gerald D. Melton Legal 
27 402 Sunnyridge Road 
Palos Verdes, California 9027 4 
Ernest S. Melton Legal 
2008 Silver Crest Drive 
Fairfield, California 94534 
Douglas A. Melton Legal 
102 Hampton 
Hazel Park, Michigan 48030 
2 . PETITION FOR FORMAL PROBATE OF WILL AND 
FORMAL APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
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Debra M. Nakkula 
PO Box 57 
Mohawk, Michigan 49950 
Carol A. Soucie 
PO Box 923 
Centerville, Utah 84014 
Brent C. Featherston 
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd. 
113 South Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 




6. No Personal Representative has been appointed in this state or elsewhere 
whose appointment has not been terminated. 
7. Petitioner has neither received nor is aware of any demand for notice of any 
probate or appointment proceeding concerning the Decedents other than the demand 
received by and on file with the Court. 
8. The time limit for formal probate or appointment has not expired because not 
more than three years have passed since Decedent ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON's death. 
9. The original of the Decedent ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON's Will, dated 
December 17, 2010, is in the possession of the Court. 
10. Petitioner believes that the Will, which is the subject of this application, was 
validly executed. 
11. Having exercised reasonable diligence, Petitioner is unaware of any 
instrument revoking the Will, which is the subject of this Petition and believes that such Will 
constitutes Decedent ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON's Last Will. 
12. Bond is not required under I. C. 15-3-603. 
WHEREFORE, PETITIONER REQUESTS THAT: 
1. The Court fix a time and place of hearing. 
2. Notice be given as required by law. 
3. PETITION FOR FORMAL PROBATE OF WILL AND 
FORMAL APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
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3. Decedent ROBERT ERNEST MEL TO N's Will, dated December 17, 2010, 
be formally probated. 
4. The Court find that JADWIGA B. MEL TON is the only devisee under 
Decedent ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON's Will dated December 17, 2010. 
5. JADWIGA B. MEL TON be formally appointed Personal Representative of 
the estate of the Decedents to act without bond. 
6. Upon qu~J~cation and acceptance, Letters Testamentary be issued. 
DATED this_~....:...,____ day of December, 2014. 
~:a~ ;t~e~ 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss 
County of Boundary ) 
Petitioner, JADWIGA B. MEL TON, being sworn, says that the facts set forth in the 
foregoing petition are true, accurate, and complete to the best of the Petitioner's 
knowledge and belief. 
,, ......... . 
1£; ~~ /'%.d/'9e.<. 
C JADWIGAiB.MEL TON 
Petitioner 
,,, ,,,, 
...... , ~ - CUSAc ,,,, t(f-
.,,, ..._\ ••••••• '.l- ,, "" ~ •• •• •t ,# 
SUBSCRIBES ~D,...,$WOR'l\ to \ efore me this day of December, 2014. -~·~v • • ---: <:; : ,- : : 
; i -·- 0 io ~ ~ S1erwJ-:. . ~ . ",;,. ~ -:. •. PU~v .• ..... ~ 
~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ 
,, .J''h •••••••• \_V ...... NOTARY PUB ,,,, 'ATE O"Y ,, .. .. 
,,,,,,,,. .... ,,,,, My commission expires on ~(t( ( (t 
4. PETITION FOR FORMAL PROBATE OF WILL AND 
FORMAL APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
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MARY W. CUSACK 
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC 
610 West Hubbard St., Suite 205 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
(208) 667-0640 
(208) 667-0708 FAX 
ISB# 5332 
F\LED 
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ST;\TE OF l{) f\HO 
COlJHTY OF BOUHOARY 
GLEHOA POSi ON, CLERK 
'J\...Y ~-sY or-Pill y (' ~RK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of the Estate of: 
ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON and 








) ______________ ) 
CASE NO. CV 13 -0313 
CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE 
FOR HOMESTEAD ALLOWANCE AND 
FOR EXEMPT PROPERTY 
(I.C. 15-2-402, I.C. 15-2-403) 




JADWIGA B. MEL TON 
38 Lilac Place 
Bonners Ferry, Idaho 83805 
I am the surviving spouse of ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON. 
Basis of Claim 
Homestead allowance pursuant to I.C. 15-2-402. 
Exempt property pursuant to I.C. 15-2-403 




Cl mant Name: J WIGA B. MEL TON 
1 . HOMESTEAD AND EXEMPT PROPERTY 
{MJT00135748.DOCX;1/20397.100} 
laimant Address: 38 Lilac Place 
Bonners Ferry, Idaho 83805 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the !/!::._ day of ~ ,bv'IC. , 2014, 
I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing CLAIM GAINST ESTATE FOR 
HOMESTEAD ALLOWANCE AND FOR EXEMPT PROPERTY to be served by regular 
US Mail, postage prepaid thereon, or by facsimile, and addressed to the following: 
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON 
113 South Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
(208) 266-0400 - FAX 
2. HOMESTEAD AND EXEMPT PROPERTY 
{MJT00135748.DOCX;1/20397.100} 
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Daniel P. Feathmton 
Bieut C. Fealhemon• 
Jeremy P. Feathe;rston 
Jeremi L . Ossman 
113 s. Second Ave. 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Phone (208) 263-6866 
Fax (208) 263-0400 
ORIGINAL 
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD. 
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON, ISB NO. 4602 
Attorney at Law 
113 South Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
(208) 263-6866 
(208) 266-0400 (Fax) 
Attorney for Heinz Alt 
FI l_ ED 
2015 JAN 13 A 10: 33 
ST/;J[ (IF ![)!,HO 
C~'"·': Yer :1i1!1 l'1ARY 
GLL.,.c.; .. FC .. f ;;:i. LE~K 
By~--\_ L.(""'\ ·- - --
r', 1 { L, nK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
In the Matter of the Estate of 









CASE NO. CV-2013-0313 
CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE 
(J.C. 15~3-804) 
Claim is hereby made against this estate by HEINZ ALT as follows: 
Loan 
Loan 
Basis of Claim 





Plus interest accrued since said loans at the statutoxy prejudment rate of twelve 
percent (12%) per annym. 
I hereby certify that my mother, Hedwig Melton, and my step-father, Robert Melton, 
borrowed the total smn of $102,574.50. Those sums were borrowed by the Decedents for the 
purpose of acquiring land and building a home in Bonners Ferry, Idaho, which is the subject 
of this litigation. 
I have attached as Exhibit "A" a true and accurate copy of the initial Note in her 
handwriting and signed by my mother, Hedwig E. Melton, certifying that she owes the initial 
CLAIM AGAINSf ESfATE • J 
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Daniel P. Fcalhetstcn 
Brent C. Featherston* 
Jeremy P. Featherston 
JeremiL.Own,.n 
113 S. Seoond Ave. 
Samlpoint, ID 83864 
Phone (208) 263-6866 
Fax (208} 263-0400 
*Li=d in Idaho&; Wil!lliogton 
sum through 1997 of $75,982.50. I am also attaching as Exhibit "B" a second Note in my 
mother's handwriting that carries forward the earlier balance of $75,982.50 and adds 
additional loan amounts made to Robert and Hedwig Melton from July 3, 2001 through July 
1, 2008, in the additional sum of $26,592.00 for a total of $102,574.50. I certify that the 
handwritten numbers on Exhibit "B" are also the handwriting of my mother, Hedwig Melton. 
Attached hereto as Exhibit "C" is a true and accurate copy of the floor plan and 
design of the residence that was to be constructed with the funds borrowed from me by 
Robert and Hedwig Melton consisting of three (3) pages. Those three (3) pages are also in 
the handwriting of either Hedwig Melton and/or Robert Melton and were provided to me as 
part of the above-referenced loan. 
It was agreed that the property was initially placed in my name to secure repayment of 
the loan. Subsequently, Robert Melton and Hedwig Melton executed Wills in 1998 
promising to leave all of their Estate to me, Heinz Alt, their son and step-son, as a means of 
full repayment. 
I was assured by Robert Melton in the Fall of2012 after his remarriage that his 1998 
Will remained in effect for the purpose of repayment of this loan. 
I am owed the sum of $75,982.50 that has been accruing interest at twelve percent 
(12%) since June 1, 1997 ($24.98 per diem) and an additional $26,592.00 which has accrued 
interest at twelve percent (12%) since July 1, 2008 ($8.74 per diem). 
I hereby make a claim against the Estates of Robert and Hedwig Melton for these 
principal amounts together with accrued interest. 
DATEDthis /~ dayofDecember,2014. 
CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE- 2 
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Daniel P, Fcalllerston 
Brent C, Fealllcrsroo* 
Jeremy P. Fealhersron 
Jercmi L. Ossman 
113 S. Secood Ave. 
SIIJldpoinl, ID 83864 
Phone (208} 263-6866 
Pax (208) 263-0400 
•UcelUtd in Idaho &: Washingloo 
UNITED STATES EMBASSY ) 
) ss: 
CONSOLATE OF _ ____ __, 
On this ~ day of December in the year 2014, before me, ____ _ 
~.bi).: ~n'U':'> ht-/1 ?;rf~iC.., • a Notary Public in and for said Embassy, personally 
appeared HEINZ ALT, known or identified to me ( or proved to me by or on oath) to me to 
be the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me 
that he executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official 
seal the day and year in this certificate first above 
__ ,- ,··J!"' .-- . 
.. ~ r • 
,• I It"' ., 
'-~ , .. r· • -
-·-
CERT~ATE ~ MAILING..{' 
I hereby certify that on the <:J:- day of ~01~ I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following person( s) in the following 
manner: 
Mary W. Cusack, Esq. 
CUSACK LAW FlRM, PLLC 
610 W. Hubbard, Suite 205 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE· 3 
[)() U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand delivered 
[ ] Facsimile No. (208) 667-0708 
[ ] Other: _ _____ _ 
1 
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MARY W. CUSACK, ISB #5332 
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC 
320 E. Neider Avenue, Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815 
(208) 667-0640 
(208) 667-0708 FAX 
ZDl5FEB -2 p I: II 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of the Estate of: ) 
) 
ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON and ) 




Deceased. ) ______________ ) 
CASE NO. CV 13-0313 
ORDER FOR FORMAL PROBATE 
OF WILL AND FORMAL 
APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE 
(I.C. 15-3-401, et seq.) 
THIS MATTER HAVING COME on for a duly noted and regularly scheduled 
hearing on the 22nd day of January, 2015, upon the Petition for Formal Probate of Will 
and Formal Appointment of Personal Representative, filed with this Court by JADWIGA B. 
MEL TON on December 9, 2014, before me, the undersigned Judge of the above-entitled 
Court. 
Mary W . Cusack, of CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC, appeared as attorney for 
JADWIGA B. MELTON. Brent C. Featherston, of FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD., 
appeared as attorney for HEINZ ALT. Both JADWIGA B. MEL TON and HEINZ ALT 
were present and gave testimony at the hearing. 
In addition , the Court at that time did hear testimony from LILA M. ROBINSON. 
The Court, after hearing the testimony of the parties and argument of counsel, and 
based thereon and the papers, pleadings and records on file therein, and being fully 
advised in the premises, finds as follows: 
1. ORDER FOR FORMAL PROBATE OF WILL AND 
FORMAL APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
{MJT00135672.DOCX; 1 /20397 .100} 
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1. The required notice has been given or waived. 
2. The proceeding was commenced within the time period provided by law. 
3. The Decedent, ROBERT ERNEST MELTON, died on July 4, 2013, at the 
age of 81 years, and domiciled in Boundary County, Idaho. The marital community of 
ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON and HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON was dissolved by the 
death of HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON on the 11 th day of August, 2008. 
" 
- ~ ..,. -~· -·- ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON died before any 
proceeding had been commenced for the probate of HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code 15-3-111, the estates of both ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON and 
HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON may be joined for probate in this proceeding. 
4. Venue is proper because at the time of death the Decedent was domiciled in 
Boundary County. 
5. The testamentary instrument to which the Petition relates is the Decedent's 
Last Will. 
6. JADWIGA B. MEL TON is entitled to appointment as Personal 
Representative of the Decedent's estate to act without bond. 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECREED THAT: 
1. The Will of the Decedent, dated December 17, 2010, is hereby formally 
probated. 
2. JADWIGA B. MEL TON is hereby formally appointed as the Personal 
Representative of the estate of the Decedent to act without bond. 
3. Upon qualification and acceptance, Letters Testamentary shall be issued. 
4. The estates of both ROBERT E. MELTON and HEDWID "HEDY" MELTON 
are hereby joined for probate in a single proceeding pursuant to I. C. 15-3-111. 
2. ORDER FOR FORMAL PROBATE OF WILL AND 
FORMAL APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
{MJT00135672. DOCX; 1 /20397 .1 00} 
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DATED this ~ y of February, 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Y\~ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT on the K day of February, 2015, I caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER FOR FORMAL PROBATE OF WILL AND 
FORMAL APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE to be served by regular 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid thereon , or by facsimi le to the following: 
Mary W. Cusack 
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC 
320 E. Neider Avenue, Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815 
(208) 667-0708 - FAX 
JADWIGA MEL TON 
38 Lilac Place 
Bonners Ferry, Idaho 83805 
GERALD D. MEL TON 
27 402 Sunnyridge Road 
Palos Verdes, California 9027 4 
ERNEST S. MEL TON 
2008 Silver Crest Drive 
Fairfield , California 94534 
DOUGLAS A. MEL TON 
102 Hampton 
Hazel Park, Michigan 48030 
DEBRA M. NAKKULA 
PO Box 57 
Mohawk, Michigan 49950 
CAROL A. SOUCIE 
PO Box 923 
Centerville, Utah 84014 
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON 
Featherston Law Firm , Chtd. 
113 South Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
(208) ~ 30400- FAX 
GLENDA POSTON 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
.. ') 
By: ~AJJ o~(L "'---
DEPUTY CLERK 
3. ORDER FOR FORMAL PROBATE OF WILL AND 
FORMAL APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
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AFFIDAVIT OF PUBLICATION 
State of Idaho 
Gout of Bou::ary, -..:..s-½'""l-"'--'--"='-d-""'--"',+.,,..'1'1,.-'-'-'..4.L;>..£..\~~~ 
beind first duly swo~n says that 
he/she is ~,L...>.1-J...;'--1:...!.-->µ::...---"-1"''--'--~~"'------ of the 
Bonners Ferry Herald, a newspaper printed and 
published at Bonners Ferry, Boundary County, Idaho ; 
that the said newspaper has been continuously and 
uninterruptedly published in said Boundary County 
during a period of 12 months prior to the first publication 
of the hereto attached notice of publication in the case 
it 
was published in the regular and entire issue of the said 
paper for a period of _±_ consecutive weeks, 
commencing on ) 9 ·t ~ay of Q o ~ , 20J5 and 
_st ~ay of /'v~ , 2015 and ending on the 
that said notice was published in said newspaper. 
\ - +-'o\:;,L-'""'""1;,."'--.l<..1.,-'-=-"''l'---'--'---'-"-i..,..,.~..J._· r.....;:i'-..._./ 
SUBSCRIB 
c.::-· -+r\ 
,~ day of _.<........;._..,_,."""-"...,.__, 20.l5.. 
) . I .,,.-,' ,,, i I..., ' ·;/ • f 
I ---~ ~ \.,- '-/ ,·la // .. I (, = :..,. __ ;; 
Notary Public-State of I · aha 
Residing at: >,;:. //11 -:--:· r .L .. ,,}(/,. f . / 
My Commission Expires : ,,;::,- /4t / ; 
7 7 
FILED 
10\S APR l O A tt: I q 
STf\TE OF IOAHO 
NOTICE TO CREt)l'.JW'Rl;Y Of BOUNDARY 
CASE NO. CV l&t QIDA POSTOl-i. CLERK 
IN THE DISTRIC'f COURT OF . 1 r "' 
TH E FIRST Jl8IY!CI~b \Au\-,,~ 
DlSTRTCTOFTHE STA'Ilnti~~·JTY Cl.ERK 
lDAH'O , TN AND FOR THE 
COl NTI OF BOUNDARY 
ln the Matter of the Estate of: 
ROB ~RT ERNEST MELTON 
,ind 
HEDWIG 11HEDY11 MELTON 
Deceased ' 
OTICE JS HEREBY GTVEN 
that thf' uudersigrled h, ~ be,~n 
ap pointed P r onal 
R e pre . enla t ive oI th 
abo •e-named De edeul. Al1 
P rson having cJaims against 
the Dec dent or thc- sta( are 
r('.q~ir d to present their claims 
Within FOUR (4) MO THS after 
th~ date _of the first publication of 
th1_ No~ce to reditor , or said 
d:ums will bt> forevt'r ban-ed. 
Claims must be• pres1,nterl to the 
~n~ e1s igne cl at lhe .addrt'SS 
rnd1 catetl and til e d with th e 
Clerk of the ourt. 
DATED thi ~ 6 day of •<-"bruarv 
2015. • . 
JADWIGA B. MELTON 
Pei sonal RercSt::ntative 
r:/ o MARYW. CUSACK 
CU A.CKLAWFIRM, PLLC 
610 West Hubbard 'l, Suite :!OS 
Coeur d1Ale0<·, ID 838]4 
BFH Legal 9172 
February 19. 26, 2015 
March5. 2015 
, .. _/ ) 
I 
/CI •. 
/ J ,,. 
/_ "':• I I 
/ ,--( ·-·/ 
" -.:- - --,•;. ,. / ... , ··\ \ l ,. 
~ • .... ·' I\ - :: U' ~ 
,J_ ,.,,_ ,...,. . • ':l J 
Page 59 of 438
05-04-' 15 15: 19 FROM-FEAT11T7 tlSTON LA\11 FIRM 2082630400 T-871 P0002/0011 F-270 
Dnniel P. Featherston 
Brent C. Featherston• 
Jeremy P. Featherston 
Ieremi L. Osunan 
113 S. Second Mo. 
Sandpoint, ll> 33864 
l'honc (.208) 263-68~ 
l'ax (.208) 263-0'IOO 
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD. 
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON, ISB NO. 4602 
Attorney at Law 
113 South Second A venue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
(208) 263~6866 
(208) 266-0400 (Fax) 
Attorney for Hein2 Alt 
FIL ED 
1015 HU - ~ P 3: 4 3 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHOt IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
· MAGISTRATE DMSION 
In the Matter of the Estate of 









CASE NO. CV-2013-0313 
PETITION TO ALLOW CLAIMS 
Petitioner, HEIN'Z ALT as Claimant in the above entitled Estate, represents that: 
1. The attached Claim Against Estate was timely filed with the clerk of court on 
January 13, 2015 and mailed to the personal representative on January 9, 2015. The Claim 
consists of the following loans to the decedents for purchase and development of the real 
property held in the estate and is a first priority purchase money loan to the decedents: 
Name & Address 
Heinz Alt 
c/o Featherston Law Finn 
113 South Second Ave. 
Sandpoint, ID 83 864 







2. None of these claims have been baxred by time or released or satisfied. The 
Personal Representative filed with the clerk of court a disallowance of claim on March 17; 
2015 which disallowance mailed to Clawiants' counsel on March 13, 2015. Said 
disallowance was unsupported and untirriely, having been mailed sixty three (63) days after 
presentation of the claim by the undersigned on January 9, 2015. 
PETITION 'l'O AU.OW Cl.AIMS- I 
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05-04- '15 15:19 FHOM-FEATµ~HSTON LAW FIRM 2082630400 T-871 P0003/0011 F-270 
~=_;r,~ 
,· ; .. (<0 .. .1:'1 ' ·, 
Daniel P. Peathcnton 
Brent C. Peathcr&ton• 
Jeremy P. FeathetBton 
Jc~mi L. Ossmal\ 
llJ s. Se<:ond Ave. 
Si111dpoint, JD 83864 
Phone (ZOS) 26'.!~~66 
Fax (208) 263-0400 
Failure of the personal representative to mail notice to a 
claimant of action on his claim for sh{ty (60) days after the 
time for original presentation of the claim has expired has 
the effect of a notice of allowance. 
Idaho Code Ann.§ 15-3-806 (2014) 
3. Petitioner believes that each of the claims listed herein is just and valid and 
should be given the priority indicated. 
WHEREFORE, PETITIONER REQUESTS THAT: 
1. The Court fix a time and place for hearing. 
2. The Court designate what petsons, if any, are to be given notice pursuant to 
I.C. 15-3-806. 
3. Notice be given to the persons designated, the Claimant(s) listed, and the 
Personal Representative. 
4. The Court enter its Order a1lowing the abovewlisted claims in the priority 
indicated. 
DATED this L day of~ 2015 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the _i_~ay of.-2015, I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following manner: 
Mary W. Cusack, Esq. 
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC 
610 W. Hubbard, Suite 205 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 





U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Overnight Mail 
Hand delivered 
Facsimile No. (208) 667-0708 
Other: · 
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Dim1al. p; ,&alb6ll,Ulll 
~C.~llienloll-. 
Jorcmy P. ~tbmsloo 
J~t..0-
113 S. Second Ave. 
S~lll>oini,m 83844 
l'bolle (208)263-6866 
Pu (2.08) ~3.0400 
tLJ ~OPY 
FF:ATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CSTD. 
BRENT C. FBATIIERSTON, lSB NO. 4602 
Attorney at Law 
113 South Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
(208) 263-6866 
(208) 266-0400 (Fax) 
Attorney for Heinz Alt 
FILED 
2015 JAN 13 A IQ: 3W 
S'YAT( Of ll)Al!O 
CO\.!H l Y Qf noutm ARY 
GLUiPi\ POSTON, Cl.EHi< 
8Y---···----------···' 
t.i. i·-t: i Y c~rnx 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TUE 
STATE _OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COV.NTY OF BOUNDARY 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
In the Matter of the Estate of 









CASE NO. CV-2013-0313 
CLAIM'. AGAINST ESTATE 
(I.C.15-3-804) 









Plus interest accrued since said loans at the statutory prejudment rate of twelve 
percent (12%) per annym. 
I hereby certify that my mother, Hedwig Melton, and my step-father, Robert Melt.on, 
borrowed the toml s,nn of$102,574.50. Those sums were borrowed by the Deceden~ for the 
purpose of acquiring land and building a home in Bonners Ferry1 Idaho, which is the subject 
of this litigation. 
I have attached as Exhibit "N' a true and accllt'ate copy of the initial Note in her 
bmidwriting and signed by my mothe1\ Hedwig E. Melton, certifying that she owes the initial 
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sum through 1997 of $75,982.50. I am also atta.clm)g as Exhibit "B" a second Note in my 
mother's handwriting that cm:ries forward the earli~ balance of $75,982.50 and adds 
additional loan an1ounts made to Robeit and Hedwig Melton from July 3, 2001 through July 
1, 2008, in the additional sum of $26,592.00 for a total of $102>574.50. I certify that the 
handwritten numbers on Exhibit "B" are also the handwriting of my mother, Hedwig Melton. 
Attached hereto as Exhibit .. C'' is a true and accurate copy of the floor plan and 
design of the residence that was to be constructed with the funds borrowed from me by 
Jwbert and Hedwig Melton consisting of three (3) pages. Those three (3) pages ate also in 
the handwriting of either Hedwig Melton and/or Robert Melton and were provided to me as 
part of the above-referenced loan. 
It was agreed that the property was initially placed in my name to secure repayment of 
the loan. Subsequently, Robert Melton and Hedwig Melt.on executed Wills in 1998 
promising to leave all of their Estate to me. Heinz Alt, their son and step-son, as a means of 
full repayment. 
I was assured by Robert Melton in the Fall of2012 after hls remarriage that his 1998 
Will remained in effect for the purpose of repayment of thls loan. 
I am owed the sum of $75,982.50 that has been accruing interest at twelve percent 
(12%) since June 1, 1997 ($24.98 pet diem) and an additional $26.592.00 which has accrued 
interest at twelve percent (12%) since July 1. 2008 ($8.74 per di.em). 
I hereby make a claim against the Estates of 'R.o~ert and Hedwig Melton for these 
principal amounts together with accrued interest 
\ i 
DATEDthis f ~ dayofDeceJJ1bflr, 2014. ~ i\ 
l
01t \l 
'. \~l · 
I l\•'• •. . - \. -
HEINZALf': . 
CLAIM AGAJNgr ESTA'I'£ • % 
\ 11 ... , ,•· 
r, -- .- ·,1 
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113$, setoodAvs, 
SIIIC!poilll, JD 83864 
Plloae. (208) 2.63,,6866 
Flix (208) 263-04DO 
UNITED STATES EMBASSY ) 
) ss: 
CONSOLATB OF ____ ---1 
On this /) day of December in. the yea1'2014, before me,--~-
f..l::>L(;vt1?,,f:, HIN li-r!r·i;ic..., , a Notary Public in and for said E~bassy, personally 
appeared HEINZ ALT, known or identified to me ( or proved to me by or on oath) to me to 
be the ~rson whose name is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me 
that he execured the same. 
. , ' ·- .. ~.  .. . . 
. . · . 
. ·~ . . · . 
No ·c or the nited States Embassy 
Residing at U1fi·rlr-i 1.t Hc: .. (11i.-t t t 
My commission expires I i~efi~~/~ 
. ::.>, "}~:: :/~;}.';} ~~;}i .'  
. . C.ERTIF1CATE ~MAILING_£ 
l bere~y certify that.on fue ~ of~Olf,I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the followmg person(s) in the following 
manner: 
MaryW. Cusack, Esq. 
CUSACK LAW F1RM, PLLC 
610 W. Hubbard. Suite 205 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
CLAJMAGAJNST~ATE-3 
[~] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
t ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand delivered 
[ J Facsimile No. (208) 667-0708 
[ } qt.her: ------
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MARY W . CUSACK 
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC 
320 E. Neider, Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815 
(208) 667-0640 
(208) 667-0708 - FAX 
ISB#: 5332 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of the Estates of: ) 
) 
ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON, and ) 
HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON, ) 
) 
Deceased . ) 
) __________ ) 
CASE NO. CV 13- 0313 
NOTICE OF HEARING AND 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT TO DENY CREDITOR 
CLAIM 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on the 27th day of July, 2015, at the hour of 
9:30 a.m. , or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, in the courtroom of the 
above-entitled court , Bonners Ferry, Idaho, before the HONORABLE JUSTIN JULIAN , 
the Personal Representative in the above-named matter, JADWIGA B. MEL TON, will 
move this Court to enter a summary judgment against HEINZ ALT and deny in its 
entirety the creditor claim filed herein by HEINZ ALT. 
The Estate is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and said motion being 
made and based upon Rule 56, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and upon the pleadings 
and records on file herein , including the following: Affidavit of Mary W . Cusack, and the 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment To Deny Creditor Claim. 
1. NOTICE OF HEARING AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
{MWC001 44317 .DOCX; 1 /20397 .1 00} 
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The grounds for this motion are that the pleadings, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
Oral argument is requested . 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ~ day of June, 2015, I caused a true and 
accurate copy of foregoing by the method ind icated below, and addressed to the 
following : 
Brent C. Featherston 
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd . 
113 S. Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
(208) 263-0400 - FAX 
Sent via email: 
cynth ia@featherston law. com 
brent@featherstonlaw.com 
MA~ ~ 
2. NOTICE OF HEARING AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
{MWC00144317.DOCX;1/20397.100} 
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MARY W. CUSACK 
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC 
320 E. Neider Avenue, Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83815 
(208) 667-0640 
(208) 667-0708 - FAX 
ISB#: 5332 
r:· l, ED 
' t L-
i.ul'l JUN 29 P \~ O \ 
S1 A1E Of 10/\HO R'f 
&~~Ji\6!~ 
OY r~?UTY C:LfRI\ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of the Estate of: ) 
) 
ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON and ) 
HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON, ) 
) 
Deceased. ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Kootenai ) 
CASE NO. CV 13- 0313 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
MARY W. CUSACK 
MARY W. CUSACK, of Cusack Law Firm, PLLC, being fi rst duly sworn on oath, 
deposes and states: 
1. I am representing JADWIGA B. MEL TON, Petitioner, in the above-
captioned matter. I am over the age of 18 years and as I am familiar with the facts and 
circumstances of this case, I make this affidavit based upon my own personal 
knowledge; 
2. Attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference as Exhibit "A", 
is a true and correct copy of the Warranty Deed, wherein the Grantors were Bobby J. 
lnvernon and Heidi L. lnvernon, the Grantees were Robert E. Melton and Hedwig 
Melton, which was recorded on April 12, 1996, as Boundary County Instrument Number 
0181217. 
1. AFFIDAVIT OF MARY W. CUSACK 
{MWC00144084. DOCX; 1 /20397 .100} 
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3. Attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference as Exhibit "B", 
is a true and correct copy of the Gift Deed, wherein the Granto rs were Robert E. Melton 
and Hedwig Melton, the Grantee was Heinz Alt, which was recorded on August 10, 
1999, as Boundary County Instrument Number 194996. 
4 . Attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference as Exhibit "C", 
is a true and correct copy of the Quitclaim Deed, wherein the Grantors were Heinz Alt, 
dealing with his sole and separate property, and Christine Alt, his wife, the Grantees 
were Robert E. Melton and Hedwig Melton, which was recorded on November 4, 1999, 
as Boundary County Instrument Number 196015. 
Further your Affiant saith naught. 
DATED this $- day of June 2015. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 25th day of June 2015. 
,,,,,,,~~~'~'~';,,,,,,,, ~ ~~ 
~' ~~ ............... ~0 % " . ~~ 
$ (J~·· · .. ~ ~ ~\ ) 
I / ~OTAR J,, \ ~ NOTRY PUBLIC - . .... . = i \ Pual\C / J My commission expires on 05/15/20 
\$;;··o···F···,·o·;~~// CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
'11, ,,,, 
11
i 11.11 1w 11111' 4fl7'k.-l hereoy (.;ertify that on the .J.X:>_~- - day of June 2015, I caused a true and 
accurate copy of the forgoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to the following: 
Brent C. Featherston 
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd. 
113 S. Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
(208) 263-0400 - FAX 
Sent via email: 
cynthia@featherstonlaw.com 
brent@featherstonlaw.com 
2. AFFIDAVIT OF MARY W. CUSACK 
{MWC00144084. DOCX; 1 /20397 .100} 
~<4~ 
MARY W . agiACK 
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::-r·':.· :. 
AFTER Rau:lDilU, Mi\IL 1D (2Rl\,.'ffi::£. 
FA'.fCI) #SOC-4/ 
WARRANTY DEED 
_fo, Value Received BOBBY J. INVE:lliON and HEIDI L. I~'VEiL'ION, ZiUsband c1nd wi f.e 
. Httcin.tikr rolled the Grantor, herclly grants, b:irgains, sells oml conveys unto 
ROBERT E . MELTON and HEDiHG i'\EL'.!'ON , husband and w 1. ~c 
wb=cddressis: 7170 HOLIDAY DR . , SPRINGH!LL, FL , 31 601: 
H::relnancr callc<l lho Unwicc, tho following described premises slLuatc<l in Ooundnry Couniy. ldn!to , 10-wi1: 
..,, 
Lot 4, BLITHE HILL SUBDrvISION, accordi~g to ~ho vlnt 
thoroof rocoruod in Book 2 of Plats, Page 41, rocorda of 
Bo\lllMry County, Idaho. 
TO HA Vi'. AND TO HOLD the S!lid premises, w!Ut U1eir appuncnrutces unto LJ,o suld Grantco 
and lo the Grun~'s heir; nnd assigns forever. And Ute s:iid Granter docs hcceby co~cnil!ll to md with 
the s:i.ld Grnntco Llml t.ce OrJ.olOr I, 11,c owner in fee simple of Sllid premises; ;!uu ,aid prcmfs.<S ure frc.: 
from all atcwnbrnnccs except ctmcnt years tu.xcs, lc\'ie..;. Md us.sc.:i.srncurs, llJJd tJ<CCJ)t U. S. Pa1e111 
r=tlo11.1, rcstrfe1io!l!l, utstm e,11s of =ni. nnd e35em,11ts visible upon U1c premises, and lhll Gnlntor 
will wurn.nl llJld lleicnd Ute same from oil claims wha!Sccver. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
66 
COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
Oo This 11th day of Aoril in the year 1996 
before me, a Notary Pub) .ic in and for said State, perscnally 
appeared BOBBY J. INVERNON and HEIDI L. INVER.NON, known or 
identified ·':o rr:e to be the persons whose names are 
subscribed to the within Instrumen t, ani,&~~nowlcdged to me 
that they executed the same. ----~ \-\UG ,,,,, 
Not Public 
Residing at~ 
Commission 8xp£res 0/7/98 
,;-r_v ,, .... ,.,,._c;/;,.111 
~ ._, .,• •.:vu' I 
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IN CONSIDERATION of low and affection. ond in addition. in cons1deration of the aid 
and assistance grantee has give granto, in the care and maintenance of grantor and the property 
hcreinat\cr cles<;ribcd without 1hought or teqUC!ot for remuneration <if any type or kind whatsoever. 
Robert E. Melton •ad Hedwig "ltedy" Melton, husband and wire, grantors. does he,cby give. 
grant, alien. convey and confirm unto Heinz Alt, 11S his S(,lc and separate propcrty.1,>tantec, whose 
current address 1s HC 85 Box 323H, Bonners Ferry, Idaho, 8380.5. the property dcse1 ibcd as 
follows: 
Lot 4, Blume Hill Subdivision, according to thc plat thereof recorded in Book 2 of 
Plats, Page 41, record.~ of Bounda1y Coun!y, Idaho. 
RESERVING unlo Grantors the nght to reside thcl'\.'On so I011g as either of said 
g:rantors health will pennil them lo reside without the aid. care and ass1sta~ of 
trained helllth care prov1ders. 
TO HAVE AND TO HO! .D the said prettllscs with the appuru:naoces unto the grantee, its 
heirs aoo as.signs forever. And the grantor does hcreh) covenant to and with the said grantee that it 
1s lhc o"mcr in foe simple of said premises and that they are free from all i:ncumbranccs and that it 
will WARRANT and DEFEND the same from all lawful claims whatsoe\-cr. 
11·1·' . 
DATED thi$ J..!!'..._ day of • ;~dtt __ , 1999. 
' 
ST A TE OF IDAHO 
:ss. 
CoWlty of Boundary ) , 
-1ii .(U-l(li,L<,f 
On this J.C._ day of~ 1999, before me. a Notaty Public in and fOI' S&ld Sta.le, 
peironally appeared Robef1 F,..,Mctt.i, and Hedwig "Hedy" MeftOll, husbaPd and wife, known 
to me to be the pcr;,on ~c IUdlle is subscribed to the foret,'<ling tnstrumcnt and acknowledged to 
me !hat thev executed the same. 
""""' IN 'WITNESS WJIERP-01', I h>-< "'"~ "1 my h~ ""'"' 
~(s~e ofidaho . 
Residing al Bonne FcIT)·, /. / 
Comm1ssioo expires: /41/...2'2/'tf!..t> P / 
r{A!T,OFIDAHOl s, 
~uf~ry) 
Ftkd fur rtllOl'd a:t ,- ,__ "' 
• ~ <'('> tM. J.Q.,..J__f, ~..,,.. .]. 
on ilu?..10_ . .day<,f -~~~-· 19 ~ . 2·is 
o'd,.,·k {) , M .. ,and re·Lvwckd i11 Roo~ .l3Q 
,f ,.);\<,,'t\"-r;..» i~. . on PUl(I< ~ 
"~ .· -:\v.,_y\Q..:~ .J .• . 
. •• > .•• 3Jxl~ 
. , ~rc::nn 
. , ., __ Fi...F ,-----·~·· . . 
,,<:;::~: ~.?.~:········ ..• 
/ ,.. .·· Jl tc •·. <, ·, ; ,"' I ~ ·. :l- '\ f '- :'A , .. 4 
; ,1. ; It( ... i 1,1 f ' .,, ; "" ~ - 1 \~\"o /'-a \ 1-,.:-.:t .... (, ~ 
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- · !ffll ;111•)117 
f.,. f20'l 251-41'16 ,.__,Ill _,I!!,~ 
19601.S 
QUfTCI..AIM DEED 
For value l'C('dvc:d, Hdoz Alf. de.Ung 1'itfl hla Mlle aid aep.rate property. 11.lJd 
Chrildr,c Alt, hla ,rife, gtan1.(n, do hertby convey. release. retnisc and fon,'VCT quitclaim unto 
Robert Melton aid Rtdwl& Mdtoa, l1111bl&d Hd rie. grantees. whose current address ,s HC 
8S Box 323H, Bonners Fcny. Idaho. 8380.S, the foUowing-descnoed real property, to-'t\it: 
Lot 4, Blwne Hill Subdiviiion, according to th¢ plat thereof recorded in Boole. 
2 (lf Plats. Page 41, records of Boundary County, Idaho. 
together with their appurtenances. 
DATEDthis _t/_. dayof_fjJ _i- ____ . 19<N. 
• r 
£,(': :r ." _-} ~ : ~~ /:.i' f 
-· - - --·-·· .. ·--- L .. - .... -.. ,. ... 
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. . A •. , 
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MARY W. CUSACK 
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC 
320 E. Neider Avenue, Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83815 
(208) 667-0640 
(208) 667-0708 - FAX 
ISB#: 5332 
··J·r J"''l "9 ° \: 0 I • tJ vi '- r 
STATE GF l'.1/-iHO 
COUNTY OF OOUNDAR Y 
GLE~OA POSTOH.~K 
BY ,t--/·..,~ 
nF PUl Y CLERK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of the Estate of: 
ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON and 
HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON, 
Deceased. 
) 
) CASE NO. CV 13- 0313 
) 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) TO DENY CREDITOR CLAIM 
) ______________ ) 
COMES NOW, Petitioner, JADWIGA B. MEL TON ("Jadwiga") , the Personal 
Representative of the above captioned estate, by and through her attorney of record, 
MARY W. CUSACK, of Cusack Law Firm, PLLC, and hereby submits this Memorandum 
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment to Deny Creditor Claim. 
I. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
A On April 11 , 1996, Bobby J. lnvernon and Heidi L. lnvernon signed a 
Warranty Deed transferring property commonly called 38 Lilac Place, Bonners Ferry, 
Idaho and which is located at what is legally described as Lot 4, BLUME HILL 
SUBDIVISION, according to the plat recorded in Book 2 of Plats, Page 41, records of 
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Boundary County, Idaho (hereinafter the "Residence") to Robert E. Melton and Hedwig 
Melton as husband and wife. Said Warranty Deed was recorded under Boundary 
County Instrument Number 0181217 on April 12, 1996. See Affidavit of Mary W. 
Cusack, ,r 2. 
B. On July 10, 1999, Robert E. Melton and Hedwig Melton, as husband and 
wife, signed a Gift Deed transferring the Residence to Heinz Alt, as his sole and 
separate property. Said Gift Deed was recorded under Boundary County Instrument 
Number 194996 on August 10, 1999. Said Gift Deed was prepared by Featherston Law 
Firm. See Affidavit of Mary W Cusack, ,r 3. 
C. On November 4, 1999, Heinz Alt, dealing with his sole and separate 
property, and Christine Alt, his wife, signed a Quitclaim Deed transferring the Residence 
to Robert E. Melton and Hedwig Melton as husband and wife. Said Quitclaim Deed was 
recorded under Boundary County Instrument Number 196015 on November 4, 1999. 
Said Quitclaim Deed was prepared by Featherston Law Firm. See Affidavit of Mary W. 
Cusack, ,r 4. 
D. Hedwig Melton (hereinafter "Hedwig") died on August 11, 2008. See 
Motion to Convert Proceedings to Supe,vised Administration and to Determine 
Intestacy, ,r 1. 
E. Robert E. Melton (hereinafter "Robert") died on July 4, 2013. 
F. Heinz Alt (hereinafter "Alt") sent a copy of his Claim Against Estate 
(hereinafter "Alt's Claim") to Jadwiga's attorney of record on January 9, 2015, and Alt's 
Claim was filed with the Court on January 13, 2015. 
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G. Jadwiga was formally appointed Personal Representative on February 2, 
2015. 
H. On February 19, 2015, Notice to Creditors was first published in the 
Bonners Ferry Herald. 
I. On March 13, 2015, a Notice of Disallowance of Claim was faxed and 
mailed to Alt through Featherston Law Firm. The Notice of Disallowance of Claim was 
fi led with the Court on March 17, 2015. 
J. On May 4, 2015, the Estate received Alt's Petition to Allow Claims. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR MOTIONS UNDER I.R.C.P. 56(c) 
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
I.R.C.P. 56(c). The plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary 
judgment . . . against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the 
existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party wi ll bear 
the burden of proof at trial. Ackerman v. Bonneville County, 140 Idaho 307, 310 (2004) . 
In determining whether any issue of material fact exists, th is court must construe 
all facts and inferences contained in the pleadings, depositions, and admissions, 
together with the affidavits, if any, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 
I.R.C.P. 56(c); Sewell v. Neilson, Monroe Inc., 109 Idaho 192, 194, (Ct. App. 1985). 
Summary judgment must be denied if reasonable persons could reach differing 
conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence. Smith v. Meridian Joint 
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School District No. 2, 128 Idaho 714, 718 (1996) (citation omitted). In ru ling on a motion 
for summary judgment, the trial court is not to weigh evidence or resolve controverted 
factual issues. American Land Title Co. v. Isaak, 105 Idaho 600, 601 (1983). Should 
the evidence reveal no disputed issues of material fact, then summary judgment should 
be granted. Smith, 128 Idaho at 718. In any case which will be tried to the court, rather 
than to a jury, the trial judge is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party 
opposing a motion for summary judgment, but instead, can arrive at the most probable 
inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts. Riverside Dev. Co. v. 
Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 518, note 1 (1982). 
Ill. LAW AND ARGUMENT 
A Creditor Claim Rules 
A creditor has three years from date of death to file a claim. Idaho Code§ 
15-3-803. A personal representative can limit the filing period of creditors to four 
months after the date of first publication of a notice to the creditors in the newspaper. 
Idaho Code § 15-3-801 (a). Known creditors must be given actual notice of the time by 
which to file a claim. Idaho Code § 15-3-801 (b); see also Tulsa Professional Collection 
Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988) (due process requires actual notice be 
given to known creditors). Any creditor who does not file its claim within the appropriate 
time frame has its claim forever barred. Idaho Code§ 15-3-801 (a), (b). 
In order for a claim to be valid, the creditor must file its claim with both (1) 
the personal representative and (2) the Court. Idaho Code§ 15-3-804(a). The claim is 
deemed to be presented on the later of (1) the delivery or mailing of the claim to the 
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personal representative or (2) the fil ing of the claim with the Court. Id. (emphasis 
added). 
Once the claim is filed with the Court, the personal representative can 
disallow the claim. Idaho Code § 15-3-806(a). Once the cla im is disallowed, the 
creditor has 60 days to file a petition to allow the claim with the court. Id. 
Failure of the personal representative to mail notice of disallowance to a 
[creditor} on his claim for sixty (60) days after the time for original presentation of the 
claim has expired has the effect of a notice of allowance. ,!Q. (emphasis added). 
Robert Melton died on July 4, 2013. The general three year statute of 
limitations would allow a creditor until July 4, 2016 to file a claim. In this contested 
matter, Letters Testamentary were issued to Jadwiga on February 2, 2015. Jadwiga 
filed a notice to creditors in the newspaper, and the date of first publication was 
February 19, 2015. Due to this publ ication, creditors have until June 19, 2015 to file a 
cla im or be forever barred. 
Prior to Jadwiga being appointed personal representative, Alt sent a 
creditor claim to Jadwiga's attorney on January 9, 2015, and filed the same claim with 
the Court on January 13, 2015. The Personal Representative sent a Notice of 
Disallowance of claim to Alt on March 13, 2015, which was within 60 days after he filed 
his claim. The Notice of Disallowance was filed with the court on March 17, 2015. The 
Notice of Disallowance was timely mailed to Alt. 
Despite Alt's argument, al l of the above dates are irrelevant. The date of 
first publ ication was February 19, 2015. After publication in the paper, the original time 
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for presentment of creditor claims was June 19, 2015 (four months after the date of first 
publ ication). The personal representative has until August 19, 2015 to disallow any 
claims that are presented . Alt's argument the disallowance was untimely filed is not in 
accordance with Idaho's statute. The Disallowance of Claim was timely issued by the 
personal representative.1 
B. Treatment of Alt's Petition to Allow Claims 
It is questionable whether Alt correctly filed a claim because the claim was 
sent before the personal representative was appointed . A literal reading of Idaho Code 
§ 15-3-804(a) requires the claim to be filed with the "personal representative" and with 
the court. Alt should have resent his claim to the personal representative once Jadwiga 
was appointed. He did not do so. Therefore, this Court should bar Alt's Claim as not 
filed in conformance with Idaho law and therefore shall be barred . 
If the Court treats this as a validly filed claim, Jadwiga still has until August 
19, 2015 to disallow Alt's Claim. Jadwiga disallowed the claim by sending notice to Alt's 
attorney on March 13, 2015, well within the timeframe to disallow this claim. Jadwiga 
objects to automatically allowing Alt's Claim. 
If this Court treats Alt's Claim as validly filed, then Jadwiga requests this 
matter be treated as a disallowed claim with a Petition to Allow Claim filed by Alt. This 
1 Even assuming that the claim could have been properly presented prior to the appointment by Jadwiga, 
it was presented on January 13, 2015, the date the claim was filed with the court (which is later than the 
date that it was sent to Jadwiga, who later was appointed Personal Representative) . Jadwiga disallowed 
the claim on March 13, 2015, which is the 59th day after the earliest possible date the claim could be 
deemed presented. Thus the disallowance was timely even accepting the premature filing date of 
January 13, 2015 as being valid and accepting for the sake of argument that the disallowance had to be 
mailed within sixty days of the date when the claim was deemed presented, not sixty days after the four 
month notice to creditors period expired as the statute clearly provides. 
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would have the result of Alt having to prove his creditor claim, rather than have it 
automatically allowed. As a matter of law, this Court should treat Alt's Claim as 
defective as filed and therefore should be disallowed in its entirety. 
C. Defects in Alt's Claim as Presented 
In addition to the statutory deficiency described above, Alt's Claim is also 
defective for the following reasons: 
1. No Original Documents 
Attached to Alt's Claim is a document entitled "Folgene Credite Auf 
Konto" (which loosely translates to "the following credit on account") signed by "Hedy 
Melton" which states in the body "all of this amount was used to built (sic) Loghouse." 
When reviewing this claim, it appears that Alt is attempting to treat this document as a 
promissory note; a promissory note signed by Hedwig in favor of Alt. Alt does not 
provide the Court with original documents. Instead, he presents "true and correct 
copies" of the purported promissory note. Without the original documents, Alt's Claim 
cannot be verified as the best evidence rule prohibits the use of copies except in certain 
instances. Idaho Code § 9-411 . The theory underlying the best evidence rule is stated 
as follows: 
The best evidence rule is designed to foster accuracy in the 
presentation of evidence found in writings. No party should 
be permitted to prove the contents of a document by 
secondary proof when it is within his power to produce the 
original. It is a preferential rule limited to documentary 
evidence. The application of the rule results in the exclusion 
of secondary evidence except when a party is unable, 
through no fault of his own, to produce the original. 
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Bell , Handbook of Evidence for the Idaho Lawyer 208 (2d 
ed. 1972). Idaho First Nat'I Bank v. Wells, 100 Idaho 256, 
261 (1979) 
As a condition precedent to the admissibility of a document, Alt must 
present "evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its 
proponent claims." I.R.E. 901 (a). When seeking to admit a writing , which is not self-
authenticating, a party must provide proof of its genuineness separate from the writing 
itself before it is admissible. Idaho First Nat'I Bank v. Wells, 100 Idaho 256, 262 (1979). 
The purported signature or recital of authorship on the face of a writing will not be 
accepted as sufficient prel iminary proof of authenticity for the admission of a writing in 
evidence. Id. Idaho Code § 9-405 provides that a writing can be authenticated in the 
following ways: (1) by anyone who saw the writing executed; (2) by evidence of 
genuineness of the handwriting of the maker; or (3) by a subscribing witness. Idaho 
Code § 9-405. Idaho Code § 9-411 is the codification of the best evidence rule in Idaho. 
Idaho Code § 9-411 provides in relevant part: There can be no evidence of the 
contents of a writing other than the writing itself, except in the following cases: 
1. When the original has been lost or destroyed; in 
which case proof of the loss or destruction must first be 
made. 
2. When the original is in the possession of the party 
against whom the evidence is offered, and he fails to 
produce it after reasonable notice. 
Typically, the loan holder will possess the original promissory note unti l 
the debt is paid . When the debt is paid, the original promissory note is returned to the 
debtor in satisfaction of payment. Alt has not provided the Court with any original 
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documents, and he has not authenticated the copies he has provided to the Court. The 
documents Alt provided to the Court are copies and do not specifically name Alt as the 
creditor. If Alt does not possess the original documents, this calls into question whether 
the debt was paid or not. In addition, even if Alt presented original documents, they 
must be authenticated as in Hedwig's handwriting. Without original documents and 
without proving the authenticity of the documents, this Court should dismiss Alt's Claim 
as filed. 
2. Defective Documents 
The documents Alt has provided in Alt's Claim are not evidence of 
a debt instrument or promissory note. Robert and Hedwig purchased the Residence 
from Bobby lnvernon and Heidi lnvernon on April 11, 1996. Later, on July 10, 1999, 
Featherston Law Firm prepared and recorded a Gift Deed transferring the Residence 
from Robert and Hedwig to Alt. On November 4, 1999, Featherston Law Firm prepared 
and recorded a Quitclaim Deed transferring the Residence from Alt, and his wife 
Christine, back to Robert and Hedwig. If there was a debt owed by Robert and Hedwig 
on the Residence to Alt, it should have been secured by a Deed of Trust along with a 
promissory note in favor of Alt. That was never done. 
In addition, the documents in Alt's Claim do not look like promissory 
notes. There is no language on the document other than the German phrase "Folgene 
Credite Auf Konto" (which loosely translates to "the following credit on account")" that 
could be construed as any sort of debt instrument. The documents could just as easily 
be a tally for the basis in the Residence for tax purposes. Or, the documents could be 
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considered a repayment log from Alt to Hedwig for amounts Alt owed her. There are 
too many unknowable facts regarding the documents to determine the true intent. The 
documents provided do not show any debt owed by Robert to Alt. Therefore, Alt's 
Claim should be denied in its entirety. 
D. Claim is Time-Barred at Hedwig's Death 
As described above, the document entitled "Folgene Credite Auf Konto" 
(which loosely translates to "the following credit on account") signed by "Hedy Melton" 
which states in the body "all of this amount was used to built (sic) Loghouse" was filed 
as a debt instrument in this matter. Even if we treat this document as a promissory 
note, it was only signed by Hedwig. Under the facts of this case, a debtor-creditor 
relationship existed only between Alt and his mother Hedwig. Robert did not sign the 
note, and therefore, was not contractually liable for the debt evidenced by the 
documents presented. Only Hedwig signed the document and therefore only Hedwig 
would be liable for any debt. Purportedly, the debt incurred by Hedwig was to build a 
house which was for the benefit of the community and if so, it would be properly 
characterized as a "community debt." See Twin Falls Bank & Trust Co. v. Holley, 111 
Idaho 349, 352 (Idaho 1986). Idaho Supreme Court went on to clarify: 
The phrase "community debt" is correct terminology insofar 
as it is used to signify a debt incurred for the benefit of the 
marital community. However, to the extent the phrase is 
used to imply the existence of a "community debtor," the 
phrase is imprecise and misleading. The marital community 
is not a legal entity such as a business partnership or 
corporation. While one may properly speak of a "corporate 
debtor," there is no such entity as a "community debtor." To 
the extent a lending institution enters into a creditor-debtor 
relationship with either member of the marital community or 
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with both members, it does so on a purely individual basis. 
Thus, the lending institution may have a creditor-debtor 
relationship with either spouse separately or with both jointly. 
As stated earlier, the community property system does not 
affect the fundamental principles governing such a 
relationship and the procedures required of a creditor in 
order to collect upon his debt. Rather, the community 
property system merely affects the type or kinds of property 
to which the creditor may look for satisfaction of his unpaid 
debt. Essentially, the community property system merely 
makes additional resources (community property) available 
to a creditor from which to seek satisfaction of unpaid debt. 
Thus, under the community property system in Idaho and 
I.C. § 32-912, [1] which has established a rule of co-equal 
management of community assets or property, when either 
member of the community incurs a debt for the benefit of the 
community, the property held by the marital community 
becomes liable for such a debt and the creditor may seek 
satisfaction of his unpaid debt from such property . .!.Q. 
(Internal citations omitted). 
At Hedwig's death, Alt, if he proved the authenticity of a debt, may have 
had a claim in Hedwig's estate against Hedwig's assets and the community property 
assets of the estate. The statute of limitations to file a claim is three years from date of 
death. Idaho Code§ 15-3-803. Hedwig died on August 11, 2008. Alt had until August 
11, 2011 to file a claim in Hedwig's estate. He did not do so. After that date, any claim 
against Hedwig's estate is statutorily time barred. In addition, at Hedwig's death, there 
is no longer any community property. Pursuant to the terms of her Last Will , all of 
Hedwig's property became the sole and separate property of her husband Robert. 
Robert did not sign the document. Robert's estate cannot be held responsible for 
Hedwig's debt. Alt's Claim should be dismissed by operation of law as barred by the 
statute of limitations. 
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E. Equitable Estoppel Does Not Apply 
Alt has asserted in Alt's Claim that Robert and Hedwig executed mutual 
Wills in 1998 as a means of full repayment of the loan Alt allegedly made to Robert and 
Hedwig. Yet, in July of 1999, the Residence was gifted to Alt. That same year, Alt 
voluntarily quitclaimed the Residence back to Robert and Hedwig, using Featherston 
Law Firm. If a debt was owed to Alt, the typical procedure is to file a Deed of Trust at 
the same time the Quitclaim was signed to protect Alt's purported loan. That did not 
happen. 
After Hedwig died, Alt knew that pursuant to the express terms of her Will 
that Hedwig's entire estate was transferred to Robert. Alt still did nothing to protect his 
purported loan. Robert married Jadwiga on June 7, 2010. Again, Alt did nothing to 
protect his purported loan. 
The only non-statutory bar to a statute of limitation defense in Idaho is the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel. J.R. Simplot Co. v. Chemetics lnt'I, Inc., 126 Idaho 532, 
534 (1994). The elements of equitable estoppel are as follows: (1) a false 
representation or concealment of a material fact with actual or constructive knowledge 
of the truth; (2) that the party asserting estoppel did not know or could not discover the 
truth; (3) that the false representation or con_cealment was made with the intent that it be 
relied upon; and (4) that the person to whom the representation was made, or from 
whom the facts were concealed, relied and acted upon the representation or 
concealment to his prejudice. !g_. Equitable estoppel does not eliminate, toll , or extend 
the statute of limitations. Ferro v. Society of Saint Pius X, 143 Idaho 538, 540 (2006) . It 
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merely bars a party from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense for a 
reasonable time after the party asserting estoppel discovers or reasonably could have 
discovered the truth. !Q. 
Put differently, there simply is no evidence establishing or permitting the 
Court to reasonably infer that Robert concealed any material facts or made any false 
representations which lulled Alt into inaction during the statutory creditor claim period in 
Hedwig's estate. Alt is a business person. Alt did not have Robert sign a promissory 
note. Alt did not have Robert sign a Deed of Trust. Robert was not related to Alt and it 
was foreseeable that Robert would leave his entire estate to his new wife, Jadwiga. 
Even if Robert did not execute a Will leaving everything to Jadwiga, by operation of law, 
she would receive one-half the estate as an omitted spouse. See Idaho Code § 15-2-
301. Alt knew that Robert had married Jadwiga and yet did nothing to protect his 
interest in the purported loan to Hedwig. Additionally, there is no evidence before the 
Court establishing that Alt relied on any representations by Robert in waiting to file this 
action. This Court should dismiss Alt's Claim. 
F. Deadman's Statute 
The purpose of the so-called "Deadman's Statute" is to prevent a litigant 
from having the benefit of his own testimony when another litigant has been deprived of 
the testimony of the decedent. 
Idaho Code § 9-202 states in relevant part: 
Who may not testify.-The following persons cannot be 
witnesses: 
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3. Parties or assignors of parties to an action or proceeding, 
or persons in whose behalf an action or proceeding is 
prosecuted against an executor or administrator, upon a 
claim or demand against the estate of a deceased person, 
as to any communication or agreement, not in writing , 
occurring before the death of such deceased person. 
The Idaho Supreme Court held that Idaho Code § 9-202(3) bars, (1) 
certain persons from testifying ; (2) in a specific action; (3) as to certain communications. 
Argyle v. Slemaker, 99 Idaho 544, 547 (1978) . All three portions of Idaho Code § 9-
202(3) must be satisfied in order for the evidence to be barred . ,!Q. Additionally, Idaho 
Code § 9-202(3) prohibits a party who is making a claim against an estate from 
testifying as to any unwritten communication with the deceased. Lunders v. Estate of 
Snyder, 131 Idaho 689, 698, 699 (1998) (emphasis added) . 
In this case, all three requirements are clearly met in that: (1) Alt is a party 
in this action against the estate; (2) Alt's Claim is against his deceased step-father's 
estate; and (3) Alt is offering testimony to a communication or agreement, not in writing , 
occurring before the death of his step-father. 
Here, Alt is asserting in Alt's Claim that Robert "assured him in the fall of 
2012 that his 1998 Will remained in effect" in order for Alt to have his purported loan be 
repaid. This is exactly the type of testimony that is barred under the Deadman's statute. 
Alt's Claim should be disallowed in its entirety.2 
2 It is also the type of situation that Idaho Code§ 15-2-701 is designed to protect aga inst assuming that 
Alt makes the claim that Robert's representation amounted to a "will contract. " Alt's oral testimony about 
being assured by Robert that Robert's 1998 remained in effect in order for his purported loan to be repaid 
is not sufficient to prove that there was a will contract since those types of agreements can be established 
only by (1) provisions in a will stating material provisions of the contract; (2) an express reference in a will 
to a contract and extrinsic evidence proving the terms of the contract; or (3) a writing signed by the 
decedent evidencing such contract. Such proof is missing in this case. 
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G. Attorney Fees Should be Awarded the Estate 
In addition, Jadwiga respectfully requests an award of attorney fees under I.C. §§ 
12-121, 12-123, and 15-8-208. As has already been acknowledged, this estate is very 
small . The inventory filed with this court on August 29, 2013 states it contained a 
residence of approximately 1,428 square feet, a bank account of approximately $1,700 
and a vehicle valued at $1 ,500 . The Estate has been forced to expend funds and 
deplete estate assets in order to respond to unfounded assertions, respond to 
discovery, and Alt's creditor claims. Attorney fees should be awarded the Estate from 
Alt. 
Ill. CONCLUSION 
Jadwiga respectfully requests this court deny Alt's request to have his creditor 
claim automatically held as allowed. Alt's creditor claim was not properly filed, and in 
any event, Jadwiga timely disallowed his claim . 
If this court treats Alt's Petition to Allow Claims as a valid petition to allow his 
claim, Jadwiga respectfully requests this Court to disallow Alt's Claim in its entirety 
based on the authority and arguments above. Finally, Jadwiga respectfully requests 
this court for an award of attorney fees in having to defend these matters. 
DATED this :let-- day of June 2015. 
Attorney for JADWIGA MELTON 
Personal Representative 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the J.,5.,,._ day of June 2015, I caused a true and 
accurate copy of the forgoing document to be served by facsimile and via email thereon, 
and addressed to the following: 
Brent C. Featherston 
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd. 
113 S. Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
(208) 263-0400 - FAX 
Sent via email: 
cynthia@featherstonlaw.com 
brent@featherstonlaw.com 
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CASE NQ, CV~2013-0313 
CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO 
VACATE AND CONTINUE 
ESTATE'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME 
and NOTICE OF HEARING 
COMES NOW the undersigned counsel, Brent C. Featherston, Featherston Law Finn, 
Chtd., for and on behalf of the Claimant, Heinz Alt, and hereby moves to vacate and continue 
the Estate's Motion for Summary Judgment set for July 27, 2015, at 9:30 a.m. for the reason 
that counsel for the Claimant, Heinz Alt, has been out of the country on a family vacation 
since June 24, 2015, and did not return to the office until Friday, July 10, 2015. The 
Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment is due Monday, July 13, 2015, and additional 
time is ~ecessary for counsel to consult with his client, who lives in Austria, and to prepare 
the Response. 
This Motion is based upon the Affidavit of Counsel and Claimant's Counsel intends 
to present argument and further evidence in support hereof. 
CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO VACATE AND CONTINUE ESTATE'S MOl'ION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, MOTfON TO SHORTEN TIME and NO'l'ICE OF HEARING- I 
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DATED this/t!1ay of July, 2015. 
Attorney for Heinz Alt, Claimant 
MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME 
COMES NOW the undersigned counsel> Brent C. Featherston; Featherston Law Firm, 
Chtd., for and on behalf of the Claimant, Heinz Alt, and respectfully requests the Court, 
pursuant I.R.C.P. 6(d). to short.en the time for hearing Claimant's Motion to Vacate and 
Continue Estate's Motion for Summary Judgment for the following reasons. 
The Claimant's Motion to Vacate Hearing is scheduled for hearing on July 14, 2015, 
at 11:00 a.m. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3) this Motion and the Notice of Hearing are to be 
served no later than fourteen (14) days prior to the time specified for hearing. Due to the 
actions of the Estate, and in order to protect the Claimant, this matter must be heard 
immediately. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 6(b) and 7(b), this Court may alter the time 
prescribed, 
There is no prejudice to the Estate by altering the time period prescribed by Rule and 
allowing the Motion to Vacate Hearing to proceed on three (3) days' notice as opposed to a 
fourteen (14) day notice. 
The Court is asked to talce judicial notice of the .file herein and to shorten time for 
hearing on the Claimant's Motion to Vacate and Continue Hearing for the reasons set forth in 
the Motion and as may be presented at hearing on this Motion. 
CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO VACATE AND CONTINUE ESTATE'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, MOTION TO SHOR'l'EN TIME and NOTICE OF HEARING- 2 
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Daniel P. Featherston 
Brent C. Featherston• 
Jeremy P. Fc,.thersron 
Jeremi L. Ossman 
113 S. Second Avi!J. 
SMdpOint, ID 8l864 
:Phone (208) 263-6866 
Fax (208) 263-0400 
The undersjgned further gives notice of intent to present further evidence and 
testimony at hearing. 
DATED this ..,La.iy of July, 2015. 
::~z 
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON 
Attorney for Heinz Alt, Claimant 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Clajmant, Heinz Alt, by a11d through bis 
attorney, Brent C. Featherston, will bring his Motion to Vacate and Continue Estate's Motion 
for Summary Judgment on for hearing on the 14th day of July, 2015, at 11 :00 a.m., or as soon 
thereafter as may be heard, at the B0W1dary County Courthouse, 6452 Kootenai Street, 
Bonners Ferry, Idaho, and will present oral testimony thereon. 
I 1" DATED this~ day of July, 2015. 
Attorney for Heinz Alt, Claimant 
CLAIMANT'S MO"flON TO VACATE ANO CONflNtJE ESTATE'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME and NOTlC£0F HEAlUNG• 3 
L 
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D3niel P, Fea1herston 
Bre111 C. Fealhers1on* 
Jertflly P. rea1herston 
Jeremi L. OS$m~n 
113 S. Second Ava. 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Phon.o (208) 263-6866 
Fsx (208) 263-0400 
•Li«,nad in ld,ho & W.Shinseon 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the~~f July, 2015, I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following manner: 
Mary W. Cusack, Esq. 
CUSACK LAW FIRM) PLLC 
610 W. Hubbard) Suite 205 




U.S. Mail) Postage Prepaid 
Overnight Mail 
Hand delivered 
Facsimile No. (208) 667-0708 
Other: ----~----
CLAIM.ANT'S MOTION 1'0 VACATE AND CONTINUE ESTATE'S MOflON FOR 
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Daniel P. PoathQtston 
Brent C. Poa1hento11* 
Jeremy P. Poather&to11 
foreml L. Oisma11 
113 S. Second Ave. 
Sandpoint. ro 83864 
Phone (208) 263-68615 
Fax (208) 263-0400. 
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD. 
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON, ISB NO. 4602 
Attorney at Law 
113 South Second A venue 
Sandpoint. Idaho 83864 
(208) 263-6866 
(208) 266-0400 (Fax) 
Attorney for Heinz Alt 
FILED 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON, 
dod: 07-04-2013, 
Deceased. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 







CASE NO. CV-2013-0313 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
TO VACATE AND CONTINUE 
ESTATE'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
I. BRENT C. FEATHERSTON. being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say: 
I am over the age of majority and competent to testify to the matters set forth herein. 
I represent Heinz Alt, who is the son of Hedwig Melton and step~son of Robert Melton, 
the Creditor Claimant and interest.ed party in the above-entitled matter. 
Over one year ago I scheduled a family vacation which caused me to be out of the 
office June 24, 2015, through July 9, 2015, traveling in France, Belgium and the Netherlands. 
On June 25, 2015, at 4:30 in the afternoon, we received by facsimile and subsequently 
by email the Personal Representative's Motion for Swnniary Judgment, Notice of Hearing, 
Affidavit of Mary Cusack and Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO VA CAT£ 
•l..i¢onacd in Idaho & WUhin;t0a ANO COlNT1NOE ESTATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT -1 
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DAnicl P. Peatherston 
BreM C. Peatherston* 
Jererny P. Featherston 
Jcremi L. Ossman 
U~ $, S~cond Ave. 
S~n<lpoint, ID 83864 
PhOne (208) 263-6866 
F'Ax (208) 263-0400 
The Notice of Hearing set he matter for hearing on July 27tti at 9:30 a.m., making my client's 
response to the Motion due Monday, July 13th• 
I returned home at 2:00 a.m. on Friday, July 10th• 
As the Court is aware, my client, Heinz Alt, is a resident of Austria and his adult son, 
Daniel Alt. resides in New York City. 
Due to my prearranged vacation, I have been unable to meet with either the client or his 
son or to review the pleadings. 
Counsel for the Estate did not arrange the July 27th hearing date in advance with my 
office, nor did she provide me any opportunity or forewarning as to her int.ention to file the 
Motion or to set it for hearing on July 27111, a courtesy that is commonly extended prior to the 
scheduling of Motions for Swn:mary Judgment. 
There is cU1Tently no hearing set in this matter and, therefore, no prejudice would arise 
from the Court vacating the July 27th hearing and resetting it to a later date. 
The Court is asked to vacate the July 27th hearing and to set the matter to a later date so 
as to allow counsel and his client suffioient time to prepare a response to the Motion and to 
conduct any necessary discovery in response to the Motion. 
Further, your Affiant sayeth naught. 
DATED this/0-1af, of July, 201S. 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL lN SUPPORT OF MOTlON TO VACATE 
AND COINTINOE ESTATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT· 2 
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Daniel P. f.,ather&!01\ 
Brent C. Feathenton• 
Jeremy P. Fer.tMrston 
Jeremi L. O~smin 
113 S. Second Ave. 
Sandpoint, ID 8381S4 
Phone (208) 263-6866 
Fax (208) 263-0400 
•Liconl<d io Idaho & Wuhioston 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the J[f-llta,y of July, 2015, I caused a true ai1d correct copy of 
the foregoing document to be served upon the following person( s) in the following manner: 
Mary W. Cusack, Esq. 
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC 
610 W. Hubbard, Suite 205 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
[ ] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand delivered 








[ ] Other: _______ _ 
Bi2 ,{I ......I'~· '---------1-----! 
AFI.-Jl>AVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPO»:r O'F MO'fION TO VACATE 
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MARY W. CUSACK, ISB # 5332 
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC 
320 E. Neider Avenue, Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83815 
(208) 667-0640 
(208) 667-0708- FAX 
·FfLE · 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of the Estates of: ) 
) 
ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON, and ) 
HEDWIG 11HEDY" MELTON, ) 
) 
Deceased. ) _____________ ) 
CASE NO. CV 13-0313 
NOTICE OF NO OBJECTION TO 
VACATE AND CONTINUE 
HEARING 
COMES NOW, JADWIGA B. MEL TON, by and through her attorney of record, 
MARY W. CUSACK, and hereby provides the Court with notice that she has no 
objection to the cancellation of the hearing by BRENT C. FEATHERSTON, attorney of 
record for HEINZ ALT, and has so stipulated. 
The hearing Is currently scheduled for July 27, 2015 at 9:30 a.m. at the Boundary 
County Courthouse· before the Honorable Judge Julian regarding the Motion for 
Summary Judgment to Deny Creditor Clalm. Said Motion was timely filed; however, Mr. 
Featherston did not notify the Court or this office of his travel plans, and this office was 
unaware of Mr. Featherston's unavatlability. 
DATED this _et_ day of July 2015. 
1. NOTICE OF NO 013Ji:CTION 
{MJT00144879. DOCX: 1120397. 100} 
· -~ 
USACK, Attorney for 
Personal Representative of the Estate of 
ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON and 
HEDWIG 11HEDY" MEL TON. 
- j 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAIUNG 
I hereby certify that on the [3rJt.... day of July 2015> I caused a true and correct 
copy of the following NOTICE OF NO OBJECTION TO VACATE AND CONTINUE 
HEARING to be e-mailed> faxed or mailed by regular U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
thereon, in an envelope addressed to: 
Brent C. Featherston 
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd. 
113 S. Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83884 
(208) 263-0400 - FAX 
Sent vie email: 
cynth ia@feetherstQnlaw.com 
brent@featherstonlaw.com 
2 , NOTICE OF NO OBJECTION 
{MJT00144879.DOCX; 1/20l97.100} 
'; 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of the Estates of: ) 
) 
ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON, and ) 
HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON, ) 
) 
Deceased, ) _____________ ) 
CASE NO. CV 13-0313 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on the 24th day of August 2015, at the hour of 
9:30 a,m., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, in the courtroom of the 
above .. entitled court, Bonners Ferry, Idaho, before the HONORABLE JUSTIN JULIAN, 
the Personal Representative in the above-named matter, JADWIGA B. MEL TON, will 
move this Court to enter a summary judgment against HEINZ ALT and deny, in its 
entirety, the creditor clalm filed herein by HEINZ ALT. 
The Estate is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and said motion being 
made and based upon Rule 56, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and upon the pleadings 
and records previously filed herein, including the following: Affidavit of Mary W. Cusack, 
and the Memorandum tn Support of Motion for Summary Judgment To Deny Creditor 
Claim. 
1. NOTICE OF HEARING AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
{MWC001448B0.DOCXj1/20;,97.100) ' 
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The grounds for this motion are that the pleadings, and admlssions on file, 
together with the affidavits, show that there Is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
Oral argument is requested . 
DATED this f~ day of July 2015. 
Attorney for Personal Representative 
JADWIGA B. MELTON 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the /Sd,,,, day of July 2015, I caused a true and accurate 
copy of foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Brent C. Featherston 
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd, 
113 S. Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83884 
(208) 263-0400 - FAX 




2. NOTICE OF HEARING AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
{MWC00144880.DOCX; 1/20397,100) 
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'ilrini C, l"cMllul1<>n• 
fo-cmy P. l'ea1her,1on 
)eremi L. 05111\~l\ 
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. FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD. 
B~~NT C. FEATHERSTON, ISB NO, 4602 
Att<>flt~~-at Law 
113 South Second A venue 
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· Atto\J)~),'"for Claimant Heinz Alt 
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STATE Of IOAHO 
couHTY OF BOUHDARY 
Gl~~s~ERK _ 
13 y ~MIO CL ERK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TllE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TUE COUNTV OF BOUNDARY 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
fii the Matter of the Estate of 
RQ)i}l{R,'.(' ERNEST MELTON. 








CASE NO. CV-2013-0313 
STIPULATION TO 
VACATE HEARING 
COMBS NOW the undersigned counsel> for and OJ\ behalf of the respective parties, and 
hei;eby stipulate and agree that the hearing on Petitioner, 1-lein,z Alt1s, Motion to Continue and 
Vacate Estate's Motion fol' Summary Judgment and Motion to Sho11en Time cmtently 
~c.hedttled f.or hearil~ Olt Tuesday. July 14. 2015, at 11:00 a.m. in Boundary County shall be 
vMated for the reason that counsel for the Estate has agreed to .reschedule tl1e Estate's Motion 
fQ1' Smnmruy Judgment for a date after luly 27, 2015. 
DATED this ~day ofJuly, 2015. 
CUSACK LAW FIRM, Pl.LC FEATHERSTON LAW Fl~~v..,,,......,... D, 
By~~ 
BRENT C. EATHERSTON 
Attorney for Heinz Alt· 
\; . t ,.. 
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Daniel P. Featherston 
Brent C. Featherston• 
Jeremy P. Featherston 
Jeremi L. Ossman 
113 S. Secon<I A\11>, 
Sanap0in1, ID 83864 
Phono (208) 263-6866 
Pax (206) 263-04-00 
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD. 
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON, !SB No. 4602 
Attorney at Law 
113 South Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
(208) 263-6866 
(208) 263-0400 (Fax) 
brent@featherstonlaw.com 
Attorney for Creditor, Heinz Alt 
FILED 
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STATE OF IOAHO 
COUNTY OF B0UNDARY 
GLENDA POSTON. CLERK 
BY \A]·--\&,(\ 
fl•'PUT Y CLERK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and 








CASE NO. CV-2013-0313 
CREDITOR'S RESPONSE 
TO ESTATE'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW the Ul"'ldersigned counsel, Brent C. Featherston, Featherston Law Fitm, 
Chtd., for and on behalf of the Creditor, Heinz Alt, ("Alt") and irt response to the Motion for 
Summaty Judgment to Deny Creditor's Claim filed by Jadwiga V. Melton (''Jadwiga"), as 
Personal Representative of the Estate of Robert Ernest Melton and Hedwig (''Hedy") Melt.on, 
Husband and Wife ("Estate») and hereby responds as follows: 
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Titis probate proceeding was filed following the death of Alt's mother, Hedy Melton, 
and, subsequently, the death of Robert Melton, Alt's step-father. The testimony previously 
presented indicated he was raised by Robert Melton when Hedy and Robert married when Alt 
was a teenager. The testimony also proved without dispute that during their marriage, 
CRID.ln'OR.'S RESPONSE TO ESTATE'S MO'flON FOR SUMMARY J'VDGMEN"f. l 
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Dani~! P. Fcalhenron 
Brent C. Featherston* 
Jeremy P. Pea!hottron 
Jett>mi L. Ouman 
113 S. Second Ave. 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Phone (208) 263-6866 
Fax (208) 263-0400 
•LiUnsed in ldiho & Woshi~oon 
Meltons were poor money managers and often borro-wed from their son, Heinz A_lt, for a 
variety of purposes. 
When moving to Idaho in the late 1990s, Meltons purchased a piece of property, in 
part with funds borrowed from Alt and built the home entirely with funds borrowed from Alt. 
· Alt's verified Claim Against Estate is unrebutted that Exhibits ''A'\ «B", and "C" are 
handwritten and signed by Hedy Melton. The handwritten notes acknowledge a loan of 
$102,574.50, in the handwriting of Hedy Melton. In German, she acknowledges her 
obligation for the loan from her son and states that it was used to purchase and/or build the 
log home. 
Hedy died in 2008 and, as he testified earlier this year, Alt visited and communicated 
often with Robert Melton, his step-dad. 
In the summer of 2011, Melton married Jadwiga Melton. Within six (6) months. the 
Will now submitted for probate allegedly leaves all of his estate to Jadwiga. 
The verified Claim contains Mr. Alt's discussion with Robert Melton in the Fall of 
2012 approximately a year after the purported Will was signed and less than a year prior to 
his death, and Robert stated the 1998 Will remained in effect for the purpose of repayment of 
the loans owed to his step-son, Heinz Alt. 
II. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Rule 56(c) provides that a Summary Judgment may be granted to an adverse property 
~'if the pleadings, depositions and admissioru, on file, together with the affidavits, if ru1y, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as matter oflaw." LR.C.P. 56(c)(2015) 
CREDITOR'S RESPONSE TO E.STAT:E'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 2 
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Br~nt C. Featherston• 
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When ruling on a Motion for Summary Judgment. the trial 
court must detennine whether the evidence, when 
construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party, presents a genuine issue of material fact or shows 
that the moving party is not entitled to judgment as a 
matter oflaw. 
Chandler v. Hayden, 147 Idaho 765, 769, 
215 P.3d 485,489 (2009) 
The Supreme Court went on to note that the "moving party bears the burden of 
proving the absence of material fact" and only once that moving party establishes the 
absence of genuine issues of material fact, does the burden shift to the non-moving party to 
show the existence of any genuine issue of material fact. Id. 
Mr. Alt respectfully submits to this Court that the Estate has failed in its burden to 
show the absence of genuine issue of material fact. The Estate's Motion for Summary 
Judgment is supported strictly by the Affidavit of Counsel, which submits to the Court a 
series of deeds, gift deeds and quitclaim deeds. Affidavit of Counsel, Exhibits "N'; "B" 
and "C". Although the Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment asserts several 
arguments that are unsupported by fact or affidavit, this Court should deny the Estate's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, as it has been inadequately supported and the Estate has 
failed to carry its burden.1 
1 For example, the Estate argues that the documents signed by Hedwig Melton attached to 
the verified Creditor's Claim raise '1too many unknowable facts regarding the docurnents to 
detennine the true intent." Memorandum, p. l O The Estate also asserts that the tenn 
"credite auf konto" which translates to ''on account" could be just as easily construed as a 
·~ally for the basis in the residence for tax purposes". Memorandum, p.9. Neither of these 
assertions are supported by any verified allegation, but are simply arguments for trial, 
which in fact, defeat the Estate' s own Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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Jeremy P. Featherston 
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III. ARGUMENT 
A. Timeliness and Appropriateness of Creditor's Claim 
The Estate's argument that the Creditor's Claim was defective or untimely is 
unsupp01ted by the evidence. This case was originally filed as a Surviving Spouse Petition 
by Jadwiga Melton's former counsel, Bruce Greene. Despite repeated indications that the 
surviving spouse statute found at Idaho Code§ 15-3-1205 is inapplicable because Mr. Melton 
and Jadwiga held no commtmity property at the time of his dea~ it still took over a year for a 
proper Petition to be filed, The Petition for the probate of the Estates of both Robert Melton 
and Hedwig Melton was filed December 9, 2014, some fifteen (15) months after the case was 
filed as a Summary Adminisu·ation on August 29, 2013. 
There is no legal provision for the filing of a creditor's claim in a sununary 
administration. Should a spouse proceed u11der § 1205, the surviving spouse '(shall assume 
and be liable for any and all indebtedness that might be a claim against the estate of the 
decedent, and there will be no administration of the estate of the decedent." LC. § 15-3-
1205( c )(2015). Jadwiga elected to commence this as a Summary Administration, thus Mr. 
Alt had no opportunity to file his Claim until the Petition for Fornutl Probate of the Estates of 
Robert Melton and Hedwig Melton was filed December 9, 2014. 
Counsel for Jadwiga did not serve the Petition until a month later by mail on January 
9, 2015. See Affidavit of Counsel, Exhibit "A". Alt's Claim was served immediately by 
mail to Jadwiga's counsel on January 9, 2015. Alt's claim was timely and the Estate's 
Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied. 
CREDITOR'& RES.PONSE TO ESTATE'& MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-4 
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B. Alt's Claim is deemed Allowed betause the Estate did not timely il)isallow. 
The verified Creditor's Claim Against the Estate was filed January 13. 2015, and 
served upon counsel for Jadwiga by U.S. Mail on January 9, 2015. See Affidavit of Counsel, 
Exhibit ·~B". The Estate filed a Notice ofDisallowance of Claim on March 17, 2015. 
On January 9th, the Claim Against Estate was served upon the Estate via U.S. Mail. 
Applying the three (3) day mail rule, I.R.C.P. Rule 6(e)(l), the Estate was served with Mr. 
Alt's Claim on January 12, 2015. The Estate did not .disallow th~ Claim until mailing to 
counsel a Disallowance on March 13, 2015. 
Again, applying the three (3) day timeframe applied to service by mail and the service 
of the Disallowance did not occur until March 16th• From January 12th until March 16th is a 
span of sixty-three ( 63) days. In fact, the Estates Disallowance of this Claim was untimely 
under I.C. § 15-3-806. 
Idaho Code § 15-3-806 provides: "Failure of the Personal Representative to mail 
notice to a claimant of action on his claim for 60 days after the time for original presentation 
of the claim has expired has the·effect of a notice of allowance." LC. §15-3-806(a)(2015) 
The Estate's Disallowance of this Claim sixty-three (63) days after presentation of the 
verified Claim is u11ti.mely. Mr. Alt's claim is, therefore, deemed allowed. This Court should 
deny Summary Judgment and should deem this Claim allowed. 
The remainder of the Estate's argument concerning creditor claim rules is largely 
irrelevant to this discussion. Mr. Alt's claim was timely filed just thirty (30) days after filing 
of Petition or Formal Probate of Mr. and Mrs. Melton's estate on December 9, 2014. 
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Additionally, counsel raises the· false argument that the Estate has W1til August 19, 
2015, to disallow presented claims based upon the fonn on publication deadline. This is 
contrary to probate law. 
Idaho Code § 15-3-801 et seq. sets forth the manner in which claims may be 
presented. Idaho Code § 15-3-801 does provide for notice by publication, but also requires a 
personal representative to give written notice by mail or other delivety to any creditor known 
to the pe!,"SOnal representative. 
Regardless of any notice to creditors from the personal representative provided by 
subsection 801, a claimant may present a claim against the estate by delivering or mailing to 
the personal representative a written statement of the claim indicating its basis, name and 
address of the claimant, and the amount claimedJ and file a written statement of the claim in 
the form proscribed by rule with the Clerk of Court. I.C. §15-3~804(a). The Creditor's Claim 
starts the time for action by the Personal Representative, not the publication deadline. 
The Claim is deemed presented upon delivery or mailing of the statement to the 
Personal Representative or filing with the Court. 
In other words, the timeframe for disallowance of the claim commenced upon service 
of the claim on January 9, 2015, by U.S. Mail to attorney M.ary Cusack representing the 
Estate. Ms. Cusack did not disallow the claim until sixty-three (63) days later when she 
mailed here disallowance on March 13. 2015. 
FFATHE ::.-r~(.:~{@ ·i~orm The Estate's Disallowance is untimely and under statute, Mr. Alt's Claim is deemed i2~2J, 
Daniel}'>, Pca!herston allowed. 
Brent C. f'eathcrston• 
Jeremy P. Pcalhcrston 
Jc~mi L. Ossman · 
113 S. Secon<I Av~. 
Sait<lpoinl, JD 83864 
PhonQ (208) 263-6866 
fax (:Z08J 263-0400 
CREDITOR'S USPONS£ fO ESTATE'S MO'l10N FOR SUMMARY JlJDGMENT· 6 
Page 110 of 438
08-10- ' 15 16: 08 FROM-FEAT ' STON LAW FIRM 2082630400 T-294 P0008/0033 F- 101 
Daniel P. f'eftthcrston 
Brent C. f'eathcn;ton• 
Jeremy P. Peo.thcraton 
Jeremi L. Ossman 
113 $, So:,eon<I rwe, 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Phone (208) 263-6866 
Fax (208) 263-0400 
Jadwiga argues that the Claim should have been resubmitted upon her appointment. 
This also is inaq,curate. The statute cited above pennits the claimant to either serve the 
personal representative or file with the court, both of which occurred in this particular 
instance. The Claim was file stamped January 13th and mailed January 9th to .the Personal 
Representative. There is no basis for the Estate's claim that it should have been resubmitted. 
C. The Estate's Claim that original documents must be submitted. 
On this argument, the Estate again badly misconstrues the law in Idaho. Counsel for 
the Estate argues that the Cotu-t should dispose by Summary Judgment the Creditor's Claim 
for the reason that ''original documents" were not produced. Counsel cites the Court to Idaho 
Code §9-411. 
I.C. § 9-411 is an evidentiary provision that provides as follows: 
There can be no evidence o.f the contents of a writing other 
than the writing itself except in the following cases; 
(1) when the original has been lost or destroyed in which case 
proof of the loss or destruction must first be made; 
(2) when the original is in the possession of the party against 
whom the evidence is offered and he fails to produce it after 
reasonable notice; 
(3) when the original is a record or other document in the 
custody of a public officer; 
(4) when the original has been recorded and a certified copy of 
the record is made evidence by this code or other statutes; 
(5) when the original consists of numerous accounts or other 
documents which cannot be examined in court without great 
loss of time and the evidence sought from them is only the 
general result of the whole; and 
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( 6) when the original consists of medical charts or records of 
hospitals licenses in this state and the provisions of § 9A20 
Idaho Code have been followed. 
fu the cases mentioned in subdivisions (3), (4) and (6) a .£fil!Y 
of the original or of the record, must be produced and those 
mentioned in subdivisions (l) and (2) either- a copy or oral 
evid~nc~ of the content. 
LC.§ 9-411(2015) 
A cursory reading of the entire plain language of I.C. § 9.411 makes it immediately 
obvious that counsel's argument is misleading of Idaho law. Nothing in the statute requires 
that original documents be presented ~' in fact, the statute makes clear that for purposes of 
items (1), (2), (3), (4), and (6) in the Code Section, a copy is sufficient. Furthennore, a plain 
reading of the opening sentence makes clear that this is an evidentiary rule that prevents 
testimony as to the contents of a writing when neither a copy nor the original is presented. 
Additionally, counsel's argument disregards that this is an evidentiary rule, which 
may or may not apply when testimony is presented, but certainly does not apply to a 
det.ermination on summary judgment. 
The best evidence rule also reproduced in Idaho Rules of Evidence, Rule 1002, 
simply provides for a preference in favor of the original written instrument or document. See 
State v. Rosencrantz, 110 Idaho 124, 714 P.3d 93 (App.1986). 
Regardless, this Motion for Summary Judgment based upon Idaho Code § 9-114 is 
misplaced and misrepresents the law in Idaho. The Court should deny the State's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on these grounds. 
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D. Defect in Documents. 
The Estate's argument here is, frankly, puzzling. It seems that the Estate simply 
wants to argue the intent of the written debt obligation signed by Hedy Melton. Counsel for 
the Estate argues that there should have been a Deed of Trust to secure any obligation owed 
when Alt deeded the property back to Mr. and Mrs. Melton in 1999. Affidavit of Mary 
Cusack, Exhibit "B". The Estate concludes this argument by stating there are "too many 
unknowable facts regarding the documents to detennine the true intent and this court should 
find therefore that the documents do not show a debt owed to Alt and the claim should be 
disallowed.'' This is an assertion that is without factual support. The Estate did not submit 
any affidavit to reflect a different intent and the Estate concedes that the document signed by 
Hedy Melton states in German ·~he following credit on account>' before reciting the amounts 
borrowed by the Meltons from Mr. Alt. 
The Estate argues that the Quitclaim Deed in 1999 somehow obviates any credibility 
to Mr. Alt's claim of a loan. Counsel overlooks the "settled law of this state that a deed, 
absolute in form, the tenns of which are not ambiguous, may constitute a mortgage". 
Steuerer v. Richards, 155 Idaho 280, 311 P.3d 292 (2013). Without belaboring this issue, the 
existence of the Quitclaim Deed has no legal effect upon the Creditor's Claim here, which is 
in writing (th.e handwriting of the debtor) and signed by the debtor decedent. 
There is no basis for the Estate's claim that the documents attached to the Creditor's 
~~ Claim are defective or reflect a different intent than the obligation stated in the handwriting of 
DanielP. Featherston the decedent, Hedy Melton, and signed by her. The Estate's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Brent C. Featherston* 
Jeremy P. Featherston 
Jeremi L . O.rnnan 
113 S. $10<;ond Ave. 
S~ndpoint, lD 83864 
Phone (20&) 263-6866 
Fax (208) 263-0400 
should be denied. 
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E. The Estate's Claim of Time Barred by Hedy's Death. 
TI-le Estate argues that the Claim is time baned because the Claim is against Hedy 
Melton and her death in 2008 results in a time bar after three (3) years. Robert did not sign 
the document and his Estate is not obligated by the note. Both assertions are unfounded. 
Mr. Alt's verified Claim states the funds were lent to "Hedwig Melton and my step~ 
father Robert Melton'' for the purpose of acquiring land and building a home, the saine home 
now at issue in this Estate and titled to Robert and Hedwig Melton at the time of their deaths 
and at the time of the filing of the Petitio11 for Joint Probate of their Estates on December 9, 
2014. 
"A debt incurred during marriage is presumed to be a community debe' Gardner v, 
Gardner, 107 Idaho 650,662,691 P.2d 1275, 1277 (App.1984) 
Although the Gardner court went on to note that this is a rebuttable presumption, the 
burden is upon the party asserting the loan as separate property to P!ove that the ')lature of 
the loan proceeds" were separate property and that must be proven with "reasonable certainty 
and particularity". Gardner, supra. 
In Winn v. Winn, the court noted that "the proceeds of loans made upon the security 
of a spouse's separate estate are separate and those made upon the security of the community 
estate are community .••. This rule is based upon the fact that the estate providing the security 
is the primary source of repayment." Winn V; Winn, 105 Idaho 811, 814, 673 P.2d 41 1, 414 
(1983). 
While there may not technically be a ·"security" instrument, it appears that a Gift Deed 
was given to Alt initially as security for the loan repayment. Alt subsequently deeded the 
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property back to the Meltons. It is undisputed that the loan proceeds were used foi· purchase 
and development of the real property and home for both Mr. and Mrs. Melton, a.11.d that that 
property was titled as community property to the Meltons until their deaths. Therefore, the 
proceeds of the loan went to community assets and are community in nature. 
As to the debt instrument containing only Hedwig Melton's signature, Idaho Code 
makes clear that "either the husband or the wife shall have the right to manage and control the 
community property and either may bind the community property by contract". Idaho Code § 
32-912 (2015). 
In short, either Hedwig or Robert had the ability to encumber the community estate 
and obligate the community assets to repay Mr. Alt's loan. It does not require both 
signatures. 
The last section of the Estate's Motion for Summary Judgment seems to assert that 
because no claim was filed against Hedwig within three (3) years of her death, that the Alt 
Claim is time barred. This, again, misstates the law, but also grossly misrepresents the status 
of this litigation. 
Hedy Melton's Estate was never submitted for probate until Robert Melton's death 
and then not until eighteen (18) :months after his dead was the surviving spouse petition 
converted to a formal petition for administration of the joint estates of Robert Ernest and 
Hedwig "Hedy" Melton on December 9, 2014. 
The Estate improperly relies on Twin Falls Banlc v. Holley to argue that the debt was 
solely Hedy's debt. Twin Falls was a bank debt collection after Holleys divorce<l. The 
bank's notes were unsecured and incurred solely by Mr. Holley. The bank unsuccessfully 
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sought to collect against :Mrs. Holley and her share of the community assets received after she 
divorced Mr. Holley. The Holley court held that the bank's collection was restrained by basic 
debtor/creditor law. With no judgment against Mrs. Holley for contractual relationship, after 
the Holleys' divorce, the bank was only entitled to collect from their judgment debtor's 
assets. The District Court also found that an extension agreement between the bank and Mr. 
Holley extinguished the prior promissory- note executed while the Holleys were still married. 
The facts are distinguishable from this case and the dicta of the opinion unpersuasive. 
To suggest the Claim is time barred is simply disingenuous. Hedy Melton:1s Estate 
was not admitted for fonnal probate until Petition was filed December 9, 2014. Mr. Alt's 
Creditor's Claim was filed and served one (1) month later on January 9, 2015. 
It is absurd for the Estate to assert that "Hedwig died on August 11, 2008. Alt had 
until August 11, 2011, to file a claim in Hedwig's Estate." There was no "Estate" pending 
for probate until Jadwiga filed on December 9, 2014. Further, Idaho Code 15-3-1 11 
provides for joint probate in a single proceeding of both husband and wife's estate and further 
states that the three (3) year statute oflitnitations probate found in I.C. § 15-3-108 applies 
only to the death of the last spouse to have died. Mr. Alt's Creditor's Claim is timely and the 
Estate's Motion for Summary Jud~ent must be denied. 
F. Equitable Estoppel 
It is puzzling at best to understand the Estate's argument of equitable estoppel since 
the statute of limitations or time bar does not affect Mr. Alt's Claim for the reasons discussed 
above. This provision is also inapplicable and does not provide a basis for the Summary 
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Judgment Motion, nor is it a necessary consideration in the Court's denial of the Estate's 
Motion. 
G. Dead Man's Statute 
Once again, the Est.ate in its Motion for Summary Judgment, misconstrues Mr. Alt's 
Creditor's Claim and asserts to this Court that the dead man statute somehow prevents the 
claim from proceeding. The Estate argues that "Alt is asserting in Alfs claim that Robert 
assured him in the Fall of 2012 that his 1998 Will remained in effect .... This is exactly the 
type of testimony that is barred wider the dead man statute. Alt's claim should be disallowed 
in its entirety." Memorandum, p.14. 
Once again, the Estate seems to misconstrue and the posture of the litigation. The 
Petition for Joint Administration of Robert and Hedwig's Estates was filed December 9, 
2014, and this Creditor's Claim was filed January 9, 2015, one month later. The Claim does 
not rely upon whether or not the 1998 Will is valid and currently in effect. 
The Claim should be deemed allowed due to the untimely Disallowance by the Estate. 
Regardless, the dead man statute contained in Idaho Code§ 9-202(3) has no application in 
this instance. I.C. § 9-202 simply provides that ''the following persons cannot be witnesses: 
..... 3. Parties or assignors of parties to an action or proceeding, ox persons in whose behalf 
an action or proceeding is prosecuted against an executor or administrator, upon a claim or 
demand against the estate of a deceased person, as to any communication or agreement not in 
writing occurring before the death of such deceased person:" J.C.§ 9-202(3)(2015). 
This Claim is in writing, as evidenced by the attachments to the Claim. It is signed by 
the decedentt Hedwig Melton; who by law can bind the marital community. I.C. § 32-912. 
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The loan proceeds were for the benefit of the community, i.e., to purchase land and build a 
home and the Creditor's Claim is unaffected by conversations that occurred between Mr. Alt 
and Mr. Robert Melton after Hedwig's death. At future evidentiary proceedings, the Court 
may be required to consider the applicability of the dead man's statute. 
The statements contained in the verified Claim may be reflective of Mr. Melton's 
acknowledgement of the debt prior to his death, and also may be a basis for challenging the 
legitimacy of the Will, should Mr. Alt choose to do so in subsequent proceedings. It is not, 
however, a basis for disallowing the Claim, which was a community debt incurred for 
Meltons and signed by Hedwig Melton. 
This is not a circumstance in which a claim is based upon an unwritten obligation or 
oral promise made during the decedent's lifetime. The situation is distinguishable, therefore, 
from cases like Kolouch v. First Security Bank of Idaho, 128 Idaho , 186, 911 P .2d 779 
(App.1996) [in which a claim is based solely upon an oral communication with decedent.]2 
The Idaho Supreme Court recently opined on the "dead man's statute,, stating first 
that the statute contained in J.C. § 9-202(3) is virtually "identical" to I.RE. 60l(b). More 
importantly, in the Supreme Court stated that "the Court has not interpreted this provision so 
broadly as to bar testimony concerning a state of affairs or matters of fact occurring before a 
decedent's death.'' A:Qril Begµesse. Inc. v. Rammell, 156 Idaho 500, 515, 328 P.3d 480, 495 
(2014); quotjng Montgomety v. Montgomery, 147 Idaho 1, 8,205 P.3d 650,657 (2009). 
2 The Estate has not moved to strike any portion of the Claim. The statutory limitations 
found in Idaho Code§ 9-202(3) are also contained within the Idaho Rules of Evidence, 
Rule 601 (b ). As such, the issue here is an evidentiary issue first and foremost and it should 
be addressed by the Court, not on summary judgment, but during the court proceedings as 
to what testimony may be admitted in support of Mr. Alt's claim. 
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The Rammell court noted that the dead man statute and Rule 601 (b) have repeatedly 
been rejected as a means to disallow testimony at trial such that the rule and statute have been 
strictly construed only where the testimony was offered to "prove" the claim against the 
estate. Such testimony may be admissible as proffered by a third party, if it is not a claim 
against the estate that is being proven. or where testimony is being offered to defend against a 
counterclaim among several examples. 
For the reasons set forth herein, the Estate's assertion of the dead man's statute is 
inapplicable on a Motion for Summary Judgment and this Court should deny the Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the evidence submitted and available to the Court~ the Court should deny 
the Estate's Motion for Summary Judgment. The creditor, Heinz Alt, requests an award of 
attorney's fees and costs under I.R.C.P. Rule 11 against counsel and the Estate, as well as 
under I.C. § 12-120(3), 12-121 and 12-123. 
Further, the Court is asked to deny the Motion for SUlllIIUUY Judgment and to deem 
the Creditor's Claim allowed by virtue of the Estate's failure to timely disallow the claim. 
DATED this ;Aay of August, 2015. 
Attorney for Heinz Alt, Creditor 
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CERTIF~TE OF MAILING 
I hereby ce1tify that on the /I) day of August, 2015, I caused a true and conect copy 
of the foregoing document to be ~erved upon the following person(s) in the following 
manner: 
Mary W. Cusack, Esq. 
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC 
610 W. Hubbard, Suite 205 





U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Overnight Mall 
Hand delivered 
Facsimile No. (208) 667-0708 
Other: -----~---
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FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD. 
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON, ISB NO. 4602 
Attorney at Law 
113 South Second Avenue 
Sandpoint,Idaho 83864 
(208) 263-6866 
(208) 266-0400 (Fax) 
Attorney for Heinz Alt 
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r.r P'.JTY CLrnK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FffiST .nJDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
In the Matter of the Est.ate of 
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and 











CASE NO. CV-2013w0313 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL 
I, BRENT C. FEATHERSTON, being fust duly swo:m on oath, depose and say: 
I am over the age of majority and competent to testify to the matters set forth herein. 
I represent Heinz Alt, who is the son of Hedwig Melton and step-son of Robert Melton. 
Attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit "A" is a true and accurate copy 
of THE Petition for Fonnal Probate of Will and Fonn.al Appointment of Personal 
Representative filed December 9, 2014. 
Attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit "B" is a true and 
accurate copy of Heinz Alt's Claim Against Estate in the sum of $102,574.50 filed January 13, 
2015. 
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Further, your Aff;t sayeth naught. 
DATED tms/6 day of August, 2015. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
. Jl 
I hereby ce1tify that on the /0 day of August, 2015, I caused a true and conect copy of 
the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following manner: 
Mary W. Cusack, Esq. 
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC 
610 W. Hubbard, Suite 205 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
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Caeack Lar.u Ffum, PLLC 
Uo \IJ- -l 11 ... LL~,J, O .. ll .. H!J 
Cocul* d'Alene, Ictoho 0J014 
208·667•0640 
FAX: 208•667•0708 
MAP.Y w. CUSACK, J.O., LLM (Toxatlon) 
mc\lsack®mcusacl<law .com 
SENT VIA FACSIMILE (208) 263-0400 - 7 pages 
January 9, 2015 
Brent C. Featherston 
Feathereton Law Firm. Chtd. 
110 0. 06.:,.:,"~ Avt11uc. 
Sandpoint. Idaho 83864 
RE: Estate of Robert Ernest Matton and Hedwig "Hedy" Melton 
Boundary Cow,ty Case No. ·1 $-0$1 ~ 
Dear Brent: 
Enclosed are the documenta which I filed with the Court in this matter: 
T-294 P0020/0033 F-101 
1. Petition for Formal Probate of Wirt and Formal Appointment of Personai 
Representative (4 pages): 
2. AU6ptanea ~f A~~~il\tl"61\t (1 pc§ii:,-,), e111J 
3. Cfaim Against Estate for Homestead Allowance and for Exempt Property (1 
page). 
It is my understanding that today you are uending me the discovery for which r have a 
motion to compel hearing scheduled for next week. In addition, I understand that you 
are locating the Melton fUe and are sending me the contents of that file. 
If I rPnaiuP thAf infnrmitinn h\t Mnnrlay, I anfiriru1t1i I 1nrill r anral th• hearing current1~1 
o"'l1oduloJ (1,11 Join,~•, H)1 201~ ol 9.~0 a.111 . 
. .. ,, --~a'' . ,:~rr ... : - . -i~ ., 
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MARYW. CUSACK 
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC 
61 O W. Hubbard I Suite 205 
Coeur d'Alene. 10 83614 
(lOIS) 66'/w(Jt340 
(208) 667-0708 FAX 
ISR 1f"1~? 
T-294 P0021/0033 F-101 
IN THE OltTRICT COURT OF 1'HE Fl~ST JUDICIAL Ul!3 I t<I<.: I Ut- l lit;. 
STATE OF ILJAHO. IN /\ND FOR r~; COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
,~ the Metter of the IEatate of! ) 
) 
RO0CI rl l!t (Nl!.l-.: I M~L I UN ona ) 
Ht:UWI~ ''HEDY" MEL TON. ) 
) 
) 
Deceased. ) ____________ ) 
CAS~ NO. CV 1J .. •OJ1::J 
PSTITION FO~ FORMAL PROBATE: 
OF WILLAND 
FORMAL APPOINTMENT OF 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
(I.C. 15·3-402) 
PETITIONCR, JADWIGA 0. MC:LTON, &TATE€ AND REPR~Sl!NTS TO TMe 
COURT THAT: 
1. Petitioner's inltmt$l Ir', lhls matter is that of the spouse of the Decedent. 
2. (a) The pcroon whooo appolntmont a& ?eraonal Representativo is 
sought is the Petitioner and is qualified to act as such and has priority because there is no 
.JJtm;on with a higher or equal priority for appolntme,11l. 
(b) The status ln which such person seeks appointment is as the person 
nominated in Decedent ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON's Will. 
3. The Decedent. ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON. died on July 4, 2013, at the 
AOA of A1 Yfmr:;. and at the time of hhl death he own~t;I property in Boundary County, 
state of ldf'ho 
4. The marital community of ROBERT ERNt:$'1' MEL TON and HEDWIG 
1'HEOY11 MEL TON 'v-.JM, ,·JiMr,lvMI hy th~ rlll\~th nf ! ICOWIC "Hf OY" fv1Ei. TON o~ tt,o 11 th 
·f, 1-"t: 111 tUN t·UK rvkMAL r-ACJeATE l.'iF WILL ANO 
ronMAL Afll"'Ol~JTMCNT or, f"ERSONAI. AEP.AESENT/\TIV; 
(MJT00135667,00CX;1/2030'7, 100) 
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' 
J_, _I.I...~ ..• l, 1111 _ 11111.1111 1111111 1111 mi mn11 II 11 I I . I ·1 . fl n l'I' 
unoerstanmng me original WIii of HEC,WI~ "HECl'l111 M!L TON hs Ii, ll ,~ ..,v:;:si;:~:slu11 uf 
P"UUtrlU[\i\Vll l-UW i-11111, vlllU, VII ~1:JjJt~111IJ1e11 6, 11!, U,, .... u,.,·.tv11 Ltiw P'l,11,, 81,lJ., lllcJ 
a Motion to Convert Proceedings to .Supa,v/.~ad .Arlm1ni.~frr1tinn ,mrl fn nRfRrmlm~ 
T9stsc}1 ~d-iaid Motion contained a true and accurate copy nf thA WIii At hflr rlAAth. 
ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON was entitled to all the property of HEDWIG "HEDY" 
MEL TON by operation of law because all property owned by HEDWIG "HEDY'' 
MEL TON was community property, and ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON died before any 
pruct:1tjlflr1~ 1i~u 1,~~11 (;ut11111c1 n.c,J fvl' the;, pr¢bate of I ICDWIG '11 ICOV" MCL TON. 
l"'ursuant to I,\,;, 1 ~'.h1-111, me. estates or oom f'\uac~ , c~1~c\) , 1v1cL., v,..,, ~, ,u 
HEDWIG 11HEDY11 MEL TON may be joined for probate In this proceeding. 
4. Venue is proper because at the time of death the Decedents were domiciled 
i" Boundsry County. 
5. The names and addresses of the spouse, ehlldren, heirs, and devisees of 
the Decedents and other persons entitled to notice pursuant I.C. 15-3--403, and the ages of 
those who are minors so far as known or ascertainable with reasonable diligence by 
Petitlone.r are: 
1'111'\IVIC Cll t\LIIJ"C:00 
J.oJuul~-· o_ '-"·- ll, .... I • U"' 38 LIiac Place 
Gerald 0. M"ltun Legal 
27 402 Sunnyrldge Road 
Palos Verdes, California 90274 
l!rnoct S. Molton L8gsl 
2008 Silver Crest Drive 
Fairfield, California 94534 
OouAlas A. Melton Legal 
102 Hampton 
Hazel Park, Michigan 48030 
2. PETITION FOR FORMAL PROBATE OF WILL ANO 
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.. 
I 
Debr~ M. Nllkkula 
PO Box 57 
IVIOnawK, IVIICntgan '+~!:10U 
Carol A. Souole 
PO Box 923 
Centervllle, Utah 84014 
Brent C. Featherston 
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd. 
113 South Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
For Hflinl Alt 
Legal . Daughtor 
Legal Daughter 
Step-Son 
~. f•Ju l'\u,.uuuul ~uµ1 uuu11lullvu liuu Luu11 Uf.'fJVl11lvJ i11 ll ,i .. .. l.111l• 1.,11 • le.•wl u111qi 
whose appointment has not been terminated. 
7. Petitioner has neither received nor Is aware of any demand for notice of any 
probate or appointment proceeding concerning the Decedents other than the demand 
rnr.Aivoo by and on file with the Court. 
8. The time limit for formal probate or appointment has not expired because not 
moM tl'18n three yeers have psgaed slnoo nf.\oodont RORFRT FRNF.ST Mil. TON'r. do:1th. 
9. Tt,e erlaii,al &f the Decedent ROBERT ERNEST MSL TON'c WIii, d~tod 
December 17, 2010, Is In the possession of the Court. 
10. Petitioner believes that the Will, which is the subject of this application. was 
valldly executed. 
11 . t.iuino nvnrririarl rQiinnihla. nllloan,-.a. Patitinnfir l'i t 1nmnrr1rr nf ,mv 
il\stru,..ent 1'6Voklng tho WIii, whloh lo the oubjoot of 1hlo Potitlon 3nd believes that such Will 
constitutes Decedent ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON's Last WIii. 
12. Bond Is not required under I.C. 15-3-603. 
WHEReFORE, PETITIONER ~EQUESTS THAT: 
1. The Court fix a time and place of hearing. 
2. Notice be given as required by law. 
3. PErtrroN FOR FORMAL PROBATE OF WILL ANO 
J.ORMAL APPOINTMENT 01= Pi!RSONI\L R&PRESENTATIVE 
{MJT00135867.OOCX;1/20397.100) 
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~. - Decedent ROBE"T ERNEST MEL TON'l) Will, c.Jt1h:J D1:1¢~"ibe1· 1?, 2010, 
be formally probated, 
4. The Court find that JADWIGA B. MEL TON Is the only devlsee under 
"Decedent ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON1s WIU dated Cecember 17, 2010. 
5. JADWfGA B. MEL TON be formally appointed Personal Representative of 
the estate of the Decedents to act without bond. 
8. Upon qualification And Eu:-.r:r.r,t:tnr.A. I AttAm TAAtBmantery bo issueci, 
DATED lhls ~ day of December, 2014. 
=~6ud 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: 65 
County of Boundary ) · 
,c:,llllu, lt;I' JAeWl8A 0. MCL TOP~. L-.,;, ,~ qyv~M, !!Y! tl~at ti~~ faet8 oot fo,th in tho 
foregoing petition are true, accurate, and complete to the best of the Petitioner'$ 
knowledge and belief. ._ /} 
~w_,j; c.l, ((&7..M-3," 
/ JADWICA ~EL ro =-
Vpetltioner 
SUBSC~l§~Q"~D SWORN to before me this g!- day of December, 2014. ,,,, '•, 
,, .. ~ W, CU,r. ''•, 
" .... _ ~ •··•··••· ~,.. ··~ "'"" !II".• .... ,,., .. f ·~/~o'fAR..,•\ \ 
i { -·- } E NOTARYP IC 
\ .n\ l>ue~\C ,1~ ! · My commisal expires on G{ ((_ ( f1. "7'. ••• ···,£, ... 
Iii, ~1'. ········\)~ -~" 
4, Permd~tlR.~!~>t't PROBATE OF WILL ANO 
FORMAL APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIV(: 
(MJT0013i667,00CX;1120397, 100} 
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CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC 
610 West Hubbard St., Suite 205 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
(208) 667-0640 
(208) 667•0708 FAX 
ISB# 5332 
f IL_ t [> 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of the Estate of: ) 
) . CASE NO. CV 13 - 0313 
) ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON and 
HEDWIG 0 HEOY" MEL TON, ) CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE 
) FOR MOME€TEAD ALLOWANCI: AND 
) FOR EXEMPT PROPERTY 
) (I.C. 16-2-402, I ,C. 1 S-2-40:5) ____________ ) 
~l~im ,~ h@rot>v m~Q@ \1r.l~ln§t thl~ ~~t~w ~y: 
Name: JADWIGA B. MEL TON 
Address: 38 Lilac Place 
Sonnen; Ferry, Idaho 83805 
I :im tho £Urviving ~pou.:<i of ROBERT ERNEST MEL TOI\L 
l:lasls of ~!aim 
Homestead allowance pursuant to I.e. 15-2-402. 
Exempt property pursuant to I.C. 15"2-403 





WIGA B, MELrON 
4. 1101.f[OT[AO Af40 C)(CMr'T f'l10ric:nrv 
(MJT00135746.00CX;1f2.0397.100) 
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ICOPY 
MARY W. ·CUSACK 
CUSACI< LAW FIRM, PLLC 
610 West Hubbard St., Suite 205 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
(208) G07·0040 
~~uo~ oo,-u,oo ,A~ 
1S6#5332 
T-294 P0026/0033 F-101 
{ 
F\LEO 
lO\~ OlC --~ A\~ t,7 
-~· f¥ 1\~!r.ijT>V Gl~iffii{ --· 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In.the Matter of the Estate of: ) 
) 
ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON and ) 




STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Kootenai ) 
CASE NO. CV 13 - 0313 
ACCEPTANCE OF APPOINTMENT 
The undersigned hereby accepts appointment to the office of Personal 
Representative of the estate of the above-named Decedent and agrees to perform and 
discharge the trust of said office. The undersigned hereby submits personally to the 
jurisdiction of this Court in any proceeding relating to the estate that may be instituted by 
an interested person as de-fined by the Idaho Uniform Probate Code. 
DATED this~ day of December, 2014. 
WIGA6. 
MAAYW. CUSAC 
CUSACK LAW FIRM, Pl.LC 
61 o We&t H11bbard St, Suite 205 
. Coeur d'Aler,e, ID &3814 
"',P.:'!!!~·,i'f /X,,. SUBSCRIBED,~~. "'v~At)! to before me this ::i:::...·day of December, 2014. 
~'' ~..J... •••••••••• C'..t.. jl~ 
'd ~-·. ~ ~ { .:#/~o'fAR)' \ ~ . ~ 
~ \ -·-" I i NOTARYPuc 
\ \ PuB \." .l ~ I My· commission expires on q (I</ /J. 
,;, v'l'. .......... ~~ ~ l 
,,,,, -11'E o? ~ ,,•'" ,,. ,,,. 
1 • ACCEPTANCE OF APPOl1'!ft,tU~~T 
{MJT00136871,COCX:1/~oae1.100> 
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Oanitl P. Fcatllcn.fo11 
11,.,t1t C. ~lbeato~• 
J=y P. FoillbM;toU 
,~J:,.0,,,11181> 
113 S. 6ecood Ave. 
&asi<4Jolnt, ll:> 8!864 
PIMlM (2.08) 26'3-6866 
l'ax (208) zo,.o400 
([] COPY 
FF:ATBERSTON LAW .FlRM, CHTD. . 
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON, ISB NO. 4602 
Attorney at Law 
113 South Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
(208) 263-6866 
(208) 266-0400 (Fax) 
Attorney for He~ Alt 
L; ; r·· l --1 1 ,...o r .. , ....... "-'«I· 
Zij\) JM~ I 3 A \O: 3W 
S1\T[ OF :~! ;\ HO 
CD 1:q; 'f t1;; ;~:): ·i~:1 !\~{Y 
GL C;L,\ P·)::. !'v:;, CLUJ~ 
~--' ...... -- . . ·- _,. . , .,. .... - ···-·'- ---- --· . 
· .: · .. ~ :' C •. t :·. r~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TUE FIRST JUDICIAL DIS'IRICT OF TllE 
STATE _OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
In the Matter of the Estate of 









CASE NO. CV-2013-0313 
CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE 
(J.C. 15~3-,804) 
Claim is hereby made against this estate by ~Z ALT as follows: 
Basis of Claim, 
Loan 
Loan 





Plus interest accrued since said loans at the statutory prejudm~t nrte of twelve 
percent (12%) per annym. 
I hereby certify that my mother, Hedwig Melto~ and my step-father, Robert Melton, 
borrowed the total sllIIl of $102,574.50. Those sums were borrowed by the Decedents for the 
p\Jrpose of acquiring land and bnilding a home in Bonners Ferry~ Idaho, which is the subject 
of this litigation. 
I have attached as Exhibit "A" a trUe and accurate copy of the initial Note in her 
handwriting and signed by my mother) Hedwig E. Melton, certifying that she o~s the initial 
Cl,AIM AGAlNSl' IW'ATE • l 
·;.J·,.;. 
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D,ml.cl P. FealbtrllOD 
:Sr,:~C.F,,,.ll)..,.n,~1' 
Juemy P. Feammi~ 
]omult..°'1mA!l 
U3S.SOUllldAw. 
SIU!dpolil1, 'ID 8,864 
j>bono (20~ 1.63-6866 
F~ (20~) 263--0400 
sum through 1997 of $75,982.50. 1 am also attaching ftS Exhibit "B" a second Not.e in my 
mother's handwriting that carries forward the earlier balance · of $75,982.50 and adds 
additional loan amounts made to Robert and Hedwig Melton from July 3, 2001 through July 
1, 2008, in the additional sum of $26,592.00 for a touil of $102,574.50. I certify that the 
handwritten .numbers on Exhibit <'B'' are also the handwriting of my mother, Hedwig Melton. 
Attached hereto as Exhibit "C" is a true and accurate copy of the floor plan and 
design of the residence that was to be constructed with the funds borrowed from me by 
Robert~ Hedwig Melton cotlsisting of three (3) pages. Those three (3) pages are also in 
the handwriting of either Hedwig Melton and/or Robert Melton and were provided to me as 
part of the above-rererenced loan. 
lt was agreed that the property was initially placed m my name to secure repayment of 
the Joan. Subsequently, Robert Melton and Hedwig Melton executed Wills in 1998 
promising to leave all of their Estate to me, Heinz Alt, their son and step-son, as a means of 
full repayment. 
. . 
I was assured by Robert Melton in the F~ of2012 after his remarriage that his 1998 
Will remained in effect for the purpose of repayment of this loan. 
I am owed the sum of $75,982.50 that bas been acc~g interest at twelve percent '· 
(12%) since June 1, ]997 ($24.98 per diem) and an addittQDal $26>592,00 which has accrued 
interest at twelve percent (12%) since July 1, 2008 ($8.74 :pet diem). 
{ hereby make a claim against the Est.ates of Ro~lt and Hedwig Melton for these 
principal amounts together with accrued interest. 
,\ 
DATED this / ';;' day ofDe<,ember, 2014. \ -. 
t 
HEINZALT 
CUiM AGAnffi' ESfATE· Z 
~· 
; 
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D~ P, l'elilhantot> 
l'!re11t C.Ft4lllm!oo~ 
Jm,my P. f'e:.thl,mon 
!mmi l,, O&mtAO 
113 $ . Secood Ave. . 
Salldpoillf, ID 83864 
P!Joo~ (~08) 263-'i866 
Jlax (.208) 263-0400 
I 
UNITED STATES EMBASSY ) 
) ss: 
C0NSOLATE OF ____ _..J 
.:· . ' 
' ! ~: • . -~.1 .:~ t ~: ~-... ·.\· ,;::< : ~-]:'\ ': 
~.::·• 
On this ! '\.. day of De~mber in the year 2014, before me. ___ _ 
fJ)1.,i~' i -~1::..-t, r-.t/N tr(....;, ',-r • aNotacy Public in and for said Embassy, personally 
~ppetu'ed HElNZ ALT. known or identified to me ( or proved to me by or on oath) to me to 
be the p_erson whose nru:ne is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me 
that he executed the same. 
., _ 
• , ... 
..·· . .. ... 
-. , . 
. -.~ .... . : ~ : . , ' . ·· :· .. : 
. ,, ·, , i 
, ··- . 
. ·;-:· _.-'::':·:·::.3--~J ?i·:~·  . ' 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILJNG / 
al~ -.Jlhrtt4:ro/._ ~J 
I hereby certify that on tho '1:.__ day of~~201f I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoitl.s document to be served upon the followmg person(s) in the following 
manner: 
Mary W. Cusack, Esq. 
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC 
610 W. Hubbard, Suite 205 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
CLAIM A.GAINfil' EST AT.E -3 
['.)91] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ l IIand delivered 
[ ] Facsimile No. (208) 667-0708 
[ ] Other: ~--~~-
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MARY W. CUSACK 
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC 
320 E. Neider Avenue, Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83815 
(208) 667~0640 




Z0\5 ~UG 11 P 12: 21 
STATE Of IOi\HO y 
COUNTY Of BOUN.OAR 
GLEHOA POSTON, Ol.'EAA 
iY \ LA-A,") ~ --
Gfi? UTY CLE l< 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Tl-IE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of the Estate of: ) 
) CASE NO. CV 13-0313 
ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON and ) 
HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON, ) REPLY MEMORANDUM IN -SUPPORT 
) OF MOT[ ON FOR SUMMARY 
Deceased. ) JUDGMENT TO DENY CREDITOR 
) CLAIM _____________ ) 
COMES NOW, Petitioner, JADWIGA B. MEL TON ("Jadwiga"), tha Personal 
Representative of the above captioned estate, by and through her attorney of record, 
MARY W. CUSACK, of Cusack Law Firm,. PLLC, and hereby submits this Reply 
Memorandum In Support of Motion for Summary Judgment to Deny Creditor Claim. 
I. Heinz Alt's Creditor Claim lg D1wtlye and was Tlmely Dlsallowed. 
Heinz Alt (hereinafter "Alt") contends that he was unable to file a creditor's cl:im 
because this matter began as a summary administration under I.C. § 15-3-105. Alt seems 
to argue that he was somehow unable to file a creditor claim until after Jadwrga filed her 
Petition for formal probate. What Alt fails to mention is he, himself, could have ot:,ened 
the probate as a creditor. That option was available to him under l,C, § 15-3-203{a)(e) . 
1. REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
{MW COO 147 815.DOCX; 1 /20397 .100} 
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Instead of filing to open a probate, Alt only moved to convert the proceedings to 
supervised administration and to determine intestacy. At no time did Aft seek to become 
the Personal Representative, which he could have done as a purported creditor any tlme 
after 45 days elapsed after the death of Robert E. Melton (hereinafter 11Robert"). 
Alt does admit he served his claim "immediately by mail to Jadwiga's counsel on 
January 9, 2015" after he was served the Petition for formal probate. What Alt falls to 
admit is Jadwiga was not appointed Personal Representative when he filed his claim. 
After a contested hearing, Jadwiga was appointed Personal Representative on February 
2, 2015. What if Jadwiga had not been appointed Personal Representative? 
The Uniform Probate Code provides procedures that must be followed. I.C. § i5-
3-104 provides in relevant part: 
No proceeding to enforce a claim against the estate of a 
decedent or his successors may be revived or commenced 
before the appointment of a person el representative. After the 
appointment and until distribution, all proceedings and actions 
to enforce a claim against the estate are governed by the 
· · - pro·cedure· prescrl!Yed ·by-this .. chapter:- (emphasis ·added):··-···-·- · 
In order for a creditor claim to be timely filed, the creditor claim must be fi led with 
the court and the Personal Representative. I.C. § 15-3-804(a). The Personal 
Representative has four months from date of first publication to receive claims. I. C. § 15-
3-801 (a). Once the statutory claim period ends1 the Personal Representative has an 
additional 60 days to allow or disallow claims. I.C. § 15-3-806(a). The creditor claims are 
payable based on the priority as set forth in I.C , § 15-3-805, Alt's argument is 
nonsensical. If it were accurate, then creditors would be paid by whomever filed first 
This is absolutely contrary to Idaho's uniform probate code. 
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The Supreme Court of Idaho has stated as follows: 
The Interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which 
we exercise free review. It must begin with the literal words 
of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, 
and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as 
a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not 
construe It, but slrnply follows the law as written, Unless the 
result rs palpably absurd, we must assume that the legislature 
means what is clearly stated in the statute. If the statute as 
written is socially or otherwise unsound, the power to correct 
it Is legislative, not Judicial. 
In the Matter of the Estate of Bruce G. Miller, Jr., 143 Idaho 
5651 567 (2006) (internal citations omitted). 
@004/ 01 2 
Again, the date of first publication was February 19, 2015·. Creditors has until June 
191 2015 to file claims. The Personal Representative has until August 19, 2015 to disallow 
any claims filed. Alt's claim was not filed with the Personal Representative and the Court. 
Even if it is deemed as filed correctly, Jadwiga timely disallowed the claim in its entirety. 
Based on Idaho's uniform probate code, Jadwiga timely disallowed the claim and it should 
not be treated as automatically allowed. In addition, Alt's claim should faif because it was 
-·~ .... . -····· ·· ··· · . ······-·· - ..... .... ... "··----·--·- ............ '. ······· . ... ·············-· ··--- .. , ... , .. ...... ... .. . ·· ·····- .... ' . ··-···-··· ··· . .. ··-· · .. ... .. .. ·-----·---·---· · .... . 
not filed in conformance with Idaho's uniform probate code . This court should grant 
Jadwiga's request for summary judgment as a matter of law. 
II. Alt's Claim Is not Supported by Admissible Evidence. 
When a party relies on written evidence, Idaho's "best evidence rule," I.C, § 
9-411, requires submission of the original writing except in six delineated circumstances, 
only two of which could possibly apply under these circumstances1: (1) if Alt submitted 
1 There is nothing in tile record that remotely indicates that the exhibits attached to Heinz's Claim against 
Estate are in the custody of a public officer, are recorded, are too voluminous to be practicably examined, 
or contain medical l'ecords. Therefore paragraphs 3 through 6 of§ 9-411 need not be addressed. 
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proof that the orlglnals were lost or destroyed, or (2) If the Estate had possession of the 
originals and refused to produce them at Alt's request. Contrary to Alt's assertions, I.C. 
§ 9-411 unequivocally requires the original document unless one of the exceptions 
applies, in which case 11either a copy or oral evidence of the contents" is acceptable. 
However, Alt has pied neither of these exceptions, so his failure to provide the original 
documents renders Inadmissible the exhibits attached to his Claim against Estate. Alt 
provides no authority for his assertion that Idaho's evidentiary rules somehow do not 
apply to summary judgment proceedings . See I. R.E. 101 ("[The Idaho Rules of Evidence} 
govern all actions, cases and proceedings in the courts of the State of Idaho and all 
actions, cases and proceedings to which rules of evidence are applicable, except as 
hereinafter provided."). 
Alt also ignores entirely the Estate's arguments that the exhibits were not proper!y 
authenticated under I.R.E. 901 (a). As discussed in the Estate's Memorandum in Support 
of Summary Judgment, Alt has not testified as to having witnessed Hedwig "Hedy" 
Melton's (hereinafter "HedwigJI) signature, provided evidence of Hedwig's handwriting, or 
Identified a subscribing witness. The Estate's concerns are serious 1i1nder these 
. 
circumstances. Significant portions of Alt's exhibits contain drastic vari~ces in the 
\ 
handwriting, with some portions hand-printed in block lettering and others written in 
cursive. Even the languages used are inconsistent. For instance, without adequate 
authentication, the Court cannot be certain as to whether certain portions of Alt's exh ibits 
(e.g. the "Folgende Credite auf Konto" language) were added after Hedwig allegedly 
signed the document or by another person. Therefore, the Court should disregard the 
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exhibits attached to Alt's Claim against Estate based on his disregard for Idaho's 
evidentiary rules. Even when asked in discovery for addltlonal information, Alt's response 
was 11see pleadings and Claim Against Estate filed with Court." Alt has not provided any 
admissible evidence to support his claim. This Court should grant Jadwiga's motion for 
summary judgment as a matter of law. 
Ill, Heinz Alt's Evidence Is lnvalld on its Face. 
Alt1s documentation of the alleged loan to Hedwig remains ineffective 
notwithstanding the arguments raised in his Response brief. Even if the exhibits attached 
to Alt's Claim Against the Estate could be adequately authenticated (whlch they cannot), 
they do not contain terms sufficient to bind any person or entity, including the Estate. 
None of the exhibits contain terms sufficient to constitute a note, a draft, or any sort of 
negotiable instrument, which must contain "an unconditional promise or order to pay a 
fixed amount of money, with or without interest or other charges described in the promise 
or order" and be payable on demand or at a definite time to the bearer or to order. See 
Alt's exhibits do not even satisfy the elements of a valid contract To be 
enforceable, a contract must "be sufficiently definite and certain in its terms and 
requirements so that it can be determined what acts are to be performed and when 
performance Is complete.'' Dales Se/Vice Co,, /no. v. Jones, 96 Idaho 662 (1975) 
(overruled on other grounds by Peavey v. Pellandini, 97 Idaho 655 (1976)) . The Court in 
Dales Se/Vice Co. explained: 
A court cannot enforce a contract unless it can determine what 
it is. It is not enough that the parties think that they have made 
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a contract; they must have expressed therr intentions in a 
manner that is capable of understanding. It is not even enough 
that they have actually agreed 1 if their expressions, when 
interpreted in the light of accompanying factors and 
circumstances, are not such that the court can determine what 
the terms of that agreement are. Vagueness of expression, 
indefiniteness and uncertainty as to any of the essential terms 
of an agreement, have been held to prevent the creation of an 
enforceable contract. 
Id. (quoting 1 Corbin on Contracts 394, § 95 (1963)). 
[§.1007/ 012 
Here, Alt relies on a German phrase "Folgende Credite auf Konto" (which loosely 
translates to uthe following credit on account") as somehow imposing a contractual 
obligation to pay the monetary sums listed on the page plus 12% interest. However, 
nothing in Alt's exhibits states any promise to pay, a payor or a payee, the time for 
compliance, and it certainly does not memorialize an interest rate of 12%. Alt has offered 
no evidence of any Idiomatic significance to that German phrase which would Imply 
anything more than its obscure literal meaning. There is simply no evidence of any 
manifestations of assent by Hedwig, Robert, or the Estate to be bound by any payment 
obligations to Alt that would create a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to avoid 
summary judgment In the Estate's favor. 
IV. Idaho's Deadman's Statute Precludes Alt from Introducing Additional 
Evidence Needed to Prevail at Trial. 
Since the exhibits attached to Alt's Claim against Estate are facially insufficient to 
create an agreement to pay, and no additional written evidence has been supplied, Alt 
cannot establish an enforceable written contract. The only remaining evidence offered In 
support of his Claim against Estate is Alt's own testimony alleging the oral agreement of 
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Robert and Hedwig to devise their estates to Alt. However, such testimony falls squarely 
under the prohibitions of the Idaho Deadman's Statute, I.C. § 9-202(3), 
The Dead man's Statute, in conjunction with Idaho Rule of Evidence 601 (b), 
11prohiblt[sJ a party making a claim against an estate from testifying as to any unwritten 
communication with the deceased.'' Lunders v. Estate of Snyder, 131 Idaho 689, 698-99 
(1998). In this matter, Alt cannot circumvent the Deadman's Statute by lntrod clng written 
exhibits purporting to somehow corrobor~te his alleged oral agreement with Hedwig and 
Robert. In Lunders, a real estate broker sued the estate of a decedent for payment of a 
sales commission set forth In a wrjtten listing agreement. Id. at 892. The decedent's 
estate disputed the claim on the grounds that the broker inter alia sold the property at an 
insufficient price. Id. at 695-96. The Court held that the broker's testimony regarding the 
decedent's oral authorization to sell the property at a price lower than specified in the 
llstlng agreement violated the Deadman's Statute because he was making a claim against 
the decedent's estate and was testifying about an unwritten communication wlth the 
decedent. Id. at 698-99. Therefore the Deadman's Statute applies to all unwritten 
communications with a decedent, even those that may potentially relate to a written 
document. 
In his Claim against Estate, Alt insists that 11[i]t was agreed that the property was 
initially placed in my name to secure repayment of the loan" and that "I was assured by 
Robert Melton In the Fall of 2012 after his remarriage that his 1998 Will remained ln effect 
for the purpose of repayment of this loan. (Emphasis added). Of course, had Alt's 
exhibits actually memorialized such terms, his testimony regarding the oral 
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communications of Hedwig and Robert would not have been necessary. Alt's allegations 
of oral representations and agreements by Hedwig and Robert are nothing more than 
testimony of unwritten communications by decedents asserted by a claimant against their 
estates - precisely the sort of testimony the Deadman's Statute was contemplated to 
prevent Alt's citation to April Beguesse, Inc. -v, Remme/I, 156 Idaho 500, 51 5 (2014 ), 
which merely held that the Oeadman's Statute did not apply to claims against parties 
other than a decedent's estate, does r;iot change this analysis. Thus, Alt cannot testify as 
to oral agreements with Hedwig and/or Robert in support of his effort to create a contract 
from the clearly insufficient exhibits submitted in support of his Claim against Estate, 
V. Alt's Failure to Timely Enforce his Clalm against Hedwig's E!.tfil.Mi 
B@rr1£11he Cl@lm as to Hedwig's Marital Community. 
Alt cites to I.C. § 15~3-111 to support the timeliness of his Claim against Estate. 
That statute, however, does nothing to validate his claim. Section 15-3-111 merely 
extends the three-year period for bringing an 11 informal probate or appointment proceeding 
Joint probates. Alt offers no authority whatsoever for extending the limitations period set 
forth 1n I. C. § 15-3-803, which strictly prohibits clarms against a decedent's estate unless 
presented within "three (3) years filter the decedent's death." (Emphasis added). This 
statute contains no special exceptions for based on the date a will is submitted for probate 
or in Instances of joint probates. Accordingly, Alt's deadlfne to assert a claim against 
Hedwig's estate lapsed three years after her death on August 11, 2008. 
As the Estate has already explained, even if Alt's Claim against Estate could be 
construed as a "community debt/ it would have no effect on § 15-3-803's three~year 
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" 
limitations period commencing on Hedwig's death. Once again, Twin Falls Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Holley, 111 Idaho 349, 352 (1986), comprehensively explains the dlstinctict'I the 
contractual liability of a married debtor and the collection of the liability from the assets of 
the marital community. As the Holley Court noted, "[a] lending Institution may have a 
creditor-debtor relationship with either spouse separately or with both jointly .. , . [T]ha 
community property system does not affect the fundamental principles governing such a 
relationship and the procedures required of a creditor In order tq collect upon his 
debt. Rather, the community property system merely affects the type or kinds of property 
to which the creditor may look for satisfaction of his unpaid debt." Id. (emphasis added). 
Alt's attempts to distinguish Holley from the case at hand are outright misleading. 
The Holley's divorce had no bearing on the vulnerability o-f their former community 
property. The Court even suggested that the lender "could have proceeded by execution 
against the community property which had been awarded to [the non-signatory spouse]" 
after the promissory note became due. Id. at 353. Although the trial court based its ruling 
on an extension agreement executed after the divorce, which was deemed to have 
"extinguished" the original promissory note, the Idaho Supreme Court expressly declined 
to render a decision on that basis. Id. at 354. Instead, the Court relied on Mr. Holley's 
(the signatory spouse) post-divorce bankruptcy, which discharged his obligations to the 
lender, including the promissory note that he signed. Id. at 353. Since Mrs. Holley did 
not sign the promissory note, "and thus was not personally liable for that obligatior;, " the 
Court held that the lender could not go after any portion of her assets even though she 
did not, herself, declare bankruptcy. Id. 
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The facts of Holley are directly pertinent to the case at hand. Hedwlg 1 like Mr. 
Holley1 was the only spouse alleged to have signed any written agreement. Hence, she 
was the only party who could have been personally liable on that purported contract. 
Once the limitations period of I.C. § 15-3-803 ran three years after Hedwig's death, the 
only potentially liable party had been discharged, just like Mr. Holley's bankruptcy 
discharged the only party liable on the promissory note. Accordingly, all contractual 
liability that could have conceivably been collected from any separate or community 
property assets of Hedwig or Robert as a result of Hedwig's signature was extinguished 
by Alt' s failure to enforce such liabilities before August 11, 2011. 
In his Creditor's Response to Estate's Motion for Summary Judgment, Alt alleges 
the 11property was titled as community property to the Meltons until their deaths," end "the 
proceeds of the loan went to community assets and are community in nature.0 On or 
about September 6, 2013, Alt filed a Motion to Convert Proceedings to S pervised 
Administration and to Determine Testacy (hereinafter the "Motion"), Under Parag·aph 2 
of the Motion, Alt asserts "The marital community of the decedent and Hedwig Meiton 
was dissolved by the death of Hedwig Melton on 08-11~2008." Alt has admiite ', and 
accepted, that the marital community between Robert and Hedwig was dissolved by 
Hedwig's death. Hedwig, by her signature alone, could bind her separate property and 
the community property. Yet, at her death, there is no more community property. Alt is 
statutorily barred from collecting a purported debt of Hedwig's against the separate 
property of Robert. This Court must grant Jadwiga's motion for summary judgment as a 
matter of law. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, there are no genuine issues of material fact as to any 
issues raised in the foregoing Motion for Summary Judgment and Jadwlga is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, Petitioner Jadwiga B. Melton respectfu lly 
requests this Court GRANT her Motion for Summary Judgment. 
11}1 .. DATEDthis f.. dayofAugust2015. 
SACK, 
Attorney for ADWIGA MEL TON 
Personal Representative 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the~ day of August 2015, I caused a true and 
accurate copy of the forgoing document to be served by facsimile and via email thereon, 
·and adcffesse<rto··tfie .. toHow,n9: -· · .... --.. _ ... ..... ... ·· .... ....... ·· ... .. ......... -... .. ... ..... ·· · · ·· .. ··· · · ...... · .. ...... ... ........ .. · .. .. 
Brent C. Featherston 
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd. 
113 S. Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
(208) 263-0400 - FAX 
Sent via email: 
cynthia@featherstonlaw.com 
brent@featherston1aw.com 
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(208) 687-0640 
(208) 667-0708 - FAX 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF Ti--lE 
Si ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of the Estate of; ) 
) 
ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON and ) 




TO: HEINZ ALT 
c/o Featherston law Firm, Chtd. 
Brent Featherston 
113 South Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
CASE NO. CV 13-0313 
NOTICE OF 
DISALLOWANCE OF CLAIM 
~0 02/ 003 
This office received your Patl~lon to Allow Claims on May 4, 2015, regarding Zhe 
Claim Against Estate dated December 15, 2014, in the aggregate amount of 
, •• H• • •-••-•-• ••• •• •- -• •• -••••••00- • • • •- • • ,.o--•••-••• ,, ·--•••, ___ -- - · - -• ff ••••••• • ••-• •••••••••••• - • - • •• • •••••••--•- --·-- .. · - • - • • • • •• • • • •M ·~- •• • •• -•••- • • • , ... ,. . -·--··----·-·- •• ••••••- • • •• • • ••••• - • • •• •••.,••• • •• ••••--•--•"•••••••••- • •• 
$102,574.50. 
The Petition to Allow Claims Is disallowed In Its entirety. 
The Personal Representative denies the Claimant's claim in its entirety fot th,';; 
following reasons; 
1. The Claimant assert.s his clalm filed on January 9, 2015 was correot!y 
filed, but it appears that the claim is defective as filed. If the Court determine~ the 
Petition to Allow Claims is a validly filed claim, the Personal Representative is also 
disallowing the Petition in its entirety. 
2. The Petition is not timely filed as it is barred by the statute of i!mitat!one. 
Hedwig "Hedy' Melton died on the 11 th day of August, 2008. Therefore, the c!,Slim 
1. DISALLOWANCE OF CREDITOR CLAIM 
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should have been filed on or before the 11 th day of August, 2011. This claim against 
Hedwig "Hedy" Melton's estate is now tlme-barred. 
3. The documentation fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted 
as there is no promissory note and no evidence of debt owed by Robert Ernest Melton, 
4. The documentation provided has not been authenticated es signed by 
Hedwig ''Hedy'' Melton. Therefore, the documentatlon supplied Is Insufficient, and the 
Personal Representative has no independent way of determining whether tha amount 
contained therein is accurate or valid, and therefore disallows this claim in its entirety, 
Failure to protest this disallowance by filing a Petition for Allowance with the 
above-named Court or commencing a proceeding against the Personal Representative 
within sixty (60) days of the mail ing of this notice shall result in your claim being forever 
barred. 
DATED this±_ day of August 2015. 
SACK, on behalf of 
MEL TON, Personal 
Representative of the Estates of 
ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON and 
HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON, deceased. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
- -· ·····---·-··--···· .. ·---·- ·-······-·-There bf certltythat on ·the -···-@h·--aay of August ZO~ s,·-i-caused a true · and ·correcr ·- ----- ---·-···--·--
copy of the following NOTICE OF DISALLOWANCE OF CLAIM to be served by facsimile and 
electronic mail to the following: 
HEINZ ALT 
c/o Featherston law Firm, Chtd. 
Brent Featherston 
113 South Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
(208) 263-0400- FAX 
cynthla@featherstonlaw.com - ELECTRONIC MAIL 
brent@featherstonlaw.com - ELECTRONIC MAIL 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 




Justin W. Julian 
Della A. Armstrong 
CASE NO. 
DATE: 8/24/2015 TIME: 9:31 am 
CLERK: COURTROOM: 001 






Robert Ernest Melton 
Jadwiga B. Melton 
Heinz Alt 
Mary W. Cusack 
Brent C. Featherston 
SUBJECT OF PROCEEDINGS: Motion for Summary Judgment 
LEGEND Ct Court (Judge) St State • Di Direct Examination 
Plf Plaintiff Pet Petitioner Redi Redirect Examination 
Dft Defendant Resp Respondent X Cross Examination 
: ~ r 
PA Plaintiff's Attorney PA Petitioner's Attorney Rex Recross Examination 
DA Defendant's Attorney RA Respondent's Attorney Juv Juvenile .. 
INDEX SPEAKER PHASE OF CASE 
9:31 Ct In session, calls case. Cusack present for J. Melton. Featherston 
. present. Time scheduled for a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by 
I_ 11 the estate on a denial of creditor's claim of H. Alt. Both parties have 
11 • il I filed memorandums and exhibits and the Court has reviewed all those I 
- documents. Any resolution? 
Counsel No 
- - - - - .. - ~ 7 
- Ct Ms. Cusack, you may proceed with argument 
Cusack Filed motion for summary judgment on creditor's claim. Defective for 
) several reasons , first question is how to file a credit's claim. Have an 
illustration for the Court. 
Ct You may approach - - - - - --
'I 
. 
Cusack As noted in memorandum, reviews statute of limitations. Cites estate 
statutes 
-
Ct - Mr. Featherston's response is joint probate, tolled until second probate 
commences. Why is his position wrong? 
Cusack No statute that covers that. Summary administration where spouse 
L 
takes all the assets and debts. Real property titled in both spouses, • - - judicial economy. Otherwise would have to do quiet title. Statute is It• - . clear it is as to the decedent. Says nothing regarding extending the . • statute of limitations . 
Ct You may proceed -
-
~ 
II~ - Cusack Statute of limitations applies to Mr. Melton's estate. Had until June 1 gm 
to file cla im. Argument is allowed if not denied within 60 days not 
correct. Must be filed with personal rep. and Court. Deemed to be filed 
C ,-.. -- .-,-· 
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the later of the two dates. Original time would be been between Feb. 19 
and June 19. First in line, first riqht 
Ct Don't see it that way. Four month time to make claim. Estate's 
responsibility to deny or approve within 60 days. You seem to be 
reading it as no action to be taken until end of publication period. 
Cusack How do you allocate claims? 
Ct Not allocating priority in that point in time. Allow or deny, wait until they 
all come in, then allocate priority 
Cusack Even if the Estate is not reading correctly the statute of limitations 
Ct Seems like there is a missing link. Estate is arguing shouldn't be 
1, allowed. Mr. Featherston, do not see your filing regarding summary I I 
judqment to be heard today 
Featherston If deny summary judgment today would file separate motion or 
allowance 
Ct Wanted to make sure was not missing operative pleading. Will not rule 
on that issue today. Will help focus argument. 
Cusack Don't understand 
-
- Ct Featherston seems to ask Court enter ruling today, but nothing before 
' 11 the Court to allow to rule on that today 
Cusack To say that his claim is automatically allowed? - (J ~- - • 
~ 
Ct Yes 
I.. ,. Cusack Statute says have to do both , file with personal rep and the Court and 
' deemed to be filed the later of the two. Filed with the personal rep ,1 
1 /9/15 and then 1 /13/15 with the Court. Exactly 60 days later. 
Ct Not deciding that issue today. No motion for summary judgment on that 
issue. 
Cusack Correct 
- - -- " . .~~r - - - . - - --
Ct Will not be addressing that today 
~ 
.- Cusack Two issues. Is that document a debt, and is it collectable. Doesn't meet 
--
I j I qualifications to be a debt, reviews reasons. Does not elevate to 
k 
11 11 negotiable instrument. If it's a contact needs to be definite enough to I 
LI ll I 
. 
ll 
'I - I enforce. Cannot be promissory note, no time compliance. His I· ~ -~ , .. l • documentation that he's used as his claim against the estate does not -. ~ . I~ 111 elevate to promissory note. If it can be construed as a promissory note, 1; is it enforceable? If monies was used as indicated, other remedies 1-. . 
~ 
.--1 were available but did not use. Bankruptcy ended statute of limitations. 






Post divorce versus property that is community in nature? riii""' .. 
Cusack Had community property together, - - . -h...C 
a 
Ct Holly case bank only had contract with one person 
- Cusack Exactly what happened here. After death is separate property. Same r r 
things occur in death and divorce. 
Ct -. Wasn't probated. He didn't get it. Estate was not probated. Her estate -
owned it. - Cusack Cannot probate a will after three years. Automatically goes to spouse. ,,,. Cites Idaho code. Intestacy estate goes to surviving spouse. Mr. Alt 
I could have gone after his claim in Heddy's estate. After three years it ' " , 
... 
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became Robert's separate property. -
Ct SurvivinQ spouse must assume indebtedness -
Cusack He didn 't sign for it 
Ct He gets more by not probating? 
Cusack Cannot extend creditor's claim. Set by statute. Did not assume debt. 
Ct Continue with argument 
Cusack Has three years to file claim. Cannot file in Robert's estate. Community 
property statute says can bind but ended with her death . Becomes 
separate property of Robert. Lost his opportunity to collect 
Ct Wish to pursue arguments you 've made in your motion for summary 
judgment? 
Cusack Not authenticated. Does not elevate to promissory note. No claim to be 
collected. 
Ct Court can only grant summary judgment if no genuine issue of material 
- fact. If ambiQuous Court must rule in favor of the opposinQ party 
Cusack No one would say this is a promissory note. Four corners of the 
document 
I Ct Do you have authority regarding requirement to stand alone? Within 
estate? You are also arguing the dead man's statute 
- Cusack All the rules of evidence in regular civil proceeding apply in estates 
Ct In regular civil court you have verbal agreements that are enforceable. 
I 
May be supported by testimony. Do you have authority? ~ 
Cusack Dead man's statute. No one can say that is what occurred - -
Ct Is there a distinction between him testifying to verbal agreement versus 
I written document? 
-
Cusack Under the dead man's statute he cannot testify to those thinQs b!: 
Ct Your position is that dead man's statute prevents him from 
supplementing? l~ -
Cusack Yes because it is self serving 
. - -
Ct Everyone is here today because it is self serving . Position is that under 
the law, if contact is defective the dead man statute prevents him from 
n testifying to supplement that document - Cusack Yes --
Ct Mr. Featherston? rf 
Featherston Reviews issues, identifies issues left. Estate was filed jointly. ~-
Ct Expect the answer of the estate is to clear Hedwig's name from the - . • 
title , argument is it doesn't impact three year statute of limitations. I I' 
What's your response? I• ~ ,111 
-
Featherston Review statute, does set a bar on creditor's claims. Creditor cannot -
- make a claim until estate is open ~i - Ct - - Creditor has standing to open an estate. Client could have opened ~ l 
estate and pursued the claim that way. Why wouldn't claim be barred 
now? - Featherston Statute of limitations does begin to run until estate is filed . Sole 
obligation or community debt. Refers to Holly case, doesn't have 
\ 
I bearing in this case. Reviews supreme Court ruling . Joint estate of I 
-- Meltons. Three year statute is not a bar aQainst the creditor's claim. I = -
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Statute specifically permits what has occurred here. 
-
Point to that section? 
Reviews statutes, joint proceeding, three year statute to limitations 
applies only to last spouse that dies. Gives extended time. Follow in 
probate proceeding we have today. Gave Mr. Alt opportunity to file 
claim. 
Reviewing statute. Reviews probation limitation. How do interpret that 
in light of 803, limitation of claims against estate. Seems as though 
they are talking about two separate things here. 
Don't follow your question 
108 is general statute. 803 also has three year limitation. What is your 
argument how the three year extension in 108 by virtue of 108 impacts 
803. Which is essentially your argument? 
803 gives us the answer, limitation of presentation of claim. Affidavit 
states received notice as creditor and then filed a claim in response. 
Fall under later provision. -
Notice to creditors creates a resurrection of time limits 
Three years is suspended because joint nature of husband and wife. 
Want to be clear. Language under 111 dovetails into 803 where three 
year presentation begins upon second spouse's death or when you get 
the actual notice 
Yes. Counsel's argument suggests that one should defer probating 
estate to wipe out creditor's claims. 
In most cases the debt incurred by both parties would be collectable or 
creditors could open their own estate 
Legislature is not granting a carte blanche to wipe out separate debt of 
first spouse to die. Debt and assets were all of community nature here. 
Believe legislature intended the specific statute should be read to 
override the general statute. Time frames begin for the first time upon 
probate of second spouse. Would like to rebut some arguments. Issue 
about commencement of action. Reviews statute and pleadings. 
Don't believe those issues are relevant. 
Commencing proceedings on a claim versus proceeding on the filing of 
a claim. Will move on. The other issue is argument about whether we 
can trust the documents reflect a debt obligation. This is a summary 
judgment proceeding. Must prove to the court by clear and convincing 
evidence. Has not met that burden. Set of wills done in our office by 
Heddy and Robert Milton that leaves everything to Mr. Alt. Signature of 
document, money loaned, money used to make payments on house . 
Mr. Alt testifies that after Mr. Milton remarried conversation occurred 
regarding wills still being in effect. Not sure if estate is still attacking the 
document for lack of authenticity 





Not concerned with that at a summary judgment hearing. What is your 
position on dead man's statute reQardinQ Mr. Alt's ability to testify? 
No motion to strike. ~'I 
-- - - ,, __ ,._, -- . -- ;= -· L 















Ct Argument in motion for summary judQment 
Featherston No motion in limine. Didn't read it that was. Would need time to brief. 
Ct Larger picture that written documents are not a contact and that Mr. Alt 
cannot testify to explain what they mean. 
10:20 Featherson Dead man's statute has been read very narrowly. Pursuant of purely 
oral claim or promise to inherit. These items are specifically barred. 
Cannot make creditor's claim on oral agreement. 
Ct Reviews specific statute to address 
~ 
Featherston Conversation is in the context of documents that date back ten to 
twelve years. 
Ct Position is that client may testify for purpose of clarifying written • , 
documents. ~ 
Featherston Not barred by dead man's statutes 
Ct Supreme Court has ruled that evidence would apply if conflicts with 
statute 
Featherston Haven't looked at that. No motion in limine. My focus is that this 
I Ii l! II statement doesn't warrant summary judgment. Community obligation. I - Testimony is admissible for a variety of reasons or to amplify the .. _ 
understanding of the parties 7 
Ct 
.-
Anything further? - '-, 
Featherston Not sure. Some issues have not been argued here today. Would hope 
\11-~ - to have an opportunity to rebut something new 
J Ct Ms. Cusack? 
- ---- r-----. 
- I 
Cusack Interpretation of general and specific statutes is misplaced. Argument 
11 of counsel is statute of limitations are tolled until second spouse 
L_ -·- passes, neQates the purpose. Cites case law a_ 
[ 
Ct Not exactly the same case. General community debt case. Debt -J 
obligation. Does not have statute of limitations and probate issues 
['~ Cusack Statute of limitations - Ct Understand that distinction between the parties positions. Anything J 
~ 
- ..-; further? 
I~ Cusack Going back to the dead man's statutes, documents don't constitute a - debt. Absolutely prohibits testimony. Cites case law. Four corners of ' " 
- "II - the document 




Cusack I Don't rise to level of promissory note. Statute of limitations has run. 1' ,1 
•..J LJ Could have opened probation matter 45 days after she died. Nothing 11,, I--' -- , _- - happened. Rules must be followed. 
Ct 
~ 
Struggling with assertion that the instant Heddy died it becomes -
1-: Robert's separate property. Community estate must move forward in n 
I time. 
Cusack Three years after Heddy died would be community. After three years 
J-Jl I there is no more opportunity. No longer community property. Can go i'1 
11 after community debt but only for short period of time 
Ct ' Anything further? _;:;_., . - - .... ----.. :-- -- ........ ,.~ Cusack No L-.lo ..... --- = ~ - - ~"'! 
~ 
- . Ct AnythinQ new touched on that you feel you need to response to? - ~ 
1- - . ---~ 
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Featherston I don't think so. 
10:32 Ct Will answer some issues now and some later. 
Featherston Written agreement is between mother and son . Other documents 
support knowledge of agreement 
Ct Discussion on page nine is not what you put in a brief when seeking 
summary judgment. You have now said that it is not crystal clear. 
I 
I Summary Judgment must be denied. Equitable estoppal not applying, 





something out. Things are not crystal clear enough for summary 
judgment. Not appropriate to rule on dead man's statute at this time. 
I Would be appropriate to take up as motion in limine to be filed by either 
' I • party. Don't know answer on whether or not the writing indicating the I . 
' 1  debt could be supplemented by testimony. 
II I For today's purposes I find there are genuine issues of material fact on 
11 I all issues except the one regarding the limitation of filing of claims. Will 
I I 
I take that one under advisement and issue written decision. 
Any questions? . LJ 
Cusack Briefing? -- - -- -
~ Ct Have focused on one issue. Any value in further briefing that point? 
Featherston If that is helpful to the Court would offer to make 
Ct Not a lot of Idaho authority. May be other states? Would be helpful to 
I the Court. Would both counsel be interest in taking a try at that? 
Featherston Ten days or two weeks? 
Cusack Yes - I ~ I n 
Ct Two weeks for Cusack and Featherston a week later. 
~ -
~.C• 
10;40 Ct Featherston to present short order on summary judgment. ~-,"' 
Featherston Notice of disallowance of claim received . Not sure how to treat this. 
Same claim. Says it disallows petition to allow. Don't know that code I 
allows this 
• - Cusack That was done because of the timeframe for filing . ~- -- --.. _4 Ct Being safe by disallowing twice? . - -
-
Cusack Based on court's statements don't believe any action is required . Court 
II. has stated that oriQinal claim was filed correctly 
Ct Court stated would not rule on that issue today. - a.a- - 1.,. -
Cusack Done in response to that 
Ct The Court is hearing from Ms. Cusack that no action should be taken in 
response to August 19th , 2015 document . 
Cusack Estate didn't want it to be automatically allowed - ---:_ -- j[I f 
Ct I Seems as much of an answer as we are going to get. ,J l 
10:42 - Court will be in recess. - ~ ·r 
L--...J - ~ [. 
I 
. • • ... ... I 
• • I 
. r • "II ,. I • ~ . - • -I I I - .... 
• ... 
~I • • 
I 
• 
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MARY W. CUSACK 
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC 
320 E. Neider Avenue, Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83815 
(208) 667-0640 
(208) 667-0708 - FAX 
ISB#: 5332 
FILED 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of the Estate of: ) 
) 
ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON and ) 






- - --- --------- ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Kootenai ) 
CASE NO. CV 13-0313 
AFFIDAVIT OF MARY W. CUSACK 
IN SUPPORT OF SUR-REPLY 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT TO DENY CREDITOR 
CLAIM 
MARY W. CUSACK, of Cusack Law Firm, PLLC, being first duly sworn on oath, 
deposes and states: 
1. I am over the age of 18 years and am an attorney licensed in good 
standing with the State of Idaho. I am representing JADWIGA B. MELTON, Petitioner, 
and surviving spouse in the above-captioned matter. 
2. Attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference as Exhibit "A", 
is a true and correct copy of Senate Bill No. 1318 which was adopted and effective as of 
July 1, 2006. 
1. AFFIDAVIT OF MARY W. CUSACK 
{MW COO 144084. DOCX; 1 /20397 .1 00} 
Page 157 of 438
3. Attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference as Exhibit "B", 
is a true and correct copy of Senate Bill No. 1249 which was adopted and effective as of 
July 1, 2007. 
4. Attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference as Exhibit "C", 
is a true and correct copy of Utah Code§ 75-3-109. 
5. Attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference as Exhibit "D", 
is a true and correct copy of Uniform Probate Code Section 3-317 and its comments 
thereto. 
Further your Affiant saith naught. 
DATED this 8th day of September, 2015. 
M~~(& 
SUBSCRIBED At':li")i!SW©.~N to before met · th day of September, 2015. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 8th day of September, 2015, I caused a true and 
accurate copy of the forgoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to the following: 
Brent C. Featherston 
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd. 
113 S. Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
(208) 263-0400 - FAX 
Sent via email: 
cynthia@featherstonlaw.com 
brent@featherstonlaw.com 
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SENATE BILL NO. 1318 
View Bill St?tu1i 
View Bill rcxt 
View . tat ·in 1\l ir Pt1tpu.{_I i,rn l In i!....1 
Page 1 of 7 
Text to be added within a bill has b en marked with Bold and Underline. Text to be removed has been 
marked with Strikethrough and Italic. How these codes are actually displayed will vary based on the 
browser software you are using. 
This sentence is marked with bold and underline to show added text. 
+his se,•1 /e11t't' i.~ 11H:HWt!+l--wif.H s.'rikt! lhrough tmd ilulit-, imiia,•ling le:xl !O he-RHHtwe-4 
Bill Status 
S13 1 8 . . .. .. , .. , ............. , ... , ......... , .. ; . . . . ... by JUDICIARY AND RULES 
ESTATE - MEDICAL ASSISTANCE COSTS - Amends existing law rela ti ng to estate 
property to s et forth provisions applicable to the recovery of me di cal 
assistance cost s by the Depar t ment of Health and Welfare; a nd t o revise 
provis ions applicab 1 e to the recovery of certain medical assista ce. 
01/30 
01/31 
02/ 0 9 
02/10 
02/14 
Senate int ro - 1st rdg - to pri nting 
Rpt pr:: - to Jud 
Rpt ou~ - rec d/p - to 2nd rdg 
2nd rdg - to 3rd rdg 
rd rdg - PASSED - 35-0-0 
AYES - - Andr eas on , Brandt , Broadsword, Bunderson, Burket t , 
Burte nshaw , Came r on, Coiner , Compton , Corder , Darrington , Davis, 
Ful cher , Gannon , Geddes , Goedde , Hill, Jorgenson , Kelly, Keough , 
Langhorst , Little , Lodge , Malepeai , Marley, McGee, McKenzie, Pearce, 
Richardson , Schroeder, Ste gne r , Stennett, Sweet, Werk , Williams 
NAYS -- Non 
Absent and ~xcuscd -- No ne 
Fl oor Spon or - Kelly 
Title apvd - to House 
0 2 / 1 5 House int ro - i~t r ag - to Jud 
03/ 0 6 Rpt out - rec d/p - to 2nd rdg 
03/07 2nd rdg - to 3rd rdg 
03/16 3rd rdg - PASSED - 64-0 - 6 
AYES - Anderson, Andr is , Barraclough, Barrett , Bastian , Bayer, Bell , 
Bilbao, Black, Block , Boe , Bolz, Bra c kett , Bradford, Cannon , 
Chadderdon , Clark, Collins , Deal , Denney, Edmunson , Ellsworth, 
Eskridge, Field( 18), Field(23) , Garrett, Hart, Ha rwood , Henbest, 
Henderson, Jaquet , Kemp, Lake, LeFavour, Loertscher , Martinez , 
Mathews , McGeachin, McKague , Miller , Mitchell , Moyle, Ni e l sen , 
onini, Pasley- Stuart, ence, Raybould , Ring , Ringo , Roberts , Rusche, 
Ryda lch, ali , Sayler , Schaefer , Shepherd(2) , Shepherd(S) , Shirley, 
Sk~ppen , Smith(30) , Smi t h(24), Smyli e , Stevenson , Trail 
NAYS -- None 
Absent and excused -- Be dke , Cro w, Snodgrass , Will s , Wood, Mr . 
Speake r 
Floor Sponsor - Smith(24) 
Title apvd - to Senate 
03/17 To enrol 
03/20 pt enrol - Pres signed - Sp signed 
03/2 1 To Governor 
03 /24 Govern o r signed 
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Se s sion Law Chapte r 17 9 
Eff ~ti v e : 07/01/0 6 
Bill Text 
J l J J LEGISLATURE Of THE STATE OF IDAHO J l l l 
Fi f t y - e ighth Le gisla t ure Second Regul a r Se ssion - 2006 
I N THE SENATE 
SENATE BI LL NO. 1318 
BY JUDICIARY AND RULES COMMITTEE 
1 AN ACT 
2 RELATING TO ES TATE PROPERTY ; AMENDING SECTION 15-3-1 2 01, IDAHO CODE, TO SET 
3 FORTH PROVI SIONS APPLICABLE TO THE RECOVERY OF MEDICAL ASS I STANCE COSTS BY 
4 THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE AND TO MAKE TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS; 
5 AMENDI NG SECTION 56-218 , IDAHO CODE, TO REVISE PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO 
6 THE RECOVERY OF CERTAI~ ME DI CAL ASSISTANCE; AND AMENDING SECTION 56-218A, 
7 IDAHO CODE , TO REVI SE A CODE REFERENCE. 

































SECTION l . Tha t Section 15-3-1201, Idaho Code, be , a nd the same is here b y 
ame nde d to r e ad ciS follows: 
15-3-1 201. COLLECTION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY BY AFFIDAVIT. (a ) Thirty (30) 
days after the d e ath of a d e c e dent, any person indebted to t he decedent or 
having posse s s ion of t a ngible personal propert y or an i nstrument e v idencing a 
debt, obligation, s tock or chose in action belonging to the decedent s hall 
make paymen t o f the indebtedness or deliver the tangible personal property or 
an instrument e v idencing a debt, obligation, stock or chose i n action to a 
person or ent i ty claiming to be the succe s s or of the decedent upon b e ing pre-
s e nt e d an affidavit made by or on behal f of the successor stating t hat: 
(1) tThe fai r ma r ket value of the entire estate of the dece dent which is 
s c bj e c t to probat e , wherever l ocate d, less liens a nd encumbrances , does 
not exceed seven t y - f ive thousand dollars ($75,000); 
(2) ~Thi. ty (30 ) days h a v e elapsed since the death of the dece den t ; 
(3) -R~o a ppl icat i on or petition for the appointment of a p r s onal r e p r e -
sentative o r for summary administration is pending or has be e n granted in 
any jurisdiction; and 
(4) t,'.!'.he claimi ng successor is entitled to payment or delivery of the 
property, inc l ud i.ng enti tlement as a trust purs uant to a wil l of the dece -
d e nt. 
(b) A transfer ag e nt of any security sha ll change t he registe red owner-
ship on the books of a corporation from the d ecedent to the s uc c essor or suc-
cessors upon the presentat i on o f an affidavit as provided in s ubsectior (a ) o f 
th i s section . 
(c) For the purpos es of this section, for the recovery of medical assis-
tance , the department of health and welfare shall be deeme d a successor to the 
estate pr ovided: 
(1) Prior to the p resentation of the affidavit, the department shall give 
notice, by regula r mail, to any person known to the department to be an 
heir, successor or creditor of the estate, and the department shall cer-
tify such notice in writing to the oerson described in subsection (a) of 
this section. 
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(2) Within sixty (60) days of mailing the notice , any person who claims 
the right to reimbursement for priority estate expense s , as permitted by 
section 15-3-805(a) (1) through (4) , Idaho Code , may submit a written 
2 
demand for payment of such expenses, toqether with any documentation of 
the expenses, to the department. Upon receipt of the funds, and up to the 
a.mount received, the department shall pay priority claims which it deter-
mines would be allowed in a probate proceeding, if any. The department 
shall notify each claimant of the disposition of his claim. The provisions 
of chapter 52 , title 67, Idaho Code, shall apply to determinations made by 
the department under this section. 
SECTION 2. Tha t Section 56-218, Idaho Code, be, and the same is he reby 
9 amended to read as follows: 
10 56-218. RECOVERY OF CERTAIN MEDICAL ASS I STANCE. (1) Except wh e re exempted 
11 or waived in accordance with federal law medi cal a s s istance pursuant to this 
12 chapter paid on behalf of an individual who was fifty-fi v e (55) years of age 
13 or old e r when th e individual r eceiv ed such a ssistance may be recove red from 
1 4 the individual's est a te, and the estate of the spouse, if a ny, for such aid 
15 paid to either or both;f1-e,.,-.k/,-'4,--l~:,-~A-a-l:-T."'+rl·i-ffl.--H'H:-£1wh lilL'tH,-'dl c1u,,.it> 
16 +--,,,+n:-t,--,_,~~~--p~ Lv L!lt.' Hti:H '.'l-t11,id .l 111ay be? L' <; !.abl i . i/-1<>, t tltJtN /l t> t I,' ,,: c!!" I .7-h" 
l 7 of ci t!wr spouse, but.:... 
18 (a) T4=he re shall be no adjustment or recovery thereof until after the 
19 death of both the individual and the spouse, i f any, and only at a t ime 
20 when the individual has no surviving child who is under twenty- one (21) 
21 years of age or is blind or permanently and totally di s abled as defined in 
22 42 U.S.C . 1382c. 
23 (b) While one (1) spouse survives, except where joint probate will be 
2 4 authorized pursuant to section 15-3-111 , Idaho Code, a claim for recovery 
25 under this section may be established in the estate of the deceased 
26 spouse. 
27 (c) The claim against the estate of the first deceased spouse must be 
28 made within the time provided by section 15-3-80l(b), Idaho Code, if the 
29 estate is administered and actual notice is given to the director as 
3 0 required by subsection (5) of this section. However, if there is no admin-
31 istration of the estate of the first deceased spouse, or if no actual 
32 notice is given to the director as required by subsection {5) of this s e c-
33 tion, no claim shall be required until the time provided for creditor 
34 claims in the estate of the survivor. 
35 (d) Nothinq in this section authorizes the r ecovery of t he a.mount of any 
36 aid from the estate or surviving spouse of a recipient to the extent that 
37 the need for aid resulted from a crime committed aga i nst the recipient. 
38 ill Transfers o f r e al or personal property, on or after the look-back 
39 dates define d in 42 U. S .C . 1396p, by recipients of such aid, o r thei r spouses, 
40 without ade quat e consideration are voidable and may be set aside by an action 
41 in the district court. 
42 (-2-~) Except where t here i s a surviving spouse, or a surviving c hild who 
43 is under twenty-one (?.l) years of age or is blind or permanently and totally 
44 di s abled as defined i n 42 U.S.C. 1382c, the amount of any medical assistance 
45 paid under t his chapte r on behalf of an individual who was tifty-five (55) 
46 years of age or older when the individual r e ceived such assistance is a claim 
47 against the estate in any guardianship or conservatorship p r oceedings and may 
48 be p a id f rom the e state . 
4 9 +-4---fJ,,~-f.-JH.+m 1 n Ii'.±.> ce;1ticn cit1-t:fl-&1 .. i1:..::s t/10 1.een•.-,.,.~! t·f;o amount o t an y 
50 ~-J.::.eHi-'-fW- t!.'i L, ; 1 /2---0±----BiH?,,'·w-:i:+lt'1-1:'-r+tf!"I<! 01 a .1. ~->-t-':tf>J c!tll I II i l ,0 , ;>,.+€-1+/---f-+in+---Hk· 
51 11 , i r ,,>+--TH-n---+<='-~4-.H.'El111 ,<i er i fflt' a, 111ffl-±+.t<:"tl--,d·ffo1 11,c t l 111:..~h:"-::'-,i,f~+t.-,-
52 (4) For purposes o f thi s section, the term "estate" shall i nclude : 
53 (a) All real and personal property and other as~c ts i ncluded within 
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1 the individual ' s estate, as defined for purposes of state probate 
? law; and 
3 (bl Any other real and personal property ar ,d olher c1ssets in which 
4 the individual had any legal title or interes t at the time of death 
5 (to the extent of such i nterest), includ ing such asse ts conveyed to a 
6 survi vor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint 
7 tenancy, ten a nc y in corrmon, survivorship , life estate, living trust 
8 or other arrangeme nt . 
9 (5) Claims made pursuant to this section s hall be classified and paid as 
10 a d ebt with preference a s defined i n sec t ion 15-3- 8 05(5), Idaho Code . Any dis -
11 tribution o r t r ansfer of the es t ate prior co satisfying such ~lajm is voidab l e 
12 and may b e set aside by an act ion in the district cour t. The per sona l repre -
13 sentative of e ver y estate subject to a claim under this section must , within 
14 thirty (3 0) days of thP appointment, give notj_ce in 1vriting to the director o f 
15 hiu or her appointme nt to administer the estate. However, if a~ exempt prop-
16 erty allowance claim i s made i11 an estate subject to a claim unde r this sec-
17 t ion by one (1) o r more persons not described in subsect~on (2) of this sec-
18 t i on, t~en, to the exte nt such exempt property allowance claim e xceeds the 
19 fair market value of the actual personal property of the d ecedent held by the 
20 estate subject to a claim under this section (includi ng, but not limited to, 
21 such items as household furniture , automobil es, furnishings, app liances, and 
?2 personal effe cts), the persons making such exempt property allowance claim 
?.3 must file with the court , and with the personal represenlalive or admi nistra-
?.4 tor of the esta te, and with the department , a wr i tten statement under oath 
25 containing the fol l owing: 
?. 6 ( d ) A statement that no personal property of the decede nt has been trans-
27 ferred wi thout adequate consid eration to any person or ent i t y , including 
28 any one (1 ) or more of the persons maki ng the exempt property a llowance 
29 claim, to the actual kno wledge of any of the persons making the exempt 
30 property allowance c laim, within a time period commenc1nq one (1) year 
31 prior to the death of the decedent and ending on t h ~ d a t e of the s tate-
3 2 ment ; or 
33 (bl A statement t hat persor:a l property of the decedent has been trans -
34 fe rred without adequate consideration to any person or entity, including 
35 one (1 ) or more oi the persons making the exempt property allowance claim, 
36 within a t i me period commencing one (1) year prior to the death of the 
37 d ecedent and ending on the date of the statement, to Lhe actual knowledge 
38 of any of the persons making the e xempt property allowance claim, and 
3 9 stating the fair market value of the personal property so transfe rred, and 
40 stating a reasonable description of such p r opert y , and slating the method 
41 o f determining the fair market value of the personal prnper.ty so trans-
42 ferred. 
43 If the wr itten s t atement indicates that there has been such a transfer o f per-
44 sonal proper ty , t hen the fair market value o f t he persona l p r operty so trans-
45 ferrcd s hall b e s ubtracted from the remaini ng exempt property allowance claim, 
46 after subtraction of t he personal property he l d by the estate, as described 
47 above , and only any still remaining portion of the exempt p =operty claim may 
46 be paid by the estate t o the persons making the exempt prope rty al lowance 
49 clajm. The stateme nt s ubmi tted under paragraph (a) or {b) of this subsection, 
50 must be signed unde r oath by all persons making the exempt property claim. 
51 (6) The department may file a notice of lien against the property ot any 
52 estat e subject to a claim under this section. 
53 (a) In order to perfecl a lien against real or persona l propert y , the 
5 4 department shall, within ninety (90) days after the personal reprcscnta-




to r, or three ( 3) years from the death of the +m~~4+1rH-H-+-~H1--trr ..... !+..,.;-J. 
--.;n 1 .·1 /oJ111>,· h'J, ' 1··r:-l-ttt*-l,:-1-;-/~rJt~ decedent , whichever is sooner, file 
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3 a notice of lien i n the same general f orm a nd manner a s p rovided in sec-
4 tion 56-218A(J) (a), Idaho Code, in the office of ~he s e c~e tary of state, 
5 pursuant t o section 45-1904 , Idaho Cod e . Failure t o fil e a notice of li en 
E does not affect thP. validi t y of claims made pursuant to thi s section. 
7 (b) The depar tment may release the lien in whole or in part to permit the 
8 estate property to b e administered by a court-aepointed personal represen-
9 tative. 
1 0 (c) The depar tment may foreclose its lien , without probate , in any of the 
11 f ollowing c i rcumstances: 
12 {i) Where no personal representative has been appointed after one 
13 (1) year from the date of death of the survivor of both the individ-
1 4 ual and spouse , if any; 
15 (ii) Where the property has been abandoned by the decedent's heirs 
16 or successors , if any; 
17 (iii) Where t he real property taxes that are due and payable have 
18 remained unpaid for two (2) years and, after demand by the depart-
19 ment, the he irs or successors, if any, have fail e d to seek appoint-
20 mentor pay t he property taxes; or 
? l (iv) Where all parties interested in the estate consent to foreclo-
2 2 sure of the 1ien. 
23 (7 ) The director s hall promulgate rules reasonably necessar y to implement 
2 4 thi s section including , but not limited to , rules establ i shing undue hardship 
25 waivers for t h e following circumstances: 
26 (a) The oR.2y asset of the estate subject to recovo:ry is income- producing 
27 p r operty that provide s the primary source of s upport fo ::: o the r family mem-
28 bers; o r 
2 9 (bl The estate has a value be low an amount specified in the rules; or 
3 0 (c) Recove ry 1,mde r the lieR by the depa rtment w.ilJ eneitle cause the 
31 heirs of the deceased ind.i.vidual to be eligible for public: assist~ 
32 (8) The cause of action to void a transfer without ade quate c onsideration 
33 established in thi s section shall not be deemed to have a ccrued unti l the 
34 department discovers, or reasonably could have di scovered , the f act s consti-
35 t uting the t r ansfe r wi thout adequate consideration . 
36 SECTION 3. That Section 56-218A, Idaho Code, be, and t he same is hereby 
37 amended to read as follows: 
38 56-218A. MEDICAL ASSISTANCE LIENS DURING LIFE OF RF:CTPIENT. (1) The 
39 dApartment may r e cove r and may impose a lien agains t the r ea l prope rty of any 
40 individual prior to his death for medical assist: anc e paid or about to b e paid 
41 under l his chapter on behal f of an individual : 
42 (a) Who is an inputicnt in a nursing facili ty , intermediate care f acility 
43 f or t he mental ly r e tarded, or other medical institution, if such i.nd i v i d -
4 4 11al is required, a s a condition of receiving servi ces i n such insti t uti on 
45 unde r the state plan, to spend for costs of me dical care a l l but a mi nimal 
46 amount of his income require d for pers onal needs; and 
47 (b) With r espect to whom the department has de termined , a f ter n o tice a nd 
48 opportunity for he aring, that he cannot reasonably be expected to be dis-
49 charged from the medical ins tituti on and t o return home. 
50 (2) No lien may be imposed on the home of an i ndiv.idua l und er s ubsect i on 
51 (1) o f thi s section if any of the following is lawfully residing in such home: 
52 (a) The spouse of such individual; 








(c) Such individual's child who is blind or p e rmanently and totally dis-
abled as defined in 42 U.S.C. 1382c; or 
(d) A sibling of s uch individual who holds an equity interest in s uc h 
home and who was residi ng in such home for a period o f a t least one (1) 
year prior to the individual 's admission to the medical institut ion . 
(3) (a) The lien shall be perfected by filin g in the office o f the s e cre-
http://lcgislaturc.idaho.gov/legislation/2006/S 1318.html 9/7/2015 
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7 tary of state a notice of lien pursuant to section 45-190 4, I daho Code . 
8 'l'hc notice of lien shall include, in addition to the inforrr,ation required 
9 by section 45-1904, Idaho Code, the amount paid o r about to h~ paid by the 
10 department on behalf of the individual , and, if appl icable, t he fact tr.at 
11 the amount of the lien may i ncrease over time. 
12 (b ) The department shall file any noti ce of lien under this section 
13 within ninety (90 ) days of the final determina tion of the department, 
14 after hearing if a ny, required in subsection (1) {bl of t~is sect ion, with 
15 the except i on of property against which the d e partment is prevented from 
16 filing a lien pursuant to subsection (2) of Lhi s section. With respect to 
17 the prope rty d e scri bed in s ubsection (2) of this section, the depa r tment 
18 shall file a not ice of lien within ninety (90) days aft e r the uepar tment 
19 is notified in wri ting that subsection (2) of this section ceases to apply 
20 to the property. 
?.l (4) Any lien imposed in a cLordance with subsection (1) of this section 
22 shall dissolve upon the individual's discharge f rom the medical institution 
2 3 and return home . 
24 (5) No recovery shall be made under this section for medic al assistance 
25 correctly paid except from such individual ' s estate as define d in subsection 
26 (4) of section 56-218, I daho Code , and s ub j ect to subsec tions (~!) (d), (5) and 
27 (6) of section 56-218 , I daho Code, or upon sale of the prope rty subject to a 
28 lien a nd may be made only after the death of such ind~vidual's surviving 
29 spouse , i f any, and only at a t ime: 
30 (a) When he has no surviving child who is unde r age twenty - one (21) 
31 years , or who is blind or permanently and toLally disabl e d as defined in 
32 42 U.S.C. 138?.c; o r 
33 {b) In the case of a lien on an indi vidual ' s home under subsection (1) of 
34 th is section, when none of the following i s lawfully residing in such home 
3 5 who has lawfully resided in such home on a c ontinuous basis since the date 
3 6 of the individual ' s admission to the medi cal inst itutio n : 
37 {i) A sibling of the individual, who was · residing in the 
38 indivi dual' s home for a period of at least one ( 1) ye ar i mmediately 
39 before the date of the individual ' s admission to the medical institu-
40 tion; or 
41 (ii) A son o r d aughter of the individual , who was residing in the 
42 individual ' s home for a period of at least two (2) years immediately 
43 before the date of the individual's admission to ~he medical institu-
4 4 t ion and who e stablishes to t he sat i sfact·on of the state that he or 
45 she provided care to such individual which permitted such individual 
16 to reside at home rather t han in an institution. 
4 7 (G) The director shal l promulgate rules reasonably necessary to implement 
48 this section i n cluding, but no t limited to , rul es establishing undue hardshi p 
49 waivers, as provided in section 56-218(7), Idaho Code , and a procedure for 
50 notice and oppor tun ity for hearing on the depa r tme nt ' s determinat ion that an 
51 individual cannot rea sonably be expected to be discharged from a medical 
52 institution and to r e turn home. 
Statement of Purpose / Fiscal Impact 
STATEM~NT OF PURPOSE 
RS 15741 
Thi s bill clarifies how the Medicaid Estate Recovery division of 
Health & Welfare can recover a ssets from the estate of a decedent 
and clears up a number of uncertain areas of law. 
Sect i o n One covers the Small Estate Affi davit, which allows a 
" successor" of the decedent t o obtain personal property a ssets 
http://lcgislature.idaho.gov/ legislation/2006/S 13 18.html 9/7/201 5 
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held by third partie s (bank accounts, stocks, etc.) by use of an 
affidavit, within the limits set forth in the statute. Thi s bill 
allows the Department of Health & Welfare to be a successor if: 
1 The 8epartment has a claim for estate recovery against 
the decedent; 
2. the Department gives notice , by regular mail , to any 
person known to the depa r tment to be an heir, successor , or 
creditor of the estate, a nd the department certifies chat 
notice in wri t i ng t o the person described in paragraph (a) 
of the sect .i on, the norma l successor; and, 
3. The Department r e imbur ses all priority claims under the 
probate code which are presented within sixty days after the 
notice . 
Use of t his procedure is far. less expensive than filing a full 
probate proceeding. 
Section Two amends Idaho Code 56- 218 to clarify the presentation 
and collection of estate recovery claims by Health & Welfare. A 
number of c larifications are made by repositioning language or 
stating the existing concept more clearl y. Under existing law, 
if the institutionalized spouse, who received Mecicaid, dies 
l eaving a surviving spouse, no nctual collection is made, but a 
"claim" must be sent to the personal representative of the estate 
of deceased jnstitutionalized s pouse , or i f no probate is done , 
to the surviving spouse. This can be very frightening to the 
surviving spouse , who often does not understand that no curr~nt 
reimbursement is bei ng demanded. Therefor, the bill both 
clari fies that no recovery is made until both spouses are 
deceased and also removes the requirement to send a claim i f no 
probate is filed at the f irst death. 
The bill also clarifies how the lien filed by the Department with 
the Se8retary of State may be release d , in order to a llow s a le of 
the property by the esta t e, or foreclosed, to expedite estate 
recovery wher the real estate has been abandoned or has real 
property taxes overdue which may be foreclosed upon or where no 
probate has bee n filed and all heirs agree to the procedure as an 
alternative to probate. 
Section Three only corrects a cross-reference. 
FISCAL NO'l'E 
'l'his bill will have no fis cal 'mpact , except that it may reduce 
the costs of estate recove ry to the Department of Health & 
We l =are. 
Contact 
Name: Robert L. Aldridge , Trus t & Estate Professionals of Idaho, Inc. 
Phone : 208-336-9880 
Cell: 208-631- 2481 
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE/FISCAL NOTE S 1318 
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S1249 . _by JUDICIARY AND RULES COMMITTEE 
PROBATE - Amends existing law relating to probate to provide that certain t ime limitations 
for commencement of proceedings and specified limitations shal l not apply to the collection 
of personal property by affidavit or the summary administration of estates In which a 
surviving spouse Is the sole beneficiary. 
01/27Introduced; read fi rst time; referred to JR for Printing 
01/28Reported Printed; referred to Judiciary & Rules 
02/04Reported out of Committee with Do Pass Recommendation; Flied for second read ing 
02/0SRead second time; flied for Third Reading 
02/06Read third time In full - PASSED - 33-0-2 
AYES -- Bair, Bayer, Brackett, Buckner-Webb, Cameron, Fulcher, Goedde, Guthrie, 
Hagedorn, Heider, Hill, Johnson, Keough, Lacey, Lakey, Lodge, Martin, McKenzie, 
Mortimer, Nonlnl, Nuxoll, Patrick, Pearce, Rice, Schmidt, Siddoway, Stennett, 
Thayn, Tippets, Vick, Ward-Engelking, Werk, Winder 
NAYS -- None 
Absent and excused -- Bock, Davis 
Floor Sponsor • Hagedorn 
Tit le apvd - to House 
02/07Received from the Senate, Flied for First Reading 
Read First Time, Referred to Judiciary, Rules, & Administration 
03/14Reported out of Committee with Do Pass Recommendation, 
Flied for Second Reading 
03/17Read second time; Flied for Third Reading 
Rules Suspended: Ayes 68 Nays o Abs/Excd 2, read three times - PASSED - 67· 
0-3 
AYES·- Agldius, Anderson(0l), Anderson(31), Anderst, Andrus, Barbieri , Barrett, 
Bateman, Batt, Beil, Bolz, Boyle, Burgoyne, Chew, Clow, Collins, Crane, Dayley, 
DeMordaunt, Denney, Erpelding, Eskridge, Gannon, Gibbs, Hancey, Harris, Hartgen, 
Henderson, Hixon, Holtzclaw, Horman, Kauffman, King, Kloc, Loertscher, Lu ker, 
Malek, McDonald, McMillan, Meline, Mendive, MIiier, Monks, Morse, Moyle, Packer, 
Palmer, Pence, Perry, Raybould, Ringo, Romrell, Rubel, Rusche, Shepherd, Sims, 
Smith, Stevenson, Trujillo, Vanorden, Vander Woude, Wills, Wood(27), Wood(35), 
Woodings, Youngblood, Mr. Speaker 
NAYS -- None 
Absent -- Gestrin, Nielsen, Thompson 
Floor Sponsor - Horman 
Title apvd - to Senate 
03/18Returned From House Passed; referred to enrolling 
Reported enrolled ; signed by President; to House for signature of Speaker 
03/19Received from Senate; Signed by Speaker; Returned to Senate 
Reported signed by the Speaker & ordered delivered to Governor 
03/20Reported delivered to Governor on 03/20/14 
03/26Signed by Governor on 03/26/14 
Session Law Chapter 264 
Effective : 07/01/2014 
Legislative Services Office• P 0 . Box 83720 • Boise, ID • 83720-0054 
208/334-2475 • FAX 208/334-2125 
(;0,.1, , ~1•11 l 1 1 1 r 208/332-1000 (Session Only) 
Maintained by lsoweb@lso.ldaho.gov 
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LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
S i xty-seco nd Legislature Second Regular Ses sion - 2014 
IN THE SENATE 
SENATE BILL NO. 1249 
BY JUDICIARY AND RULES COMMITTEE 
1 AN ACT 
2 RELATING TO PROBATE; AMENDING SECTION 15-3-108, IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE THAT 
3 CERTAIN TIME LIMITATIONS FOR COMMENCEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS AND SPECIFIED 
4 LIMITATIONS SHALL NOT APPLY TO THE COLLECTION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY BY 
5 AFFIDAVIT OR THE SUMMARY ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES IN WHICH A SURVIVING 
6 SPOUSE IS THE SOLE BENEFICIARY AND TO MAKE TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS. 
7 Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
8 SECTION 1. That Section 15-3-108, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby 
9 ame nded to read as follows: 
10 15-3-108. PROBATE -- TESTACY AND APPOINT;)llEN'l' PROCEEDINGS -- ULTIMATE 
11 TIME LIMIT. No informal probate or appointment proceeding or formal testacy 
12 or appointment proceeding, other than a proceeding to probate a will previ -
13 ously probated at the tes tator' s domicile and appointment p r oceedi ngs re-
14 lating to an estate in which there has been a prior appointment or procced-
15 ings under section 15-3-1201, Idaho Code, or section 15-3-1205, Idaho Code , 
16 may be commenced more than t hree (3) years after the d e cedent ' s death, ex-
17 cept_:_ 
18 { 1) 4:-_f.f a previous p r oceeding was dismissed because of doubt about the 
19 fact of the decedent's death, appropriate probate, appointme nt or testacy 
20 proceedings may be maintained at any time thereafter upon a finding that the 
21 decedent 1 s death occurred prior to the initiation of the previ ous proceeding 
22 and the applicant or petitioner has not delayed unduly in initiat ing the sub-
23 sequent proceeding; 
24 (2) a~ppropriate probate, appointment or testacy proceedings may be 
25 maintained in relation t o the esta te of an absent, disappeared or missing 
26 person for whose estate a conservator has been appointed, at any time within 
27 three (3) years after the conservator becomes able to establish the death of 
28 t he p r otected person; and 
29 ( 3) -a-~ proceeding t o contest an informally probated will a nd to secure 
30 appoint ment of the person with legal priority for appointment in the event 
31 the contest is successful, may be commenced wi thin the later of twelve (12) 
32 months from the informal probate or three (3) years from the decedent's 
33 death. 
34 These limitations do not apply to proceedings to construe probated wills or 
35 determine heirs of an intestate or to proceedings under section 15-3-1201, 
36 Idaho Code , or section 15-3-1205 , Idaho Code. In cases under s u bsection { 1) 
37 or (2) of this section, the date on which a testacy or appo i ntment proceeding 
38 is properly commenced shall be deemed to be the date of the decedent's death 
39 fo r purposes of other limitations provisions of this code which relate to the 
40 date of death. 
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STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
RS22512 
Summary Administration under section 15-3-1205, Idaho Code, and the Small Estate Affidavit 
tinder section 15-3-1201, Idaho Code have for many years been thought by the practicing bar and by 
courts to be exempt from the three year limitation on probate proceedings under section 12-3-108, 
Idaho Code. This has allowed those two procedures to be an easy, efficient, and inexpensive way 
to pass property to the correct heirs if a standard probate is barred by the three year limitation. 
However, recently some courts have held to the contrary, and in some districts judges in the same 
district have ruled differently on that question. This bill eliminates that confusion by clearly stating 
that the two procedures are not subject to the three year limitation. 
FISCAL NOTE 
This bill will have no fiscal impact. 
Contact: 
Robert L.Aldridge, Trust & Estate Professionals of Idaho, Inc. 
(208) 336-9880 
Statement of Purpose/ Fiscal Note S1249 
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§ 75-3-109. Letters upon several estates jointly. 
Utah Statutes 
Title 75. Utah Uniform Probate Code 
Chapter 3. Probate of Wills and Administration 
Current through Chapter 437 of the 2014 General Session 
§ 75-3-109. Letters upon several estates jointly 
(1) Upon petition by any person interested in two or more estates, the court may, after notice 
and hearing, grant letters upon these estates jointly if administration has not commenced 
with respect to any such estate and if: 
(a) All or any part of the estate of one decedent has descended from another 
decedent; or 
(b) Two or more decedents held any property during their lifetimes as tenants-in-
common and if the persons entitled under the wills of these decedents or under the 
law of intestate succession to receive the estates of these decedents are the 
same. 
(2) If letters are granted upon two or more estates jointly under this section, these estates 
shall be administered the same as if they were but one estate except that claims may be 
enforced only against the estate to which they relate. 
Cite as Utah Code§ 75-3-109 
History. Enacted by Chapter 194, 1977 General Session 
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UNIFORM PROBATE CODE (1969) 
(Last Amended or Revised in 2010) 
Drafted by the 
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS 
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 
and by it 
APPROVED AND RECOMMENDED FOR ENACTMENT 
IN ALL THE STATES 
WITH COMMENTS 
COPYRIGHT © 2014 
By 
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS 
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 
(Last updated: April 23, 2014) 
Uniform Law Commission 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
111 N. Wabash Ave., Suite 1010 • Chicago, IL 60602 
(312) 450-6600, Fax (312) 450-6601 
www .uniformlaws.org 
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UNIFORM PROBATE CODE 
Table of Contents 
ARTICLE I 

























PART 1. SHORT TITLE, CONSTRUCTION, GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Short Title. 
Purposes; Rule of Construction. 
Supplementary General Principles of Law Applicable. 
Severability. 
Construction Against Implied Repeal. 
Effect of Fraud and Evasion. 
Evidence of Death or Status. 
Acts by Holder of General Power. 
Cost of Living Adjustment of Certain Dollar Amounts. 
PART 2. DEFINITIONS 
General Definitions. 
PART 3. SCOPE, JURISDICTION AND COURTS 
Territorial Application. 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction. 
Venue; Multiple Proceedings; Transfer. 
Practice in Court. 




Qualifications of Judge. 
Oath or Affirmation on Filed Documents. 
PART 4. NOTICE, PARTIES AND REPRESENTATION IN ESTATE LITIGATION 





Notice; Method and Time of Giving. 
Notice; Waiver. 
Pleadings; When Parties Bound by Others; Notice. 
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Comment 
This section is the substantive provision (I) declaring the successors to be distributees 
and (2) to have the powers of owners so far as dealing with the estate assets subject to the 
obligations to others. 
Details concerning the status of distributees under UPC Section 3-908 and the power to 
deal with property are provided in UPC Section 3-910. 
Although one state cannot control the law of another, the universal successor should be 
recognized in other states as having the standing of either a foreign personal representative or a 
distributee of the claim to local assets. Paragraph (3) attempts to remove any limitation of this 
state in such a case. 
SECTION 3-317. UNIVERSAL SUCCESSION; UNIVERSAL SUCCESSORS' 
LIABILITY TO CREDITORS, OTHER HEIRS, DEVISEES AND PERSONS ENTITLED 
TO DECEDENT'S PROPERTY; LIABILITY OF OTHER PERSONS ENTITLED TO 
PROPERTY. 
(a) In the proportions and subject to the limits expressed in Section 3-321, universal 
successors assume all liabilities of the decedent that were not discharged by reason of death and 
liability for all taxes, claims against the decedent or the estate, and charges properly incurred 
after death for the preservation of the estate, to the extent those items, if duly presented, would 
be valid claims against the decedent's estate. 
(b) In the proportions and subject to the limits expressed in Section 3-321, universal 
successors are personally liable to other heirs, devisees, and persons entitled to property of the 
decedent for the assets or amounts that would be due those heirs, were the estate administered, 
but no allowance having priority over devisees may be claimed for attorney's fees or charges for 
preservation of the estate in excess of reasonable amounts properly incurred. 
(c) Universal successors are entitled to their interests in the estate as heirs or devisees 
subject to priority and abatement pursuant to Section 3-902 and to agreement pursuant to Section 
359 
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3-912. 
(d) Other heirs, devisees, and persons to whom assets have been distributed have the 
same powers and liabilities as distributees under Sections 3-908, 3-909, and 3-910. 
(e) Absent breach of fiduciary obligations or express undertaking, a fiduciary's liability is 
limited to the assets received by the fiduciary. 
Comment 
The purpose of succession without administration is not to alter the relative property 
interests of the parties but only to facilitate the family's expeditious settlement of the estate. 
Consistent with this, the liability arising from the assumption of obligations is stated explicitly 
here to assist in understanding the coupling of power and liability. Subsection (b) includes an 
abatement reference that recognizes the possible adjustment that may be necessary by reason of 
excess claims under UPC Section 3-902. 
In succession without administration, there being no personal representative's notice to 
creditors, the short non-claim period under UPC Section 3-803(a)(l) does not apply and creditors 
are subject to the statutes of limitations and the limitation of three years on decedent's creditors 
when no notice is published under UPC Section 3-803(a)(2). The general statutes of limitation 
are suspended for four months fo llowing the decedent's death but resume thereafter under UPC 
Section 3-802. The assumption of liability by the universal successors upon the issuance of the 
Statement of Universal Succession is deemed to be by operation of law and does not operate to 
extend or renew any statute of limitations that had begun to run against the decedent. The result 
is that creditors are barred by the general statutes of limitation or 3 years whichever is the 
shorter. 
The obligation of the universal successors to other heirs, devisees and distributees is 
based on the promise to perform in return for the direct distribution of property and any 
limitation or !aches begins to run on issuance of the statement of universal succession unless 
otherwise extended by action or assurance of the universal successor. 
It should be noted that this statute does not deal with the consequences or obligations that 
arise under either federal or state tax laws. The universal successors will be subject to 
obligations for the return and payment of both income and estate taxes in many situations 
depending upon the tax law and the circumstances of the decedent and the estate. These tax 
consequences should be determined before electing to utilize succession without administration. 
360 
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MARY W. CUSACK 
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC 
320 E. Neider Avenue, Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83815 
(208) 667-0640 
(208) 667-0708 - FAX 
ISB#: 5332 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND·FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of the Estate of: 
ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON and 
HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON, 
Deceased. 
) 
) CASE NO. CV 13-0313 
) 
) SUR-REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 
) SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DENY 
) CREDITOR CLAIM 
--- ---- - - - ---- ) 
COMES NOW, Petitioner, JADWIGA B. MEL TON ("Jadwiga"), the Personal 
Representative of the above captioned estate, by and through her attorney of record , 
MARY W. CUSACK, of Cusack Law Firm, PLLC, and hereby submits this Sur-Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment to Deny Creditor Claim. 
I. Procedural Background. 
On June 29, 2015, Jadwiga moved for Summary Judgment to deny a creditor claim 
against the above-captioned estate submitted by Heinz Alt ("Heinz"). The Court heard 
oral argument on Jadwiga's Motion for Summary Judgment on August 24, 2015. At the 
hearing the Court invited the parties to submit additional briefing on the issues of (A) 
whether I.C. § 15-3-111 extends the three-year limitations period on the presentation of 
1. SUR-REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
{MWC00149030.DOCX;1 /20397 .100} 
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creditor claims under I.C. § 15-3-803(a)(1), and (B) whether Jadwiga waived a limitations 
defense to Heinz's claim by failing to provide timely notice of disallowance. 
II. I.C. § 15·3-111 does not Toll the Three.Year Statute of Limitations of 
I.C. § 15-3-803 on Claims against an Estate. 
As Jadwiga has previously clarified, I.C. § 15-3-111 expressly allows for joint 
probate when the martial community of a couple ended at the death of the first spouse, 
and the surviving spouse was entitled to all of the deceased spouse's property by will, 
law or both, and no probate had been commenced on the death of the deceased spouse. 
The reason this rule is needed is I.C. § 15-3-108 only allows three years for the probate 
of a Will in Idaho. 
In Idaho, it is common to find many instances wherein the first spouse dies and the 
surviving spouse does not open a probate. When all the assets are t it led in joint names 
and the surviving spouse is not hindered in his or her ability to gain access or have control 
over the remaining assets, the surviving spouse may not view a probate as necessary. 
However, to transfer real property, a legal action must commence. 
When real property is held in the joint names of the husband and wife until the 
death of the second spouse, three options are available to enable the real property to be 
transferred to beneficiaries. The first and most favorable option is to jointly probate the 
estates. The other two options are to commence a quiet title action or to open another 
case to determine the heirs of the first spouse who died. Allowing the use of I.C. § 15-3-
111 saves time and judicial economy by probating both estates in one proceeding. This 
process is used almost exclusively to transfer real property, such as in this case. 
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I.C. § 15-3-111 makes no mention of or reference of any kind to I.C. § 15-3-
803(a)(1 )'s three-year limitations period for bringing a creditor claim. At the same time, 
I.C. § 15-3-803(a)(1) does not cross-reference I.C. § 15-3-111 or any other exceptions to 
its plain and clear-cut rule that "[a]II claims against a decedent's estate which arose before 
the death of the decedent" must be presented no later than "three (3) years after the 
decedent's death." (Emphasis added). The statute does not create special exceptions 
for joint probates and does not expand the definition of "the decedent's death" to 
encompass more than its plain and ordinary meaning, i.e. , the death of the decedent 
subject to the creditor claim at issue irrespective of his/her marital status. 
I.C. § 15-3-803 has a strict creditor claim limitations period. The longest time frame 
is three years after the decedent's date of death; however, this time frame can be shorted 
to four months by publishing a notice to creditors. Construing I.C. § 15-3-111 to enlarge 
the creditor claim limitations period of I.C. § 15-3-803 of the first spouse who died to three 
years after the death of the surviving spouse, solely based on the executor's choice to 
probate both estates jointly, is not supported by the plain language of the statute, and is 
not warranted from any reading of the statutes when taken together. Construing statutes 
to produce such an absurd result runs afoul of standard Idaho canons of construction. 
See Idaho v. Ephraim, 152 Idaho 176, 178 (2012) ("Constructions of a statute that would 
lead to an absurd result are disfavored."). The only logical use of this statute is not to 
enlarge the creditor claim limitations period but to save judicial economy when real 
property is held in joint names at the death of the surviving spouse. 
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There is only one exception to the statute of limitations as set forth in I.C. § 15-3-
803. This exception is found in the Idaho counterpart of the federal Medicaid Law at I.C. 
§ 56-218, which provides for the recovery of certain assistance provided by Medicaid. 
For many years, the statute provided that recovery could be made from the individual's 
estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any, for such aid paid to either or both, but there 
would be no adjustment or recovery until the death of the surviving spouse. In 2006, the 
statute was updated to provide that no claim needed to be f iled on the death of the first 
spouse, unless actual notice was given of the probate, or if a joint probate were opened 
under I. C. § 15-3-111. See Senate Bill No. 1318 which is attached as Exhibit "A" of the 
Affidavit of Mary W. Cusack In Support Of Sur-Reply Memorandum In Support Of Motion 
For Summary Judgment To Deny Creditor Claim (hereinafter "Cusack Affidavit") and 
incorporated herein by this reference. The reason for the change was given as follows: 
Section Two amends Idaho Code§ 56-218 to clarify the presentation and 
collection of estate recovery claims by Health & Welfare. A number of 
clarifications are made by repositioning language or stating the existing 
concept more clearly. Under existing law, if the institutionalized spouse, 
who received Medicaid, dies leaving a surviving spouse, no actual collection 
is made, but a "claim" must be sent to the personal representative of the 
estate of deceased institutionalized spouse, or if no probate is done, to the 
surviving spouse. This can be very frightening to the surviving spouse, who 
often does not understand that no current reimbursement is being 
demanded. Therefor[e] [sic], the bill both clarifies that no recovery is made 
until both spouses are deceased and also removes the requirement to send 
a claim if no probate is filed at the first death. 
If either Hedy or Robert had received Medicaid, the State of Idaho would be able 
to claim their recovery in this probate (because I.C. § 15-3-11 1 was utilized) even though 
Robert left a surviving spouse, Jadwiga. There is no other provision in Idaho Code that 
allows for the extension of a creditor's claim limitations period for fil ing a claim. 
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I.C. § 56-218 was amended in 2006 to provide for an expanded recovery for estate 
recovery claims for Health and Welfare. I.C. § 15-3-803 was not amended to allow for 
expanded recovery when a joint probate is commenced. When two statutes are in 
conflict, the one enacted later in time governs and the specific statute will control over the 
general statute. Mickelsen v. City of Rexburg, 101 Idaho 305, 307, 612 P.2d 542, 544 
(1980). I.C. § 56-218 is both the later-enacted statute and the specific statute. It therefore 
controls over the provisions contained in I.C. § 15-3-803. In re Estate of Wiggins, 306 
P.3d 201 , 209, 155 Idaho 116 (Idaho 2013). 
Similarly, I.C. § 15-3-108 was amended, effective July 1, 2014, to provide that the 
three year statute of limitations on probate proceedings does not apply to Summary 
Administration under I.C. § 12-3-1205. See Senate Bill No. 1249 which is attached as 
Exhibit "B" of Cusack Affidavit and incorporated herein by this reference. Under I.C. § 
12-3-1205, the statute expressly provides that "the surviving spouse shall assume and be 
liable for any and all indebtedness that might be a claim against the estate of the 
decedent." I.C. § 15-3-111 has no such express language. The legislature's omission of 
any such express language in I.C. § 15-3-111 (stating the three year ultimate limit on 
presenting claims is tolled) is a clear indication that in a joint probate, the surviving spouse 
is not assuming the liability of the deceased spouse. Jadwiga used the joint probate 
process to transfer real property held in the joint names of Hedwig and Robert, not to 
expand a creditor's recovery period. 
After a review of other states who have adopted the Uniform Probate Code, Idaho 
is the only one that has adopted the unique language found in I.C. § 15-3-111. However, 
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Utah has adopted Utah Code§ 75-3-109 which provides for joint administration of estates 
but clearly provides that "claims may only be enforced against the estate to which they 
relate." This is consistent with the Estate's argument set forth above. See Utah Code§ 
75-3-1 09 which is attached as Exhibit "C" of Cusack Affidavit and incorporated herein by 
this reference. 
Statutes of limitations are laws passed by each state to set the maximum time after 
an event when legal proceedings may be initiated. When the period of time specified in a 
statute of limitations passes, a claim can no longer be filed. The intention of these laws is 
to faci litate resolution in a reasonable length of time. These statutes are designed to 
prevent fraudulent and stale claims from arising after all evidence has been lost or after 
the facts have become obscure through the passage of time or the defective memory, 
death, or disappearance of witnesses. 
Accordingly, Idaho's Uniform Probate Code applies a maximum three-year 
limitations period on the presentment of creditor claims which beings to run on the 
decedent's death and not upon the death of his or her successors, except in the case of 
Medicaid recovery as noted above. This rule is also stated in the official comment to 
Uniform Probate Code§ 3-317 explains: 
In succession without administration, there being no personal representative's 
notice to creditors, the short non-claim period under UPC Section 3-803(a)(1) does 
not apply and creditors are subject to the statutes of limitations and the limitation 
of three years on decedent's creditors when no notice is published under UPC 
Section 3-803(a)(2). The general statutes of limitation are suspended for four 
months following the decedent's death but resume thereafter under UPC Section 
3-802. The assumption of liability by the universal successors upon the issuance 
of the Statement of Universal Succession is deemed to be by operation of law and 
does not operate to extend or renew any statute of limitations that had begun to 
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run against the decedent. The result is that creditors are barred by the general 
statutes of limitation or 3 years whichever is the shorter. 
(Emphasis added). See Comment to Uniform Probate Code which is attached as 
Exhibit "D" of Cusack Affidavit and incorporated herein by this reference. 
Idaho Code at§ 15-3-111 provides a means of effectively passing property of joint 
estates and contains no tolling provisions on the presentment of creditor claims for the 
first spouse who died. Thus, the Idaho Code plainly limits the presentation of creditor 
claims against an estate to a maximum of three years after the decedent's death 
regardless of whether the surviving spouse's estate exercises the right to jointly probate 
the estates of both spouses. Jadwiga is entitled to summary judgment to deny Heinz's 
creditor claim against Robert's estate because it is barred by the statute of limitations. 
Ill. Jadwiga's Disallowance of Heinz1 Claim was Timely. 
On August 27, 2015, the Court sent the parties a letter requesting their respective 
positions on whether Jadwiga's disallowance of Heinz's claim was timely, and if not, 
whether Jadwiga effectively waived any statute of limitations defense against Heinz's 
claim. 
Throughout these proceedings, Heinz has continuously insisted, without support, 
that J.C. § 15-3-806(a) requires a personal representative to disallow a creditor claim 
within 60 days of the presentation of its creditor claim, ignoring the plain statutory 
language that states: "[f]ailure of the personal representative to mail notice to a claimant 
of action on his claim for sixty (60) days after the time for original presentation of the cla im 
has expired has the effect of a notice of allowance." (Emphasis added). The statute's 
use of the word "for" clearly indicates that the personal representative has 60 days after 
the claimant's four-month period for original presentation of claims, which begins after the 
7. SUR-REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
{MWC00149030. DOCX;1/20397.100} 
Page 184 of 438
publication of the notice of creditors under I. C. § 15-3-801 . The analysis would only favor 
Heinz if I.C. § 15-3-806(a) had instead stated "[f]ailure of the personal representative to 
mail notice to a claimant of action on his claim for sixty (60) days after the time of the 
original presentation of the claim ." 
I.C. § 15-3-806(d) also uses the identical language found in I.C. § 15-3-806(a) to 
determine when to calculate interest on allowed claims. I.C. § 15-3-806(d) provides: 
Unless otherwise provided in any judgment in another court entered against 
the personal representative, allowed claims bear interest at the legal rate 
for the period commencing sixty (60) days after the time for original 
presentation of the claim has expired unless based on a contract making a 
provision for interest, in which case they bear interest in accordance with 
that provision. (emphasis added). 
The Court of Appeals of Idaho in Bingham Mem. Hosp. v. Boyd, found that the 
Personal Representative filed his notice to creditors which started the four month period 
for creditors to file their claims. Bingham Mem. Hosp. v. Boyd, 134 Idaho 669, 674 (Ct. 
App. 2000). The Court of Appeals held that interest could not begin to accumulate until 
six months after the Personal Representative first published his notice to creditors. Id. 
The Court held the "time for original presentation of the cla im" is the four month period for 
creditors to file their claim and therefore, interest would not begin to accumulate until 60 
days after that period ended (i.e. six months after date of first publication). Id. Here, the 
notice to creditors was filed on February 19, 2015. Under Idaho law, Jadwiga clearly had 
until August 19, 2015 to disallow any creditor claims that were validly fi led. Accordingly, 
Jadwiga t imely disallowed Heinz's claim. 
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IV. Conclusion 
Based on the foregoing, Petitioner Jadwiga B. Melton respectfully requests this 
Court GRANT her Motion for Summary Judgment to Deny Creditor Claim, in part, as it is 
barred by operation of law due to the running of the statute of limitations. 
DATED this -5!!2._ day of September 2015. 
MARYW. C SACK, 
Attorney for JADWIGA MEL TON 
Personal Representative 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ~ day of September 2015, I caused a true and 
accurate copy of the forgoing document to be served by facsimile and via email thereon, 
and addressed to the following: 
Brent C. Featherston 
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd . 
113 S. Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
(208) 263-0400 - FAX 
Sent via email: 
cynth ia@featherston law. com 
brent@featherstonlaw.com 
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BRENT C. FEATHERSTON, ISB No, 4602 
Attorney at Law 
113 South Second Avenue 
San,dpoint, Idaho 83864 
(208) 263-6866 
(208) 263-0400 (Fax) 
brent@featherstonlaw.com 
Attorney for Creditor, Heinz Alt 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and 








CASE NO. CV-2013~0313 
CREDITOR'S POST HEARING 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE 
TO ESTATE'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMAR\' JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW the undersigned counsel, Brent C. Featherston, Featherston Law Finn, 
Chtd., for and on behalf of Heinz Alt, ("Alt"), a creditor and interested party in the above-
referenced Estate of Robert Emest Melton and Hedwig "Hedy'' Melton, ("Estate") and hereby 
submits Post Hearing Memorandum in Response to Estate's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
At hearing on August 24, 2014, the Court asked for additional post-hearing b1iefing on the 
Estate' s statute of limitations argument asserted under Idaho Code 15-3"803 and 
subsequently the Court notified counsel by correspondence dated August 27th that the parties 
should also brief the issue of whether the Estate timely disallowed Ml', Alt's Creditor's Claim 
and, if not, the Claim would be deemed allowed rendering a waiver of the statute of 
limitations argument. 
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For these reasons. the undersigned will address first the issue of untimely 
disaltowance of Mr. Alt's claim followed by the statute oflimitations argument. 
I. ARGUMENT 
A. The Estate bas failed to timely disallow Mr. Alt's claim and the Claim is 
deemed allowed by operation of law. 
The Estate's Reply filed September 8th asserts that Alt provides no basis for his 
assertion that a personal representative's failure to disallow a creditor's claim within sixty 
(60) days results in allowance of the claim. The Estate ignores Idaho Ptobate Code. which 
provides as follows: 
(a) As to claims presented in the manner described in 
§15~3-804(a) of this part within the time limit described in 
§15-3-803 of this part, the personal representative may 
mail a notice to any claimant stating that the claim has 
been disallowed ..... Failure of the personal representative 
to mail notice to a claimant of actio:p. on his claim for sixty 
(60) days after the time for original presentatiol1 of the 
claim has expired has the effect of a notice of allowance. 
LC. §15-3-806(a)(2015) 
In examining the language "time for oliginal presentation of the claim" found in 
subsection 806> note that LC. 15-3-802(c) provides''. . . the proper presentation of a claim 
under § 15-3-804, Idaho Code, is equivalent to the commencement of a proceeding on the 
claim." I.C. §15-3-802 (2015) 
Idaho Code§ 15-3-804 spells out the manner in which a creditor may present a 
claim including that a ''claimant shall deliver or mail to the personal representative a 
written statement of the claim indicating its basis and name and address of the claimant and 
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the amount claimed and file a written statement of the claim in the form proscribed by rule 
with the Clerk of the Court.'' LC. § 15-3-804(a)(2015) 
The Code Section goes on to state that the claim is deemed presented on the last to 
occur of either delivery or mailing of the claim to the personal representative or filing of 
the claim with the court. 
The phrase "after the time for original presentation of the claim" is consistent 
throughout the Code and refers to the process and presentation of "the" specific creditor's 
claim, not some general timeline for claim presentation, as argued by the Estate. 1 
In this case. the undisputed evidence establishes that Mr. Alt's Claim was filed 
Januaty 13, 2015. It was served upon counsel by U.S. Mail on January 9th. See: Affidavit 
of Counsel filed August 10, 2015, Exhibit "B;'. 
Measuring the time from January 9th, and pennitting three (3) day mail rule for 
service on the Estate of the Claim, the Estate's clock for disallowance purposes began on 
January 12th . (Applying a filing date of January 13, 2015, one (1) day later, does not 
change the outcome.) 
The Estate did not disallow Mr. Alt's Claim until it mailed a Disallowance on 
Ma1·ch 13th• Again, applying a three (3) day mail rnle provided for in I.R.C.P. Rule 6(e)(l). 
the Estate's Disallowance was not served upon counsel for Alt until March 161\ sixty-three 
(63) days after service of the Claim. (Sixty~two (62] days after court filing of the Clajm,] 
1 If the Estate's interpretation is cotrect, it is curious that the Personal Representative 
attempted clisallowance so close to the 60 day timeframe, though not timely. 
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Mr. Alt's Creditor's Claim was timely filed, but was not timely disallowed. Under 
LC. § 15~3~806(a), failure of the Estate to disallow the claim has the effect of deeming the 
Claim allowed. This result renders the Estate's Motion for Summary Judgment moot. 
The Estate argues that its sixty (60) day time period did not begun to run until after 
the time for presentation of all claims (four months following publication) has expired. 
The Estate extrapolates from the language "for original presentation of the claim'' that this 
must mean a general timeline for all creditors to submit claims, but provides no supporting 
case law. 
The Estate seeks to support its interpretation ofidaho Code §15-3-806(a) by 
referring the Court to J.C. § 15~3-806(d) and the case ofBingham_Memorial Hospital v. 
Boyd, 134 Idaho 669 (App.2000). Both the Bingham Memorial Hospital and subsection 
806(d) deal strictly with when interest is to be applied or computed upon a claim against 
the Estate, when the contract supporting the claim does not provide for interest. 
Perhaps more relevant is the plain language of the statute's subsection in question: 
''Failure of the Personal Representative to mail notice of disallowance or partial allowance 
on his claim for sixty (60) days after the time for original presentation of!!)& claim has 
expired has the effect of a notice of allowance." 1.C, §15-3M806. The use of"the' in the 
sentence makes clear that this provision is specificJo the specific creditor's claitn; not a 
general four ( 4) month provision applicable to "any,, or "all" claims, language that should 
be prese;nt (but is not) for the Estate;s argument to make sense. 
The Court should find that the Estate has failed to timely disallow Mr. Alf's claim 
and by operation oflaw it is deemed allowed under I.C §15-3-806. The allowance of Mr. 
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Alt;s claim requires the Court to deny the Estate1s Motion for Summary Judgment in its 
entirety. 
B. The Estate's statute of limitation iu--gument is inapplicable in light of 
Idaho Code 15 .. 3 .. 111. 
The Estate asserts that Mr. Alfs claim is barred by a statute oflimitations found in 
I.C. §15~3-803. The Estate's brief argues that LC. §15~3-111 does not "toll'' the statute of 
limitations found h1 section 803. The logic of the Estate's argument bears further scrutiny. 
First, the facts are that this Estate consists entirely of the marital community property 
of Hedwig Melton and Robert Melton. It is undisputed that all of the Estate assets, namely 
the home and property were titled in their names, Robert and Hedwig Melton, husband and 
wjfe, at the time of Robert's death. No probate was filed of Hedwig's estate when she died. 
If it had been, the p1'oceeding would have been eithel' a sununaiy administration unde1; I.C. 
§15-3-1205, with Robert required to "assume and be liable for any and all indebtedness" ora 
full blown probate of the wills would have been performed, with Mr. Alt being notified as 
both a creditor and heir under het 1999 Last Will and Testament of Hedwig Melton. 
Affidavit of Counsel filed August 26, 2014, Exhibit ''G". Neither occurred. 
Second, Hedwig Melton died August 11, 2008 and Robert Melton died July 4, 2013 . 
Mr. Alt's claim is against both estates and is timely as filed immediately upon the filing of the 
joint probate Petition. 
Third, :tvfr. Alt's claim is a conununity property debt as a loan incurred by Mr. and 
Mrs. Melton in purchasing and building the real property that was held in their names at the 
time of Mr. Melton's death in 2013. Verified Creditor's Claim filed January 13, 2015. 
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Fourth, Mr. Alt's claim was filed January 13, 2015, less than two (2) years following 
the death of Robe1t Melton and immediately upon the proper filing of a joint probate of 
Hedwig and Robert's estates under IC. 15-3-111.2 
The Estate urges that Mr. Alt' s claim is barred by a "statute of Hmitations" resulting 
from LC. §15-3-803. Subsection (a)(l) requires that ''claims against a decedent's estate 
which arose before the death of the decedent, ... ifnot barred earlier by another statute of 
limitations or non-claim statute, are baned against the estate, the personal representative, and 
the heirs and devisees of the decedent, unless presented within the earlier of the following 
dates: (1) three (3) years after the decedent's death; or (2) within the time provided in §15-3-
80 I (b ), Idaho Code, for creditors who are given actual notice. and within the time provided in 
§15-3~80l(a), Idaho Code, for all creditors barred by publication''. I.C. §15-3-
803(a)(2015)[emphasis added]. LC. §15-3-803(a)(l)(2015) 
The Estate argues that Alt was required as a creditor to file probate of his mother's 
estate by 2011 to preserve his credito:es claim against both Robert and Hedwig Melton. (No 
explanation is offered as to how §803 bars Alt's claim against Robert's Estate.) 
When interpreting a statute) the Comt is to give it its plain meaning if the language is 
unambiguous. "The plain meaning of a statute therefore will prevail unless clearly expressed 
legislative intent is contrary or unless plain meaning leads to absurd results." St. Luke's 
!{egional Medical Center, Ltd. v. Board ofCom'rs of Ada County, 203 P.3d 683,685, 146 
~~f..:~iJann Idaho 753~ 755 (2009) As discussed below, the Estate's argument leads to absurd results. 
Daniel P, F~~1nerston 
Brcn1C.fca1hent<>A* 2 For some inexplicable reason, Jadwiga and her former counsel initially filed this a 1205 
Jeremy l', l'eaiMrst0n summary administration though the property was titled community property of Robert and Jercmi L Ossman 
113 S. Second Ave. 
Hedwig at Robert's death. 
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At the outset, the plain language of §803(a) establishes a time limit for filing claims 
within a pending estate. The legislature's use of phrases presumes that an estate has been 
filed: 
1. "All claims against a decedenf s estate ... " 
2. "if not barred earlier by another statute of limitations or non-claim statute ... " 
3. ''are barred against the estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and 
devisees of the decedent ... " I.C. §15-3-803(a)(2015) 
To adopt the Estate's interpretation, the Legislative language of section 803 should 
read: ''All claims against a decedent's estate which arose before the death ... are barred against 
the ~cedent, the personal representative ... ". That is not the language adopted by the 
legislature and the language adopted is unambiguous that the time limit on claims applies 
after an estate is opened for probate. 
The Legislature did not impose an obligation upon the creditor in section 803 to file 
the probate in order to preserve his claim, only the obligation to file a timely claim once the 
probate is filed. That timely claim must be within three (3) years of the decedent's death or 
within the time provided for creditor's actual notice or publication. The claim must be 
"presented within the earlier of' these two (2) dates. In other words, even where an estate is 
filed for probate and no notice to creditors given, it is incumbent on a creditor to file the 
claim within three (3) years of death. 
It is well established that generally a probate will not be permitted more than three (3) 
years after the decedent's date of death, thus barring claims. but also barring any probate 
proceeding. Idaho Code §15-3-108 establishes a three (3) year "statute oflimitation'' from 
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the decedenf s date of death on filing for probate of the estate. The exception is I.C. § 15-3-
111 that establishes: "In cases in which a marital community has been dissolved by the death 
of either spouse at any tune, the survivor was then entitled to all of the property of the 
decedent by will, law, or both, and the survivor died before any proceeding had been 
commenced for the probate of the estate of the spouse whose death occurred first, the estates 
of both may be Joined for probate in a single proceeding_ ... The three (3) year provision of 
§ 15-3-108, Idaho Code, applies only to the death of the spouse whose death occurred last." 
I,C. §15-3-111 (2015). 
This exception to the three (3) year statute ofli.m.itation on filing of probate is equally 
applicable to the three (3) year limitation on filing of claims in an estate, for several reasons. 
First, the Cotut's obligation is to give effect to the plain legislative intent as expressed 
in the statute. "To ascertain legislative intent, the Court examines not only the literal words 
of the statute, but the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, the policy behind the 
statute, and its legislative history." St. Luke's Regional Medical Center, Ltd. v. Board of 
Com'rs of Ada County, 203 P.3d 683,685, 146 Idaho 753, 755 (2009) Since the plain 
language of section 803 discussed above contemplates a deadline for filing claims within an 
open estate, not a statute of limitation on claims against decedents, the claim limitations 
necessaiily follow the limitations on filing of a probate proceeding. 
It makes no sense to require a creditor to assert his claim within three (3) years of the 
first spouse to die or risk losing the claim when section 1205 requires the surviving spouse to 
assume the liability and J.C. 15-3-111 permits filing of a joint probate upon the second 
spouse's death. The foolishness of forcing creditor initiated probates for debt owed by the 
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surviving spouse is obvious. 
Second, "[i)t is a basic tenet of statuto1y construction that the more specific statute or 
section addressing the issue controls over the statute that is more general." 'Wheeler v, ldah,Q 
De12t. of Health and Welfare, 207 P.3d 988,995, 147 Idaho 257,264 (2009). 
The Estate asserts the general statute that a claim must be presented in an open estate 
within three (3) years of the decedent's death under §803. This is consistent with § 108 that 
prohibits filing of an estate more than three (3) years after decedent's death. Both sections 
are general provisions that apply to filing of probate and presentation of creditor claims 
within probate proceedings. The more specific provision found in J.C. § 15-3-111 pennits 
filing of a joint probate wider specific circumstances (marital community, survivor entitled to 
all of estate, and survivor dies before any probate of spouse's estate is comme.1.1ced). This 
more specific statute "controls over" the more general statute~s asserted by the Estate. To do 
otherwise renders a nonsensical result. 
Third, the Estate argues that Alt lost his right to assert this claim by failing to file a 
probate of Hedwig's estate by 2011 but provides no explanation for how this affects the claim 
against this joint probate of Robert and Hedwig's estates. 
Robert could have taken ownership of the community assets in 2008 subject to the 
deceased spouse's debts and liabilities, under a 1205 surnnwry administration~ or full blown 
probate with notice to creditors. Since he took no action and Jadwiga has now filed a joint 
probate under I.C. §15-3-111, her right to inherit (if any) is subject to Alt's creditor's claims, 
Robert never pm bated Hedwig's 1999 Will. He did not acquire clear title to the property by 
not probating the estate, but he also did not expunge the community obligation incurred by 
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Hedwig and Robert when they borrowed funds from him. 
The Estate's Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied. 
Lastly, the Estate engages in a wandering discussion of recent changes to the 
Medicaid recovery statute found at LC. 56-218 asserting that it is more recent and somehow 
controlling ovel'the effects ofI.C. 15~3~111. None of this is relevant. The Medicaid 
recovery statutes are dictated by Federal law and are designed to recover funds on behalf of 
the "payor of last resort" the federal Medicaid assistance program funded by tax payer 
dollars. See: In re: Estate of Melvin Peterson 157 Idaho 827,340 P.3d 1143 (2014). The 
Medicaid recovery rules are also unique in that the Department is prohibited from recovering 
from the recipient's estate on death until the surviving spouse has died. J.C. 56-218 
(l)(a)(2015). This argument is ilTelevant to this case. 
The Estate also argues that recent amendments to I.C. 15-3-1205 providing that such 
summary proceedings are NOT subject to a three (3) year filing limitation is also irrelevant. 
Counsel argues that the legislature's failure to also amend 1.C. 15-3-111 reflects a legislative 
intent to not extend the creditor claim period as the Estate construes section 803. This is 
simply silly. A plain reading of the Statement of Purpose for RS22512 attached to counsel's 
affidavit makes clear the legislative intent was to clarify the application of the three (3) year 
limitation because "some coitrts have held to the contrary, and in some districts judges in the 
same district have ruled differently on that question. This bill eliminates that confusion by 
··JT "·1 ··~:::a clearly stating that the two procedures [including small estate affidavits] are not subiect to the FWmt9N~J!Aw nM,Qrm. J 
• .!"'~.~T~ ~ -, 
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three year limitation." 
The Estate argues nonsensicaJly that it was always Jadwiga's intent to utilize the joint 
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probate procedure Wlder section 111 to "transfer real property ... not to expand a creditor's 
recovery period." This foolishly ignores that both Robert and Hedwig's estates are subject 
to creditor claims once the joint probate is filed, whether she likes this or not. Jadwiga cannot 
manipulate ownership of property she claims on the basis of a will purportedly signed just six 
(6) months after marriage to Robert and after just three (3) years of marriage that is titled to 
her predecessor and Robert Melton and was constructed and purchased with Mt. Alt' s funds. 
Finally, the Estate argues that Utah code and the conunent to the Unifonn Probate 
Code suppo1ts its position. The argwnent regarding Utah's statute does not help the Estate. 
Alt's claim "relates", or is asserted, against both Robert and Hedwig's estates. Further, 
Utah's statute cited by the Estate is not specific to married couples and community property. 
It refers to joint tenants or tenants i11 common. 
The Estate's reference to the Uniform Probate Code comments is also inapplicable as 
the portion quoted states it is addressing "universal succession" or "succession without 
administration" where no notice to creditors, etc... This is not the circumstances in this 
proceeding and the comment is inapplicable. 
II. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Court should fmd as a matter of law that the 
Estate failed to timely disallow Alt's claim and it is deemed allowed under I.C. § 15-3-806(a). 
Further, the Estate's Motion for Summazy Judgment based upon I.C. §15~3-803(a) 
~-' · w~arni should be denied as a matter oflaw. 
"$!'l8,~n1 .. . 
DaniclP. Fcathmcon Mr. Alt is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs based l.lpon Idaho Code§§ 
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DATED this /~y of September, 2015. 
BRENT C. FEATHERST 
Attorney for Heinz Alt, Creditor 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIALl.iDIStm@F,O .. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY G~f!~~ 6j-~ 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATES OF ) 
) Case No: CV-2013-0000313 
Robert Ernest Melton and Hedwig Melton ) 
) MEMORANDUM OPINION 
DECEASED, ) 
______ ___ _ ) 
Brent C. Featherston 
Attorney for Heinz Alt 
113 South Second A venue 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Mary Cusack 
Attorney for Jadwiga Melton 
320 E. Neider Avenue, Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
This cause was called to hearing on the personal representative's motion for summary 
judgment on August 24, 2015. Ms. Cusack represents Jadwiga Melton, the surviving spouse of 
Robert Melton and personal representative of the estate. Mr. Featherston represents Heinz Alt, 
the claimant against the estate, son of Hedwig ("Hedy") Melton, and step-son of Robert Melton. 
Hedy and Robert were married until her death on August 11, 2008. Robert then remarried the 
personal representative, Jadwiga, in July 2010. 
Heinz filed a claim against the estate in the amount of $102,574.50, alleging an 
unsecured loan to his mother "Hedy" and Robert to purchase the residential real property owned 
by the estate. The personal representative argues on summary judgment that the claim against 
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Hedy' s estate is untimely as a matter of law and must be denied. Heinz argues that the 
disallowance of his claim was untimely, and the claim has therefore been allowed by operation 
oflaw. Alternatively, Heinz argues that his claim against Hedy's estate is not untimely and can 
proceed to trial. 
The court ruled at summary judgment hearing that issues of fact regarding "the dead 
man's statute" and other theories advanced by the personal representative required denial of 
summary judgment. The issues regarding timeliness of the disallowance of claim and Heintz's 
claim against Hedy's estate received additional briefing post-hearing. Those briefs are now on 
file and have been reviewed by the court. The remaining portions of the summary judgment 
motion are now ripe for determination. 
II. 
STANDARD ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Rule 56(c), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, provides for summary judgment where there 
is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. In order to make that determination, the court looks to "the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits if any ... " 
On a motion for summary judgment, the facts in the record are to be liberally construed 
in favor of the party opposing the motion. If the record contains conflicting inferences or if 
reasonable minds might reach different conclusions, a summary judgment must be denied. Roell 
V City of Boise, 130 Idaho 199, 938 P.2d 1237 (1997); Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539,808 
P.2d 876 (1991) 
On a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must determine if there are factual 
issues to be resolved by the trier of fact. It is not the function of the trial court to weigh the 
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evidence or resolve controverted issues. American Land Title Co. v. Isaak, l 05 Idaho 600, 671 
P.2d 1063 (1983); Merrill v. Duffy Reed Construction Co. , 82 Idaho 410, 353 P.2d 657 (1960). 
If there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law, the court must enter summary judgment. Zumwalt v. Stephan, Balleisen & Slavin, 
113 Idaho 822, 748 P.2d 406 (Ct. App. 1987) 
III. 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
The following facts are either undisputed by the parties in their affidavits, or those 
proposed by the non-moving party, which are accepted as true for purposes of this motion. 
Hedy was Heinz's mother. Hedy married Robert Melton when Heinz was a teenage child. 
Hedy and Robert were not financially successful, so in 1996 and 1997, Heinz made a series of 
loans to Hedy and Robert totaling $102,574.50 for the purpose of purchasing land and building a 
log home residence in Boundary County. The loan is documented in detail in Hedy' s 
handwriting and signature, copies of which are attached to the Claim Against Estate as exhibits 
A and B. Exhibit C shows the detailed floor plan of the residence, and is written in the 
handwriting of Hedy and/or Robert Melton. Exhibit C was provided to Heinz by Hedy and 
Robert as part of the loan process. 
Hedy and Robert initially agreed to secure Heinz's loan by deeding the real property in 
his name. Subsequently, it was agreed that Heinz would quitclaim the property to Hedy and 
Robert, in exchange for their promise to name Heinz as their sole beneficiary in their wills. Hedy 
and Robert subsequently executed valid wills in 1998 which did in fact name Heinz as their sole 
beneficiary so he would ultimately inherit the property purchased and built with his loan money. 
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Hedy died in 2008, and Robert remarried to Jadwiga in July 2010. Jadwiga is now the 
personal representative of Robert's estate. In December of 2010, Robert executed a new will 
which omitted Heinz and named Jadwiga as his sole beneficiary. In 2012, Heinz inquired of 
Robert's will and was assured by Robert that his current will was the 1998 will which still 
honored the agreement that Heinz be his sole beneficiary. 
Robert died on July 4, 2013. Hedy's will was not probated following her death in 2008. 
The residential real property purchased and constructed with Heinz' s loan proceeds is the only 
significant estate asset. Ultimately, the estates of Hedy and Robert Melton were joined together 
for probate in this proceeding pursuant to Idaho Code Section 15-3-111 in 2015. Heinz filed a 
claim against both estates on January 13, 2015. On March 17, 2015, the Personal 
Representative filed a Notice ofDisallowance, and on May 4, 2015, Heinz filed his Petition to 
Allow Claims. 
A. WAS THE DISALLOWANCE TIMELY? 
Heinz argues that the Personal Representative's March 17, 2015, Notice of Disallowance 
exceeded the 60 day time limit and his claim is therefore allowed as a matter of law pursuant to 
IC§ 15-3-806. While it is true that the local practice has been to disallow a claim against the 
estate within 60 days, a close reading of the controlling provision reveals the following: 
"Failure of the personal representative to mail notice to a claimant of action on his 
claim for sixty (60) days after the time/or original presentation of the claim has 
expired has the effect of a notice of allowance." ( emphasis added) 
Thus, it is clear from a close reading of the statute that the 60 day time limit for denial of 
a claim does not accrue upon its filing, but rather upon expiration of "the time for original 
presentation of the claim". Heinz argues that the focus of the statute is on "the" claim at hand, 
meaning that the 60 day time limit runs from date of its presentation. Heinz' s interpretation of 
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the statute is not entirely without logic, and likely explains local practice and understanding. 
However, the court concludes that the specification of "the time for", which precedes and 
modifies the reference to "the" claim, means that the estate's duty to disallow begins running 
after expiration of the deadline for presenting the claim. If the legislature intended to craft the 
statute as Heinz urges, it would simply read" ... 60 days after presentation of the claim . ... ", 
without any need for reference to "the time for original presentation" having expired. 
In this probate, the personal representative filed her Notice to Creditors on February 61\ 
and published it for the first time on February 19, 2015. Idaho Code §15-3-801 (a) and (b) 
provide that creditors have four ( 4) months to present their claims from the date of first 
publication of notice in a newspaper of general circulation. In those instances where a creditor 
has received personal delivery of the "Notice to Creditors", those claims must be presented 
within 60 days. It is not clear in the record whether Heinz received personal delivery of the 
Notice to Creditors under subsection (b). Ifhe did, he had until about April 8th to file his claim, 
meaning that the estate had until about June 8th to deny it. If Heinz fell into the category of 
creditors served by publication of the notice, the original time for presentation of those claims 
did not expire until about June 19th, giving the estate another 60 days to effectively deny that 
class of claims. Under either scenario, the Personal Representative's March 1th disallowance 
was clearly timely. 
B. IS HEINTZ'S CLAIM AGAINST HEDY'S ESTATE TIME-BARRED? 
The personal representative argues that Robert's claim against Hedy's estate is time 
barred by IC § 15-3-803, which provides in relevant part as follows: 
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LIMIT A TIO NS ON PRESENTATION OF CLAIMS 
(a) All claims against a decedent's estate which arose before the death of the decedent, 
including claims of the state and any subdivision thereof ( except claims for state taxes), 
whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, 
founded on contract, tort, or other legal basis, if not barred earlier by another statute of 
limitations or nonclaim statute, are barred against the estate, the personal representative, 
and the heirs and devisees of the decedent, unless presented within the earlier of the 
following dates: 
(1) three (3) years after the decedent's death; 
Hedy died in 2008 and Heinz did not file his claim against her estate until early 2015 . As 
that span of time far exceeds three years following Hedy's death, the Personal Representative 
argues that the claim is barred. 
Heinz argues that because Hedy's estate was not probated until 2015, there was no estate 
within which he could have filed his claim, so the three year limitation did not begin to run until 
Hedy's estate was opened. The court is not persuaded. IC§ 15-3-203 provides in relevant part: 
PRIORITY AMONG PERSONS SEEKING APPOINTMENT AS PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE 
(a) Whether the proceedings are formal or informal, persons who are not disqualified have 
priority for appointment in the following order: 
*** 
(6) forty-five (45) days after the death of the decedent, any creditor; 
Heinz, as a creditor of Hedy's estate, therefore had the clear remedy to probate her estate 
as the personal representative and prosecute his claim within three (3) years of her death. 
Heinz also argues that IC§ 15-3-111 supports his contention that the three year limitation 
on presenting claims is tolled when spouses' estates are probated jointly. Again, the court is not 
persuaded. IC § 15-3-11 provides: 
JOINT PROBATE ON DEATH OF SURVIVOR OF MARRIAGE DISSOLVED BY DEATH 
In cases in which a marital community has been dissolved by the death of either spouse at 
any time, the survivor was then entitled to all of the property of the decedent by will, law, or 
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both, and the survivor died before any proceeding had been commenced for the probate of the 
estate of the spouse whose death occurred first, the estates of both decedents may be joined for 
probate in a single proceeding in any court having jurisdiction of the estate of the spouse whose 
death occurred last. The three (3) year provision of section 15-3-108, Idaho Code, applies only to 
the death of the spouse whose death occurred last. The initial application or petition filed in any 
such joint proceeding shall contain a statement of the facts upon which such joint proceeding is 
based, in addition to all other statements required by this code to be made therein. 
There is nothing in this section that states or suggests any tolling of a creditor' s deadline 
to present a claim, just because the estate is subsequently jointly probated. Indeed, this section 
specifically exempts the three (3) year limitation on probate following death of the first spouse, 
as found in section 108. That fact clearly demonstrates the legislature's ability and willingness to 
make special exceptions within this particular provision where warranted and intended. As there 
is no exception made to the three (3) year creditors' bar found in 15-3-803, one shall not be 
implied by the court. Heinz's claim against Hedy's estate was not filed or "presented" within 
three years of her death and is now barred by IC§ 15-3-803(a)(l). 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, the court concludes that the Personal Representative' s 
disallowance of Heinz's claim is not untimely. Heinz's claim against Hedy's estate is barred by 
IC 15-3-803, and therefore subject to summary judgment dismissal. Heinz may still proceed with 
his claim against Robert's estate. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, regular mail, 
postage prepaid, and/or delivered, this ~ day of October, 2015, to: 
Brent Featherston 
113 South Second A venue 
Sandpoint, ID 83 864 
Mary Cusack 
320 E. Neider Aver, Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815 
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ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON and ) 
HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON, ) 
) 
Deceased. ) __________ ) 
CASE NO. CV 13- 0313 
JUDGMENT 
I.R.C.P. 54(b) 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The Personal Representative's disallowance of Heinz Alt's claim, filed 
March 17, 2015, in the above referenced estate was timely filed . 
2. Heinz Alt's claim against the Estate of Hedwig "Hedy" Melton is barred 
pursuant to I.C. § 15-3-8~ . 
DATED this S.;..-- day of December 
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RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE 
With respect to the issues determined by the above Judgment or Order, it is hereby 
CERTIFIED, in accordance with Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P., that the Court has determined that 
there is no just reason for delay of the entry of a Final Judgment and that the Court has 
and does hereby direct that the above Judgment or Order shall be a Final Judgment upon 
which execution may issue and an appeal may be taken as provided by the Idaho 
Appellate Rules. t(:} 
DATED this ~ day of December 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3 day of December 2015, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT was mailed via Regular U.S. Mail or faxed to: 
MARY W. CUSACK 
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC 
320 E. Neider, Suite 206 
Coeurd' Alene, ID 83815 
(208) 667-0708 - FAX 
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CASE NO. CV-2013-0313 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, JADWIGA MELTON, AND TO 
YOUR ATTORNEY, MARY CUSACK 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
l. The above-named Appellant, HEINZ ALT, appeals against the above-named 
Personal Representative, JADWIGA MELTON, to the District Court of the First Judicial 
District from the JUDGMENT entered in the above-entitled matter on December 3, 2015, by 
the Honorable Justin Julian, Magistrate Judge, presiding . 
. 2. That the party has a right to appeal to the District Court, and the Judgments or 
Orders described in Paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 1-705(3), Idaho Code § 17-201 and I.R.C.P 83. 
3. (a) IsaClerk'stranscriptrequested? Yes. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - l 
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'FATHERSTON LAW FIRM.OITD. 
~TTORNFYS "l LAW 
Daniel P. Featherston 
Brent C. Featherston* 
Jeremy P. Featherston 
Jererni L . Ossman** 
113 S. Second Ave. 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Phone (208) 263-6866 
Fax (208) 263-0400 
*Licensed in Idaho & Wo.shington 
**Licensed in Idaho & Michigan 
(b) These proceedings were electronically recorded by the Clerk of the Court and 
are in the custody of Clerk of the Court, Boundary County, Idaho. 
4. This Appeal is brought both on matters oflaw and matters of fact. 
5. Appellant will separately file a statement of the issues on appeal. 
6. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the Clerk of the Court, 
and upon the court reporter, if one was present at these proceedings. 
(b) That the Clerk of the District Court or administrative agency will be promptly 
paid upon notice of the Clerk's estimate. 
( c) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
the Idaho Criminal Rules. 
DATED this /'7 day ofJanuary, 2016. 
I 
FEATHER~ ; IRM 
~ -
By BRENTC.FEAfHERST 
Attorney for Appellant 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
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-- ··-·-- - -·--· -
!@lliRSIQN LAW [IRM,Qn:I?. 
ATTORNl'iS AT {AW 
Daniel P. Featherston 
Brent C. Featherston* 
Jeremy P. Featherston 
Jererni L. Ossman** 
113 S. Second Ave. 
Sandpoint, 1D 83864 
Phone (208) 263-6866 
Fax (208) 263-0400 
*Licensed in Idaho & Washington 
**Licensed in Idaho & Michigan 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the /J~day of January, 2016, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following 
manner: 
Glenda Poston 
Boundary County Clerk of the Court 
215 S. First Avenue 
Sandpoint, ID 83 864 
Mary W. Cusack, Esq. 
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC 
610 W. Hubbard, Suite 205 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
[ ] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
~] Hand delivered 
[ ] Facsimile 
[ ] Courthouse Mail 
[ ] Other: _______ _ 
[ ] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand delivered 
~ Facsimile No. (208) 667-0708 
[ ] Other: ______ _ 
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Jan.15. 201 6 4:48PM Mitche11, Haynes, Fried1 ander , Pete No. 6429 P. 2/ 4 
ST A 1E OF \DAHO y 
COl)N1Y QF BOUN0~~6 QiV'\ 
l -) 5 . \\ (2 - AT _:!..1~----=--,-, 
F\LEJ>LENDA POSTON, CLERK 
~ ---BY - DEPUTY CLERK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST WDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of the Estate of ) 
) 
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and ) 
HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON ) 
) 
Deceased. ) 
CASE NO. CV 2013"313 
ORDER OF REASSIGNMENT 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above matter is reassigned to the Honorable 
Jeff Brudie. Administrative District Judge for the Second Judicial District. for the 
reassignment to a District Judge from the Second Judicial District for all further 
proceedings, Pw·suant to the Idaho Supreme Court Order for Assignment of Second 
Judicial District Judges to the First Judicial District dated June 17. 2015. this 
reassignment shall be considered an appointment by the Supreme Court pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 40(d)(l )(l)(iii). 
-:---
DATED this IS day of .J:3n , 2016. 
ORDER OF REASSIGNMENT: 1 
LANSING L. HA YNES 
Administrative District Judge for the 
First Judicial District · · · 
. ._,_./,' 
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Jan, 15. 2016 4:48 PM Mit r~ell, Hayne s, Fri edlan der, Pete No. 6429 P. 3/4 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby ce11ify that on the &.:> day of ~CX..(\ · , 2016i a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing was sent via facsimile, to the following: 
Honorable Jeff M. Brudie 
Faxed: 208-799-3058 
Honorable Barbara Buchanan 
Interoffice mail 
Brent C. Featherston 
Attorney at Law 
Fax: 208-263-0400 
Mary Cusack 
Attorney at Law 
Fax: Q.o~ - lR.(Q1- C>lob 
ORDER OF REASSIGNMENT: 2 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
B~'\~~ --
Deputy Clerk ( ) 
. '---... 
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Jan. 15. 201 6 4: 49PM Mitrhe] l, Haynes, Friedlander, Pele No. 6429 
In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
ASSIONMBNT OF SEGOND J\JDICIAL DISTRICT -) 
JUDOllS TO 'rt-ti! FIRST JUDICIAL ll!STIUCT ) Oll.OBR . 
) 
WHl!lt2AS, lh!s Court havi~s dolermlned a. 0 rtctd for addU!onil'Judlcl,I uei,tanto In lho Flll8t. 
J\JOICJAl. DISTIUCf of d10 Slate af Idaho and !ho wlgr1111ent o(S~_nd Jndlolef Dhhiol 'CourtJ\ldiOI JBP(? · 
bRUl>llt JOHN 81.lmNl!II. JAY GASKILL &lld ORl!OORY _fl'TZMAIJRICB Gre. n~ouaq-:. an4 w_UI 
j)t'(ln1o1, tho efllclanl admlnltu-,llon ofJuillco; theroforo, good ol\lS6 appearing. 
IT HB.RBBY lS ORDBRED ·rhll Seoond Judlolal Dl,t~« Court )udgt.1 JllPP BIWDJB, JOHN 
STl!GNQR, Jr,Y GASKILL pntl GRl!OORY PITZMAURTCB 1,o,·o.nd li~b}' an,, ASSIONED lo tho FIRST 
JUDICIAL DISTRlCT and eppoln<ed lo pN111do In eny ~!lffl u mq bo d~ign~l~ by Ille Adml~_lair.1lvo 
Olftrict Judge 111 thD Pl~ JUDICIAL DISl'RIC'f and_wlgl!Cd by •.~o Admlnhtntlvo Dl11r'!cl 111dgo lrt \he 
Seeond Jtldlottl District to <Odduct •II prooeedll\&ll n~ to, lh_olt ll~_•I di~jlf?llllon dwlllg, lho ptrlod 
lndk:aled bellow: 
IT PUllTimR. IS ORDBl\80 fhal Ll!o rtpot1111$ ot 811Y prooeedlng In 1h11 DiAfrlot Court ~18J1ed to 
Ol1trlct Coull JudR,Oa J8PF llRUOIB, JOliN ffiONBR. JAY OA!l~~L,Pnd Cl\rmoaY PITZMAUIUC8 
may bo b1 an olcctronlo recotdlng of_lfuiofficl~I ~(d I" 11011 o(a C9UJt R~rtCrM delennlnal bylltP Dlslrlat 
" CoutUudge, c' ; • . • 
• IT ~UR'rHBll l~ ORDl!Rl.10 1hn \ho a.ulgnn,cnt o_f ~ In lho P~~ JVgi~l~L-DISfR(9' ,to tJ!.~ 
Jll<lgo, llst~ above shall bv con!ldeml 1ppolnlme~li by lh\> ldalul 6'\Jpreme Cou~ al!ll thf~ pun111)1°l Iv ~.qf11 
• ' ' ~ t .o •.f I • I , ~ 
40(d)(IJ(l)(III) o(th, Idaho Ruloa of Civil P~ul'O, lho~ shall bo no rlsfiJ tq dltqutlll}' lhosoJlldllfll wlthDlll 
c~ll-$0 lull)' ofth& PIMT JUOICIAL DIS'l'RICT cuo. to which lliey ~ M$l&\ed,. _.:: : ,. . . . . . ,' ,. 
11'. FURTH nit JS ORD'l!RllD I hat, eopy orthla Order shall bo pl~~ i~ ~ju·d~ ~~,&i.f,n~ql!\ ill~ 19: l)e 
• . • • I .' I•... . . . • • ·- · 
n11lnl:lfl!cd by t~o or11rl~t$avrf Cforhu oenlnll rcglslor ofBIIJudgo wlg,t~nl?rdo~. , . . , .. . ,, . , 
DATijDtbit~cl-.yofJune,20lS. . . . , .... -· .. • , , 
. ,· - · .. '... . -·· . . , 
- ByOtdotoftheSoP.~"\Dc~~.r1., ..... ·JZ .-__: -.:, ;·, 
lloger s. auro)ok. C~l~fJu9tlcD · 
. ... ., 
. . ( ' i. 
Slcphen-W.K~nyon,Cl;rk t. ~···:<:· ,:, : :! · -·· .. , .. i!; ::1 t 
• QC): Alfmllllslralivenlsll'lo1JudgosJ&ff8rudlo811dU1JsingHayn~ . ,,. · : , : .:.1 .,. · , ;: ·· - . ·, 
Dlstrk1 Judget Jeffllrudl,, John StegMr, J,yQuklJI 1111d Ore11,0iy Fil~¥Mrloo , 
'Trlil C1?urt /\drnlnl,!ra!Ofll tlon, J11,y P. Oe,kill 11J1d K•rlcno Behtl1111e r • 
tluman Re.sllun:c.t D)reotor And~ ~1rto11on , ·r ,... ·: 1 •! ·, . , , : , • 
l:)irec(or ofCOllrt M1111 eme vblon la 
.. ;·.: -· :. 
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l 
Fl LED 
ZD!h JAN 25 A 9: 05 
Si,\TE J F l'.1;\HO 
COUHTY OF 80\JNOMn 
GLEHD~zt.CLE?.K 
BY r-K nr=--.,. y ~1_ 1< 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
ROBERT ERNFST MELTON and 









) _ _ _______ ) 
Case No. CV 2013-313 
ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE 
It is ORDERED that Judge John Stegner, whose chambers are located in Moscow, 
Idaho, is assigned to preside over all further proceedings in the above-entitled matter. 
DATED this :2-hl:ay of January 2016. 
·e 
cfnc!~l.trtrffive District Judge 
ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE -1 
- --- - ------ --- - ...... ________ - -- - - --- ---------- -
Page 215 of 438
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that a full, true, complete 
and correct copy of the foregoing 
ORDER AffilGNING JUDGE was delivered to: 
Brent Featherston: Fax 20~263-0400 
Mary Cusack: Fax 208-667-0708 
Hon John Stegner: fax 208-883-5719 
on this ~(:)...--.day of January 2016. 
~ ~ ----· -----~ , ____y-..._ --··· / 
\ 
~ eputy G:lerk 
. ) -
ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE-2 
---------··-· · ····---- -
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03-02-'16 15 :45 FROM-FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM 2082630400 T-262 P0001/0003 F-986 
Daniel P. Pea1heralon 
Brent C, Fcatheralon* 
Jeremy P. Fcathelllton 
)m:mi L. Ossman** 
113 S. S<>C<>n<1Avc, 
S:lndpoint, lD 83864 
Phone (208) 263-6866 
Fa.-: (208) 263-0400 
•!.,jc.,n,,.d in ldaha I,_ WWlh\tlOO 
• •Lic<n""1 in l<hlho It 'Michl£an 
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD. 
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON, ISB No. 4602 
Attorney at Law 
113 South Second A venue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83 864 
(208) 263-6866 
(208) 263-0400 (Fax) 
brent@featherstonlaw.com 
Attorney for Creditor, Heinz Alt 
FILED 
2016 HAR -2 PH ~: 03 
STATE OF lOAHG · 
COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
GLEH~ ~~?1TC~LERK 
BY ~~ --::i. 
. - n-:- .... IJ r:-,-Cl :e ·· u.,._, T _ f'\ _1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and 








CASE NO. CV-2013-0313 
AMENDED 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, JADWIGA MELTON, AND TO 
YOUR ATTORNEY, MARY CUSACK 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Appellant, HEINZ ALT, appeals against the above-named 
Personal Representative, JADWIGA MELTON, to the Distiict Court of the First Judicial 
District from the n.JDGMENT entered in the above-entitled matter on December 3, 2015, by 
the Honorable Justin Julian, Magistrate Judge, presiding. 
. 2. That the party has a right to appeal to the District Court, and the Judgments or 
· Orders described in Paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Idaho 
Appellate Rule 17(m) and I.R.C.P. Rule 83(a). 
3. (a) Is a Clerk's transcript requested? Yes. 
AMENDED NOTlCE OF APPEAL. 1 
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03-02-'16 15:45 FROM-FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM 2082630400 T-262 P0002/0003 F-986 
Ditniel P. Peathc:.rston 
Brent C. Penthc:.rston* 
Jeremy P. Feathcnaon 
Jcremi L. Os&man•¥ 
113 S. Second Ave. 
s~ndpoint, ID 83864 
Phone (208) 26~-6866 
Fax (208) 263-0400 
•Lioco,cd io ldilha k. W..hintton 
.. L1ocn1c~ In Id.Iha & Michrs•n 
(b) These proceedings were electronically recorded by the Clerk of the Court and 
are in the custody of Clerk of the Court, Boundary County, Idaho. Hea~ing on Motion for 
Summary Judg.nent held August 24, 2015. 
4. This Appeal is brought both on matters of law and matters of fact. 
5. Appellant will separately file a statement of the issues on appeal. 
6. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the Clerk of the Court, 
and upon the court reporter, if one was present at these proceedings. 
(b) That the Clerk of the District Court or administrative agency will be promptly 
paid upon notice of the Clerk1s estimate. 
( c) lb.at service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
the Idaho Rules of Civil ,edure and Idaho Code. 
DATED this ~ day of March, 2016. 
Attom.ey for Appellant 
AMENDED NOTICE OF Al'PEAL. 2 
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03-02-'16 15 :45 FROM-FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM 2082630400 T-262 P0003/0003 F-986 
D&lliel P. Fealhcmlon 
Bn:ni C. Fealhonton* 
Jeremy P. Foatherslon 
krcnti L. Ossman*~ 
11~ S. Soicond Ave. 
S6ildpoin1, ID 83864 
Phomi (208) 263-6866 
f',1)( (208) 263-0400 
<l,io,,n,.d in 14'11o 8t W..hlnj.10ft 
"Lic.on,od 101~111lo & Mielusan 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
n# · 
I hereby certify that on the~ day of March, 2016, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following 
manner: 
Glenda Poston 
Boundary County Clerk of the Court 
P.O.Box419 
Bonners Ferry, Idaho 83805 
Mary W. Cusack, Esq_ 
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC 
610 W. Hubbard, Suite 205 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
AMENDEO NOTJCE OJt Al'PEi\L · 3 
[ ] U.S. Mail. Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight_Mail 
[ ] ijand delivered 
[W Facsimile 
[ ] Courthouse Mail 
[ ] Other: _ ______ _ 
U.S. Mail, Posmge Prepaid 
Overnight Mail 
Hand delivered 
Facsimile No. (208) 667-0708 
Other: -------~ 
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FILED 
2016 HAR -3 AH IQ: 16 
STATE OF IDAHO 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF, ) 
) Case No: CV-2013-0000313 
ROBERT E MEL TON and ) 
HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON ) ESTIMATE OF TRANSCRIPT COST 
) 
DECEASED, 
You have filed a Notice of Appeal in the above entitled matter. Unless otherwise 
ordered , a transcript is required and the transcript fee must be paid within fourteen (14) 
days of the filing of the Notice of Appeal. It is estimated that the cost of the transcript is 
$120.25. 
·c.,l 
DATED this 3 day of March, 2016. 
ESTIMATE OF TRANSCRIPT COST -1 
GLENDA POSTON 
Clerk of the District Court 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage 
prepaid, regular mail, and/or delivered, this ::t~ay of March, 2016 to: 
Brent C. Featherston 
Attorney at Law 
113 S. Second Avenue 




ESTIMATE OF TRANSCRIPT COST -2 
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FILED 
2016 HAR f S PH I: oa 
STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
GLENDA POSTON. CLERK 
BY • 1 oE~rrtr!f' 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of 
Robert Ernest Melton, etal. 
Deceased 
) 
) Case No: CV-2013-0000313 
) 
) NOTICE OF LODGING 
) OF TRANSCRIPT 
) 
TO: THE PARTIES ABOVE NAMED OR THEIR ATTORNEYS: 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED pursuant to I.R.C.P. 83(0) that the transcript 
previously ordered in the above entitled matter has been lodged with the Clerk of the 
District Court, Magistrate Division, of Boundary County, State of Idaho. 
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that you have twenty-one (21) days from the date 
of this Notice to secure your copy of the transcript from the Clerk of the District Court, and 
to file any objections. 
DATED this (5~") dayof '-iY7t .. ,·c l1, 20 1(.{.;) . 
NOTICE OF LODGING TRANSCRIPT-1 
GLENDA POSTON 
Clerk of the District Court 
. By la VVJ , L L0J~if) ~7 ° Deputy Clerk 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the fo egoing was mailed, regular 
mail, postage prepaid, and/or delivered, this ~ ~day of ~\. · , c , 20 f (.._-, , to: 
Mary W Cusack 
Attorney at Law 
320 East Neider Avenue, Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene ID 8381 5 
Brent C. Featherston 
Attorney at Law 
113 S. Second Avenue 
Sandpoint ID 83864 
) 
)/4 \~ l0'-~ \.~.r\ 
/ Deputy Clerk 
NOTICE OF LODGING TRANSCRIPT -2 
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03-17-'16 11 :44 FROM-FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM 2082630400 
FILED 
101& MAR 11 PH \2: 08 
STATE OF lOAHO 
rou!HY Of BOUNDARY 
GLE l P, JSTOH, CLERt\ 
T-362 P0001/0001 F-178 
ll~CllIVEJD 
MAR 1 7 2016 
Featherston L 
aw .FY;r'nl, Obtd, 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF, 
Robert Ernest Melton, etal. 
DECEASED, 
) 
) Case No: CV-2013"0000313 
~ RECEIPT OF TRANSCRf~r t· 
) 
-----~--------) 
I, Brent Featherston, hereby certify that on the /f~t March, 2016, I received 
a copy of the Clerk's Transcript of Motion for Summary Judgment held in the above 
matter on August 24, 2015, before the Hon. Judge Justin W. Julian. 
RECEIPT OF TRANSCRIPT.- 1 
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FILED 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and 
HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON 
) 
) Case No. CV-2013-313 
) 
) 
) ORDER SETTING BRIEFING 
) SCHEDULE AND SCHEDULING 
) ORAL ARGUMENT _______________ ) 
On January 13, 2016, the Appellant, Heinz Alt, filed a Notice of Appeal with 
this Court. The appeal is taken from the Judgment entered by the Magistrate Judge 
on December 3, 2015, after granting a motion for summary judgment filed by the 
estate's personal representative, ,Jadwiga Melton. The transcript of the motion for 
summary judgment hearing was filed with this Court March 15, 2016. Consequently, 
a briefing schedule is appropriate. 
ORDER SETTING BRIEFING 
SCHEDULE AND SCHEDULING 
ORAL ARGUMENT 
Page 1 
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Good cause appearing, 
It is ORDERED that: 
(1) Appellant's statement of issues on appeal is due no later than May 4, 
2016; 
(2) Appellant's opening brief shall be filed and ser'ved no later than June 8, 
2016; 
(3) The personal representative's response brief shall be filed and served no 
later than July 6, 2016; 
(4) Appellant's reply brief, if any, shall be filed and served no later than July 
27, 2016; 
(5) Oral argument will be conducted on August 19, 2016, at 10:00 a.m. by 
telephone with the Court placing the call. 
Dated this l..'o/'l:; of April 2016. 
ORDER SETTING BRIEFING 
SCHEDULE AND SCHEDULING 
ORAL ARGUMENT 
~l-"""- "--~~'~ John R. Stegner 
District Judge 
Page 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that full, true, complete, and correct copies of the foregoing 
ORDER SETTING BRIEFING SCHEDULE AND SCHEDULING ORAL 
ARGUMENT were delivered in the following methods to: 
Brent Featherston 
Attoniey at Law 
113 South Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Mary Cusack 
Attorney at Law 
320 E. Neider Aver, Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815 
on this~ day o~ 2016. 
ORDER SETTING BRIEFING 
SCHEDULE AND SCHEDULING 
ORAL ARGUMENT 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ X] Fax .;l Oc ~ 3 .QL.-~CX) 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X ] Fax d-~ ' <.R&, l .(Jl{¾' 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
Page 3 
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05-04- ' 16 16:47 FROM-FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM 2082630400 T-605 P0002/0003 F-750 
. ,. \ . -·-··· 
DanM P. Pcath,:,rston 
Brent C. Pcathersl(ln* 
Jeremy P. FeatheritOn 
Jeremi L Osstn3Jl •• 
113 S. Second Ave. 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Phone (i08) 263-6866 
F~ (i08) 263-0400 
•Lic.-c,..i io ld>ho & Wash~oon 
••Licen""' ii\ Ic!AAo & Mich,s•n 
ORIG11~AL 
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD. 
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON, ISB No. 4602 
Attorney at Law 
113 South _Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
(208) 263-6866 
(208) 263-0400 (Fax) 
prent@featherstonlaw.com 
Attorney for Creditor, Heinz Alt 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and 








CASE NO. CV-2013-0313 
APPELLANT'S STATEMENT 
OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
COMES NOW· the undersigned counsel for and on behalf of the Appellant, Heinz 
Alt, and pursuant to the Court's Order Setting Briefing Schedule and Scheduling Oral 
Argument. hereby submits a Statement ofissues on Appeal as follows: 
1. Did the trial court err in granting partial summary judgment determining that 
the Appellant's claim was timely disallowed by the Personal Representative? 
2. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment that Appellant's 
Creditor's Claim is time barred as against the Estate of Hedwig Melton? 
3. Did the trial court err as a matter of law holding that Idaho Code § 15-3-111, 
does not toll or extends the time within which A.P!)ellant'$ Creditor's Claim may be asserted 
against the joint estate of Robert and Hedwig Melton? 
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Dsniel P. PeathcrS!()n 
Bront C, f1,~1hen,1on·• 
Jeremy P. Feathesston 
fo~ml L. Ossman .. 
113 S. Second Ave. 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Phono (208) 263-6866 
Fax (208) 263-0400 
•Licc,ised !~ IOaho & Washing1on 
"'Li=iildin ld,Jto&MJClut>ll 
4. Did the trial court err as a matter of Jaw in granting summary judgment based 
upon Idaho Code § 15-3-803(a) holding that all claims are barred against Hedwig Melton's 
estate when that state is filed for probate after the three (3) year period as a joint estate 
permitted by Idaho Code § 15-3-111? 
DATED this Lj/? dayofMay, 2016. 
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ~ day of May, 2016, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following 
manner: 
Hon. John R. Stegner 
Second Judicial District Judge 
P.O. Box 8068 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Mary W. Cusack, Esq. 
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC 
610 W. Hubbard, Suite 205 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 










U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Overnight Mail 
Hand delivered 
Facsimile No. (208) 883-5719 
Courthouse Mail 
Other: --------
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and 








CASE NO. CV-2013-0313 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
CO:tvfES NOW the undersigned counsel for and on behalf of the Appellant, Heinz 
Alt, and pursuant to the Court's Order Setting Briefing Schedule and Scheduling Oral 
· Argument, hereby submits Appellant's Brief as follows: 
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The Appellant in this matter, Heinz Alt, (''Alt") is the son of Hedwig Melt.on 
("Hedy") and step-son of Robert Emest Melt.on (''Robert"). This ca<,e commenced with the 
filing _of a Petition for Summary Administration of Estate on August 29, 2013, by Robert's 
wife of just over three years, Jadwiga Melton ("Jadwiga"). Robert married Jadwiga in 201 0 
, after Hedy died in 2008. 
It is undisputed that all assets of the Estates of Robert and Hedy, primarily consisting 
of the personal property and contents of a home and the log home and real property in 
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Boundary County, Idaho are community property. It is also undisputed that the real property 
was purchased, and the log home built, by Robert and Hedy with funds lent to them by :Mr. 
Alt.1 Mr. Alt's Creditor's Claim and affidavits and testimony estabiish that Robert and Hedy 
were spendthrifts. The total loan funds are itemized in attachments to Alt's Claim against the 
Estate filed January 13, 2015 signed by Hedy. The totals of $102,574.50 and Hedy's own 
writing acknowledges that the initial $75,982.50 was utilized to purchase and build the log 
house in Boundary County, which) at time of death, was titled to Robert and Hedy as 
community property. The property was initially titled to Mr. Alt and his wife as 
acknowledgement or security of the loan. Subsequently, the Meltons executed Wills leaving 
all of their estates to Mr. Alt. The real property was deeded back to Meltons. See: Creditor's 
Claim and Affidavit of Mary W. Cusack filed June 25, 2015, Exhibits "A'\ "B'' and C''. 
Hedy died on August 11, 2008, and no pi-obate was filed. Alt maintained continuing 
cont.act with his step-father, Robert~ visiting Idaho from his home in Austria on a number of 
occasions from 2008 until 2012 and maintaining contact by phone and email. 
In the summer of 2010, Robert apparently manied Jadwiga, who now submits for 
pl'obate a purported Last Will and Testament of Robert executed in December, 2010, just six 
(6) months following their marriage. Robert died on July 4, 2013. Jadwiga originally filed 
a Petition for Swnmary Administration which was ultimately abandoned in favor of Petition 
to jointly probate the Estates of Robert and Hedwig Melton filed December, 2014. Because 
the 2010 "Will" was not self~authenticating) Mr. Alt challenged it and filed a Motion to 
Convert Proceedings and to Strike Petition for Summary Administration. 
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TI1e 2010 Will is not self-authenticating and was challenged at the hearing for 
appointment of Jadwiga as Personal Representative in a Fonnal Probate proceeding. 
Jadwiga's counsel introduced the testimony of Lila Robinson, a bank employee, who recalled 
Robert coming in to. sign a Will. Robert's signature was purportedly witnessed by Ms. 
Robinson and Kristina Russell on Page 5 of 5. However, a separate, un-numbered page was 
attached to the 2010 Will as filed with the Court which is titled "SELF·PROVING 
AFFIDA VII'' in which Ms. Russell purports to notarize the signatures of Robert, Lila 
Robinson and a third party, Annie Swift, with Ms. Robinson and Ms. Swift being identified 
as "witnesses,' to Robert's signature and execution. Neither Ms. Russell or Ms. Swift 
verified the 2010 Will. 
Following the December 9, 2014, filing by Jadwiga of the Petition for Formal Probate 
of Will and Formal Appointment of Personal Representative, Mr. Alt filed his Claim against 
the Estate, which was served upon Jadwiga's counsel by mail on January 9, 2015. On March 
13, 2015, Jadwiga's counsel mailed a Notice ofDisallowance of Claim. 
Alt timely filed a Petition to Allow the Claim on May 4th noting and preserving the 
untimely disallowance by Jadwiga, sixty-three (63) days after presentation of the Claim. 
On June 25, 2015, Jadwiga's counsel filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Affidavit of Mary Cusack and Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Jadwiga's Motion for Summary Judgment covered a plethora of issues. Alt filed his 
Response to Estate's Motion for Summary Judgment on August 10th• At hearing on August 
24, 2015, the Court dispensed with, and declined to grant, Summary Judgment on all of the 
Estate's argument, except taking under advisement the issue of the Estate's Disallowance and 
whether Mx. Alt's Claim is time baned. 
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Subsequently, the trial court issued a Memorandum Opinion on October 8, 2015, 
concluding that Alt's claim was timely disallowed by the Est.ate and :further concluding that 
Alt's claim as against Hedy's Estate is barred by Idaho Code § 15-3-803, but not barred as to 
Robert's Estate. 
The trial wurt enteted Judgment under I.R.C.P. Rule 54(b) on December 3, 2015. Alt 
timely appealed by filing his Notice of Appeal on January 13, 2016, and Amended Notice of 
Appeal on March 2, 2016. 
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. Did the trial court err in granting Partial Summary Judgment m its 
determination that the Estate had timely disallowed Alt's claim? 
8. Did the trial court err by granting Summary Judgment for the Estate 
determining that Alt's creditor's claim is baned as against Hedy Melton's Estate. 
1. Did the Trial court err as a matter of law that Idaho Code § 15-3-111 
does not toll period for Creditor's Claim when asserted against a joint community property 
estate of Robert and Hedy Melton? 
2. Did the Trial Cowt en as a matter of law by holding that Idaho Code § 
15-3-803(a) necessruily bars all claims against Hedy Melton's Estate when her Estate was 
filed as a community property joint probate under Idaho Code § 15-3-111, more than three (3) 
years after her death and as pem1itted by I. C. § 15-3 M 111? 
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III. ARGUMENT 
A. Did the Trial Court err in granting Partial Summary Judgment in its 
determination that the Estate had timely disallowed Alt's Claim? 
The Estate asserts that Alt provides no basis for his assertion that a personal 
representative's failure to disallow a creditor's claim within sixty (60) days results in 
allowance of the claim. The Estate ignores Idaho Probate Code, which provides as follows: 
(a) As to claims presented in the manner described in §15M 
3-804(a) of this part within the time limit described in §15-3-
803 of this part, the personal representative may mail a notice 
to any claimant stating that the claim has been disallowed ..... 
Failure of the personal representative to mail notice to a 
claimant of action on his claim for _sixty (60) days after the 
time for original presentation of the claim has expired has the 
effect of a notice of allowance. 
r.c. §15-3-806(a)(2015) 
In examining the language "time for odginal presentation of the claim" found in 
subsection 806, note that I.C. §15-3-802(c) provides " ... the proper presentation of a claim 
under §15-3-804, Idaho Code, is equivalent to the commencement of a proceeding on the 
claim." J.C. §15-3M802 (2015) 
Idaho Code §15-3-804 spells out the manner in which a creditor may present a claim 
including that a "claimant shall deliver or mail to the personal representative a written 
statement of the claim indicating its basis and name and address of the claimant and the 
amount claimed and file a written statement of the claim in the form proscribed by rule with 
the Clerk of the Court." I.e. §15-3-804(a)(2015) 
The Code section goes on to state that the claim is deemed ptesented on the last to 
occur of either delivery or mailing of the claim to the personal representative or :filing of the 
claim with the court. 
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The phrase "after the time for original presentation of the claim" is consistent 
throughout the Code and refe.rs to the process and presentation of "the', specific creditor's 
claim. 
In this case, the undisputed evidence establishes that Mr. Alt's Claim was filed 
January 13; 2015. It was served upon counsel by U.S. Mail on January 91h_ See: Affidavit of 
Counsel filed August 10, 2015, Exhibit "B". 
Measuring the time from January 9th, and permitting three (3) day mail rule for 
service on the Estate of the Claim, the Estate's clock for disallowance purposes began on 
January 12th• (Applying a filing date of January 13, 2015, one (l) day later, does not change 
the outcome.) 
The Estate did not disallow Mr. Alt's Claim until it mailed a Disallowance on March 
13 th• Again, applying a three (3) day mail rule provided for in I.R.C.P. Rule 6(e)(l); the 
Estate's Disallowance was not served upoll counsel for Alt until March 1611\ sixty4hree (63) 
days after service of the Claim. (Sixty-two [62) days after court filing of the Claim.] 
Mr. Alt's Creditor's Claim was timely filed, but was not timely disallowed. Under 
J.C. §15-3r806(a), failure of the Estate to disallow the Claim has the effect of deeming the 
Claim allowed. This result renders the Estate's Motion for Summary Judgment moot. 
The Estate argues that its sixty ( 60) day time period did not begun to run until after 
the time for presentation of all cJaims (four months following publication) has expired. The 
Estate extrapolates from the language ''for original presentation of the claim" that this must 
mean a general timeline for all creditors to submit claims, but provides no supporting case 
law. 
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Perhaps more relevant is the plain language of the statute's subsection in question: 
1'Failure of the Personal Representative to mail notice of disallowance or partial allowance on 
his claim for sixty (60) days after the time for original presentation of the claim has expired 
has the effect of a notice of allowance." LC. § 15-3-806. The use of "the" in the sentence 
makes clear that this provision is specific to the specific creditor's cJaim, not a general four 
(4) month provision applicable to Han.y" or "all" claims, Janguage that should be present (but 
is not) for the Estate's argument to make sense. 
The Court should find that the Estate has failed to timely disallow Mr. Alt' s Claim 
and by operation of law it is deemed allowed under I.C. §15-3-806. The allowance of Mr. 
Alt's Claim required the Court to deny the Estate's Motion for Summary Judgment in its 
entirety and deem the Claim allowed as against the Estate. 
B. Did the trial court err by granting Summary Judgment for the Estate 
determining that Alt's creditor's Claim is barred as against Hedy 
Melton's Estate? 
Should the Court uphold the Trial Court's determination that the Estate timely 
disallowed Alt's Creditor's Claim, then the true crux of the issue on appeal from the Trial 
Comi's grant of Summary Judgment is the application ofldaho Code §15-3-803 (a) to joint 
probates filed more than three (3) years after one spouse's death pursuant to §15-3-111 and · 
the effect upon an otherwise timely Creditoi·'s Claim . 
. Section 111 essentially extends the normal three (3) year statute of limitations 
found in Idaho code §15~3-108. "No informal probate or appointment proceeding or 
f01mal testacy or appointment proceeding, ... may be commenced more than three (3) years 
after the decedent's death ... . " Idaho Code §15-3-108 (2015) By its terms, Section 108's 
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t~ee (3) year time limit on probate filings does not apply to summary administrations 
under Idaho Code §15-3-1205. 
The Summary Administration procedures set forth in section 1205, also provides 
that the debts of the deceased spouse pass through to the surviving spouse: 
... (c) In the event that the survivjng spouse (or person 
claiming through or wider the surviving spouse) shall elect to 
proceed under this section. the surviving spouse shall assume 
and be liable for any and all indebtedness that might be a 
claim against the estate of the decedent and there will be no 
administi:ation of the estate of the decedent. 
Idaho Code§ 1S-3-1205 (2016) 
Jadwiga initially elected to proceed under 1205 by filing a summary administration 
petition and then applied for a joint probate of the estates of Robert and Hedwig Melton 
under Idaho Code § 15~3~111. The Trial Court found that Alt's Creditor claim, though 
timely filed in the jojnt probate proceeding, is barred as a matter of law wider Idaho Code§ 
l 5-3-803(a). 
1. Did the Trial Court err as a matter of law that Idaho Code § 15-
3-111 does not also toll the period for ~reditor's claim when 
asserted against community property Estate of Robert and Hedy 
Melton? 
The Idaho Supreme Court has been clear about interpreting legislation: "When 
considering the interpretation of a particular provision, particularly one containing 
ambiguities, a court should look to the surrounding provisions for proper context. Idaho 
Dept. Of Health & Welfare v. McCormick. 283 P.3d 785, 793, 153 Idaho 468, 476 
(Idaho,2012); See: State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866, 264 P.3d 970, 973 (20ll) 
["Provisions should not be read in isolation, but must be interpreted in the context of the 
entire [statute].") 










Page 237 of 438
06- 08-' 16 16 :24 FROM-FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM 2082630400 T-817 P0011/0020 F-213 
DJr1iel P. Pc~thersron 
Brent C. Poatherston~ 
Jeremy l>. :Pcathcrston 
Jercmi L. Ossman• • 
113 S. Seco11dAYe. 
Sandpoin1, ID 83864 
Phonb (i08) 263-6866 
F~ (208) 263-0400 
:,,Lic.tsn~od. in JdW &. WadUnsron 
HLi0t1ma:4 in ld.iho &: Mu::tufal\ 
As discussed above, the legislative scheme establishes several things: 
First, probate of an estate is usually barred three (3) years following the death of 
the decedent, except in §1205 Summary Administrations where the estate is community 
property and will pass to the spouse subject to the debts of the decedent; ruuJ., when the 
estate is community property in nature and the surviving spouse is entitled to inherit the 
property, then the marital estates may be filed jointly for probate upon the death of the 
surviving spouse. The three (3) year provision ofldaho Code §15-3-108 only then applies 
to the death of the surviving spouse. Again, it is essentially a tolling of the statute of 
limitations for probating the estate of the first spouse to die. 
This case presents both circumstances. Jadwiga initially filed this as 1205 summary 
administration in August, 2013. Under that petition, Hedy's interests would pass to Robert 
but together with the obligation owed to her son, Mr. Alt. However, this did not effect a 
transfer of assets to Jadwiga. since she is not the surviving spouse of Hedy and all of the 
Estate assets were community assets of Robert and Hedy Melton. 
Ryalizing this, Jadwiga then filed a joint administration of both Hedy and Robert's 
Estates in December, 2014. This filing provided Mr:. Alt the first opportunity to assert his 
Claim for repayment of the $102,000.00 loan to Robert and Hedy. 
. Second, it is clear that the legislative intent has to be ignored in order to accept the 
Trial Comt's reasoning in applying section 803(a) as a bar to Alt's Claim in Hedy's estate. 
If the legislature provided an exception to the three (3) year statute of limitations on 
probates for summary administrations and joint probates of husband and wife where the 
assets are comnmnity property, it is logical that that same extension of time must be 
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applied to creditor's claims in those two (2) exceptions: summary administration and joint 
probate upon surviving spouse's death. The summary administration, by definition, would 
have passed the log home and property to Robert subject to Hedy's debts and liabilities, 
just as the joint probate requires administration and accounting of both decedents' debts 
and obligations to creditors. Any other interpretation renders the legislative scheme 
absurd. 
The Trial Court's Memorandum Opinion adopts Jadwiga's argument that1 as a 
creditor, Alt was required to seek appointment as personal representative under Idaho Code 
§15-3-203 to advance and protect his Creditor's Claim against Hedy's estate. This would 
also practically require that Alt necessruily bring suit against his step father, Robert, during 
his lifetime. 
The assertion is now that the debt owed by botl1 Robert and Hedy to Mr. Alt is time 
barred as a creditor against Hedy's Estate, under Idaho Code §15-3-803(a), hut that Hedy's 
community interest passes to Robert's Estate by operation of her death in 2008, free of that 
obligation to Alt. 
A more logical reading of subsection 803(a) on which Jadwiga and the Trial Court 
rely, is that the legislature intended that upon opening of an estate and appointment of a 
personal representative, the time limits for submission of a claim are triggered. Since the 
presumption under I.C. §15-3-108 is that most estates must be opened within three (3) 
years, that is the presumptive timeframe found in subsection 803(a): 
(a) All claims against a decedent's estate which arose before 
the death of the decedent ... if not barred earlier by another 
statute of limitations or nonclaim statute, are barred against 
the estate. the personal representative, and the heirs and 
devisees of the decedent, unless presented within the earlier 
of the following dates: 
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(1) three 0) years after the decedent's death; or 
(2) within the time provided in section 15-3-80I(b), Idaho 
Code, for creditors who are given actual notice, and within 
the tjme provided in section 15-3-80l(a), Idaho Code, for all 
creditors barred by publication. 
Idaho Code §15-3J803 (2016) 
However, the Supreme Court has been clear that the Courts are to construe statutes 
by considering the surrounding provisions. If one is to strictly apply subsection 108 there 
would be 110 right to joint probate of Hedy's Estate as her death was more than three (3) 
years prior to filing. However, subsection 111 pennits an exception to that three (3) year 
statute of limitations, which necessarily extends to the filing of creditor claims against both 
spouses. Both Estates are subject to probate and Mr. Alt's Creditor's Claim. It makes no 
sense to bar the Claim as against one spouse, but permit it against the Estate of the spouse 
who survived but inherits the earlier spouse's share of the community property subject to 
her debts and liabilities. 
The Trial Court found that this provision had no exceptions and required Mr. Alt 
had to have filed for probate of Hedy's Estate within three (3) years of her death jn order to 
preserve his Creditor's Claim. Having failed to do so, the Court found that Alt's Claim is 
barred as against Hedy's Estate in this joint probate of both Robert and Hedy's community 
property Estates. 
The Trial Court's finding is in error as a matter oflaw and must be reversed. 
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2. The Trial Court erred as a matter of law by holding that Idaho 
Code § 15-3-803(a) bars Alt's Claim against Hedy Melton's 
Estate when her Estate was submitted for joint probate in 
December, 2014 under Idaho Code§ 15-3-111. 
First, there existed at the time of summary judgment a genuine issue of material fact 
as to whether the claim "arose before the death of the decedent" (Hedy) that precluded 
entry of Summary Judgment. 
Idaho Code §15-3-803(a) only applies to claims that arose prior to the death of the 
decedent. The Claim against Estate is signed by Mr. Alt under oath and provides that at the 
time of the loan, he initially took title to the property and house to secure repayment but 
subsequently Robert and Hedy executed Wills leaving all of their Estate to Mr. Alt "as a 
means of full repayment". The ''debt1', therefore, did not become due and payable until 
after Hedy and Robert's death and did not ~tarise" before Hedy's death. This is 
corroborated by the Affidavits of Counsel and related documents submitted with Alfs 
Motion to Strike Petition for Summary Administration and to Convert Proceedings to 
Formal Administration. 
For this reason alone) the provisions of subsection 803 are not applicable or are in 
dispute and the Court was required to deny Summary Judgment. 
Second, the legislature clearly did not intend the result found by the Trial Court. 
The objective of statutory interpretation is to derive the intent 
of the legislative body that adopted the act. Statutory 
interpretation begins with the literal language of the statute. 
Provisions should not be read in isolation, but must be 
interpreted in the context of the enti.re document. The statute 
should be considered as a whole, and wot·ds should be given 
their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings. It should be noted 
that the Court must give effect to all the words and provisions 
of the statute so that none will be void, superfluous, or 
redundant. When the statutory language is unambiguous, the 
clearly expressed inte11t of the legislative body must be given 
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construction. 
Statev. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863,866, 
264 P.3d 970, 973(2011) 
The Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that the three (3) year statute of limitations in 
probate proceedings does not prohibit creditor claims, recognizing the effect ofldaho Code 
§15-3-111 in Medicaid recovery claims where Medicaid is prohibited from enforcing 
recovery until the surviving spouse's death under Idaho Code §56-218. Idaho DeI?t. Of 
Health & Welfare v. McCormick, 283 P.3d 785, 790, 153 Idaho 468, 473 (2012) 
Mr. Alt's Claim was filed January 13, 2015, less than two (2) years following the 
death of Robert Melton and immediately upon the filing of a joint probate of Hedwig and 
Robert's Estates under I.C. 15-3-111.2 
The Estate urges that Mr. Alt' s Claim is barred by a "statute of limitations" 
resulting from I.C. §15-3-803. Subsection (a)(l) requires that "claims against a decedent's 
estate which arose before the death of the decedent, .. .if not baned earlier by another 
statute of ]imitations or non-claim statute, are barred against the estate. the personal 
representative. and the heirs and devisees of the decedent1 unless presented within the 
earlier of the following dates: (1) three (3) years after the decedent's death; or (2) within 
the time provided in §15-3-80l(b), Idaho Code, for creditors who are given actual notice, 
and within the time provided in §15-3~80l(a), Idaho Code, for all creditors barred by 
FEA1m}#$~ '-:" '•? '~on-o. publication''. I.C. §15-3-803(a)(2015)[emphasis added]. J.C. §15-3-803(a)(1)(2015) . 
. •;ro · -- ~~ ~ 
Daniel P. Featherston 
:Brent C. l'eatberston• 
Jeremy P. Pcalheraton 
Jeremi L. Ossman•• 
11 3 S. Second Ave. 
Sandf>oin1, JD 8J864 
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2 For some reason, Jadwiga initially filed this as a 1205 Summary Administration, though 
the property was titled as community property of Robert and Hedy. 
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At the outset, the plain language of §803(a) establishes a time limit for filing claims 
within a pending estate. The legislature's use of phrases presumes that an estate has been 
filed: 
l. "All claims against a decedent's estate .. . " 
2. "if not bmred earlier by another statute of limitations or non-claim 
statute ... " 
3. "are barred against the estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and 
devisees of the decedent .. .'' J.C. §15-3-803(a)(2015) 
The language adopted is unambiguous that the time limit on claims applies after an 
estate is opened for probate. Though Hedy's death was more than three (3) years prior to 
the Estate being opened, that is permitted by I.C. § 15~3-111. 
The Legislature did not impose an obligation upon the creditor in section 803 to file 
the probate in order to preserve his claim, only the obligation to file a timely claim once the 
probate is filed. That timely claim must be within three (3) years of the decedent's death or 
within the time provided for creditor's actual notice or publication. The claim must be 
"presented within the earlier of' these two (2) dates. In other words, even where an estate 
is filed for probate and no notice to creditors given, it is incumbent on a creditor to file the 
claim timely . 
. It is well established that generally a probate will not be permitted more than three 
(3) yeai·s after the decedent's date of death, thi•s barring claims, but also barring any 
~Ell~.J~rorm. probate proceeding. Idaho Code §15-3-108 establishes a three (3) year ~(statute of 
Daniel P. Feathatston 
Brent c . Feath4n ro11~ 
)eremy P. Feathecston 
Jeremi L. Own•n** 
113 S. Second Ave. 
S~nClpoint, ID 83&64 
PhOnti (208) 263-6866 
}'ax (208) 2-63-0400 
• Lic•••od in ld,ho &: wa,hia;ton 
••Uoeiu e-(1 tri t~o &. Michi; .in 
limitation" from the decedent's date of death on filing for probate of the estate. The 
exception is LC. §15-3-111 that establishes: 
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In cases in which a marital community has been dissolved by 
the death of either spouse at any time, the survivor was then 
entitled to all of the property of the decedent by will. law, or 
both, and the survivor died before any proceeding had been 
commenced for the probate of the estate of the spouse whose 
death occurred first, the estates of both may be joined for 
probate in a single proceeding .... The three (3) year provision 
of § 15-3-108, Idaho Code, applies only to the death of the 
spouse wh~se death occurred last. 
J.C. §15-3-111 (2015). 
This exception to the three (3) year statute of limitation on filing of probate is 
equally applicable to the three (3) year limitation on filing of claims in an estate, for several 
reasons. 
The Courf s obligation is to give effect to the plain legislative intent as expressed in 
the statute. "To ascertain legislative intent, the Court examines not only the literal words 
of the statute, but the i-easonableness of the proposed interpretations, the policy behind the 
statute, and its legislative history." St. Luke's Regional Medical Center, Ltd. v. Board of 
Com'rs of Ada County. 203 P.3d 683, 685, 146 Idaho 753, 755 (2009). Since the plain 
language of section 803 discussed above contemplates a deadline for filing claims within 
an open estate, not a statute of limitation on claims against decedents, the claim limitations 
necessarily follow the limitations on filing of a probate proceeding. 
It makes no sense to require a creditor to assert his claim within three (3) years of 
the first spouse to die or risk losing the claim when section 1205 requires the surviving 
spouse to assume the liability and LC. § 15-3~ 111 pe1mits filing of a joint probate upon the 
second spouse's death. The foolishness of forcing creditor~initiated probates for debt owed 
by both spouses is obvious. 
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Also. "[i]t is a basic tenet of statuto1y construction that the more· specific statute or 
section addressing the issue controls ovet the statute that is more general." Wheeler v. 
Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 207 P.3d 988, 995, 147 Idaho 257, 264 (2009). 
Jadwiga asserts the general statute that a claim must be presented in an open estate 
within three (3) years of the decedent's death under §803. This is consistent with §108 that 
prohibits filing_of an estate more than three (3) years after decedent's death. Both sections 
are general provisions that apply to filing of probates and presentation of creditor claims. 
However, the more specific provision fmmd in LC. §15-3~111 permits filing of a 
joint probate undet specific circumstances (marital community, survivor entitled to all of 
estate, and survivor dies before any probate of spouse's estate is commenced). This more 
specific statute "controls over" the more general statute's asserted by the Estate. To do 
otherwise renders a nonsensical result. 
Lastly, the Estate argues that Alt lost his right to assert this Claim by failing to file a 
probate of Hedwig's Estate by 2011 but provides no explanation for how this affects the 
claim against this joint probate ofRobe1t and Hedwig's estates. 
Robert could have acquired full ownership of the community assets in 2008 
(subject to Hedy's debts and liabilities) through a 1205 Summary Administration. Since he 
took no action, and Jadwiga has now filed a joint probate under I.C. §15-3-111, her right to 
inherit (if any) is subject to Mr. Alt's Claim against both Robert and Hedy's Estate. Robert 
did not acquire clear title to the property by not probating the Estate, but he also did not 
expunge the 5tommunity obligation incurred by Hedwig and Robert when they borrowed 
funds from him. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Trial Court erred in granting Partial Summary 
Judgment finding that Mr. Alt's claim is time barred as against Hedy's Estate but not 
against Robert's. The estate is a joint estate consisting wholly of community property. 
The community estate had not been submitted to probate upon Hedy's death and therefore 
Hedy's interests (as with Robert's) were subject to the liability of Mr. Alt's claim. This 
Court is asked to reverse the Trial Comt's ruling. 
Further, the Trial Court erred in finding that Jadwiga timely disallowed Mr. Alt's 
Claim. The Court is asked to reverse that finding and remand with instruction to deem Mr. 
Alt' s Claim allowed as provided by law. 
The Appellant requests award of attorney's fees and costs. 
f( 
DATED this 'zS day of June, 2016. 
:ZATHE TON LAW FIRM, ~ ..._.L __ 
---------=------------
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON 
Attorney fot Appellant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of the Estate of, ) 
) 
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and ) 
HEDWIG "HEDY" MELTON, ) 
) 
Deceased. ) _______ ) 
Case No. CV-2013-313 
ORDER VACA TING AND RESETTING 
ORAL ARGUMENT 
In order to accommodate the Court's calendar, 
It is ORDERED that the oral argument currently scheduled for August 19, 2016, is 
vacated and rescheduled to be conducted by telephone conference call, to be initiated by 
the Court, at 9:30 A.M. on Friday, the 26th day of August 2016, at which time all counsel 
for the respective parties shall be available to participate in the conference call . 
.,~ ~i'l.' 
Dated th.is __ \ _ day o~ 2016. 
ORDER VACATING AND 
RESETTING ORAL ARGUMENT - 1 
ohnl~e~ 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that a full, true, complete and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER VACATING 
AND RESETTING ORAL ARGUMENT was mailed to: 
Brent Featherston 
Attorney at Law 
113 South Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Mary Cusack 
Attorney at Law 
320 E Neider Avenue, Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815 
~ 
on this ~ day Ju, 2016.~---::::::-::;;..---- -----:::::.~ -::::: 
ORDER VACATING AND 
RESETTING ORAL ARGUMENT - 2 
' . ,. 
; 
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JADWIGA MELTON'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the Magistrate Court of the First Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho in and for the County of Boundary 
Honorable John R. Stegner, presiding 
Mary W. Cusack ISB# 5332 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of the Estate of: 
ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON and 
HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON, 
Deceased. 
) 
) CASE NO. CV 13- 0313 
) 





COMES NOW, Petitioner, JADWIGA B. MELTON (hereinafter "Jadwiga"), the 
Personal Representative of the above captioned estate, by and through her attorney of 
record, MARY W. CUSACK, of Cusack Law Firm, PLLC, and hereby submits her 
Respondent's Brief as follows: 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The above-referenced Decedents, ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON (hereinafter 
"Robert") and HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON (hereinafter "Hedy") were married in the 
1970's. Hedy had a son, HEINZ ALT (hereinafter "Alt") prior to her marriage to Robert. 
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Hedy died in 2008, leaving her entire estate to Robert. After Hedy's death, Robert did 
nothing to probate her estate, even though they owned their home together. Two years 
later, Robert married Jadwiga. Robert died in 2013, leaving his entire estate to Jadwiga. 
After Robert's death, Jadwiga began the probate of Robert's estate. Through this 
process, Alt is trying to assert he has an interest in Robert's estate through Hedy, his 
deceased mother, claiming she owed him money. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND OBJECTION 
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 83, on appeal from a magistrate court's decision, the district 
court, must hear appeals as an appellate proceeding and a transcript must be prepared 
as provided in Rule 83(g). I.R.C.P. § 83(f)(1 ). The district court must review the case on 
the record and determine the appeal in the same manner and on the same standards of 
review as an appeal from the district court to the Supreme Court under the statutes and 
law of this state, and the Idaho Appellate Rules. Id. 
Jadwiga objects to certain representations made by Alt in the Procedural History 
portion of his Brief, which Alt alleges are "undisputed." 
a. Alt states "It is also undisputed that the real property was purchased, 
and the log home built, by Robert and Hedy with funds lent to them by Mr. Alt."1 There is 
no evidence to support this statement, nor have we agreed or concurred this to be factual. 
In addition, no footnote was provided in the Brief, as noted. 
b. "Mr. Alt's Creditor's Claim and affidavits and testimony establish that 
Robert and Hedy were spendthrifts." The assertion that Robert and Hedy were 
5. RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
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"spendthrifts" isn't factual. In the Creditor's Response to Estate's Monon for Summary 
Judgment, Alt alleges Robert and Hedy were poor money managers, a statement that is 
not supported with any factual proof; rather Alt's allegations, affidavits, and testimony are 
purely self-supported by Alt and are barred by I.C. § 9-202. No factual proof has been 
offered to support this allegation. 
c. "The property was initially titled to Mr. Alt and his wife as 
acknowledgement or security of the loan." This statement is completely false. The home 
was purchased by Robert E. Melton and Hedwig Melton, as husband and wife, and titled 
accordingly in the Warranty Deed recorded under Boundary County Instrument Number 
0181217 on April 12, 1996. It wasn't titled to Alt and his wife until July 10, 1999. See 
Affidavit of Mary W Cusack, dated 06/25/2015, ,r 2 and ,r 3 a·nd incorporated herein ·by 
this reference (hereinafter ''Cusack Affidavit"). 
Ill. UNDISPUTED FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A. On April 11, 1996, Bobby J. lnvernon and Heidi L. lnvernon signed a 
Warranty Deed transferring property commonly called 38 Lilac Place, Bonners Ferry, 
Idaho and which is located at what is legally described as Lot 4, BLUME HILL 
SUBDIVISION, according to the plat recorded in Book 2 of Plats, Page 41, records of 
Boundary County, Idaho (hereinafter "Residence") to Robert and Hedy as husband and 
wife. Said Warranty Deed was recorded under Boundary County Instrument Number 
0181217 on April 12, 1996. See Cusack Affidavit,r 2. 
6. RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
{MWC00163 393 .DOCX; 1 /20397 .100} 
Page 255 of 438
B. On July 29, 1998, both Robert and Hedy each executed a Last Will and 
Testament prepared by Featherston Law Firm, naming the survivor of them as sole 
beneficiary. 
C. On July 10, 1999, Robert and Hedy, as husband and wife, signed a Gift 
Deed transferring the Residence to Alt, as his sole and separate property. Said Gift Deed 
was recorded under Boundary County Instrument Number 194996 on August 10, 1999. 
Said Gift Deed was prepared by Featherston Law Firm. See Cusack Affidavit ,r 3. 
D. On November 4, 1999, Alt, dealing with his sole and separate property, and 
Christine Alt, his wife, signed a Quitclaim Deed transferring the Residence to Robert and 
Hedy as husband and wife. Said Quitclaim Deed was recorded under Boundary County 
Instrument Number 196015 on November 4, 1999. Said Quitclaim Deed was pre·pared 
by Featherston Law Firm. See Cusack Affidavit ,r 4. 
E. On August 11, 2008, Hedy died. 
F. On June 7, 2010, Robert married Jadwiga. See Petition for Summary 
Administration of Estate Where Surviving Spouse is Sole Beneficiary, ,r 4 and 
incorporated herein by this reference. 
G. On December 17, 2010, Robert executed a new Last Will and Testament 
(hereinafter "Robert's 2010 Will") See Petition for Summary Administration of Estate 
Where Surviving Spouse is Sole Beneficiary, ,r 5 and incorporated herein by this 
reference. 
H. On July 4, 2013, Robert died. 
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I. On August 26, 2013, Jadwiga filed a Petition for Summary Administration 
of Estate Where Surviving Spouse is Sole Beneficiary. 
J. On August 30, 2013, a Decree Vesting Estate in Surviving Spouse was 
entered by this Court, and was recorded in Bonner County as Instrument No. 850805. 
K. On September 6, 2013, Alt filed a Motion to Convert Proceedings to 
Supervised Administration and to Determine Testacy, which the Court did not grant or 
deny. 
L. On December 9, 2014, Jadwiga filed a Petition for Formal Probate of Will 
and Formal Appointment of Personal Representative. 
M. On January 9, 2015, Alt sent a copy of his Claim Against Estate (hereinafter 
"Alt's Cla1m") to Jadwiga's attorney of record. On Janua·ry 13, 2015, Alt's Claim ·was filed 
with the Court. 
N. On January 22, 2015, the Court heard Jadwiga's Petition to formally probate 
Robert's 2010 Will and the Court formally admitted Robert's 2010 Will to probate. 
0. On February 2, 2015, an Order for Formal Probate of Will and Formal 
Appointment of Personal Representative was entered and Letters Testamentary were 
issued by the Court to Jadwiga. 
P. On February 19, 2015, the Notice to Creditors was first published in the 
Bonners Ferry Herald. 
Q . On March 13, 2015, a Notice of Disaflowance of Claim was faxed and 
mailed to Alt through Featherston Law Firm. The Notice of Disal/owance of Claim was 
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filed with the Court on March 17, 2015. The Notice of Oisallowance of Claim provided the 
claim was disallowed in its entirety for the following reasons 1) it was not timely filed and 
barred by the statute of limitations; 2) it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted; and 3) its documentation was insufficient and the Personal Representative had 
no independent way of determining whether the amount contained therein was accurate 
or valid . 
R. On May 4, 2015, the Estate received Alt's Petition to Allow Claims. 
S. On June 29, 2015, Jadwiga moved for Summary Judgment to deny Alt's 
creditor claim. 
IV. ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL 
A. Whether the Trial Court correctly held the estate's disallowance of Alt's 
Claim was timely disallowed. 
B. Whether the Trial Court correctly held Alt's Claim is barred by the statute of 
limitations as against Hedy's estate. 
C. Whether the Trial Court correctly held as a matter of law that I.C. § 15-3-
111 does not toll or extend the statute of limitations for a creditor to file a claim against 
the joint estate of Robert and Hedy. 
D. Whether the Trial Court correctly held that all claims are barred against 
Hedy's estate because three years have elapsed even though a joint probate was 
commenced for Hedy and Robert under I.C. § 15-3-111. 
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V. ARGUMENT ON ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL 
1. The Court Correctly Held the Estate's Disallowance of Alt's Claim was 
Timely as it was Not Supported by Admissible Evidence, it was Not Filed Correctly, 
and the Time for Disallowance Begins Four Months After the Date of First 
Publication. 
A. Alt's Claim is not supported by admissible evidence because his own 
testimony is barred by I.C. § 9-202 and the purported agreement is 
unenforceable on its face. 
For nearly two decades, the appellate courts of this state have consistently 
held that the trial courts must determine the admissibility of evidence as a "threshold 
question" to be answered before addressing the merits of motions for summary judgment. 
In re Estate of Montgomery, 147 Idaho 1, 6 (Idaho 2009)(internal citations omitted). When 
considering evidence presented in support of, or opposition to, a motion for summary 
judgment, a court can only consider material which would be admissible at trial. Id. Thus, 
if the admissibility of evidence presented in support of a motion for summary judgment is 
raised by objection by one of the parties, the court must first make a threshold 
determination as to the admissibility of the evidence "before proceeding to the ultimate 
issue, whether summary judgment is appropriate." Id. 
Here, Alt's Claim fails because the only evidence he proffered was his own 
testimony, which is barred by the I.C. § 9-202 (the so-called "Deadman's Statute"). The 
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purpose of I.C. § 9-202 is to prevent a litigant from having the benefit of his own testimony 
when another litigant has been deprived of the testimony of the decedent. 
I.C. § 9-202 states in relevant part: 
WHO MAY NOT TESTIFY. The following persons 
cannot be witnesses: 
3. Parties or assignors of parties to an action or 
proceeding, or persons in whose behalf an action or 
proceeding is prosecuted against an executor or 
administrator, upon a claim or demand against the 
estate of a deceased person, as to any communication 
or agreement, not in writing, occurring before the death 
of such deceased person. 
The Idaho Supreme Court held that I.C. § 9-202(3) bars, (1) certain persons from 
testifying; (2) in a specific action; (3) as to certain communications. Argyle v. Slemaker, 
99 Idaho 544, 547 (1978). All three portions of I.C. § 9-202(3) must be satisfied in order 
for the evidence to be barred. Id. Additionally, I.C. § 9-202(3) prohibits a party who is 
making a claim against an estate from testifying as to any unwritten communication with 
the deceased. Lunders v. Estate of Snyder, 131 Idaho 689, 698, 699 (1998) (emphasis 
added). 
I.C. § 9-202, in conjunction with Idaho Rule of Evidence 601(b), "prohibit[s] a party 
making a claim against an estate from testifying as to any unwritten communication with 
the deceased." Id. In this matter, Alt cannot circumvent l.C. § 9-202 by describing his 
written exhibits as corroborating his alleged oral agreement with Hedy. 
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In Alt's Claim, he insists that "(i]t was agreed that the property was initially placed 
in my name to secure repayment of the loan." If Alt's exhibits actually memorialized such 
terms, his testimony regarding the oral communications with Hedy would not have been 
necessary. Alt's allegations of oral representations and agreements by Hedy are nothing 
more than testimony of unwritten communications by a decedent, asserted by a claimant, 
against the estate - precisely the sort of testimony I.C. § 9-202 was contemplated to 
prevent. Thus, Alt cannot testify as to any oral agreements with Hedy and/or Robert in 
support of his effort to create a contract from the clearly insufficient exhibits submitted in 
support of his claim against the estate. 
The exhibits attached to Alt's Claim do not contain terms sufficient to bind any 
person or entity, including the Estate. No'ne of the exhibits contain terms sufficient to 
constitute a note, a draft, or any sort of negotiable instrument. A document must contain 
"an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money, with or without interest 
or other charges described in the promise or order" and be payable on demand or at a 
definite time to the bearer or to order. See f.C. § 28-3-104. 
Alt's exhibits do not satisfy the elements of a valid contract. To be enforceable, a 
contract must "be sufficiently definite and certain in its terms and requirements so that it 
can be determined what acts are to be performed and when performance is complete." 
Dales Service Co., Inc. v. Jones, 96 Idaho 662 (1975) (overruled on other grounds by 
Peavey v. Pelfandini, 97 Idaho 655 (1976)). The Court in Dales Service Co. explained: 
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A court cannot enforce a contract unless it can determine what 
it is. It is not enough that the parties think that they have made 
a contract; they must have expressed their intentions in a 
manner that is capable of understanding. It is not even enough 
that they have actually agreed, if their expressions, when 
interpreted in the light of accompanying factors and 
circumstances, are not such that the court can determine what 
the terms of that agreement are. Vagueness of expression, 
indefiniteness and uncertainty as to any of the essential terms 
of an agreement, have been held to prevent the creation of an 
enforceable contract. 
Id. ( quoting 1 Corbin on Contracts 394, § 95 ( 1963) ). 
Nothing in Alt's Claim or exhibits state any promise to pay, a payor or a payee, the 
time for compliance, and it certainly does not memorialize an interest rate of 12%. There 
is simply no admissible evidence of any manifestations of assent by Hedy, Robert, or the 
Estate, to be bound by any payment obligations to Alt. 
Alt cannot establish an enforceable written contract. The exhibits attached to Alt's 
Claim are facially insufficient to create an agreement to pay, and no additional written 
evidence has been supplied. The only remaining evidence offered in support of Alt's 
Claim is his own testimony alleging the oral agreement of Hedy and Robert to devise 
their estates to Alt. However, such testimony falls squarely under the prohibitions of I. C. 
§ 9-202(3). 
Alt was able and legally free to bring in third party affidavits to support his position. 
He did not. Alt had an obligation to come forward with admissible evidence that provided 
a factual dispute. He did not. Without any credible admissible evidence, Alt's Claim must 
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fail. The Court properly denied Alt's creditor claim against Hedy's Estate based on the 
[lack of] admissible evidence before the Court. 
8. Alt's Claim should not be automatically allowed because he did not 
properly follow the Statutory Process for Filing a Creditor Claim. 
Idaho's Uniform Probate Code (hereinafter "UPC") provides the statutory 
framework for procedures that must be followed after a person dies in the administration 
and distribution of that person's estate. This includes the process for filing creditor claims. 
I. C. § 15-3-104 provides in relevant part: 
No proceeding to enforce a claim against the estate of 
a decedent or his successors may be revived or 
commenced before the appointment of a personal 
representative.· After the appointment and until 
distribution, all proceedings and actions to enforce a 
claim against the estate are governed by the procedure 
prescribed by this chapter. (Emphasis added). 
Jadwiga filed her Petition for Formal Probate of Will and Formal Appointment of 
Personal Representative, along with Robert's 201 O Will, with the Court on December 9, 
2014. Said Petition was opposed by Alt who argued that Robert's 2010 Will was invalid 
and should not be probated. The Court, after hearing argument and testimony, found 
Robert's 2010 Will to be valid and admitted it to probate. The Order formally probating 
Robert's 201 O Will was entered on February 2, 2015 and on the same day, Letters 
Testamentary were issued to Jadwiga appointing her as Personal Representative. 
Jadwiga caused a Notice to Creditors to be first published on February 19, 2015. Based 
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on that publication, a creditor had four months, or until June 19, 2015 to file a claim. I. C. 
§ 15-3-801 (a). 
There are two ways for a creditor to present a claim against an estate. The first 
option is for a creditor to file a claim in an open probate matter. I.C. § 15-3-804(a). In 
order for a cla im to be considered valid , the creditor must file its claim with both (1) the 
personal representative and (2) the Court. Id. The claim is deemed to be presented on 
the later of (1) the delivery or mailing of the claim to the personal representative or (2) the 
filing of the claim with the Court. Id. (Emphasis added). 
The second option is for a creditor to commence a proceeding against the personal 
representative in any court where the personal representative may be subjected to 
jurisdiction, to obtain payment of his claim against the estate, but the commencement of 
the proceeding must occur within the time limited for presenting the cla im. /.C. § 15-3-
804(b). 
In this instance, Alt failed to correctly file his claim. On January 13, 2015, Alt filed 
his claim with the Court, but never filed it with the Personal Representative. In order for 
a creditor claim to be timely filed, the creditor claim must be filed with the court and the 
Personal Representative. I.C. § 15-3-804(a) (emphasis added). A Personal 
Representative was not appointed until February 2, 2015. Subsequent to the January 13, 
2015 filing of Alt's Claim, Alt filed a Petition for Allowance of Claim on May 4, 2015, which 
was within the statutory notice period. Alt's Petition thereby met the criteria for 
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"commencing a proceeding" as outlined in I.C. § 15-3-804(b). Alt's Claim was never 
properly filed and therefore cannot be deemed to be automatically al lowed. 
C. Alt's Claim is not automatically allowed as Jadwiga clearly 
disal!owed All's Claim and sent him notice of that disallowance. 
Alt insists, without support, that I.C. § 15-3-806 requires a personal 
representative to disallow a creditor claim within 60 days of its presentation, ignoring the 
plain statutory language that states: "[f]ailure of the personal representative to mail notice 
to a claimant of action on his claim for sixty (60) days after the time for original 
presentation of the claim has expired has the effect of a notice of allowance." 
(Emphasis added). The statute's use of the phrase "time for original presentation of the 
claim" clearly indicates that the personal representative has 60 days to disallow a 
creditor's claim after the four-month period for claim presentation. The four-month 
presentation time period begins after the first publication date of the notice of creditors 
under I.C. § 15-3-801 . The first publication date of the Notice to Creditors was February 
19, 2015. ( See Affidavit of Publication filed April 10, 2015.) This publication date allows 
creditors four months (in this case, until June 19, 2015), to present their claims against 
the estate. Then estate then has sixty days from the end of the presentation period (in 
this case, until August 19, 2015) to disallow any claim presented against the estate. 
If Alt's interpretation was accurate, then by way of example, if an estate had twenty 
five creditors, then the Personal Representative would have to keep track of at least one 
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hundred different dates, just relating to the creditor claims alone - 1) the date the creditor 
filed its claim with the Personal Representative; 2) the date when the creditor filed its 
claim with the Court; 3) the date on which the claim is deemed to be valid; and 4) the date 
by which a disallowance should be filed. This could not be what the legislature intended 
given the purpose of the UPC. 
The goal of the UPC is to make the probate process simple and quick. As stated 
by Idaho's Supreme Court "[t]his code shall be liberally construed and applied to promote 
its underlying purposes and policies." Subsection (b) states that, "[t]he underlying 
purposes and policies of this code are: (1) to simplify and clarify the law concerning the 
affairs of decedents . . . ; (3) to promote a speedy and efficient system for liquidating the 
estate of the decedent and· making distribution to his successors. In Re Estate of Elliott, 
141 Idaho 177, 181 (2005); See a/so J.C.§ 15-1-102{b). Jadwiga's interpretation is much 
more logical and in keeping with the purposes and policies of the UPC. The Personal 
Representative only has to keep track of the date of first publication, and then count out 
4 (four) months from the date of first publication to determine when a creditor can file a 
claim. The Personal Representative then has 60 days after the four-month period to 
disallow claims. Jadwiga's interpretation would make the process simple and 
streamlined, while Alt's interpretation would be unduly burdensome and complex for the 
Personal Representative's administration of the estate. 
If the Court should deem the filing of the claim on January 9, 2015 to Jadwiga's 
counsel (prior to Jadwiga being appointed personal representative) as meeting the criteria 
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for filing a claim under Idaho law, and if the Court accepts Alt's argument as to when the 
disallowance is due, then the Estate had until March 13, 2015 to send a disallowance to 
Alt (the later of the filing with the Court or the Personal Representative). The Estate faxed 
its disallowance to Alt on March 13, 2015 and mailed the disallowance on the same day. 
Alt received notice within 60 days of filing his claim with the Court that the claim was 
disallowed. 
This distinction is moot, however, because even if Jadwiga has "allowed" Alt's 
claim, affirmatively or through inaction, she was permitted to (and did) effectively revoke 
that allowance by sending a Notice of Disallowance to Alt. The permissibility of revoking 
a notice of allowance (even where it is caused by the personal representative's inaction) 
has been conclusively established in other UPC jurisdictions. 
In Estate of Krichau, 501 N.W. 2d 722, 726 (Neb. 1992), a Nebraska appellate 
court explained: 
If the statute is interpreted to cause the personal 
representative to irrevocably allow the claim by not giving 
notice of disallowance within 60 days of its filing, personal 
representatives will be forced to deny all claims except those 
claims that are unquestionably good. If the personal 
representatlve can change his or her mind and disallow a 
claim that was once allowed, the worst that could happen is 
that the claimant would be in a state of uncertainty. If certainty 
is an important element to a claimant, that claimant can 
always petition the court to allow the claim. In this regard, the 
claimant would be in no greater state of uncertainty than any 
other litigant doing business with a dilatory party and would 
suffer no greater disadvantage than a claimant who has 
received notice of allowance when the personal 
representative still has the power to disallow the claim. 
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The Supreme Court of Nebraska later endorsed and agreed with the holding in In 
re Estate of Krichau stating, " We agree with the Court of Appeals interpretation" and '"We 
believe that [our statute] permits a personal representative to disallow a claim that has 
been allowed by the failure to object. We also believe that public policy is best served by 
this interpretation of the statute and not by a restrictive interpretation of the statute." In 
re Estate of Dickie, 623 N.W.2d 667, 670, (Neb.2001 ); see also In re Gaytan Estate, 591 
N.W.2d 310,314 (Mich.Ct.App. 1998) (holding a similar provision "permits a claim that 
has been deemed allowed as a consequence of the personal representative's failure to 
disallow it within the statutory period to be disallowed subsequently by the personal 
representative"). 
The Supreme·Judicial Court of Maine· similarly upheld a personal representative's 
disallowance of a creditor claim, even though it was served more than 60 days after the 
running of the four-month creditor claim period. Swett v. Estate of Wakem, 490 A.2d 679, 
680 (Me. 1985). The Swett Court further elaborated: 
Id. 
Had the legislature intended the provision to have the 
consequence advocated by the claimants, instead of 
providing "the personal representative may furnish a notice" 
and "has the effect of a notice of allowance," the legislature 
could have employed the language used in section 5-428 
[which is the identical language contained in I.C. § 15-5-428], 
which governs claims against protected persons. That section 
provides in relevant part: 
"A presented claim is allowed if it is not disallowed by 
written statement mailed by the conservator to the 
claimant within 60 days after its presentation." 
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Accordingly, Jadwiga did not allow Alt's claim, either affirmatively or by operation 
of Idaho law. Alt was not disadvantaged in any way as he filed his Petition for Allowance 
of Claims during the statutory period for notice. Alt's Claim is not automatically allowed 
as Jadwiga sent him a Notice of Disallowance, to which Alt responded. 
D. Time for Disallowance is After the Four Month Creditor Claim 
Period. 
While Idaho does not have any case law interpreting I.C. § 15-3-806(a), its 
Court of Appeals has interpreted I.C. § 15-3-806(d) which uses the identical language 
found in I.C. § 15-3-806(a) to determine when to calculate interest on allowed claims. 
I.C. § 15-3-806(d) provides: 
Unless otherwise provided in any judgment in another court 
entered against the personal representative, allowed claims 
bear interest at the legal rate for the period commencing sixty 
(60) days after the time fo r original presentation of the claim 
has expired unless based on a contract making a provision for 
interest, in which case they bear interest in accordance with 
that provision. (Emphasis added). 
The Court of Appeals of Idaho found that the Personal Representative published 
his notice to creditors, which started the four month period for creditors to file their claims. 
Bingham Mem. Hosp. v. Boyd, 134 Idaho 669, 674 (Ct. App. 2000). The Court of Appeals 
held that interest could not begin to accumulate until six months after the Personal 
Representative first published his notice to creditors. Id. The Court held the "time for 
original presentation of the claim" is the four month period for creditors to file their claim 
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and therefore, interest would not begin to accumulate until 60 days after that period ended 
(i.e. six months after date of first publication). Id. Here, the notice to creditors was first 
published on February 19, 2015. Under Idaho law, Jadwiga clearly had until August 19, 
2015 to disallow all creditor claims that were validly filed. Accordingly, Jadwiga timely 
disallowed Alt's Claim. Therefore, Alt's Claim is not deemed to be automatically allowed. 
The Disallowance of Claim was timely issued by the personal representative and 
Alt's Claim is not automatically allowed. The Court properly found the Estate's 
Disallowance of Claim was timely filed. 
2. The Court Correctly Held the Three Year Statute of Limitations has Passed 
Regarding Claims Against Hedy's Estate. 
Statutes of limitations are laws passed by a legislative body in common law 
systems to set the maximum time after an event when legal proceedings may be initiated. 
See Black's Law Dictionary. After the time period set out in the applicable statute of 
limitations has run, no legal action can be brought regardless of whether any cause of 
action ever existed. Id. The intention of these laws is to facilitate resolution of legal claims 
in a reasonable length of time. These statutes are designed to prevent fraudulent and 
stale claims from arising after all evidence has been lost, or after the facts have become 
obscure through the passage of time or the defective memory, death, or disappearance 
of witnesses. 
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Under Idaho's UPC, the statute of limitations to file a claim is three years from date 
of death. /.C. § 15-3-803. See also Witt v. Jones, 111 Idaho 165 (Idaho 1986) (Claims 
against the estate of a decedent are controlled by I.C. § 15-3-803, which provides . .. (b) 
All claims against the decedent's estate which arose before the death of the decedent, 
including claims ... founded on contract, tort, or other legal basis, are barred against the 
estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent, unless 
presented within three (3) years after the decedent's death whether or not notice to 
creditors has been published."). I. C. § 15-3-803 has a strict creditor claim limitations 
period of three years; however, this time frame can be shorted to four months by 
publishing a notice to creditors. J.C.§ 15-3-801(b). 
Alt's argument that he was precluded from filing a claim in Hedy's estate is false. 
Alt could have, at any time 45 days after the death of his mother, opened a probate as a 
creditor of her estate. I.C. 15-3-203(a)(6). Alt claims in his Appellant Brief "This would 
practically require Alt necessarily bring suit against his step father, Robert, during his 
lifetime." Again, it is more appropriate to bring suit against Robert during Robert's lifetime, 
as Robert was a party to the alleged actions between Hedy, himself and Alt. This is 
exactly the reason there are statutes of limitation - to avoid situations where the witnesses 
are no longer available. 
Hedy died on August 11, 2008. Alt had until August 11 , 2011 to file a claim against 
Hedy's estate. He did not do so. After August 11, 2011, any claim against Hedy's estate 
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is statutorily time barred. The Court properly found the three year statute of limitations 
had run regarding any claims against Hedy's estate. 
A. I.C. § 15-3-111 does not Toll a creditor claim period. 
Alt is confusing the process to probate an estate with the time to file creditor 
claims. A probate may only be opened within three years of the decedent's death. J.C. 
§ 15-3-108. If the decedent owned real property at his death, and more than three years 
elapses without opening a probate, the heirs must employ another method to transfer the 
real property out of the decedent's name. 
In Idaho, it is common to find many instances wherein the first spouse dies and the 
surviving spouse does not open a probate. When all the assets are titled in joint names 
and the surviving spouse is not hindered in his or her ability to gain access or have control 
over the remaining assets, the surviving spouse may not view a probate as necessary. 
However, to transfer real property, a legal action must commence. 
When a surviving spouse needs to transfer real property during the surviving 
spouse's lifetime, and more than three years have passed since the death of the first 
spouse, the surviving spouse cannot probate the Will of the deceased spouse. However, 
a surviving spouse may use the Summary Administration process as provided under I.C. 
§ 15-3-1 205. The legislature amended I.C. § 15-3-108, effective July 1, 2014, to provide 
that the three year statute of limitations on probate proceedings does not apply to 
Summary Administration under I.C. § 15-3-1205. See Senate Bill No. 1249 attached as 
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Exhibit "8'' of the Affidavit of Mary W Cusack in Support of Sur-reply Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment to Deny Creditor Claim (hereinafter "Cusack 
Affidavit II"). 
The marital community of Hedy and Robert was dissolved at Hedy's death. By 
Will and by law, Robert was entitled to all Hedy's property, and the need for probate was 
not necessary. I.C. § 15-3-111 expressly allows for joint probate when the martial 
community of a couple ended at the death of the first spouse, and the surviving spouse 
was entitled to all of the deceased spouse's property by will, law or both, and no probate 
had been commenced on the death of the first spouse. If Robert had commenced a 
proceeding under I.C. § 15-3-1205 after Hedy's death, then Robert would have taken 
Hedy's estate subject to her debt. Robert did not probate Hedy's estate nor did he pursue 
Summary Administration under I.C. § 15-3-1205. 
Upon Robert's death, Jadwiga commenced a joint probate under I.C. § 15-3-111 . 
There is no statutory or case law that supports Alt's contention that opening a joint probate 
somehow tolls or extends the statute of limitations imposed upon the creditors of the first 
spouse to die. Jadwiga jointly probating the estates of Robert and Hedy most certainly 
did not create an opportunity for the estate to be subject to Hedy's debt, as Hedy's debt 
was barred due to Robert's actions and Alt's inaction. 
When real property is held in the joint names of a husband and wife until the death 
of the second spouse, there are only three options available to remove the first spouse's 
name from the real property to enable the real property to be transferred to beneficiaries. 
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The first option is to commence a quiet title action. The second option is to petition the 
Court to determine the heirs of the first spouse who died. The third and most favorable 
option is to jointly probate the estates of both spouses in one action. See I. C. § 15-3-111. 
As pointed out by Alt, a Summary Administration cannot be used by a new spouse 
because that process would not clear the former spouse's name from lhe property. See 
Appellant's Brief, page 9, ,r2. 
I.C. § 15-3-111 states in relevant part "The three (3) year provision of section 15-
3-108, I.C., applies only to the death of the spouse whose death occurred last." This 
means that although both spouses' names are included in the probate caption, only the 
Will of the last spouse to die is used to probate the assets. Allowing the use of I.C. § 15-
3.:.111 saves time and judicial economy by probating both estates in one proceeding. This 
process is used almost exclusively to transfer real property, such as in this case. 
I.C. § 15-3-111 makes no mention of or reference of any kind to I.C. § 15-3-
803(a)(1 )'s three-year limitations period for bringing a creditor claim. At the same time, 
I.C. § 15-3-803(a)(1) does not cross-reference I.C. § 15-3-111 or any other exceptions to 
its plain and clear-cut rule that "[a]II claims against a decedent's estate which arose before 
the death of the decedent" must be presented no later than "three (3) years after the 
decedent's death ." (Emphasis added). The statute does not create special exceptions 
for joint probates and does not expand the definition of "the decedent's death" to 
encompass more than its plain and ordinary meaning, i.e., the death of the decedent 
subject to the creditor claim at issue irrespective of his or her marital status. 
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After a review of other states who have adopted the UPC, Idaho is the only one 
that has adopted the unique language found in I.C. § 15-3-111. However, Utah has 
adopted Utah Code § 75-3-109 which provides for joint administration of estates but 
clearly provides that "claims may only be enforced against the estate to which they relate." 
This is consistent with the Estate's argument set forth above. See Utah Code§ 75-3-109 
attached as Exhibit "C" of Cusack Affidavit II. 
Choosing one process or another to probate an estate does not enlarge the time 
for creditor's to file a claim. As a creditor, Alt could have, at any time 45 days after the 
death of his mother, opened a probate as a creditor of her estate. /.C. 15-3-203(a)(6). 
By his inaction, the statute of limitations had run against his mother's estate. The Court 
correctly held the statute of limitations had run, regardless of the process Jadwiga chose 
to probate her husband's estate. 
B. Creditors must present their claims within three years of date of death no 
matter which process is chosen to administer an estate. 
I.C. § 15-3-803 has a strict creditor claim limitations period. The longest time frame 
to present a creditor's claim is three years after the decedent's date of death; however, 
this time frame can be shorted to four months by publishing a notice to creditors. 
Construing I.C. § 15-3-111 to enlarge the creditor claim limitations period of I.C. § 15-3-
803 of the first spouse who died to three years after the death of the surviving spouse, 
solely based on the executor's choice to probate both estates jointly, is not supported by 
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the plain language of the statute, and is not warranted from any reading of the statutes 
when taken together. Construing statutes to produce such an absurd result runs afoul of 
standard Idaho canons of construction. See Idaho v. Ephraim, 152 Idaho 176, 178 (2012) 
("Constructions of a statute that would lead to an absurd result are disfavored."). The 
only logical use of this statute is not to eh large the creditor claim limitations period but to 
save judicial economy when real property is held in joint names at the death of the 
surviving spouse. If the legislature had intended to allow creditors an extended period of 
time (beyond the three years provided under I.C. § 15-3-803) to file claims in the joint 
probate, it would have added that language as it did under I.C. § 15-3-1205. It did not. 
As stated by the Magistrate Court in its Memorandum Opinion: 
"There is nothing in this section [I.C. § 15-3-111] thaf states or 
suggests any tolling of a creditor's deadline to present a claim, 
just because the estate is subsequently jointly probated . 
Indeed, this section specifically exempts the three (3) year 
limitation on probate following the death of the first spouse, as 
found in section 108. That fact clearly demonstrates the 
legislature's ability and willingness to make special exceptions 
within this particular provision where warranted and intended. 
As there is no exception made to the three (3) year creditor's 
bar found in 15-3-803, one shall not be implied by the Court." 
There is only one exception to the statute of limitations as set forth in I.C. § 15-3-
803. This exception is found in the Idaho counterpart of the federal Medicaid Law at I.C. 
§ 56-218, which provides for the recovery of certain assistance provided by Medicaid. 
For many years, I.C. § 56-218 provided that recovery could be made from the individual's 
estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any, for such aid paid to either or both, but there 
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would be no adjustment or recovery until the death of the surviving spouse. The issue of 
timely filing a creditor claim came before the Supreme Court in 2005. See In the Matter 
of the Estate of Joe Kaminsky, Deceased, 141 Idaho 436 (Idaho 2005). 
In the Estate of Kaminsky, Mr. Kaminsky applied for, and was approved for, 
Medicaid assistance and received $54,067.59 in Medicaid assistance during his lifetime. 
Id. at 437. At the time of his death, Mr. Kaminsky was survived by his wife, Clara, and 
his three adult children. Id. On March 5, 2003, approximately two years and eight months 
after Mr. Kaminsky's death, his Last Will and Testament was informally admitted to 
probate. Id. The Will, executed January 13, 1998, directed that Mr. Kaminsky's entire 
estate be distributed to his three children. Id. Prior to the probate filing, the Department 
had written to an attorney for the Kaniinskys, stating a claim against the Estate in the 
amount of $54,766.79 for recovery of the Medicaid assistance received by Decedent. Id. 
The letter, dated January 23, 2003, then stated that no demand for payment would be 
made as long as Clara survived but that, upon Clara's death, demand for payment would 
be made upon her estate. Id. On March 11, 2003, the Kaminskys' attorney responded 
to the Department's letter, stating that the Department's claim against Decedent's Estate 
was disallowed because it was not presented within two years of his death. Id. On April 
3, 2003, the Department filed a Petition for Allowance of Claim (Petition) in the Decedent's 
probate. Id. The Estate objected to the Petition and a hearing on the matter was held on 
April 24, 2003. Id. The magistrate denied the Petition as untimely under I.C. § 15-3-
803(a)(1 ). Id. 
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In response to the ruling in the Kaminsky case, in 2006, the legislature updated 
I.C. § 56-218 to provide that no claim needed to be filed on the death of the f irst spouse, 
unless actual notice was given of the probate, or if a joint probate were opened under I. C. 
§ 15-3-111. See Senate Bill No. 1318 which is attached as Exhibit'/'.\" of Cusack Affidavit 
//. The reason for the change was given as follows: 
Section Two amends I.C. § 56-218 to clarify the presentation 
and collection of estate recovery claims by Health & Welfare. 
A number of clarifications are made by repositioning language 
or stating the existing concept more clearly. Under existing 
law, if the institutionalized spouse, who received Medicaid, 
dies leaving a surviving spouse, no actual collection is made, 
but a "claim" must be sent to the personal representative of 
the estate of deceased institutionalized spouse, or if no 
probate is done, to the surviving spouse. This can be very 
frightening to the surviving spouse, who often does not 
understand that no current reimbursement is being 
demanded. Therefor[e] [sic], the bill both clarifies that no 
recovery is made until both spouses are deceased and also 
removes the requirement to send a claim if no probate is filed 
at the first death. 
If either Hedy or Robert had received Medicaid, the State of Idaho would be able 
to claim their recovery in this probate (because I.C. § 15-3-111 was utilized) even though 
Robert left a surviving spouse, Jadwiga. There is no other Idaho statutory provision that 
allows for the extension of a creditor's claim limitations period for filing a claim. 
The legislature has never amended I.C. § 15-3-803 to allow expanded recovery 
for creditor claims when a joint probate is commenced. However, I.C. § 15-3-108 was 
amended, effective July 1, 2014, to provide that the three year statute of limitations on 
probate proceedings does not apply to Summary Administration under I.C. § 12-3-1205. 
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See Senate Bill No. 1249 which is attached as Exhibit "B" of Cusack Affidavit II. Under 
I.C. § 12-3-1205, the statute expressly provides that "the surviving spouse shall assume 
and be liable for any and all indebtedness that might be a claim against the estate of the 
decedent." I.C. § 15-3-111 has no such express language. Again, the legislature's 
omission of any such express language in I.C. § 15-3-111 (stating the three year ultimate 
limit on presenting claims is tolled) is a clear indication that in a joint probate, the surviving 
spouse is not assuming the liability of the deceased spouse. Jadwiga used the joint 
probate process to transfer real property held in the joint names of Hedy and Robert, not 
to expand a creditor's recovery period. 
Accordingly, Idaho's UPC applies a maximum three-year limitations period on the 
presentment of creditor claims which beings to run on the decedent's death and ·not upon 
the death of his or her successors, except in the case of Medicaid recovery as noted 
above. This rule is also stated in the official comment to UPC§ 3-317 and explains: 
In succession without administration, there being no personal representative'~ 
notice to creditors, the short non-claim period under UPC Section 3-803(a)(1) does 
not apply and creditors are subject to the statutes of limitations and the limitation 
of three years on decedent's creditors when no notice is published under UPC 
Section 3-803(a)(2). The general statutes of limitation are suspended for four 
months following the decedent's death but resume thereafter under UPC Section 
3-802. The assumption of liability by the universal successors upon the issuance 
of the Statement of Universal Succession is deemed to be by operation of law and 
does not operate to extend or renew any statute of limitations that had begun to 
run against the decedent. The result is that creditors are barred by the general 
statutes of limitation or 3 years whichever is the shorter. 
(Emphasis added). 
See Comment to UPC which is attached as Exhibit "D" of Cusack Affidavit II. 
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I.C. § 15-3-111 provides a means of effectively passing property of joint estates 
and contains no tolling provisions on the presentment of cred itor claims for the first spouse 
who died. Thus, the statutory language of the UPC adopted by Idaho plainly limits the 
presentation of creditor claims against an estate to a maximum of three years after the 
decedent's death regardless of whether the surviving spouse's estate exercises the right 
to jointly probate the estates of both spouses. The Court correctly ruled the statute of 
limitations to present claims is not enlarged when a joint probate is filed under I.C. § 15-
3-111 . 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Petitioner, Jadwiga B. Melton, respectfully requests this 
Court · uphold Summary Judgment to Deny Creditor Claim, in part, as it rs barred by 
operation of law due to the running of the statute of limitations and is not tolled by filing a 
joint probate. In addition, Jadwiga respectfully requests this Court to uphold the Summary 
Judgment whereby Alt's Claim was timely disallowed and therefore, not automatically 
allowed. 
lih 
DATED this Ji__ day of July, 2016. 
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Attorney,J r JADWIGA MEL TON 
Personal Representative 
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I hereby certi_fy that on the /J day of July, 2016, I caused a true and accurate 
copy of the forgoing document to be served by facsimile and via email thereon, and 
addressed to the following: 
Brent C. Featherston 
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd. 
113 S. Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
(208) 263-0400 - FAX 
Sent via email: 
cynthia@featherstonlaw.com 
brent@featherstonlaw.com 
Boundary County Court Clerk 
Sent via email: 
courts@boundarycountyid.org 
Honorable John R. Stegner 
(208) 883-2259 - FAX 
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ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and 








CASE NO. CV-2013-0313 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
COMES NOW the undersigned counsel for and on behalf of the Appellant, Heinz 
Alt, the creditor of the joint estates of Robert Ernest Melton and Hedwig "Hedy" Melton, and 
pursuant to the Court's Order Setting Briefing Schedule and Scheduling Oral Argument, does 
hereby submit Appellant's Reply Brief as follows! 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The Appellant, Heinz Alt. ("Alt") will not restate all of the procedural or factual 
history in this Reply Brief and will rest upon the Appellant's Opening Brief filed June 8, 
2016. 
However, it bears noting some obvious misrepresentations in the record m 
Respondent's Brief filed July 6, 2016. 
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SpeciftcaUy, Respondent, Jadwiga Melton e'Jadwiga"), states in Respondent's Brief 
"through this process, Alt is ttying to assert he has an interest in Robert's Estate through 
Hedy, his deceased mother, claiming she owed him monei'. This misstates the Creditor's 
Claim, which was a claim against both the Estates of Robert and Hedwig Melton. The 
Creditor's Claim on file is clear and unequivocal in that it asserts a claim by Alt against both 
his mother and step-father's estates. It js not a claim that is restricted to Hedy and the 
Respondent's Bdef misstates the record in that regard. 
Specifically, the verified Claim Against Estate states as follows: "I hereby certify that 
my mother, Hedwig Melton, and my step-father, Robert Melton, borrowed the total swn of 
$102,574.50. Those sums were borrowed by the decedents for the purpose of acquiring land 
and building a home in Bonners Ferry, Idaho, which is the subject of this litigation." Claim 
Against Estate, p. l. 
Further, the claim concludes by stating: "I hereby make a claim against the estates of 
Robert and Hedwig Melton for these principal amounts together with accrued interest Dated 
this 15th day of December, 2014. Heinz Alt". Claim Against Estate, p.2 
Furthennore, the Respondent, Jadwiga, "objects to certain" undisputed facts as 
follo-ws: 
a. "That the real property was purchased and the log home built by Robert and 
Hedy with funds lent to them by Mr. Alt." 
b. ''Mr. Alt>s Creditor's Claim and Affidavits and testimony establish that 
Robert and Hedy were spendthrifts." 
C. ''The property was hutially titled to Ml.-. Alt and his wife as aclmowledgment 
or security of the loan." Respondent's Brief, pp.5-6 .. 
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Apparently, Jadwiga wishes to dispute these three (3) facts established by sworn 
testimony at the Summary Judgment proceeding now in her Appellate Brief. 
"On appeal from a grant of a motion for summary judgment, this court employs the 
same standard as used by the district judge originally ruling on the motion. Summary 
judgment· is proper if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that the1-e is no genuine as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled_ to judgment as a matter of law." Shawver v. Hucklebeny Estates, LLC, 140 
Idaho 354, 359, 93 P.3d 685, 690 (2004). 
Although Jadwiga appears to now dispute these three (3) facts summarized above1 it 
should be noted that they are facts that were undisputed in the Summary Judgment 
proceeding and are reflected in the filings of record. Jadwiga filed her Motion for Summary 
. Judgment and Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment on or about June 25, 2015. 
The Motion was supported by the Affidavit of Mary Cusack, which contained as attachments 
an initial Warranty Deed of the real property to Robert and Hedy Melton and subsequent Gift 
Deed from Meltons to Mr. Alt in 1999 followed by a Quitclaim Deed from Mr. Alt dated 
November 4, 1999, back to Robert and Hedy Melton. See Affidavit of Mary Cusack, 
Exhibits A, B and C. 
By compaiison, Exhibits A and B attached to the verified Creditor's Claim Against 
Estate. indicate in decedent, Hedwig Melton's, own hand writing that the debt to Mr. Alt was 
incurred :from 1996 through 2001. Verified Claim Against Estate. 
Also not surprising is the juxtaposition of the Quitclaim Deed from Alt back to 
Robert and Hedwig Melton on November 4, 1999. Affidavit of Mazy Cusack, Exhibit C as 
compared to the Last Will and Testament of Robert Melton and Hedwig Melton leaving all of 
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their estate to Mr. Alt dated and executed July 29, 1998. Affidavit of Counsel filed August 
26, 2014, Exhibits "F" and "G''. 
When applying the applicable standard for summary judgments, that is, whether or 
not any genuine issue of material fact arises from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and 
affidavits on file, it is clear that th.e three (3) facts ·'disputed'' in Respondent's Brief filed July 
6, 2016, are in fact undisputed in the material record before the Court. 
In point of fact, if the record is in dispute on these matters and they are material facts, 
that dictates a result against the Respondent and this Court must overturn the Trial Court's 
Grant of Summary Judgment. I.R.C.P. 56 (2016) 
In any event, these particular matters are undisputed in the record before the Court. 
Appellant filed affidavits and a verified claim, which were matters of record before the Trial 
Court and were not disputed by any affidavit submitted by Jadwiga. Further, these sworn 
affidavits were not subject to any motion to strike. 
Like it or not, the points made in Appellant's Brief are undisputed fact for purposes of 
the record on Summary Judgment. 
The remaining assertion of"Undisputed Facts and Procedural Background'; contained 
in Respondent's Brief beginning at page 6 through 9, section Ill, are unimportant to the 
Court's disposition of this appeal. 
II. . ARGUMENT 
Appellant is truthfully puzzled by Respondent's Brief in its discussion of the issues 
on appeal and argument section. It appears that Respondent has simply reiterated all of the 
claims set forth in her original Swnmary Judgment briefing, which were rejected by the Trial 
Court and on which Summary Judgment was denied, Notably; Respondent did not file a 
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Cross Appeal in this matter and, therefore, does not have the light to raise these new issues 
on an appeal in her own right. The Respondent is limited to the Appellant's issues on appeal 
which are set forth in Appellant's Opening BdeffiledJune 8, 2016. 
A. The Trial Couii incorrectly held that Alt's Creditor's Claim was timely 
disallowed. 
For some reason> in this section of Respondent's Brief, counsel argues that ''the trial 
courts must detennine the admissibility evidence as a threshold question to be answered 
before addressing the merits of the motions for summary judgment". Respondent's Brief, 
p.10. What follows in Respondent's Brief is a lengthy discussion of the ''dead man's statute'' 
in Idaho Code § 9-202. Respondent's Brief, beginning at the bottom ·of page 10 and 
continuing through the top of page 14, spends great length discussing the admissibility or 
inadmissibility of the Creditor's Claim or statements contained therein. 
Notably missing in the record on any level is a motion by Respondent to strike the 
contents of Alt's Creditor's Claim. Furthennore, these are matters that were dispensed with 
by the Trial Court sununarily and withot1t much discussion during oral argument. 
Court: Well, you say those - those written documents, 
they could evidence anything, but isn't that 
exactly why the Court would not be able to 
grant you swnmary judgment on that issue, 
because the CoUit can only grant summary 
judgment when it' s abundantly clear and crystal 
clear and there's no dispute of genuine issue of 
material fact as to what the documents do or do 
not show? 
Ms. Cusack: But your Honor ... 
Court: And when there's ambiguity then the court has 
t.o rule in favor of the non~moving party on 
summary judgment. 
Tr. 8/24/2015, p.10 
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The Court in its finding on Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment stated as 
follows: 
Court: 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF -6 
Alright then. Let me walk through some of 
this. I'm going to be able to answer some of 
these issues here and now and others I will not 
be able to answer here and now. The - what 
I'm going to take as the primary~ I think, 
argument (indiscernible - inaudible) between 
the parties is this interrelationship between 15~ 
3-111 and 108 and the creditor claim statute 
under 15-3-803. I think is really what's going 
on here, to put it bluntly. That's, um, that's the 
cmx of this - this case, whether or not Mr. Alt 
can proceed with his claim against the Estate 
when that claim is based on an agreement 
which was - seems to be a bit of a combination 
between verbal and written between his mother, 
Hedy, and himself, which Robert did not 
sign ... . With respect to the rest of the Estate's 
issues on suminary judgment. I will say that, 
perhaps unlike many Magistrate's on the bench, 
that I actually have practiced - did a lot of 
summruy judgment work and, at least at one 
point in time, I had a very good understanding 
of what does fly on summary judgment and 
what does not fly and just how high that hurdle 
is to get beyond any genuine issue of material 
fact. The discussion at page nine by the Estate 
regarding defective documents is exactly not 
the kind of thing one wants to put into a brief 
when you're seeking suinmruy judgment. 
That's actually what you put into a brief when 
you're opposing summary judgment and which 
is, basically, the document could mean this or it 
could mean that. As soon as that bell in (sic) 
nu1g no Court that understands summary 
judgment would ever grant one. Because what 
you have basically said there is that this is not 
crystal clear, there are two reasonable - or 
multiple ways that this evidence can be 
interpreted and you can - such issues can never 
be resolved on summary judgment. So 
regarding whether or not the written 
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documentation means one thing or means the 
other or whether it's, uh, what weight it carries, 
that is not appropriate for summary judgment. 
Tr. 8/24/2015, pp.29~31 
Respondent did not file a Cross-Appeal and, therefore, the Trial Court's Summary 
Judgment on the variety of issues raised in her Motion for Summary Judgment is not for 
this Court's review on appeal. 
The only matters before this Court on appeal are the issues raised by Appellant on 
appeal from the Trial CoUit,s Judgment dated Decembet 3, 2015. As a result, Appellant 
will not reply to Respondent's Brief beginning at Section V, pp.10-14. 
This failure to Cross-Appeal similarly applies to subsection B of Respondent's 
Brief beginning on page 14. In fact, Respondent's Brief truly makes no sense in light of 
the Trial CoUit's ruling. Respondent appears to be arguing that Alt's claim should not be 
automatically allowed because of some perceived impropriety in the manner of its filing. 
If Respondent is asserting affirmatively that the claim is defective and should have 
been disallowed, that argument must have been raised at the trial level or the Respondent is 
ban·ed from asserting the claim on appeal. "To properly raise an issue on appeal, there 
must either be an adverse ruling by the Court below, or the issue must have been raised in 
the court below. an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." Garner v. Bartschi, 
139 Idaho 430, 436, 80 P.3d 1031, 1037 (2003); quoting McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 
391,397, 64 P.3d 317,323 (2003). 
Respondent's argument set fo1th in Subsection B of Respondent's Brief is quite 
puzzling because (a) Respondent prevailed on the issue of the timeliness of their 
disallowance and, therefore, there is no adverse ruling for her to assert in regard to Mr. 
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Alt's claim; and (b) this perceived issue of a "defect'' in the Alt claim was not raised before 
the Trial Court or, if the issue was raised, the Court ruled against Respondent and she has 
not appealed. 
This Court is asked to disregard Respondent's Brief and the arguments contained in 
Subsection B, pages 14 through 16. 
Respondent's Brief begins, for the first time, to address the issues on appeal at page 
16, Subsection C. Unfortunately, Respondent simply does not address the statutory 
construction issues raised in Appellant's B1ief, Section A. It appears to be Respondent's 
position that no matter when a creditor's claim is submitted, the Estate has until sixty (60) 
days after the time period for all creditor's claims to be filed within which to aUow or 
disallow the specific creditor's claim received earlier. This defies logic and appears to 
arise from Respondent's misunderstanding of allo\\ing or disallowing claims versus paying 
claims, which seems to be the source of Respondent's confusion as reflected in the record 
at oral argument: 
Court: 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRlEF - 8 
I- I don't understand Mr. Alt to be making that 
argument. I think what he's saying, in that 
situation, and I think he's interpreting the 
statute correctly, which is, yes you - when you 
do publication there's a four-month time for 
creditors to step fotward and make their claims. 
But when someone does step fotward and make 
the claim then it triggers the estate's 
responsibility to either allow it or disallow it 
within sixty days. I think you're in - you're 
misinterpreting that statute to say the no (sic) 
action has to be taken on a claim once filed, 
until the fouHnonth publication period, which 
is a service of ptocess statue, expires. And I -
I've never understood it to work that way. 
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Ms. Cusack: Well if that is not the correct interpretation. the 
Estate's interpretation of that, Your Honot, how 
can you allocate claims? ... .. 
Court: It's--that's--that's in:elevant. It's - it's 
whether the claim is valid or not. You're no 
(sic) allocating priority at that point in time. 
You're - you're just because you allow a claim, 
doesn't mean you have to pay it at that time .... 
Tr. 8/24/2015, p.3,U.10-241 
In ruling on the timeliness of the disallowance, the Trial Court held that it is ·~iocal 
practice" to disallow a claim within sixty (60) days of submission, but that "a close reading 
of the controlling provision reveals the follows: "Failure of the personal representative to 
mail notice to a claimant of action on his claim for 60 days after the time for original 
presentation of the claim has expired has the effect of a notice of allowance.', 
Memorandum Opinion, p.4. In reading this provision, the Court concluded that that 
language "time for original presentation of the claim" extended Alt's time to have filed his 
claim as late as April 8th and the Estate' s time to respolld until June 8th• Memorandum 
Opinion, p.5. Based upon this· finding, the Court ruled that the disallowance was timely. 
This ruling disregards Alt's arguments that his early filing of the Creditor's Claim 
triggered the sixty (60) day time for the Estate to allow or disallow the claim or face a 
result that the claim is deemed allowed by the Estate's untimely response. 
1 Interestingly, the Court repeatedly stated it would not make a determination of whether 
the Estate timely disallowed Alt's claim since there was no Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment pending before the Court from Mr. Alt. Sl1bsequently, the Court issued a letter 
on August 27, 2015, stating that the Court first needed to determine whether the 
disallowance was timely since an untimely disallowance would operate as a waiver of the 
statute of limitations defense. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF· 9 
Page 290 of 438
07-27-'16 16 :04 FROM-FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM 2082630400 T-058 P0011/0015 F-827 
The Trial Court's MemorandUUI. Opinion is in error for the reason that it interprets 
the phrase "time for original presentation of the claim" as necessarily tying the Estate's 
deadline for disallowances to the publication period. First, it is undisputed that Alt' s claim 
was filed January 13, 2015, before the Estate had even conunenced publication on 
February 19th• Second, publication is not required under the Idaho Probate Code and, 
therefore, the time for disallowance is triggered by Alt's filing of a Creditor's Claim. 
Unless notice has already been given under this section, a 
personal representative upon his appointment may publish a 
notice to creditors once a week for three successive weeks in 
a newspaper of general circulation .. . notifying creditors of 
the estate to present tl1eir claims within four months after the 
date of the fh·st publication of the notice or be forever barred. 
l.C. § 15-3-80l(a)(2016) 
Notably> the personal representative is not required at all to publish notice to 
creditors and creditors may be given notice by other means (mail or other delivery). In the 
instant case, Alt filed his Creditor's Claim a full month prior to the publication even 
commencing. The ~st.ate did not timely disallow the claim, and it is deemed allowed by 
operation of statute. 
The Trial Court erred in its Memorandum Opinion of finding that Alt's Creditor's 
Claim was timely disallowed giving account for the publication period which commenced 
February 191\ a full month after Alt's Creditor's Claim was filed and sei-ved upon the 
Estate. This Court is asked to reverse and remand with instruction to the Trial Court that 
FEA'I'HElf~~ Alfs Creditor's Claim is deemed allowed due to the Estate's untimely disallowance. 
Daniel P. Pea1bemon 
B~n! C. Featherston• 
Jerem~ P. Feathe.rston 
1 ere mi l... Ossman• • 
113 S. Second Aw. 
Sandpolni, JD 83864 
Pho11e (Z08) Z63-6866 
F;,x (l08) 263-0400 
'Lle..os.od io Jd,ba & W,<hiogtcn 
••Llocn,odin ldahG&:Mtchleo>) 
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B. The Trial Court erred in its ruling that the three--year statute of 
limitation applies to Alt's Creditor's Claim against the Estate of Hedwig 
Melton. 
Respondent's Brief cites the Court to Witt v. Jones, 111 Idaho 165 (1986) for the 
premise that a three-year statute of limitations applies to all Creditor's Claims from the date 
of death. Respondent's Brief, p.22. 
However, Witt v. Jon.es is inapplicable to this circumstance because it does not 
specifically address the delay that is permitted in filing a joint probate of community property 
of a husband and wife until the second spouse dies and as allowed under Idaho Code§ 15-3~ 
111. 
Witt v. Jones did not involve community property being jointly probated after the second 
spouse is dead beyond the three-year statute of lhnitations. As a consequence, Witt v. Jones 
is inapplicable and unhelpful to the analysis of this issue. 
It appears to be Respondent's position that they can absolve both Robert and 
Hedwig's estate from any liability under the Alt Creditor's Claim by having it both ways. 
To explain, the Estate has taken advantage ofldaho Code§ 15-3-111 by waiting until 
Robert's death to probate the community estate of Robert and Hedwig and then filing it as a 
joint probate of Robert and Hedwig's assets as provided by subsection 111. Furthermore, any 
earlier probate of the Est.ate prior to Robert's death would necessarily have been a summary 
administration under Idaho Code§ 15-3-1205.2 
It is undisputed that any passing of the colnrnunity interest from Hedy to Robert in 
the community estate is under Section 1205 subject to the separate and community debts of 
Hedy at the time of her death. J.C. § 15-3-1205(c)(2016). 
2 In fact, this proceeding was commenced under the summary administration provisions of 
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The Estate would argue to this Court that she can assume the community interest of 
Hedy into Robert's estate expunging any debts of Hedy thereby passing title to Robert free 
of the Alt loan.3 
In fact, the Estate at oral argument argued that Hedy's death had the legal effect of 
' 1extinguishing" a community interest and passing all title to Robert free and clear of the 
Creditor's Claim at the time of Hedy's death regardless of any proceeding or lack of 
probate proceeding or subsequent Creditor's Claim by Mr. Alt. 
Ms. Cusack: ..... So this idea of filing in Robert's estate is 
really, uh, it doesn't matter because there is no 
claim. Anything that he would have had ended 
three years after Hedy's death. I don't see how 
we can - under the community property statute 
it does say that spouses can bind the community 
property. but at her death that ended. And then 
three years after her death the1·e was no 
opportunity, again, for Mr. Alt to say that there 
was any more community property. Because it 
just became separate property of Robert. So by 
- by waiting he lost his opportunity to collect, if 
there was one. 
Tr. 8/24/2015, pp.9"10 
The Court clearly did not accept Respondent's position: 
Court: 
I.C. § 15r3-1205. 
I have - I'm struggling with your assertion, and 
I don't really know that it's particularly 
germane to the issue I have to decide, but your 
assertion that essentially, and correct me if I'm 
misunderstanding it~ at the instant Hedy died 
there was no more community property, it all 
became Robert's separate property. I don't 
know that I - that that makes sense that the 
3 It should be noted that Alt's Creditor's Claim is asserted against both Robert and Hedwig. 
At no time has the creditor limited his claim to only that of his mother's estate. 
Al'l>ELLANT"S REPLY llRJEF - 1l 
Page 293 of 438
07-27-'16 16:04 FROM-FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM 2082630400 T-058 P0013/0015 F-827 
Oaoiel J>. Featherston 
Brent C. Peatherston~ 
Jeremy P. Featherston 
Jc.n:mi L Ossman•• 
113 S. Second Aw. 
Sal)dpolnt, ID 83864 
Phone (208) 263-6866 
F;,.x (208) 263-0400 
:,-LlrAD!dd in td.1h.o & W.ashlngton 
"Li«>n,,d in ld:iho ~ M\chlf•o 
transfer would be a~o automatic. It seems 
to me that there is a community estate that 
would move forward in time until it's 
terminated either by operation of the three-year 
statute oflimitation or by a probate decision. 
Tr. 8/24/2015, p.28, 11.8~14 
While it is clear the Court did not accept the Estate's argument that community 
property deed of the real estate simply evaporated on Hedy's death. It is also clear that the 
Court ened to the extent the quote above contains a finding that the right to probate and} 
therefore, submit Creditor's Claim terminates either by the three~year statute of Jjmitations 
or by a probate decision on Hedy's Estate alone. It is clear that Subsection 111 pennits a 
spouse or their family to defer any probate proceedings witil the second spouse dies and 
then a joint probate may be filed. It is equally clear that that joint probate leaves open the 
opportunity for creditor's claims against both or either of the deceased spouses. If the 
legislative intent was othenvise, it would have so stated. 
The Respondent has put forth no argument to substantiate their position that 
Subsection 803, which is a general bar to creditor's claims three years following the date of 
death, could act as a specific bar to one creditor's claim as to one spouse in a joint probate 
permissible under Subsection 111. The more specific timeframe variations contained in 
Subsection 111 override the more general time limitations of Subsection 803. 
The plain meaning of the statute, therefore, will prevail Wlless 
clearly expressed legislative intent is contrary or Wlless plain 
meaning leads to absurd results. 
APPELLANT'S REPl. V BRmF - 13 
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The Respondent's interpretation of Subsection 803 in light of the specific 
pennission found in Subsection 111 leads to an absurd result and requires the Court to 
overlook the plain legislative intent which was to pennit joint probate of community 
estates subsequent to the_ three-year statute of limit.ations for probate following death. 
·Furthennore, the debt in question is a community debt. It was by the plain 
language of the claim a loan to ·Robert and Hedwig for the purchase of their property and 
construction of their log home which was titled as community property at the time of their 
death. 
Pursuant to the rules applicable to Motions for Summary Judgment, the Trial Court 
was required to assume those facts set forth in the Creditor's Claim are true when ruling on 
the Motion for Sununary Judgment. 
In doing so, the Trial Court should have presumed that the community debt of 
Robert and Hedwig was not, and could not be. expunged by some manipulated 
interpretation of Section 803 in light of the joint probate permitted under Subsection 111. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Trial Court erred in granting Partial Summary 
Judgment finding that Mr. Alt' s claim is time barred as against Hedy's Estate but not 
against Robert's. The Estate is a joint estate consisting wholly of community property. 
The community estate had not been submitted to probate upon Hedy•s death and therefore 
Hedy's interests {as with Robert's) were su~ject to the liability of Mr. Alt's claim. This 
Court is asked to reverse the Trial Court's ruling. 
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Further, the Trial Court erred in finding that Jadwiga timely disallowed Mr. Alfs 
Claim. The Court is asked to reverse that finding and remand with instruction to deem Mr. 
Alt's Claim allowed as provided by law. 
The Appellant requests award of attorney's fees and costs. 
DATED this~day of July, 2016. 
FEA-»~W FIDM, C 
By~~~~-7~=======---=----= 
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON 
Attorney for Appellant 
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Second Judicial District Judge 
P.O. Box 8068 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
- COURT MINUTES -
John R. Stegner 
District Judge 
Date: August 26, 2016 
In the Matter of the Estate of, 
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and 











Sheryl L. Engler 
Court Reporter 
Recording: Z: 3/2016-08-26 
Time: 9:32 A.M. 
Case No. CV-2013-313 
Appearances: 
Brent Featherston, Sandpoint, ID 
appearing on behalf of the appellate 
Mary Cusack, Coeur d'Alene, ID 
appearing on behalf of the respondent 
Subject of Proceedings: Appellate Argument by telephone pursuant to IRCP 7.2 
This being the time fixed pursuant to written order of the Court for the hearing of 
appellate argument in this case, Court noted the participation of counsel in this conference 
call. 
Court questioned whether it had jurisdiction over this matter, indicating that it 
appears that the judgment that was appealed from only relates to Hedwig Melton. Counsel 
concurred. Colloquy was had between Court and counsel regarding this Court's jurisdiction. 
Court indicated that it believed it should decline to exercise jurisdiction over this case and 
send it back to Judge Julian for a determination of all of the claims made by Mr. Alt against 
the Estates of Hedwig Melton and Robert Melton. Court informed counsel that it would like 
more authority supporting this Court's jurisdiction over this matter and afforded Mr. 
Featherston until September 9, 2016, to submit authority, and afforded Ms. Cusack until 
September 23, 2016, to respond. Court scheduled further hearing for 3:00 P.M. on October 
7, 2016, by telephone conference to be initiated by the Court. 
Court recessed at 9:45 A.M. 
APPROVED BY: 
~ -Ml'~ 
JOHN R. STEGNER 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
[Following the hearing, at the request of Ms. Cusack, there being no objection from 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and 
HEDWIG "HEDY'' MELTON 
) 
) Case No. CV-2013-313 
) 
) 
) ORDER SETTING BRIEFING 
) SCHEDULEAND 
) RESCHEDULING ORAL 
) ARGUMENT _ ______________ ) 
On January 13, 2016, the Appellant, Heinz Alt, filed a Notice of Appeal with 
this Court. The appeal is taken from the Judgment entered by the Magistrate Judge 
on December 3, 2015, after granting in part a motion for summary judgment filed by 
the estate's personal representative, Jadwiga Melton. On August 26, 2016, this Court 
conducted a telephonic hearing. Prior to hearing argument on the substance of the 
appeal, this Court questioned counsel regarding whether this Court had jurisdiction to 
hear the appeal. Counsel requested additional time to brief the issue. 
ORDER SETTING BRIEFING 
SCHEDULE AND RESCHEDULING 
ORAL ARGUMENT 
Page 1 
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Good cause appearing, 
It is ORDERED that: 
(1) Appellant's brief regarding this Court's jurisdiction shall be filed and 
served no later than September 9, 2016; 
(2) The personal representative's response brief shall be filed and served no 
later than September 23, 2016; 
(5) Oral argument will be conducted on October 7, 2016, at 10:00 a.m. by 
telephone with the Court placing the call. All pending issues will be addressed at 
that time if this Court concludes it would be appropriate to proceed to hear the 
pending appeal. 
';>~ 
Dated this _l_ day of September 2016, nunc pro tune to August 26, 2016. 
John R. Stegner 
District Judge 
ORDER SETTING BRIEFING 
SCHEDULE AND RESCHEDULING 
ORAL ARGUMENT 
Page 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that full, true, complete, and correct copies of the foregoing 
ORDER SETTING BRIEFING SCHEDULE AND RESCHEDULING ORAL 
ARGUMENT were delivered in the following methods to: 
Brent Featherston 
Attorney at Law 
113 South Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Mary Cusack 
Attorney at Law 
320 E. Neider Aver, Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815 
c:p<J U.S.Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
f::::,]( U.S.Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
GLENDA f·OSTUr\ 
on this \ 'St- day of September 2016. CLERK OF THE COURT 
ORDER SETTING BRIEFING 
SCHEDULE AND RESCHEDULING 
ORAL ARGUMENT 
Page 3 
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FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CllTD. 
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON) ISB No. 4602 
Attorney at Law 
113 South Second A venue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
(208) 263-6866 
(208) 263-0400 (Fax) 
brent@featherstonlaw.com 
Attorney for Creditor, Heinz Alt 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and 








CASE NO. CV-2013-0313 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
RE: JURISDICTION 
COMES NOW the undersigned counsel for and on behalf of the Appellant, Heinz 
Alt, and pursuant to the Court's Order Setting Briefing Schedule and Rescheduling Oral 
Argument issued September 1, 2016, hereby submits Appellant's Brief Re J\µ'isdiction,as 
follows: 
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The Appellant in this matter, Heinz Alt, ("Alt") is the son of Hedwig Melton 
(''Hedy") and step-son of Robert Ernest Melton ("Robert"). This case commenced with the 
filing of a Petition for summary Administration of Estate on August 29, 2013, by Robert's 
wife of just over three years, Jadwiga Melton ("Jadwiga1)). Robert married Jadwiga in 2010 
after Hedy died in 2008. 
A.l'PEl..LAN'l''S BRIEF R£: JORISDICTION-1 
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Subsequently, the trial court issued a Memorandum Opinion on October 8, 2015, 
' . 
concluding that Alt's claim was timely disallowed by the Estate and further concluding that 
Alt's claim as against Hedy's Est.ate is barred by Idaho Code§ 15-3-803, but not barred as to 
RoberCs Estate. 
The trial court entered Judgment under I.R.C.P. Rule 54(b) on December 3, 2015. Alt 
timely appealed by filing his Notice of Appeal on Janumy 13, 2016, and Amended Notice of 
Appeal on March 2, 2016. The appeal is taken pursuant to Idaho Code §1-705(3). Idaho 
Code § 17-201 and IRCP 83, IAR 17 (m) and Idaho case law. 
JI. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. Does this Court have jurisdiction on appeal from the Trial Court's 
JUDGMENT, I.R.C.P. 54(b) dismissing Alt's creditor claim against the estate of Hedwig_ 
Melton as time barred? 
Ill. ARGUMENT 
A. Does this Court have jurisdiction on appeal from the Trial Court's 
JUDGMENT, I.R.C.P. 54(b) dismissing Alt's creditor claim against the 
estate of Hedwig Melton as time barred? 
1. The form of the judgment is torred and appealable. 
First, Idaho Code §17-201 provides that appeal may be taken from a 'judgment, or order of 
the magistrates division of the district court in probate matters: .... 7. Refusing, allowing or 
directing the ... payment of a debt, claim, legacy or distributive share." 
Fwther, Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
The court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or 
more. but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court 
expressly det.e1mines that there is no just reason for clelay. 
Otherwise, any judgment, however designated, that adjudicates 
fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer 
than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the 
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claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the 
entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the 
parties' rights arid. liabilities. · 
In the event the ttial court determines that a partial judgment 
should be certified as final undet· this Rule 54(b ), the court 
must execute a certificate which must immediately follow the 
court's signature on the partial judgment and be in substantially 
the form found in Appendix B. 
I.R.C.P.,Rule 54 (2016) 
The Judgment prepared by opposing counsel and signed by the M~gistrate contains 
the certificate and complies with the requirements of IRCP 54 (b ). Further, the legislature 
provided in Idaho Code §17-201 that such a decision in a probate matter is appealable. 
The document appealed from in this case fits the criterion of a partial judgment 
certified as final and appealable under IRCP 54 (b). Subsection (a) of rule 54 requires that a 
Judgment ''state the relief' to which a party is entitled on one or more of the claims and must 
be a separate document, as opposed to the memorandum decision. 
Further, it must contain certain words in a particular format: "A judgment or partial 
judgment must begin with the words "JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: .. ," and it 
must not contain any other wording between those words and the caption. A judgment may 
include any findings of fact or conclusions of law expressly required by statute~ rule, or 
regulation." IRCP Rule 54 (20 I 6) 
. The Judgment appealed from in this case perfectly fits the criterion of Rule 54, both 
parts (a) as to the form of Judgment, and (b) certifying the partial judgment as final and 
~*tl~r appealable. This Court, therefore, has jurisdiction to hear this appeal. 
Daniel P. FC31Mtst.Qn 
Brent C. Fcathor<ton* 
Jeremy P. Feather&(Oll 
Joremi L. Omr,a11•• 
113 S. Second Ave. 
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2. Alt hus a statutory right to appeal this judgment. 
~e right to appeal this ruling is of statutory origin granted by the legislature in Idaho 
Code §17-201, specifically in probate matters. Further, the right to appeal a judgment in a 
special proceedin_g such as probate case, has been acknowledged by the Idaho Supreme Court 
recently. 
'~Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 83(a)(6), "any order, judgment or decree by a magistrate in a 
special proceeding in which an appeal is provided by statute'' is a judgment or order rendered 
by a magistrate that can be appealed to the district judges division of the district court." 
In re Estate of McKee, 283 P.3d 749, 754, 153 Idaho 432,437 (2012) 
fu discussing Idaho Code § 17-201, the Court noted: 
"Subsection (7) of LC. § 17-201 lists as appealable, orders or 
judgments H[r]efusing, allowing or directing the distribution or 
partition of an estate, or any part thereof, or the payment of a 
debt, claim, legacy or distributive share." Decisions by courts 
in these areas are subject to review regardless of whether they 
are final judgments." 
Inre Estate of McKee, supra; citing: Est.ate of 
Keeven, 716 P.2d 1224, 1227, 110 Idaho 452,455 (1986) 
The Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal. 
3. This appeal is not a "piece meaP' appeal under 54 (b). 
The District Court at the time originally set for oral argument raised the question as to 
jurisdiction to hear this appeal. The Court specifically raised the question of whether the 
Trial Court's Judgment was contrary to the objective to avoid piece meal appeals. 
It is significant that Idaho Code § 17-201 and Rule 83 specifically permit appeals from 
specific rulings, regardless of whether it may be perceived as piece meal. Therefore, the 
statutory provision would override any limitations of the trial court's discretion under Rule 54 
(b) to certify the judgment as final and appealable. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF RE: JURISDICTION- 4 
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'~The language ~f a statute should be . given its plain, usual and ordinary meaning. 
Where a statute is clear and unambiguous. the expressed intent of the legislature shall be 
given effect without engaging in statutory construction." Idaho Code § 73-113 (2016) 
~'When a statute and lule "can be reasonably interpreted so that there is no conflict 
between them. they should be so interpreted rather than interpreted in a way that results in a 
conflict." State v. Johnson, 188 P.3d 912,916, 145 Idaho 970, 974 (2008) 
To suggest that IRCP 54 (b) does not permit appeal of the judgment dismissing Mr. 
Alt's creditor claim against the estate of Hedwig Melton is to disregard the provisions Idaho 
Code §17-201. The Court is obligated to read the statute applying the plain meaning of the 
words contained therein which permit this appeal, and further to construe rule 54 so as to 
carry out that plain meaning. This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Idaho 
Code §17-201-
4. If the statutory rights of appeal conflict with 54 (b), Mr. Alt's 
substantive rights· under the statute prevail. 
If the Court determines rule 54 and the statute, Idaho Code § 17-20 I, conflict, then the 
statute prevails as a substantive right of appeal granted to Mr. Alt by the legislature. 
~1[L]egislation is a constitutional exercise of the Legislature's power to enact substantive law 
[and] that legislation is to be given due deference and respect" State v. Johnson, 188 P.3d 
912,916, 145 Idaho 970, 974 (2008) 
By contrast, the powers of the Court in rule making are limited to procedural. "A 
careful reading of the Constitution of the Stat.e of Idaho and the legislature's codification of 
the Idaho Supreme Court's rule making power, reveals that this Court's rule making power 
goes to procedural, as opposed to substantive, rules." State v. Beam, 828 P.2d 891,892, 121 
Idaho 862, 863 (1992) 
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''Substantive law presc1ibes norms for societal conduct and punishments for 
violations thereof. It thus creates, .defiries; and regulates primary rights . . In contrast, practice 
and procedure pertain to the essentially mechanical operations of the courts by which 
substantive law, rights, and remedies are effectuated." State v. Currington, 700 P.2d 942, 944, 
108 Idaho 539, 541 (1985) _ 
. The Legislature clearly provided a substantive right of appeal from specific orders in 
a probate case as set out in Idaho Code § 17-201. Any contrary provision of Rule 54 is 
superseded by Mr. Alt's substantive right of appeal provided by the legislature. 
5. Even under the "piece meal" appeal analysis, the 54 (b) certificate 
was proper. 
Finally~ should this court choose to make an analysis of the Magistrate's exercise of 
discretion in dismissing Mr. Alt's claim against the Estate of Hedwig Melton, it should be 
noted that decision effectively disposed of all of Alt's claims against Mrs. Meltons' estate. 
While it is true these claims survive against the community property interests of Ml-. Melton, 
it is nonetheless a final disposition as against Hedwig Melton's estate and, therefore, 
appealable. 
This fact is distinguishable from those cases where the appellate court dismissed the 
appeal as improper rule 54 (b) certification. In Bishop v. Capital Financial Services. the 
appellant had five ( 5) different claims against multiple parties. The Court entered partial 
summary judgment in favor of Capital Financial on Bishop's claims and certified the 
judgment. As in this case, the Judgment was prepared by counsel with a rule 54 certificate. 
In dismissing the appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court held that ordinarily such a certificate 
requires the Court to "weigh the overall policy against piecemeal appeals against the 
exigencies the case at hand may present" and the Supreme Court noted that multiple claims 
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and multiple parties to the suit dictated against the certificate unless "the interests of justice" 
are served by an immediate appeal. Bishop~- Capital F1_nancial Services, 712 P.2d 567, 569, 
109 Idaho 866., 868 (1985) 
Here, there is but one claim again$t the joint estate of Mr. and Mxs. Melton. With no 
applicable case law or authority, the magistrate dismissed the claim against Mrs. Melton's 
estate. Even if the Magistrate's discretion ~n issuing a 54 (b) certificate is subject to scrutiny 
· as to piece meal appeals ( disregarding the appeal as a matter of right m1der Idaho Code 17-
20 I), the certificate was properly issued. The Judgment dismissed a significant portion of 
Alt's claim overall and all of his claims against Hedwig Melton. Further, the decision was 
issued without benefit of any case law or authority to support the decision. These facts 
support the Magistrate's issuance of the Judgment and 54 (b) certificate. This Court properly 
has jurisdiction of this appeal. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, this Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal. The 
Appellant requests award of attorney's fees and costs. 
DATED this ~ay of September, 2016. 
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Hon. John R. Stegner 
Second Judicial District Judge 
P.O. Box 8068 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Mary W. Cusack, Esq~ 
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC 
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MARY W. CUSACK ISB# 5332 
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC 
320 E. Neider Avenue, Suite 206 
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(208) 667-0640 
(208) 667-0708 - FAX 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of the Estate of: 
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and 
HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON, 
Deceased. 
) 
) CASE NO. CV 13-0313 
) 
) PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S 
) RESPONSE BRIEF 
) 
) __________ ) 
COMES NOW, Petitioner, JADWIGA B. MELTON (hereinafter "Jadwiga"), the 
Personal Representative of the above-captioned estate, by and through her attorney of 
record , MARY W. CUSACK, of Cusack Law Firm, PLLC, and hereby submits her Personal 
Representative's Response Brief as follows: 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This case concerns one claim against the estates of ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON 
(hereinafter "Robert") and HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON (hereinafter "Hedy"). These 
estates are being probated jointly. Appellant, HEINZ ALT (hereinafter "Alt") has made the 
3. PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S RESPONSE BRIEF 
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same claim against each of these estates. The Trial Court granted summary judgment in 
favor of the Personal Representative by disallowing Alt's claim against Hedy's estate. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND OBJECTION 
The decision to grant or deny a 54(b) certificate rests in the sound discretion of the 
trial judge who is best able to evaluate the situation. Swope v. Swope, 112 Idaho 974, 
978, 739 P.2d 273, 277 (1987) . Therefore, this Court must give broad discretion to the 
trial court judge's decision to grant the certificate. 
Ill . ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL 
Does this Court have jurisdiction to hear this appeal, regarding the dismissal of 
Alt's claim against Hedy's estate? 
IV. ARGUMENT ON ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL 
This court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the summary judgment 
disposed of all of Alt's claims against Hedy's estate. This case concerns one claim against 
two separate estates. Alt has raised a claim against both Robert and Hedy's estates. The 
summary judgment issued at the Trial Court disposed of all of Alt's claims against Hedy's 
estate. 
Jadwiga supports Alt's brief regarding the Court's Jurisdiction, and is issuing this 
brief to further clarify the Court's jurisdiction. 
4. PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S RESPONSE BRIEF 
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A. This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal because the summary 
judgment resolved Alt's claim against Hedy's estate. 
So long as an order granting partial summary judgment resolves one or more of 
the claims between the parties, it may be certified as a final order pursuant to Rule 54(b). 
Toney v. Coeur D'Alene Sch. Dist. No. 271, 117 Idaho 785, 786, 792 P.2d 350, 351 
(1990). A trial court, however, may not issue any interlocutory order as final under Rule 
54(b) if the order does not resolve one or more of the claims. Toney v. Coeur D'Alene 
Sch. Dist. No. 271. 117 Idaho at 786, 792 P.2d at 351; Brinkmeyer v. Brinkmeyer. 135 
Idaho 596, 599 21 P.3d 918, 921 (2001); Rife v. Long. 127 Idaho 841, 844, 908 P.2d 143, 
146 (1995). Furthermore, the decision to grant this 54(b) certificate rests in the sound 
discretion of the trial judge, who was best able to evaluate the situation. Swope v. Swope. 
112 Idaho at 978, 739 P.2d at 277. 
In this case, there is one claim against two estates. The Trial Court's summary 
judgment wholly disposed of Alt's claim against Hedy's estate, but did not dispose of Alt's 
claim against Robert's estate. Accordingly, the summary judgment resolved the claim 
between Alt and Hedy's estate, and may be certified as a final order pursuant to Rule 
54(b). This is not piecemeal because one of the claims between the estates has been 
wholly decided and resolved, and is therefore ripe for appeal. Therefore, this Court should 
give discretion to the trial court judge's decision to grant this Rule 54(b) certificate, and 
hear this appeal. 
5. PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S RESPONSE BRIEF 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing , this Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal as it deals 
with a claim that has been fully resolved between Alt and Hedy's estate. In addition, 
Jadwiga respectfully requests th is Court for an award of attorney fees and costs . 
·)r· St--
DATED this _d--__ day of September 2016. 
Attorney for 
Personal Representative 
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0 
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be served by facsimile and via email thereon , and addressed to the following: 
Brent C. Featherston 
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd . 
113 S. Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
(208) 263-0400 - FAX 
Sent via email: 
cynth ia@f eatherston law. com 
brent@featherstonlaw.com 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
- COURT MINUTES -
John R. Stegner 
District Judge 
Date: October 7, 2016 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and 











Sheryl L. Engler 
Court Reporter 
Recording: Z: 3/2016-10-07 
Time: 10:00 A.M. 
Case No. CV-2013-313 
Appearances: 
Brent Featherston, Sandpoint, ID 
appearing on behalf of the appellate 
Mary Cusack, Coeur d'Alene, ID 
appearing on behalf of the respondent 
Subject of Proceedings: Appellate Argument by telephone pursuant to IRCP 7.2 
This being the time fixed pursuant to written order of the Court for the hearing 
of appellate argument in this case, Court noted the participation of counsel in this 
conference call. 
Court stated for the record that it had afforded counsel an opportunity to brief 
the issue of whether there is an appropriate basis to hear an appeal in this case. Mr. 
Featherston argued on the jurisdiction issue. Ms. Cusack argued on the jurisdiction 
issue. Both counsel concurring that this case has jurisdiction to hear the appeal and 
for reasons articulated on the record, Court stated that it would hear the appeal. 
Mr. Featherston presented argument on behalf of the appellant. Call was 
dropped at 10:13 A.M. and replaced. Back on the record at 10:17 A.M., Court and 
counsel participating in the hearing by telephone as before. Mr. Featherston resumed 
his appellate argument and responded to inquiI·ies from the Court. Ms. Cusack 
presented argument on behalf of the respondent and responded to inquiries from the 
Court. Mr. Featherston argued in rebuttal. 
Court considered the matter as having been fully submitted and informed 
Terry Odenborg 
Deputy Clerk 
COURT MINUTES - 1 ORIGINAL 
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counsel that in due course it would render a written opinion. 
Court recessed at 10:58 A.M., subject to call. 
Terry Odenborg 
Deputy Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and 
HEDWIG "HEDY'' MELTON, 
Deceased, 
) 
) Case No. CV-2013-313 
) 
) 
) OPINION ON APPEAL 
) 
) ________________ ) 
This is an appeal brought by Heinz Alt ("Heinz"), the Appellant, in which he 
challenges the Magistrate Judge's decision granting partial summary judgment in 
favor of Jadwiga Melton, the personal representative of the Estate of Robert Ernest 
Melton and Hedwig "Hedy" Melton. The Magistrate Judge held that the personal 
representative's rejection of Heinz's claim was timely and that because Heinz failed 
to bring a claim against the estate of his mother, Hedwig Melton ("Hedy"), within 
three years of her death, summary judgment was appropriate. 
BACKGROUND 
Heinz is the biological son of Hedy and the stepson of her deceased husband, 
Robert Ernest Melton ("Robert"). Appellant's Br., p. 1. Heinz alleges that he loaned 
OPINION ON APPEAL - 1 -
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money to his mother and step-father to enable them to purchase land and build a 
log home in Boundary County. Id. at 2. At some point, the property was deeded to 
Heinz. Id.; see also Gift Deed (Ex. B attached to the Aff. of Mary W. Cusack). Heinz 
alleges that the property was deeded to him as security for the money he loaned to 
his mother and step-father. Appellant's Br., p. 2. Subsequently, Heinz claims Hedy 
and Robert executed wills in which they bequeathed all of their respective property 
to him. Id. Following the signing of the wills by Hedy and Robert, Heinz and his 
wife deeded the property back to Hedy and Robert. 1 Id. 
Hedy died on August 11, 2008. Id. At the time of her death, Hedy had a will 
directing that all of her property would pass to Robert, and, in the event that Robert 
preceded her in death, to Heinz. Last Will and Testament of Hedwig "Hedy" Melton 
(Ex. G attached to the Aff. of Counsel (Brent C. Featherston)). Hedy's will was 
never probated. Appellant's Br., p. 2. 
In 2010, Robert married Jadwiga Melton ("Jadwiga"). Id. Robert died on July 
4, 2013. Id. At the time of his death, Robert had a new will directing that all of his 
property would pass to J adwiga. Last Will and Testament of Robert Melton (Ex. B 
attached to the Aff. of Counsel (Brent C. Featherston)). Robert executed the new 
will in December of 2010 after marrying Jadwiga. Id. Prior to December 2010, 
1 The timeline of events regarding when the property was deeded to Heinz, when the Meltons executed 
their wills, and when Heinz deeded the property back to the Meitons are disputed facts. In the 
Appellant's Brief, Heinz claims that "[t]he property was initially titled to [me] and [my] wife as 
acknowledgment or security of the loan. Subsequently, tl1e Meltons executed Wills leaving all of their 
estates to [me] . The real property was deeded back to Meltons." Appellant's Br., p. 2. However, the 
personal representative claims that the property was originally titled to Hedy and Robert, and was not 
titled to He:inz until July 16, 1999, after the Meltons' wills were executed. Resp' t's Br., p . 6; Aff. of Mary 
W. Cusack. 
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Robert's will mirrored Hedy's will in that if he preceded her in death, all of his 
property would pass to her, and, if she preceded him in death, all of his property 
would pass to Heinz. Last Will and Testament of Robert Ernest Melton (Ex. F 
attached to the Aff. of Counsel (Brent C. Featherston)). 
On August 29, 2013, Jadwiga filed a Petition for Summary Administration of 
Robert's estate pursuant to I.C. § 15-3-1205. The only assets of the estate are the 
land and home located in Bonners Ferry, Idaho. Heinz maintains that Hedy and 
Robert purchased the land and constructed the home with money he loaned to 
them. On August 30, 2013, a Decree Vesting Estate in Surviving Spouse was 
entered. 
On September 6, 2013, Heinz filed a Motion to Convert Proceedings to 
Supervised Administration and to Determine Testacy based on his claim that he is 
entitled to repayment of the money he loaned Hedy and Robert to purchase the real 
property and construct the home at issue. On October 21, 2013, an Order Setting 
Aside the Decree Vesting Estate in Surviving Spouse was entered. On December 9, 
2014, Jadwiga filed a Petition for Formal Probate of Will and Formal Appointment 
of Personal Representative. Because Hedy's will was never probated, Jadwiga 
requested that the estates of both Hedy and Robert be joined for probate in one 
proceeding. This was done pursuant to I.C. § 15-3-111. 
On January 13, 2015, Heinz filed a claim for $102,574.50 against the estate 
based on I.C. § 15-3-804. Heinz submitted several documents to support his claim. 
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On February 2, 2015, Jadwiga was appointed the personal representative of 
the estate of Robert and Hedy Melton. On February 9, 2015, Jadwiga filed a Notice 
to Creditors with the Court. The notice was first published in the Bonners Ferry 
Herald on February 19, 2015. On March 13, 2015, Jadwiga mailed a Notice of 
Disallowance of Claim to Heinz's attorney. The Notice of Disallowance was filed 
with the Court on March 17, 2015. In that notice, Heinz was informed that his 
claim was being disallowed for the following reasons: (1) the claim was untimely 
because Heinz failed to bring it within three years of Hedy's death, (2) Heinz failed 
to provide documentation that Robert owed a debt to him, and (3) Hedy's signature 
on some of the documents submitted by Heinz had not been authenticated. Notice of 
Disallowance of Claim, p. 1-2. On May 4, 2015, Heinz filed a Petition to Allow 
Claims. 
On June 29, 2015, Jadwiga filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to Deny 
Creditor Claim. A hearing was held on August 24, 2015. On October 8, 2015, 
Magistrate Judge Justin W. Julian issued his Memorandum Opinion granting 
Jadwiga's Motion for Summary Judgment in part. Specifically, Judge Julian 
concluded that Jadwiga's disallowance of Heinz's creditor claim was timely, and 
that Heinz's claim against Hedy's estate is barred by LC. § 15-3-803 because Heinz 
failed to bring his claim within.three years of Hedy's death. Mem. Op., p. 4-7. The 
Magistrate Judge expressly stated that "Heinz may still proceed with his claim 
against Robert's estate." Id. at 7. On Decembe1· 3, 2015, the Magistrate Judge 
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entered a Judgment on the above two issues and certified it as a final judgment 
pursuant to Rule 54(b), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.2 
On January 13, 2016, Heinz filed a Notice of Appeal. An Amended Notice of 
Appeal was later filed on March 2, 2016, and Appellant's Statement of Issues on 
Appeal was filed May 4, 2016. Heinz identifies the following issues on appeal: 
1. Did the trial court err in granting partial summary judgment 
determining that the Appellant's claim was timely disallowed by the 
Personal Representative? 
2. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment that 
Appellant's Creditor's Claim is time barred as against the Estate of 
Hedwig Melton? 
3. Did the trial court err as a matter oflaw holding that Idaho Code § 
15-3-111 does not toll ·or extends (sic) the time within which 
Appellant's Creditor's Claim may be asserted against the joint estate 
of Robert and Hedwig Melton? · 
4. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in granting summary 
judgment based upon Idaho Code § 15-3-803(a) holding that all 
claims are barred against Hedwig Melton's estate when that state 
[sic] is filed for probate after the three (3) year period as a joint 
estate permitted by Idaho Code§ 15-3-111? 
Appellant's Statement of Issues on Appeal, p. 1- 2. 
Oral argument was heard by this Court on October 7, 2016. Brent 
Featherston appeared by telephone and argued on behalf of Heinz. Mary Cusack . 
also appeared by telephone and argued on behalf of Jadwiga. The case is now ready 
for a decision to be issued. 
2 Because the Magistrate Judge concluded that Heinz could still pursue his claim against Robert's estate, 
this Court questioned whether the Magistrate's decision could be appealed even with a Rule 54(b) 
certification. Briefing on the issue of jurisdiction was requested. Counsel for both Heinz and Jadwiga 
argued that this Court had jurisdiction on two independent bases. First, because of J.C.§ 17-201 which 
states an appeal may be brought from a "judgment, or order of the magistrates division of the district 
court in probate matters: ... 7. Refusing, allowing or directing the ... payment of a debt, claim, legacy or 
distributive share." And second because Rule 54(b) allows for an appeal to be brought under the 
following circumstances: "When an action presents more than one claim for relief . .. or when multiple 
parties are involved." It appears that jurisdiction is arguably afforded under the statute and Rule, 
therefore, this Court concludes that it has jurisdiction to proceed. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When an appellate court reviews a trial court's decision on summary 
judgment, it employs the same standard as that properly employed by the trial 
court when originally ruling on the motion. Montgomery v. Montgomery, 147 Idaho 
1, 5, 205 P.3d 650, 654 (2009). 
"Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, affidavit s, and discovery 
documents on file with the court, read in a light most favorable to the non-moving 
party, demonstrate no material issue of fact such that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter oflaw." Harwood v. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672, 677, 39 P.3d 
612, 617 (2001) (citations omitted); Idaho R. Civ. P . 56(c) (2015). "A material fact is 
one upon which the outcome of the case may be different." Peterson v. Romine, 131 
Idaho 537, 540, 960 P.2d 1266, 1269 (1998) (citation omitted). "If the evidence is 
conflicting on material issues, or if reasonable minds could reach different 
conclusions, summary judgment is not appropriate." Id. "The burden of proving the 
absence of mate1·ial facts is upon the moving party." Harwood, 136 Idaho at 677, 39 
P.3d at 617 (citations omitted). However, when a motion-for summary judgment is 
supported by affidavits, "an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations 
or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial." Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(e) (2015). 
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An appellate court "exercises free review over questions of law and matters of 
statutory interpretation." Guzman v. Piercy, 155 Idaho 928, 934, 318 P.3d 918, 924 
(2014) (citations omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
I. Did the trial .court err in determining that Heinz's claim was 
disallowed in a timely way by Jadwiga? 
Heinz mailed his Claim Against Estate to Jadwiga's attorney on January 9, 
2015, and filed his claim with the Court on January 13, 2015. Appellant's Br., p. 6. 
On February 2, 2015, Jadwiga was appointed personal representative of the estate. 
Letters Testamentary, p. 1. On February 9, 2015, Jadwiga filed her Notice to 
Creditors with the Court and on February 19, 2015, the notice was first published 
in the Bonners Ferry Herald (with the last publication on March 5, 2015). Notice to 
Creditors; Aff. of Publication. On March 13, 2015, Jadwiga mailed a Notice of 
Disallowance of Claim to Heinz's attorney. Appellant's Br., p. 3. That Notice of 
Disallowance was filed with the Court on March 17, 2015. On these facts, Judge 
Julian concluded that Jadwiga's Disallowance of the claim had been timely filed. 
Mero. Op., p. 5. Heinz appeals from this adverse determination. Heinz contends 
that because the disallowance was untimely, the claim should have been allowed. 
Appellant's Br., p. 7. 
Heinz argues that Jadwiga did not disallow his claim within the statutory 
sixty day time period set forth in I.C. § 15-3-806(a). Id. at 5-7. Heinz wrote the 
following in support of his argument: 
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Measuring the time from Janua;ry 9th [the date Heinz mailed 
his claim to Jadwiga's attorney], and permitting three (3) day mail rule 
for service on the Estate of the Claim, the Estate's clock for 
disallowance purposes began on January 12th. (Applying a filing date 
of January 13, 2015, one (1) day later, does not change the outcome.) 
The Estate did not disallow Mr. Alt's Claim until it mailed a 
Disallowance on March 13th. Again, applying a three (3) day mail rule 
provided for in I.R.C.P. Rule 6(e)(l), the Estate's Disallowance was not 
served upon counsel for Alt until March 16th, sixty-tp.ree (63) days 
after service of the Claim. (Sixty-two (62] days after court filing of the 
Claim.) 
Mr. Alt's Creditor's Claim was timely filed, but was not timely 
disallowed. Under I.C. § 15-3-806(a), failure of the Estate to disallow 
the Claim has the effect of deeming the Claim allowed. This result 
renders the Estate's Motion for Summary Judgment moot. 
Appellant's Br., p. 6. 
Heinz's argument is predicated on his claim that a personal representative 
must disallow a creditor's claim within sixty days of its presentation. Id. at 6-7. 
Heinz relies on LC.§ 15-3-806(a), which states: "Failure of the personal 
representative to mail notice to a claimant of action on his claim for sixty (60) days 
after the time for original presentation of the claim has expired has the effect of a 
notice of allowance." Heinz argues "[t]he use of 'the' [before claim] in the sentence 
makes clear that this provision is specific to the specific creditor's claim, not a · 
general four (4) month provision applicable to 'any' or 'all' claims." Appellant's Br., 
p. 7. 
In granting Jadwiga's Motion for Summary Judgment on this issue, the 
Magistrate Judge wrote the following: 
While it is true that the local practice has been to disallow a claim 
against the estate within 60 days, . .. it is clear from a close reading of 
the statute that the 60 day time limit for denial of a claim does not 
accrue upon its filing, but rather upon expiration of "the time for 
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original presentation of the claim." ... '[T]he time for," which precedes 
and modifies the reference to "the" claim, means that the estate's duty 
to disallow begins running after expiration of the deadline for 
presenting the claim. If the legislature intended to craft the statute as 
Heinz urges, it would simply read " .. . 60 days after presentation of the 
claim . . . ", without any need for reference to "the time for original 
presentation" having expired. 
Mem. Op., p. 4-5. Judge Julian concluded that the "disallowance was clearly 
timely." Id. at 5. 
The Magistrate Judge's finding that the "disallowance was clearly timely" 
will be affirmed for two reasons. 
First, the plain language of I.C. § 15-3-806(a) makes clear that the personal 
representative has sixty days after the time for the original presentation of the 
claim has expired to mail a notice of disallowance to a claimant. 
The objective of statutory interpretation is to derive the intent of the 
legislative body that adopted the act. Statutory interpretation begins 
with the literal language of the statute. Provisions should not be read 
in isolation, but must be interpreted in the context of the entire 
document. The statute should be considered as a whole, and words 
should be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings. It should be 
noted that the Court must give effect to all the words and provisions of 
the statute so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant. When 
the statutory language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of 
the legislative body m-qst be given effect, and the Court need not 
consider rules of statutory construction. 
State u. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866, 264 P.3d 970, 973 (2011) (quoting Farber u. 
Idaho State Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho 307, 310, 208 P.3d 289, 292 (2009) (italics added). 
If Heinz's interpretation were to be employed, the words "the time for 
original" and "has expired" found in I. C. § 15-3-806(a) would be rendered 
superfluous. If the legislature intended the statute to require a personal 
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representative to deny a creditor's claim with sixty days of its presentation, the 
statute could simply read: "Failure of the personal representative to mail notice to 
a claimant of action on his claim for sixty (60) days after presentation of the claim 
has the effect of a notice of allowance." Instead, the legislature added the verbiage 
"the time for original" and "has expired." Consequently, those words must be given 
effect so that they are not rendered superfluous. 
This interpretation is consistent with Idaho Court of Appeals case law. In 
the case In re Estate of Boyd the Court of Appeals wrote the following in 
determining when interest on a creditor's claim would begin to accrue: 
John filed his notice to creditors in compliance with LC. 15-3-801 on 
August 5, 1994, thus starting the four-month period for creditors to file 
their claims. J.C. § 15-3-803. Idaho Code § 15-3-806(d) provides that 
"allowed claims bear interest at the legal rate for the period 
commencing sixty (60) days after the time for original presentation of 
the claim has expired." Therefore, the interest on BMH's claim could 
not begin to accumulate until six months after John first published his 
notice to creditors. 
In re Estate of Boyd, 134 Idaho 669, 674-75, 8 P.3d 664, 669- 70 (Ct. App. 2000) 
(italics added). Section (d) of LC.§ 15-3-806, the provision interpreted by the Court 
of Appeals in In re Estate of Boyd, contains language identical to that found in 
section (a). Section (d) states: "Unless otherwise provided in any judgment in 
another court entered against the personal representative, allowed claims bear 
interest at the legal rate for the period commencing sixty (60) days after the time for 
original presentation of the claim has expired . ... " I.C. § 15-3-806(d) (italics added). 
Based on this statutory language, the Court of Appeals concluded that interest on a 
creditor's claim (filed on August 8, 1994) could.not begin to accumulate until six 
OPINION ON APPEAL -10 -
Page 327 of 438
months after the first notice to creditor's was published on August 5, 1994.3 In re 
Estate of Boyd, 134 Idaho at 675, 8 P.3d at 670. This interpretation is consistent 
with the Magistrate Judge's holding that "the 60 day time limit for denial of a claim 
does not accrue upon its filing, but rather .upon expiration of 'the time for original 
presentation of the claim."' Mem. Op., p. 4. 
Heinz had to present his claim within four months of the date of the first 
publication of notice to creditors or within sixty days after the notice was mailed or 
delivered to him.4 LC. § 15-3-803(a); I.C. § 15-3-B0l(a) & (b). The first publication 
of the notice occurred on February 19, 2015. Heinz therefore had until June 19, 
2015, to present his claim. The estate then had sixty days after the time for original 
presentation of the claim had expired (i.e., sixty days after June 19, 2015) to mail a 
notice of disallowance. I.C. § 15-3-806(a). Because the Notice of Disallowance of 
Claim was mailed to Heinz's attorney on March 13, 2015, it was timely. 
Second, even assuming, for the sake of argument, that Heinz's interpretation 
is correct, Jadwiga did, in fact, mail a timely notice to Heinz that his claim had been 
disallowed. Heinz's claim was deemed presented on January 13, 2015, the day he 
3 Although not at issue in the case, U1e timeline analyzed in Boyd strongly suggests that Heinz' s 
interpretation of the 60 day time period is incorrect. In Boyd, the personal representative first published 
notice to creditors on August 5, 1994. On August 8, 1994, the creditor filed its claim. Notice of 
disallowance of the claim was not filed until January 25, 1995, some 170 days after the creditor's claim 
was filed. However, the disallowance was filed within 60 days after the time for original presentation of 
the claim had expired (i.e., 173 days, or within 60 days after the four month period for presentation of 
creditors' claims had expired). 
4 It is unclear from the record whether notice was mailed or delivered to Heinz. (There is not a certificate 
of service attached to the Notice to Creditors filed with the Court on February 9, 2015.) However, even 
assuming that Notice was mailed to Heinz at the beginning of February, the Estate's disallowance of his 
claim was nonetheless timely. Heinz would have been allowed to present his claim within 60 days of the 
Notice, giving him until the beginning of April, and the estate would have been afforded an additional 60 
days after the time for presentation of the claim had expired to disallow the claim (i.e., the beginning of 
June) . 
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filed it with the Court. LC. § 15-3-804(a) (A "claim is deemed presented on the last 
to occur of: (1) delivery or mailing of the written statement of claim to the personal 
representative; or, (2) the filing of the claim with the court."). On March 13, 2015, 
fifty-nine days after Heinz's claim was deemed presented, Jadwiga mailed a Notice 
of Disallowance of Claim to Heinz's attorney. Appellant's Br., p. 6. Pursuant to the 
plain language of LC.§ 15-3-806(a) a personal representative does not have to 
serve, but rather need only mail, a disallowance within sixty days after the time for 
original presentation of the claim has expired. LC. § 15-3-806(a) ("Failure of the 
personal representative to mail notice to a claimant of action on his claim for sixty 
(60) days after the time for original presentation of the claim has expired has the 
effect of a notice of allowance."). 
Consequently, Heinz's assertion that the disallowance was untimely because 
it was not served upon counsel until March 16, 2016, is unpersuasive. Had the 
legislature intended. that service must be complete within sixty days after the time 
for original presentation of the claim, the term "serve" could have easily been used 
in place of the term "mail" in LC. § 15-3-806(a). 
The Magistrate Judge correctly determined that Heinz's claim was timely 
disallowed by Jadwiga. Summa1·y judgment was appropriately granted on this · 
issue because there is not a genuine issue of material fact and the estate was 
entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw. The Magistrate Judge's decision on this 
issue will therefore be affirmed. 
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II. Did the trial court err in determining that Heinz's claim against 
Hedy's estate is barred by I. C. § 15-3-803 because he failed to bring 
his claim within three years of her death? 
LC. § 15-3-803(a) provides in relevant part that: 
All claims against a decedent's estate which arose before the death of 
the decedent, ... whether due or to become due, absolute or 
contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or 
other legal basis, if not barred earlier by another statute of limitations 
or nonclaim statute, are barred against the estate, the personal 
representative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent, unless 
presented within the earlier of the following dates: 
(1) three (3) years after the decedent's death; or 
(2) within the time provided in section 15-3-801(b), Idaho Code, for 
creditors who are given actual notice, and within the time provided in 
section 15-3-801(a), Idaho Code, for all creditors barred by publication. 
The three year limitation for creditors in LC. § 15-3-803(a)(l) parallels the general 
time limit for probating an estate. LC. § 15-3-108 states: "No formal probate or 
appointment proceeding or formal testacy or appointment proceeding ... may be 
commenced more than three (3) years after the decedent's death." 
Although the general rule requires a probate action to be commenced within 
three years of an individual's death, there are two exceptions to the rule. First, 
pursuant to LC. § 15-3-1205, upon the death of a person leaving a surviving spouse 
as the sole devisee or beneficiary, the surviving spouse (or any person claiming title 
to any property through or under such surviving spouse) may file a petition for a 
decree vesting the property in the surviving spouse, or other claimant, with the 
condition that the surviving spouse (or person claiming entitlement through the 
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surviving spouse) assume and be liable for any and all i~debtedness that might be 
claimed against the estate of the decedent. 5 
Second, pursuant to I.C. § 15-3-111, a joint probate may be commenced to 
administer the estates of two deceased spouses. That provision reads: 
In cases in which a marital community has been dissolved by the death 
of either spouse at any time, the survivor was then entitled to all of the 
property of the decedent by will, law, or both, and the survivor died 
before any proceeding had been commenced for the probate of the 
estate of the spouse whose death occurred first, the estates of both 
decedents may be joined for probate in a single proceeding in any court 
having jurisdiction of the estate of the spouse whose death occurred 
last. The three (3) year provision of section 15-3-108, Idaho Code, 
applies only to the death of the spouse whose death occurred last. The 
initial application or petition filed in any such joint proceeding shall 
contain a statement of the facts upon which such joint proceeding is 
based, in addition to all other statements required by this code to be 
made therein. 
r.c. § 15.3.111. 
Heinz argues that I.C. § 15-3-111 tolls the normal three year statute of 
limitations found in I.C. § 15-3-803(a)(l) because it extends the three year statute of 
limitations for probating an estate found in I.C. § 15-3-108. Appellant's Br., p. 7, 11. 
Heinz contends that 
[i]f the legislature provided an exception to the three (3) year statute of 
limitations on probates for summary administrations and joint 
probates of husband and wife where the assets are community 
property, it is logical that the same extension of time must be applied 
to creditor's claims in those two (2) exceptions: summary 
administration and joint probate upon surviving spouse's death. The 
summary administration, by definition, would have passed the log 
s J.C.§ 15-3-1205 does not state a time limit for the summary administration of estates in which a 
surviving spouse is the sole beneficiary, and there is no reference to LC.§ 15-3-108 within the provision. 
Therefore, it appears to be an exception to the general rule that a will must be probated within three years 
of the decedent's death since it is not a typical probate _proceeding. See 1.C. § 15-3-1205 ("there will be no 
administration of the estate of the decedent.") . 
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home and property to Robert subject to Hedy's debts and liabilities, 
just as the joint probate requires administration and accounting of 
both decedents' debts and obligations to creditors. 
Id. at 9-10. 
In rejecting to this argument when it was made previously, Judge Julian 
concluded that: 
There is nothing in [LC. § 15-3-111] that states or suggests any tolling 
of a creditor's deadline to present a claim, just because the estate is 
subsequently jointly probated. Indeed, this section specifically 
exempts the three (3) year limitation on probate following death of the 
first spouse, as found in section 108. That fact clearly demonstrates 
the legislature's ability and willingness to make special exceptions 
within [I.C. § 15-3-111] where warranted and intended. As there is no 
exception made to the three (3) year creditors' bar found in 15-3-803, 
one shall not be implied by the court. Heinz's claim against Hedy's 
estate was not filed or "presented" within three years of her death and 
is now barred by IC § 15-3-803(a)(l). 
Mem. Op., p. 7. 
LC. § 15-3-111 was added to Idaho's probate statutes in 1973. In 1995 the 
statute was amended to add the following language: "The three (3) year provision of 
section 15-3-108, Idaho Code, applies only to the death of the spouse whose death 
occurred last." The statement of purpose reads as follows: 
This legislation amends existing Idaho Code Section 15-3-111 to clarify 
when a joint probate may be used at the second death of a husband 
and wife. Some courts have held that the three year limit on probates 
in Idaho Code Section 15-3-108 applies to the first death and therefore 
bars a joint probate unless both spouses died within three years of the 
time of commencement of the joint probate. This legislation makes the 
Code Section clearly state that only the second death need be within 
the time periods of Idaho Code Section 15-3-108. 
S.B. 1166, 1995 First Reg. Sess. of the 53rd Leg. (Id. 1995). 
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A basic tenet of statutory construction is that the more specific statute or 
section addressing an issue controls over the statute that is more general. Marshall 
v. Dept. of Transp., 137 Idaho 337, 341, 48 P.3d 666, 670 (Ct. App. 2002) (citation 
omitted). "[T]he more general statute should not be interpreted as encompassing an 
area already covered by one which is more specific." Id. (citation omitted). It is 
undisputed that LC. § 15-3-111 extends the general three year timeframe in which 
to file a probate action. Consequently, in cases such as this one, LC.§ 15-3-111 is 
the specific statute, while LC. § 15-3-108 and LC. § 15-3-803(a)(l) are general 
statutes. Because the three year provision of LC. § 15-3-108 only applies to the 
death of the spouse whose death occurred last, it would follow that the three year 
timeframe set out in LC.§ 15-3-803(a)(l) would also only apply to the death of the 
spouse whose death occurred last in probate actions filed pursuant to LC. § 15-3-
111. 
Additionally, interpreting I.C. § 15-3-803(a)(l) as barring creditors' claims 
against the "estate of the spouse whose death occurred first" in probate actions 
commenced pursuant to LC. § 15-3-111 simply because the death occurred more 
than three years prior to the commencement of the probate action would produce an 
absurd result. This is· because LC. § 15-3-111 expressly allows "the estates of both 
decedents [to] be joined f<?r probate in a single proceeding" within three years of the 
"death of the spouse whose death occurred last." If the statute oflimitations for the 
first to die is not tolled, then in effect the only estate to probate is that of the second 
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to die. "Constructions of a statute that would lead to absurd or unreasonably harsh 
results are disfavored." State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 690, 85 P.3d 656, 666 (2004). 
The Magistrate Judge therefore erred in determining that Heinz's claim 
against Hedy's estate is barred by LC. § 15-3-803 because he failed to bring his 
claim within three years of her death. Summary judgment was consequently 
inappropriately granted on this issue. The Magistrate Judge's decision on this issue 
will be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The Magistrate Judge's decision that Heinz's claim was timely disallowed by 
Jadwiga and that the estate was entitled to summary judgment on that issue is 
AFFIRMED. 
The Magistrate Judge's decision that Heinz's claim against Hedy's estate is 
barred by I.C. § 15-3-803 and that the. estate was entitled to summary judgment on 
that basis is REVERSED. This issue is REMANDED for further proceedings. 
f"-
Dated this ~'1 day of November 2016. 
District Judge 
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knowledge and belief, the items therein are true and correct, and that the costs claimed are 
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1 - 1 
Rate Info - identifies rate source and level 
Slip ID User 
Dates and Time Activity 
Posting Status Client 
Descri~tion Reference 
70833 TIME 8. Featherston 
1/12/2016 Revise 
WIP AltHeinz. Melton. BCF 
R~vise Notice of Appeal; Correspondence to 
Client and contingent fee agreement 
70996 TIME Cynthia B. 
1/11/2016 Prepare 
WIP AltHeinz.Mefton.BC F 
Prepare Notice of Appeal 
71575 TIME Cynthia B. 
2/16/2016 Telephone Conf 
WIP AltHeinz.Melton. BCF 
Telephone conference with Boundary County 
Clerk & Judge Julian's Clerk 
71635 TIME B. Featherston 
3/1/2016 Research 
WIP AltHeinz.Melton .BCF 
Research Appellate Rules & Prepare Amended 
Notice of Appeal 
72613 TIME 8. Featherston 
4/27/2016 Review 
WIP AltHeinz. Melton. BCF 
Review & Respond to Judge's Email re: Schedule 
72741 TIME Cynthia B. 
4/27/2016 Review 
WIP AltHeinz. Melton. BCF 
Review emails; calendar appeal deadline 
73340 TIME Cynthia B. 
5/3/2016 Conference w/ 
WIP AltHeinz.Melton.BCF 
Calendar Briefing; Schedule deadlines 
T-782 P0007/ 0010 F-215 
Page 1 
Units Rate Slip Value 
DNB Time Rate Info 
Bill Status 
0.75 250.00 167.50 
0.00 T@13 
0.25 90.00 22.50 
0.00 T@13 
0.20 90.00 18.00 
0.00 T@13 
0.70 250.00 175.00 
0.00 T@13 
0.26 250.00 62.50 
0.00 T@13 
0.20 90.00 18.00 
0.00 T@13 
0.20 90.00 18.00 
0.00 T@13 
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Dates and Time Activity DNBTime Rate Info 
Posting Status Client Bill Status 
Descri12tion Reference 
73343 TIME Cynthia B. 0.20 90.00 18.00 
5/4/2016 Review 0.00 T@13 
WIP AltHeinz.Melton. BCF 
Revise fax file to Clerk & Counsel 
73439 TIME B. Featherston 4.00 250.00 1000.00 
6/8/2016 Research 0.00 T@13 
WIP AltHeinz.Melton.BCF 
Research and Draft Opening Appeal Brief 
74153 TIME B. Featherston 2.00 250.00 500.00 
7/26/2016 Review 0.00 1@13 
WIP AltHeinz.Melton.BCF 
Review Respondent's Brief; Draft Reply Brief 
74154 TIME B. Featherston 3.00 250.00 750.00 
7/27/2016 Review 0.00 T@13 
WIP AltHeinz. Melton. BCF 
Review Respondent's Brief and Draft Reply Brief 
74280 TIME Cynthia B. 0.25 90.00 22.50 
7/27/2016 Other 0.00 T@13 
WIP AltHeinz. Melton. BCF 
Fax File; Fax to Counsel and Judge 
74691 TIME B. Featherston 1.75 250.00 437.50 
8/26/2016 Review 0.00 T@13 
WlP AltHeinz. Melton. BCF 
Review Briefing and Prepare for Oral Argument 
74811 TIME Cynthia B. 0.20 90.00 18.00 
8/26/2016 Other 0.00 T@13 
WIP AltHeinz.Melton. BCF 
Calendar "Jurisdiction" Deadlines 
75064 TIME B. Featherston 5.00 250.00 1250.00 
9/9/2016 Research 0.00 T@13 
WIP AltHeinz.Melton. BCF 
Research and Draft Brief on Jurisdiction Over 
Appeal 
75489 TIME B. Featherston 2.00 250.00 500.00 
10/7/2016 Prepare 0.00 T@13 
WIP AltHeinz.Melton.BCF 
Prepare & Present Oral Argument on appeal 
i 
I 
76437 TIME B. Featherston 0.50 250.00 125.00 i ' 
11/29/2016 Review 0.00 T@13 i I 
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WIP AltHein:z:.Melton.BCF 
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FILED 
2016 DEC 22 PN 3: 32 
STATE Of mAHO 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and 
HEDWIG "HEDY' MELTON, 
Deceased, 
) 
) Case No. CV-2013-313 
) 
) ORDER DENYING 
) APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR 
) ATTORNEY'S FEES ON 
) APPEAL _________________ ) 
This Court's Opinion on Appeal in this case was filed on November 30, 2016. 
In that decision, this Court did not award either party attorney's fees on appeal, 
and did not address the issue of costs. On December 14, 2016, the Appellant, Heinz 
Alt, filed Appellant's Memorandum of Fees and Costs Pursuant to I.A.R. 40. Alt 
requests that this Court award him his costs in the amount of $447.25 and 
attorney's fees in the amount of $5,212.50. Alt claims that he "is entitled to award 
of attorney's fees and costs" pursuant to ''I.A.R. 40" "as provided for in the Court's 
Opinion on Appeal filed November 1, 2016."1 Appellant's Memo. of Fees and Costs 
Pursuant to I.AR. 40, p. 1-2. 
Alt is not entitled to an award of attorney's fee. "Any party seeking attorney 
fees on appeal must assert such a claim as an issue presented on appeal in the first 
1 This Court's Opinion on Appeal was filed on November 30, 2016, not on November 1, 2016. 
ORDER DENYING 
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appellate brief filed by such party as provided by Rule 35(a)(5) and 35(b)(5)." I.AR. 
41(a). I.A.R. 35(a)(5) provides that "[i]f the appellant is claiming attorney fees on 
appeal the appellant must so indicate in the division of issues on appeal that 
appellant is claiming attorney fees and state the basis for the claim." In addition, 
"simply requesting an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 41, 
without citing any statutory or contractual basis for the award, is insufficient to 
raise the issue of attorney fees on appeal." Mortensen v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 149 
Idaho 437, 448, 235 P.3d 387, 398 (2010) (citing Athay v. Stacey, 142 Idaho 360, 371, 
128 P.3d 897, 908 (2005)). 
Here, Alt did not assert a claim for attorney's fees in his Statement of Issues 
on Appeal or in his Appellant's Brief. Additionally, Alt has failed to cite any 
statutory basis for an award of attorney's fees. Alt has simply cited I.AR. 40, which 
deals with costs on appeal, and this Court's Opinion on Appeal, which did not 
address attorney's fees because neither party asserted such a claim in their initial 
briefs as required by I.A.R. 41(a). Since Alt failed to do that which is required to 
obtain attorney's fees on appeai, his request for attorney's fees will be denied. 
Alt also requests his costs on appeal. "Costs shall be allowed as a matter of 
course to the prevailing party unless otherwise provided by law or order of the 
Court." I.A.R. 40(a). Any party claiming costs must file a memorandum of costs 
with the court within 14 days of the filing and announcement of the opinion. I.AR. 
40(c). The opposing party may file an objection to the claimed costs within 14 days 
ORDER DENYING 
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of the date of service of the memorandum of costs. I.A.R. 40(d). Because the time for 
the Estate to object to Alt's claimed costs has not expired, this Court will defer a 
decision on the issue of costs until the 14 day time for objection has passed. 
Good cause appearing, 
IT IS ORDERED that the Appellant's request for attorney's fees on appeal 
is DENIED. 
tJQ 
Dated this ;JZ day of December 2016. 
ORDER DENYING 
APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR 
ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL 
John R. Stegner 
District Judge 
-3-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
. I do hereby certify that full, true, complete, and correct copies of the foregoing 
ORDER DENYING APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES ON 
APPEAL were delivered by the following methods to the following: 
Brent Featherston 
Attorney at Law 
113South Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Mary Cusack 
Attorney at Law 
320 E. Neider Avenue, Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815 
on this ~ day of December 2016. 
( ] E-Mail 
~ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
( ] E-Mail 
N U.S.Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
~unty Clerk of the Court 
ORDER DENYING 
APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR 
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FILED 
2016 DEC 23 PM 12: 50 
STATE Of IOAHO 
COUNTY OF 80U~DI\RY 
GLENDA POST.OH. CLERK 
av l &A "V 
· DE?'m Y CLrnK __ _ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of the Estate of: ) 
) 
ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON and ) 
HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON, ) 
) 
Deceased. ) 
) _____________ ) 
CASE NO. CV 13- 0313 
RESPONDENT'S OBJECTION TO 
APPELLANT'S MEMORANDUM OF 
FEES AND COSTS PURSUANT TO 
I.A.R. 40 AND MOTION TO DISALLOW 
COMES NOW, Petition, JADWIGA B. MEL TON, by and through her attorney of 
record, MARY W. CUSACK, of Cusack Law Firm, PLLC. and PURSUANT TO I.AR. 40 
(d) and I.R.C.P. 54(d)(5), objects to Appellant's Memorandum of Faes and Costs 
Pursuant to I.A.R. 40 and respectfully move~ the Court for an order disallowing fees and 
costs. 
The Respondent's Objection to Appellant's Memorandum of Fees and Costs 
Pursuant to I .A. R. 40 and Motion to Disallow is made for the reason and upon the grounds 
that Appellant is not the prevailinQ party in all issues under I.A.R. 40, has failed to cite any 
statutory or contractual provision, law, or authority authorizing an award of attorney fees 
and costs, and such attorney fees and costs are unreasonable. 
Oral argument is requested. 
DATED this '2--~ day of December, 2016. 
M~~~ 
Attorney for JADWIGA B. MEL TON 
1. RESPONDENT'S OBJECTION TO APPELLANT'S MEMO OF FEES AND COSTS 
MOTION TO DISALLOW 
{LMH00170891 .DOCX;1/20397.100} 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the z_,,;p(Z( day of December, 2016, I caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoi!')g RESPONDENT'S OBJECTION TO APPELLANT'S 
MEMORANDUM OF FEES AND COSTS PURSUANT TO I.AR. 40 AND MOTION TO 
DISALLOW to be served by facsimile or regular U. S. Mail, postage prepaid thereon, and 
addressed to the following: 
HONORABLE JUDGE JOHN STEGNER 
LATAH COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
PO Box 8068 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 883-2259 - FAX 
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON 
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd. 
113 South Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
(208) 263-0400 - FAX 
LEEANN M. ST. CLAIR 
2. RESPONDENT'S OBJECTION TO APPELLANT'S MEMO OF FEES ANO COSTS 
MOTION TO DISALLOW 
{LMH00170891 .DOCX;1/20397 .1 00} 
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MARY W. CUSACK, ISB # 5332 
LEEANN M. ST. CLAIR, ISB #10112 
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC 
320 E. Neider Avenue, Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815 
(208) 667-0640 
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FILED 
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STATE Of IOAHO 
rOJHTYOFBOUHD~RY 
CLE.WA f-OSTOn. CLERK 
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· c 7:ifiY cLEN< 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of the Estate of: 
ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON and 
HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON, 
Deceased. 
) 
) CASE NO. CV 13,.0313 
) 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
) RESPONDENTS OBJECTION TO 
) APPELLANT'S MEMORANDUM OF 
) FEES AND COSTS PURSUANT TO 
) I.AR. 40 AND MOTION TO DISALLOW _ _ ____________ ) 
INTRODUCTION 
P.004/013 
COMES NOW, Petitioner, JADWIGA B. MELTON, (hereinafter "Petitioner", or 
"Respondent"), and pursuant to I.A.R. 40 and I.R.C.P 54(d), hereby submits her 
Memorandum In Support of Respondent's Objection to Appellant's Memorandum of Fees 
and Costs Pursuant to I.AR. 40 and Motion to Disallow opposing the Memorandum of 
fees and costs filed by Brent Featherston on behalf of his client, Alt Heinz (hereinafter 
u Appellant"). 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
1. A Judgment was Issued In the above entitled action, the Honorable Justin 
Julian presiding, dated and fi led with the Clerk on the 3rd Day of December 2015 granting 
1. MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S OBJECTION 
{LMH001 70939.DOCX;1/20397.100} 
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summary judgment in favor of the Personal Representative/Respondent on the following 
issues: 
a. The Personal Representative's dlsallowance of Heinz Alt's claim, filed 
March 17, 2015 in the above entitled estate was timely filed ; and 
b. Heinz Alt's claim against the Estate of Hedwig "Hedy" Melton is barred 
pursuant to I.C. § 15-3-803. 
2. On appeal, Appellant and Respondent briefed the issues and oral argument 
was heard before this Court on October 7, 2016. This Court issued on Opinion on Appeal 
dated November 29, 2016 and filed with the Clerk on November 30, 2016 affirming the 
Judgment issued by the Magistrate court in part and reversing in part. This Court 
concluded as follows: 
a. The Magistrate's decision that Heinz's claim was timely disallowed by 
Petitioner and that the estate was entitled to summary judgment on that 
issue is affirmed. 
b. The Magistrate's decision that Heinz's claim against Hedy's estate is 
barred by LC. § 15-3-803 and that the estate was entitled to summary 
judgment on that basis is reversed. That issue being remanded for 
further proceedings. 
3. On December 14, 2016, Appellant filed his Memorandum of Fees and Costs 
pursuant to I.AR. 40, which is incorporated herein by reference. 
2 . MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S OBJECTION 
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ARGUMENT 
1 . Obiection is Timely. 
Petitioner's objection to the opposing party's Memorandum of Costs is filed in 
accordance with I.A.R. 40(d). Under the rule, "any party may object to the claim for costs 
of another party by filing and serving on the adverse party and objection to party or all of 
such costs, stating the reasons in support thereof." I.A.R. 40(d). An objection must be 
made no later than fourteen (14) days after the date of service of the memorandum of 
costs. Id. An objection to costs is deemed filed upon mailing. Id. 
In this matter, Petitioner filed her objection pursuant to 1.A.R. 40(d) In a timely 
manner. Petitioner was served Appellant's Memorandum of Fees and Costs Pursuant to 
I.AR. 40 (hereinafter '1Appellant's Memorandum") via facsimile on December 14, 2016. 
Petitioner is required to file her petition by December 28, 2016. Petitioner submitted 
Respondent's Objection to Appellant's Memorandum of Fees and Costs Pursuant to 
I.A.R. 40 and Motion to Disallow (hereinafter "Objection") on December 23, 2016 
contemporaneously with this memorandum. The Objection is filed within the statutory 
period of 14 days of service of Appellant's Memorandum and is timely. 
2. Appellant is Not Entitled to Fees or Costs. 
Appellant is not entitled to attorney's fees because he failed to clalm attorney's 
fees in accordance with I.AR. 41 and I.AR. 35. In the alternative, Appellant is not entitled 
to his fees or costs because he provides no authority upon which an award for fees or 
costs may be granted and he is not the prevailing party. 
2.1. I.A.R. 41 and 35(s)(5) require a claim for attorney's fees to be asserted 
as an Issue presented on appeal. 
3. MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S OBJECTION 
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Appellant waived his claim for attorney's fees by failing to argue his claim for 
attorney's fees in his opening brief. The Idaho Appellate Rules require an appellant to 
both assert and argue for attorney's fees in their opening brief. The Idaho Appellate Rules 
state in pertinent part: 
"[a] party seeking attorney's fees on appeal must assert such 
a claim as an issue presented on appeal in the first appellate 
brief filed by such party as provided by Rules 35(a)(5) and 
35(b)(5), provided, however, the Supreme Court may permit 
a later claim for attorney's fees under such conditions as it 
deems appropriate." 
I.AR. 41 (a). More specifically, "[iJf the Appellant is claim Ing attorney's fees on appeal the 
appellant must so indicate in the division of issues on appeal that appellant is claiming 
attorney's fees and state the basis for the claim." I.A.R. 35(a)(5). 
Appellant's only mention of attorney's fees in his opening brief Is his closing 
sentence simply requesting an award of attorney's fees and costs. The Appellant's Brief 
Is incorporated herein by reference. The Supreme Court of Idaho has held that: 
"a party must make argument in the argument section of Its 
brief to receive attorney's fees on appeal. I.A.R. 35(a)(6). 
[The Supreme Court] has held that when attorney's fees are 
requested, but are not discussed in the argument portion of 
the brief, the request will not be considered." 
Bouten Constr. Co. v. H.F. Magnuson Co., 133 Idaho 756,768,992 P.2d 751, 763 (1999) 
(citing, W9aver v. Searle Bros., 131 Idaho 610, 616, 962 P.2d 381 , 387 (1998)). The 
Appellant's issues on appeal do not state a request for attorney's fees in the argument 
portion of Appellant's Brief and no basis for the claim is argued. Because Appellant did 
not argue attorney's fees in his opening brief, the Appellant's Memorandum of Fees and 
Costs pursuant to I.A.R. 40(a) as it relates to attorney's fees should not be considered. 
4. MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S OBJECTION 
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2.2. I.A.R. 40(a) requires an Independent basis for awarding costs. 
Appellant provides no basis for an award of fees or costs. The right to recover 
costs is statutory and no cost can be granted unless provided for by law or order of the 
Court. Idaho Power Co. v. Idaho Public Utilities Commission, 102 Idaho 744, 750, 639 
P.2d 442,448 (1981), see also, Agrodyne, Inc. v. Beard, 114 Idaho 342,348, 757 P.2d 
205, 211 (Ct. App. 1988) (Pet. Rehearing denied). The Appellant states he was the 
prevailing party and relies solely on I.AR. 40 and I.R.C.P. 54(e), neither of which provide 
for his fees and costs. 
Appellant submitted his Memorandum of Fees and Costs pursuant to I.A.R. 40(a), 
including attorney fees. I.A.R. 40(a) states that "[c]osts shall be allowed as a matter of 
course to the prevatling party unless otherwise provided by law or order of the Court." 
I.A.R. 40(a). I.AR. 40(a) provides for the awarding of costs on appeal and I.A.R. 41 
specifies the procedure for requesting an award of attorney's fees on appeal, but neither 
provide the authority for such an award. Edwards v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., 
154 Idaho 511, 520, 300 P.3d 43, 52 (2013); (citing, Gilman v. Davis, 138 Idaho 599,603, 
67 P.3d 78, 82 (2003) (declining to address the issue of attorney fees)); see also, Camp 
v. East Fork Ditch Co. Ltd., 137 Idaho 850, 55 P.3d 304 (2002). An authority must be 
cited or proved to the Court in order to receive such an award. Appellant has not met the 
requirements of I.A.R. 40(a). 
Idaho courts require a party requesting fees to submit the statutory basis for 
requesting fees. Capstar Redio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 153 Idaho 411, 425 (2012); 
see also, Michalk v. Michalk, 148 Idaho 224, 235, 220 P .3d 580, 591 (2009). Moreover, 
a party waives his issues and arguments on appeal when the request is not supported by 
5. MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S OBJECTION 
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legal authority or the record. Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 375 P.3d 282, 
297 (2016); Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010). Appellant 
has waived his right to request fees and costs because he did not argue It In his brief, nor 
did he do so on the record . 
In this matter, no order for attorney's fees was issued by this Court. Without 
reference to a separate statutory provision or order providing for fees and costs, the 
Appellant's fees and costs may not be awarded. 
2.3. Appellant does not meet the requirements for awarding attorney's fees 
under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) or (2). 
Appellant's attorney's fees may not be awarded pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(e) because 
he is not entitled by contract, statute, or based upon a frivolous or unreasonable defense. 
Appellant relies upon IRCP 54(e) as the basis for the award, but the Rule itself requires 
a contractual, statutory basis, or showing that the appeal was defended frivolously, 
unreasonably, or without foundation. Appellant cannot meet any of the three additional 
requirements. 
I.R.C.P. 54(e) states, in pertinent part: 
"[l]n any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney 
fees, including paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or parties as 
defined in Rule 54(d)(1)(B), when provided for by any statute or 
contract...Attomey's fees under Idaho Code Section 12-121 may be 
awarded by the court only when it finds that the case was brought, 
pursued or defended frlvolously, unreasonably or without 
foundation, which finding must be in writing and include the basis and 
reasons for the award. No attorney's fees may be awarded pursuant to 
Idaho Code Section 12-121 on a default judgment." 
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) and (2) (emphasis added). 
6. MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S OBJECTION 
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Appellant is not entitled to attorney's fees because does not meet the requirements 
of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1 ). First, Appellant cannot rely upon the existence of a contract as the 
basis for attorney fees. The existence of a contract in this matter is in dispute and 
unresolved by the Magistrate court. Further, the documents submitted by the Appellant 
in support of the existence of a contract contain no language allowing for an award of 
attorney fees. Second, the Appellant has failed to provide any applicable statutory 
authority for awarding attorney fees. Thus, Appellant fails to fulfill the requirements laid 
forth in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) and must rely solely on I.R.C.P 54(e)(2). 
To succeed on his request for attorney's fees under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(2} and pursuant 
to I.C. 12-1 21 , the Appellant must be the prevailing party as well as demonstrate to this 
court that Respondent's defense was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. 
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(2). By statute, this Court has discretion, "in any civil action, [to] award 
reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party .. . " I.C. 12-121. However, under this 
section, an award of _attorney's fees is only appropriate where the court has "the abiding 
belief that the appeal was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or 
without foundation. Wagner v. Wagner, 160 Idaho 294, 371 P.3d 807 (2016) (citing 
Minich v. Gem State Developers Inc., 99 Idaho 911, 918, 591 P.2d 1078, 1085 (1979)). 
"Such circumstances exist when an appellant has only asked the appellate court to 
second-guess the trial court by reweighing the evidence or has failed to show that the 
district court incorrectly applied well-established law." Snider v. Arnold, 153 Idaho 641, 
645-46, 289 P.3d 43, 47-48 (2012). 
In the matter of the appeal, the Respondent reasonably defended the appeal. This 
Court acknowledged in its Opinion that Respondent's position as to the first issue was 
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grounded in established Idaho Appellate case law, which Appellant failed to cite or 
distinguish. The second Issue, by contrast, is one of first impression for the Court. 
Respondent is then reasonable In bringing a defense a,:td attorney's fees may not be 
awarded to Appellant under Idaho Civil Rule 54(e)(2). 
2.4. Appellant Is not entitled to the fees and costs requested because he 
is not the prevailing party as to all issues. 
If this court should find that Appellant is entitled to fees and cost, the award must 
be apportioned. A party is entitled to only those fees and costs related to issues on which 
he prevails. I.AR. 40(a); I.R.C.P. 54(e); see a/so, BBale v. Speck, 127 Idaho 521,903 
P .2d 110 (Ct. App. 1995). Additionally, under I.R.C.P. 54, even if the Appellant is entitled 
to attomey's fees, he Is entitled only to those attorney's fees as to the claims upon which 
he prevailed. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1 )(B); sea also, Ramco v. H-K Contractors, 118 Idaho 108, 
113, 794 P.2d 1381, 1386 (1990). Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure address apportionment 
of costs a party prevails In part, stating: 
"The trial court may determine that a party to an action 
prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and on so finding 
may apportion the costs between and among the parties in a 
fair and equitable manner after considering all of the issues 
and claims involved in the action and the resulting judgment 
or judgments obtained." 
I.R.C.P 54(d)(1 )(B). The court has a duty to apportion to each party only the attorney's 
fees related to the claims upon which the party prevailed under section I.R.C.P. 54. 
Schroeder v. Partin, 151 Idaho 471 , 478-79, 259 P.3d 617, 624-25 (2011). 
Notwithstanding the fact that this Court reversed the Magistrate's decision that 
Heinz's claim against Hedy's estate is barred by I.C. § 15-3-803 and that the estate was 
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entitled to summary judgment on that basis, the Appellant is not entitled to his full fees 
and costs. By reversing the Magistrate's decision, this matter is not final. and it is not 
certain whether appellant will be the prevailing party on that Issue. 
3. Appellant's costs are unreasonable. 
Appellant's costs are unreasonable because they are excessive. The costs 
referenced are the Cost for Production of Appellant's Brief, Reply Brief, and Brief re: 
Jurisdiction. The cost for production of Appellant's three briefs totals two hundred and 
forty six dollars ($246.00) for forty one (41) pages at six dollars ($6.00) per page. There 
is no explanation or support for such cost as opposed to the cost of production with a 
standard office copy machine. Appellant's cost for production is unreasonable and should 
be disallowed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant failed follow the procedure for requesting fees 
and costs or to provide an adequate basis upon which Appellant's fees and costs may be 
granted. Therefore, Petitioner Jadwiga Kinast respectfully requests this Court GRANT 
her Motion to Disallow and Objection to Attorney's Fees and Costs. 
DATED the 2JJ"-day of December, 2016. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the lflv/. day of December 2016, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S 
OBJECTION TO APPELLANT'S MEMORANDUM OF FEES AND COSTS PURSUANT 
TO I.AR. 40 AND MOTION TO DISALLOW was mailed via Regular U.S. Mall or faxed 
to: 
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON 
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD. 
113 S. Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
(208) 263-0400 - FAX 
HONORABLE JUDGE JOHN STEGNER 
LATAH COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
PO Box 8068 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 883-2259 - FAX 
L/JLQ 
LEEANN M. ST. CLAIR ( 
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FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD. 
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON, ISB No. 4602 
Attorney at Law 
113 South Second Avent\e 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
(208) 263~6866 
(208) 263-0400 (Fax) 
brent@featherstonlaw.com 
Attorney for Appellant, Heinz Alt 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE Fil{ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and 












MEMORANDUM OF FEES 
AND COSTS 
COMES NOW the undersigned counsel for and on behalf of the Appellant, Heinz 
Alt, and hereby submits Appellant's Reply to Respondent's Objection to Memorandum of 
Fees and Costs as follows: 
The matter of fees was addressed by the Court' s Order Denying Appellant's 
Request for Attomey's Fees on Appeal issued December 22, 2016, received in this office 
December 27th• The remaining issue of costs pursuant to I.A.R. 40(d) was left open by the 
Court's Order. The Court's Order indicates that the Court had not received Respondent's 
Objection at the time of the Order's issuance. 
The time for Respondent's Objections has now passed, that deadline being 
December 28, 2016, fourteen (14) days following the filing of Appellant's Memorandum 
of Fees and Costs pursuant to I.A.R. 40. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S OBJECTION 
TO MEMORANOUM OF FEES AND COSTS· J 
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The Respondent objects that Appellant's costs are .unreasonable or excessive and 
Respondent's assertion that ''there-.i~ no explanation or support" for a $6.00 per page cost 
for production of briefs. I.AR. 40(b) provides that costs shall include the following items: 
1. F_i)ing Fee .. . : 
2. Costs of Reporter's Transcript 
3. Costs of Clerk's or_Agency's .Record 
4. Costs for the production of Appellant's briefs, Respondent's briefs, reply 
brief and briefs in support of Ol' in opposition to Petitions for Rehearing or Review 
including covers, but excluding appendixes at the rate of $6.00 per page. LA.R. 40(b) 
Appellant's Memorandum of Costs itemizes exactly those costs recoverable under 
I.A.R. 40 and also attaches and incorporates a slip list itemizing the Boundary County 
Clerk Appellant's filing fee and estimated transcript costs. 
Appellant is entitled to $447.25 as costs as a matter ofright. 
There is no basis for Respondent's assertion that Appellant did not prevail and is 
not entitled to costs on appeal. The Court's Memorandum of Decision on Appeal makes 
clear that the Appellant did prevail on one (1) of the two (2) alternative issues on appeal. 
Prevailing on either issue results in the Appellant prevailing on the underlying issue. 
Appellant appealed the Trial Court's ruling that the disallowance of their creditor's claim 
was untimely, but also appealed the Court~s ruling on Summary Judgment that the 
creditor's claim was barred as to the Estate of Hedwig "Hedy" Melton. Appellant 
prevailed on the latter issue and is therefore the prevailing party on appeal and entitled to 
his costs as a matter of 1ight in the amount of $44 7 .25. 
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_· ) . . · . 
DATED this X day of Jamiary, 2017 . 
. BRENT C. FEATHERSTON 
Attorney for Appellant Alt 
CERTIFIC1 TE OF MAILING 
· 1 Jlt?( 
I hereby certify that on the _,.Jc.,___ ·ctay of January, 2017, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following 
manner: 
Ho11. John R Stegner 
Second Judicial Distdct Judge 
P.O. Box 8068 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Mary W. Cusack, Esq. 
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC 
610 W. Hubbard, Suite 205 
Coe\u· d'Alene, ID 83 814 
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U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Overnight Maii 
Hand delivered 
Facsimile No. (208) 883-5719 
Courthouse Mail 
Other: _ _______ _ 
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Overnight Mail 
Hand delivefed 
Facsimile No. (208) 667-0708 
Other: ---------
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Mary W. Cusack ISB# 5332 
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC 
320 E. Neider Avenue, Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83815 
(208) 667-0640 
(208) 667-0708 - FAX 
mary@mcusacklaw.com 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of the Estate of: 
ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON and 
HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON, 
Deceased . 
) 
) CASE NO. CV 13 - 0313 
) 
) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
) 
) Idaho Appellate Rule 17 ______________ ) 
JADWIGA MEL TON'S NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho in and for the County of Boundary 
Mary W . Cusack ISB# 5332 
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC 
320 E. Neider Avenue, Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83815 
(208) 667-0640 
(208) 667-0708 - FAX 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Brent C. Featherston ISB #4602 
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, Chtd 
113 South Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
(208) 263-6866 
(208) 266-0400 - FAX 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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TO: ALT HEINZ, AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY, BRENT C. FEATHERSTON OF 
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD, 113 SOUTH SECOND AVENUE, SANDPOINT, 
IDAHO 83864 , AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The appellant, JADWIGA B. MELTON, the Personal Representative of the 
above captioned estate, by and through her attorney of record , MARY W. CUSACK, of 
Cusack Law Firm, PLLC, appeals against the above named Respondents to the Idaho 
Supreme Court from the Opinion on Appeal , entered in the above entitled action, entered 
on the 30th day of November, 2016, Honorable John R. Stegner presiding . A copy of the 
opinion being appealed is attached to this notice as well as a copy of the final judgment 
as this is an appeal from an Order entered after final judgment. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
opinion described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable decision under and pursuant to 
Idaho Appellate Rule 11 (a)(2) and (b) . 
o This is an EXPEDITED APPEAL pursuant to I.AR. 12.2. 
3. Appellant provides the following preliminary statement of the issue on 
appeal, which the appellant then intends to assert in the appeal. This preliminary 
statement, however, provides only a preliminary issue and shall in no way prevent the 
Appellant from asserting other issues on appeal. The preliminary issue on appeal is: 
a. Did the district court err in reversing the Magistrate Judge's decision 
that Heinz's claim against Hedy's estate is barred by Idaho Code § 15-3-803? 
4. Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? No. 
2. NOTICE OF APPEAL 
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5. a. Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes 
b. The Appellant requests the reporter's standard transcript as defined 
in Rule 25(c), I.AR. , including preparation of the following portions of the reporter's 
transcript in [ ] hard copy [X] electronic format [ ] both (check one) : 
i. Oral argument on appeal by the parties heard October 7, 2016. 
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the Clerk's 
Record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.AR. : All pleadings 
filed in this case on or after April 1, 2015. 
7. No additional charts or pictures offered or admitted as exhibits are 
requested in this Appeal. 
8. I certify the following: 
a. That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter 
of whom a transcript has been requested , as named below at the 
address set out below: 
1. Name and Address: Sheryl Engler; P.O. Box 6068, Moscow, Idaho 
83843; 
b. That the clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the reporter's transcript; 
c. That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been 
paid ; 
d. That the appellate filing fee has been paid; and 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 20. 
3. NOTICE OF APPEAL 
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DATED this qVI\ day of January, 2017. 
ACK, 
Attorney for DWIGA MEL TON 
Personal Representative, Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the q~day of January, 2017, I caused a true and accurate 
copy of the foregoing document to be served by the method and to the addresses 
indicated below: 
Brent C. Featherston 
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd. 
113 S. Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
(208) 263-0400 - FAX 
brent@featherstonlaw.com 
Sheryl Engler 
Latah County District Court 
PO Box 6069 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(208)883-2559 - FAX 
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Sent via e-mail and U.S. Mail: 
Sent via fax 
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( 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and 
HEDWIG "HEDY'' MELTON, 
Deceased, 
) 
) Case No. CV-2013-313 
) 
) 
) OPINION ON APPEAL 
) 
) ________________ _ ) 
This is an appeal brought by Heinz Alt ("Heinz"), the Appellant, in which he 
challenges the Magistrate Judge's decision granting partial summary judgment in 
favor of Jadwiga Melton, the personal representative of the Estate of Robert Ernest 
Melton and Hedwig "Hedy" Melton. The Magistrate Judge held that the personal 
representative's rejection of Heinz's claim was timely and that because Heinz failed 
to bring a claim against the estate of his mother, Hedwig Melton ("Hedy"), within 
three years of her death, summary judgment was appropriate. 
BACKGROUND 
Heinz is the biological son of Hedy and the stepson of her deceased husband, 
Robert Ernest Melton ("Robert"). Appellant's Br., p. 1. Heinz alleges that he loaned 
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money to his mother and step-father to enable them to purchase land and build a 
log home in Boundary County. Id. at 2. At some point, the property was deeded to 
Heinz. Id.; see also Gift Deed (Ex. B attached to the Aff. of Mary W. Cusack). Heinz 
alleges that the property was deeded to him as security for the money he loaned to 
his mother and step-father. Appellant's Br., p. 2. Subsequently, Heinz claims Hedy 
and Robert executed wills in which they bequeathed all of their respective property 
to him. Id. Following the signing of the wills by Hedy and Robert, Heinz and his 
wife deeded the property back to Hedy and Robert.1 Id. 
Hedy died on August 11, 2008. Id. At the time of her death, Hedy had a will 
directing that all of her property would pass to Robert, and, in the event that Robert 
preceded her in death, to Heinz. Last Will and Testament of Hedwig "Hedy" Melton 
(Ex. G attached to the Aff. of Counsel (Brent C. Featherston)). Hedy's will was 
never probated. Appellant's Br., p. 2: 
In 2010, Robert married Jadwiga Melton ("Jadwiga"). Id. Robert died on July 
4, 2013. Id. At the time of his death, Robert had a new will directing that all of his 
property would pass to Jadwiga. Last Will and Testament of Robert Melton (Ex. B 
attached to the Aff. of Counsel (Brent C. Featherston)). Robert executed the new 
will in December of 2010 after marrying Jadwiga. Id. Prior to December 2010, 
1 The timeline of events regarcling when the property was deeded to Heinz, when the Meltons executed 
their wills, and when Heinz deeded the property back to the Meltons are disputed facts. In the 
Appellant's Brief, Heinz claims that "[t]he property was initially titled to [me] and fmy] wife as 
acknowledgment or security of the loan. Subsequently, the Mel tons executed Wills leaving all of their 
estates to [meJ. The real prope1-ty was deeded back to Meltons." Appellant's Br., p. 2. However, the 
personal representative claims that the property was originally titled to Hedy and Robert, and was I).Ot 
titled to Heinz until July 16, 1999, after the Meltons' wills were executed. Resp't's Br., p. 6; Aff. of Mary 
W. Cusack. 
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Robert's will mirrored Hedy's will in that if he preceded her in death, all of his 
property would pass to her, and, if she preceded him in death, all of his property 
would pass to Heinz. Last Will and Testament of Robert Ernest Melton (Ex. F 
attached to the Aff. of Counsel (Brent C. Featherston)). 
On August 29, 2013, Jadwiga filed a Petition for -Summary Administration of 
Robert's estate pursuant to LC.§ 15-3-1205. The only assets of the estate are the 
land and home located in Bonners Ferry, Idaho. Heinz maintains that Hedy and 
Robert purchased the land and constructed the home with money he loaned to 
them. On August 30, 2013, a Decree Vesting Estate in Surviving Spouse was 
entered. 
On September 6, 2013, Heinz filed a Motion to Convert Proceedings to 
Supervised Administration and to Determine Testacy based on his claim that he is 
entitled to repayment of the money he loaned Hedy and Robert to purchase the real 
property and construct the home at issue. On October 21, 2013, an Order Setting 
Aside the Decree Vesting Estate in Surviving Spouse was entered. On December 9, 
2014, Jadwiga filed a Petition for Formal Probate of Will and Formal Appointment 
of Personal Representative. Because Hedy's will was never probated, Jadwiga 
requested that the estates of both Hedy and Robert be joined for probate in one 
proceeding. This was done pursuant to LC. § 15-3-111. 
On January 13, 2015, Heinz filed a claim for $102,574.50 against the estate 
based on LC. § 15-3-804. Heinz submitted several documents to support his claim. 
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9'n February 2, 2015, Jadwiga was appointed the personal representative of 
the estate of Robert and Hedy Melton. On February 9, 2015, Jadwiga filed a Notice 
to Creditors with the Court. The notice was first published in the Bonners Ferry 
Herald on February 19, 2015. On March 13, 2015, Jadwiga mailed a Notice- of 
Disallowance of Claim to Heinz's attorney. The Notice of Disallowance was filed 
with the Court on March 17, 2015. In that notice, Heinz was informed that his 
claim was being disallowed for the following reasons: (1) the claim was untimely 
because Heinz failed to bring it within three years of Hedy's death, (2) Heinz failed 
to provide documentation that Robert owed a debt to him, and (3) Hedy's signature 
on some of the documents submitted by Heinz had not been authenticated. Notice of 
Disallowance of Claim, p. 1-2. On May 4, 2015, Heinz filed a Petition to Allow 
Claims. 
On June 29, 2015, Jadwiga filed a Motion fo1· Summary Judgment to Deny 
Creditor Claim. A hearing was held on August 24, 2015. On October 8, 2015, 
Magistrate Judge Justin W. Julian issued his Memorandum Opinion granting 
Jadwiga's Motion for Summary Judgment in part. Specifically, Judge Julian 
concluded that Jadwiga's disallowance of Heinz's creditor claim was timely, and 
that Heinz's claim against Hedy's estate is barred by LC. § 15-3-803 because Heinz 
failed to bring his claim within.three years of Hedy's death. Mem. Op., p. 4-7. The 
Magistrate Judge expressly stated that "Heinz may still proceed with his claim 
against Robert's estate." Id. at 7. On December 3, 2015, the Magistrate Judge 
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entered·a Judgment on the above two issues and certified it as a final judgment 
pursuant to Rule 54(b), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.2 
On January 13, 2016, Heinz filed a Notice of Appeal. An Amended Notice of 
Appeal was later filed on March 2, 2016, and Appellant's Statement of Issues on 
Appeal was filed May 4, 2016. Heinz identifies the following issues on appeal: 
1. Did the trial court err in granting partial summary judgment 
determining that the Appellant's claim was timely disallowed by the 
Personal Representative? 
2. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment that 
Appellant's Creditor's Claim is time barred as against the Estate of 
Hedwig Melton? 
3. Did the trial court err as a matter of law holding that Idaho Code§ 
15-3-111 does not toll or extends (sic) the time within which 
Appellant's Creditor's Claim may be asserted against the joint estate 
of Robert and Hedwig Melton? · 
4. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in granting summary 
judgment based upon Idaho Code § 15-3-803(a) holding that all 
claims are barred against Hedwig Melton's estate when that state 
[sic] is filed for probate after the three (3) year period as a joint 
estate permitted by Idaho Code§ 15-3-111? 
Appellant's Statement of Issues on Appeal, p. 1-2. 
Oral argument was heard by this Court on October 7, 2016. Brent 
Featherston appeared by telephone and argued on behalf of Heinz. Mai·y Cusack . 
also appeared by telephone and argued on behalf of Jadwiga. The case is now ready 
for a decision to be issued. 
2 Because the Magistrate Judge concluded that Heinz could still pursue his claim against Robert's estate, 
this Court questioned whether the Magistrate's decision could be appealed even with a Rule 54(b) 
certification. Briefing on the issue of jurisdiction was requested. Counsel for both Heinz and Jadwiga 
argued that this Court had jurisdiction on two independent bases. First, because of IC. § 17-201 which 
states an appeal may be brought from a "judgment, or order of the magistrates division of the district 
court in probate matters: .. . 7. Refusing, allowing or directing the .. . payment of a debt, claim, legacy or 
distributive share." And second because Rule 54(b) allows for an appeal to be brought under the 
following circumstances: "When an action presents more than one claim for relief . . . or when multiple 
parties are involved." It appears that jurisdiction is arguably afforded under the statute and Rule, 
therefore, this Court concludes that it has jurisdiction to proceed. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When an appellate court reviews a trial court's decision on summary 
judgment, it employs the same standard as that properly employed by the trial 
court when originally ruling on the motion. Montgomery v. Montgomery, 147 Idaho 
1, 5, 205 P.3d 650, 654 (2009). 
"Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, affidavits, and discovery 
documents on file with the court, read in a light most favorable to the non-moving 
party, demonstrate no material issue of fact such that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter oflaw." Harwood v. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672, 677, 39 P.3d 
612, 617 (2001) (citations omitted); Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c) (2015). "A material fact is 
one upon which the outcome of the case may be different." Peterson v. Romine, 131 
Idaho 537, 540, 960 P.2d 1266, 1269 (1998) (citation omitted) . "If the evidence is 
conflicting on material issues, or if reasonable minds could reach different 
conclusions, summary judgment is not appropriate." Id. "The burden of proving the 
absence of material facts is upon the moving party." Harwood, 136 Idahq at 677, 39 
P.3d at 617 (citations omitted). However, when a motion·for summary judgment is 
supported by affidavits, "an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations 
or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial." Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(e) (2015). 
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An appellate court "exercises free review over questions of law and matters of 
statutory interpretation." Guzman v. Piercy, 155 Idaho 928, 934, 318 P.3d 918, 924 
(2014) (citations omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
I. Did the trial court err in determining that Heinz's claim was 
disallowed in a timely way by Jadwiga? 
Heinz mailed his Claim Against Estate to Jadwiga's attorney on January 9, 
2015, and filed his claim with the Court on January 13, 2015. Appellant's Br., p. 6. 
On February 2, 2015, Jadwiga was appointed personal representative of the estate. 
Letters Testamentary, p. 1. On February 9, 2015, Jadwiga filed her Notice to 
Creditors with the Court and on February 19, 2015, the notice was ffrst published 
in the Bonners Ferry Herald (with the last publication on March 5, 2015). Notice to 
Ci-editors; Aff. of Publication. On March 13, 2015, Jadwiga mailed a Notice of 
Disallowance of Claim to Heinz's attorney. Appellant's Br., p. 3. That Notice of 
Disallowance was filed with the Court on March 17, 2015. On these facts, Judge 
Julian concluded that Jadwiga's Disallowance of the claim had been timely filed. 
Mem. Op., p . 5. Heinz appeals from this adverse determination. Heinz contends 
that because the disallowance was untimely, the claim should have been allowed. 
Appellant's Br., p . 7. 
Heinz argues that Jadwiga did not disallow his claim within the statutory 
sixty day time period set forth in LC.§ 15-3-806(a). Id. at 5- 7. Heinz wrote the 
following in support of his argument: 
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Measuring the time from January 9th [the date Heinz mailed 
his claim to Jadwiga's attorney], and permitting three (3) day mail rule 
for service on the Estate of the Claim, the Estate's clock for 
disallowance purposes began on January 12th. (Applying a filing date 
of January 13, 2015, one (1) day later, does not change the outcome.) 
The Estate did not disallow Mr. Alt's Claim until it mailed a 
Disallowance on March 13th. Again, applying a three (3) day mail rule 
provided for in LR.C.P. Rule 6(e)(l), the Estate's Disallowance was not 
served upon counsel for Alt untii March 16th, sixty-t_hree (63) days 
after service of the Claim. (Sixty-two [62] days after court filing of the 
Claim.) 
Mr. Alt's Creditor's Claim was timely filed, but was not timely 
disallowed. Under LC. § 15-3-806(a), failure of the Estate to disallow 
the Claim has the effect of deeming the Claim allowed. This result 
renders the Estate's Motion for Summary Judgment moot. 
Appellant's Br., p . 6. 
Heinz's argument is predicated on his claim that a personal representative 
must disallow a creditor's claim within sixty days of its presentation. Id. at 6-7. 
Heinz relies on LC.§ 15-3-806(a), which states: "Failure of t4e personal 
representative to mail notice to a claimant of action on his claim for sixty (60) days 
after the time for original presentation of the claim has expired has the effect of a 
notice of allowance." Heinz argues "[t]he use of 'the' [before claim] in the sentence 
makes clear that this provision is specific to the specific creditor's claim, not a · 
general four (4) month provision applicable to 'any' or 'all' claims." Appellant's Br., 
p. 7. 
In granting Jadwiga's Mot~on for Summary Judgment on this issue, the 
Magistrate Judge wrote the following: 
While it is true that the local practice has been to disallow a claim 
against the estate within 60 days, ... it is clear from a close reading of 
the statute that the 60 day time limit for denial of a claim does not 
accrue upon its filing, but rather upon expiration of "the time for 
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original presentation of the claim." ... "[T]he time for," which precedes 
and modifies the reference to "the" claim, means that the estate's duty 
to disallow begins running after expiration of the deadline for 
presenting the claim. If the legislature intended to craft the statute as 
Heinz urges, it would simply read" ... 60 days after presentation of the 
claim ... ", without any need for reference to "the time for original 
presentation" having expired. 
Mem. Op., p. 4-5. Judge Julian concluded that the "disallowance was clearly 
timely." Id. at 5. 
The Magistrate Judge's finding that the "disallowance was clearly timely" 
will be affirmed for two reasons. 
First, the plain language of I.C. § 15-3-806(a) makes clear that the personal 
representative has sixty days after the time for the original presentation of the 
l 
claim has expired to mail a notice of disallowance to a claimant. 
The objective of statutory interpretation is to derive the intent of the 
legislative body that adopted the act. Statutory interpretation begins 
with the literal language of the statute. Provisions should not be read 
in isolation, but must be interpreted in the context of the entire 
document. The statute should be considered as a whole, and words 
should be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings. It should be 
noted that the Court must give effect to all the words and provisions of 
the statute so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant. When 
the statutory language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of 
the legislative body m-qst be given effect, and the Court need not 
consider rules of statutory construction. 
State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866, 264 P.3d 970, 973 (2011) (quoting Farber v. 
Idaho State Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho 307, 310, 208 P.3d 289, 292 (2009) (italics added). 
If Heinz's interpretation were to be employed, the words "the time for 
original" and "has expired" found in I. C. § 15-3-806(a) would be rendered 
superfluous. If the legislature intended the statute to require a personal 
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representative to deny a creditor's claim with sixty days of its presentation, the 
statute could simply read: "Failure of the personal representative to mail notice to 
a claimant of action on his claim for sixty (60) days after presentation of the claim 
has the effect of a notice of allowance;" Instead, the legislature added the verbiage 
"the time for original" and "has expired." Consequently, those words must be given 
effect so that they are not rendered superfluous. 
This interpretation is consistent with Idaho Court of Appeals case law. In 
the case In re Estate of Boyd the Court of Appeals wrote the following in 
determining when interest on a creditor's claim would begin to accrue: 
John filed his notice to creditors in compliance with LC. 15-3-801 on 
August 5, 1994, thus starting the four-month period for creditors to file 
their claims. LC. § 15-3-803. Idaho Code § 15-3-806(d) provides that 
"allowed claims bear interest at the legal rate for the period 
commencing sixty (60) days after the time for original presentation of 
the claim has expired." Therefore, the interest on BMH's claim could 
not begin to accumulate until six months after John first published his 
notice to creditors. 
In re Estate of Boyd, 134 Idaho 669, 674-75, 8 P.3d 664, 669-70 (Ct. App. 2000) 
(italics added). Section (d) of LC. § 15-3-806, the provision interpreted by the Court 
of Appeals in In re Estate of Boyd, contains language identical to that found in 
section (a). Section (d) states: "Unless otherwise provided in any judgment in 
another court entered against the personal representative, allowed claims bear 
interest at the legal rate for the period commencing sixty (60) days after the time for 
original presentation of the claim has expired . ... " I .C. § 15-3-806(d) (italics added). 
Based on this statutory language, the Court of Appeals concluded that interest on a 
creditor's claim (filed on August 8, 1994) could.not begin to accumulate until six 
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months after the first notice to creditor's was published on August 5, 1994. 3 In re 
Estate of Boyd, 134 Idaho at 675, 8 P.3d at 670. This interpretation is consistent 
with the Magistrate Judge's holding that "the 60 day time limit for denial of a claim 
does not accrue upon its filing, but rather _upon expiration of 'the time for original 
presentation of the claim."' Mem. Op., p. 4. 
Heinz had to present his claim within four months of the date of the first 
publication of notice to creditors or within sixty days after the notice was mailed or 
delivered to him.4 I.C. § 15-3-803(a); I.C. § 15-3-801(a) & (b). The first publication 
of the notice occurred on February 19, 2015. Heinz therefore had until June 19, 
2015, to present his claim. The estate then had sixty days after -the time for original 
presentation of the claim had expired (i.e., sixty days after June 19, 2015) to mail a 
notice of disallowance. LC.§ 15-3-806(a). Because the Notice of Disallowance of 
Claim was mailed to Heinz's attorney on March 13, 2015, it was timely. 
Second, even assuming, for the sake of argument, that Heinz's interpretation 
is correct, Jadwiga did, in fact, mail a timely notice to Heinz that his claim had been 
disallowed. Heinz's claim was deemed presented on January 13, 2015, the day he 
3 Although not at issue in the case, the timeline analyzed in Boyd strongly suggests that Heinz's 
interpretation of the 60 day time period is incorrect. In Boyd, the personal representative first published 
notice to creditors on August 5, 1994. On August 8, 1994, the creditor filed its claim. Notice of 
disallowance of the claim was not filed until January 25, 1995, some 170 days after the creditor's claim 
was filed. However, the disallowance was filed within 60 days after the time for original presentation of 
the claim had expired (i.e., 173 days, or within 60 days after the four month period for presentation of 
creditors' claims had expired). · 
4 It is unclear from the record whether notice was mailed or delivered to Heinz. (There is not a certificate 
of service attached to the Notice to Creditors filed with the Court on February 9, 2015.) However, even 
assuming that Notice was mailed to Heinz at the beg.inning of February, the Estate's disallowance oflris 
claim was nonetheless timely. Heinz would have been allowed to present his claim within 60 days of the 
Notice, giving him until the beg.inning of April, and the estate would have been afforded an additional 60 
days after the time for presentation of the claim had expired to disallow the claim (i.e., the beginning of 
June). 
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filed it with the Court. LC. § 15-3-804(a) (A "claim is deemed presented on the last 
to occur of: (1) delivery or mailing of the written statement of claim to the personal 
representative; or, (2) the filing of the claim with the court."). On March 13, 2015, 
fifty-nine days after Heinz's claim was deemed presented, Jadwiga mailed a Notice 
ofDisallowance of Claim to Heinz's attorney. Appellant's Br., p. 6. Pursuant to the 
plain language of I. C. § 15-3-806(a) a personal representative does not have to 
serve, but rather need only mail, a disallowance within sixty days after the time for 
original presentation of the claim has expired. LC.§ 15-3-806(a) ("Failure of the 
personal representative to mail notice to a claimant of action on his claim for sixty 
(60) days after the time for original presentation of the claim has expired has the 
effect of a notice of allowance."). 
Consequently, Heinz's assertion that the disallowance was untimely because 
it was not served upon counsel until March 16, 2016, is unpersuasive. Had the 
legislature intended. that service must be complete within sixty days after the time 
for original presentation of the claim, the term "serve" could have easily been used 
in place of the term "mail" in LC. § 15-3-806(a). 
The Magistrate Judge correctly determined that Heinz's claim was timely 
disallowed by Jadwiga. Summary judgme.nt was appropriately granted on this · 
issue because there is not a genuine issue of material fact and the estate was 
entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw. The Magistrate Judge's decision on this 
issue will therefore be affii·med. 
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( 
II. Did the trial court err in determining that Heinz's claim against 
Hedy's estate is barred by I.C. § 15-3-803 because he failed to bring 
his claim within three years of her death? 
LC. § 15-3-803(a) provides in relevant part that: 
All claims against a decedent's estate which arose before the death of 
the decedent, . .. whether due or to become due, absolute or 
contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or 
other legal basis, if not barred earlier by another statute of limitations 
or nonclaim statute, are barred against the estate, the personal 
representative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent, unless 
presented within the earlier of the following dates: 
(1) three (3) years after the decedent's death; or 
(2) within the time provided in section 15-3-B0l(b), Idaho Code, for 
creditors who are given actual notice, and within the time provided in 
section 15-3-B0I(a), Idaho Code, for all creditors barred by publication. 
The three year limitation for creditors in LC. § 15-3-803(a)(l) parallels the general 
time limit for probating an estate. LC. § 15-3-108 states: "No formal probate or 
appointment proceeding or formal testacy or appointment proceeding . . . may be 
commenced more than three (3) years after the decedent's death." 
Although the general rule requires a probate action to be commenced within 
three years of an individual's death, there are two exceptions to the rule. First, 
pursuant to LC. § 15-3-1205, upon the death of a person leaving a surviving spouse 
as the sole devisee or beneficiary, the surviving spouse (or any person claiming title 
to any property through or under such surviving spouse) may file a petition for a 
decree vesting the property in the surviving spouse, or_ other claimant, with the 
condition that the surviving spouse (or person claiming entitlement through the 
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surviving spouse) assume and be liable for any and all indebtedness that might be 
claimed against the estate of the decedent.5 
Second, pursuant to LC. § 15-3-111, a joint probate may be commenced to 
administer the estates of two deceased spouses. That provision reads: 
In cases in which a marital community has been dissolved by the death 
of either spouse at any time, the sU1·vivor was then entitled to all of the 
property of the decedent by will, law, or both, and the survivor died 
before any proceeding had been commenced for the probate of the 
estate of the spouse whose death occurred first, the estates of both 
decedents may be joined for probate in a single proceeding in any court 
having jurisdiction of the estate of the spouse whose death occurred 
last. The three (3) year provision of section 15-3-108, Idaho Code, 
applies only to the death of the spouse whose death occurred last. The 
initial application or petition filed in any such joint proceeding shall 
contain a statement of the facts upon which such joint proceeding is 
based, in addition to all other statements required by this code to be 
made therein. 
LC. § 15-3-111. 
Heinz argues that LC. § 15-3-111 tolls the normal three year statute of 
limitations found in LC. § 15-3-803(a)(l) because it extends the three year statute of 
limitations for probating an estate found in LC.§ 15-3-108. Appellant's Br., p. 7, 11. 
Heinz contends that 
[i]f the legislature provided an exception to the thi·ee (3) year statute of 
limitations on probates for summary administrations and joint 
probates of husband and wife where the assets are community 
property, it is logical that the same extension of time must be applied 
to creditor's claims in those two (2) exceptions: summary 
administration and joint probate upon surviving spouse's death. The 
summary administration, by definition, would have passed the log 
s I.C. § 15-3-1205 does not state a time limit for the summary administration of estates in which a 
surviving spouse is the sole beneficiary, and there is no reference to I.C. § 15-3-108 within the provision. 
Therefore, it appears to be an exception to the general rule that a will must be probated within three years 
of the decedent's death since it is not a typical probate.proceeding. See l.C. § 15-3-1205 ("there will be no 
administration of the estate of the decedent.") . 
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home and property to Robert subject to Hedy's debts and liabilities, 
just as the joint probate requires administration and accounting of 
both decedents' debts and obligations to creditors. 
Id. at 9- 10. 
In rejecting to this argument when it was made previously, Judge Julian 
concluded that: 
There is nothing in [LC. § 15-3-111] that states or suggests any tolling 
of a creditor's deadline to present a claim, just because the estate is 
subsequently jointly probated. Indeed, this section specifically 
exempts the three (3) year limitation on probate following death of the 
first spouse, as found in section 108. That fact clearly demonstrates 
the legislature's ability and willingness to make special exceptions 
within [I.C. § 15-3-111] where wananted and intended. As there is no 
exception made to the three (3) year creditors' bar found in 15-3-803, 
one shall not be implied by the court. Heinz's claim against Hedy's 
estate was not filed or "presented" within three years of her death and 
is now barred by IC § 15-3-803(a)(l). 
Mero. Op., p. 7. 
I.C. § 15-3-111 was added to Idaho's probate statutes in 1973. In 1995 the 
statute was amended to add the following language: "The three (3) year provision of 
section 15-3-108, Idaho Code, applies only to the death of the spouse whose death 
occurred last." The statement of purpose reads as follows: 
This legislation amends existing Idaho Code Section 15-3-111 to clarify 
when a joint probate may be used at the second death of a husband 
and wife. Some courts have held that the three year limit on probates 
in Idaho Code Section 15-3-108 applies to the first death and therefore 
bars a joint probate unless both spouses died within three years of the 
time of commencement of the joint probate. This legislation makes the 
Code Section clearly state that only the second death need be within 
the time periods of Idaho Code Section 15-3-108. 
S.B. 1166, 1995 First Reg. Sess. of the 53rd Leg. (Id. 1995). 
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A basic tenet of statutory construction is that the more specific statute or 
section addressing an issue controls over the statute that is m9re general. Marshall 
v. Dept. of Transp., 137 Idaho 337, 341, 48 P.3d 666, 670 (Ct. App. 2002) (citation 
omitted). "[T]he more general statute should not be interpreted as encompassing an 
area already covered by one which is more specific." Id. (citation omitted). It is 
undisputed that I.C. § 15-3-111 extends the general three year timeframe in which 
to file a probate action. Consequently, in cases such as this one, I. C. § 15-3-111 is 
the specific statute, while LC. § 15-3-108 and I.C. § 15-3-803(a)(l) are general 
statutes. Because the three year provision of I.C. § 15-3-108 only applies to the 
death of the spouse whose death occurred last, it would follow that the three year 
timeframe set out in I.C. § 15-3-803(a)(l) would also only apply to the death of the 
spouse whose death occurred last in probate actions filed pursuant to I.C. § 15-3-
111. 
Additionally, interpreting LC. § 15-3-803(a)(l) as barring creditol'S' claims 
against the "estate of the spouse whose death occurred first" in probate actions 
commenced p--ursuant to LC. § 15-3-111 simply because the death occurred more 
than three years prior to the commencement of the probate action would produce an 
absurd result. This is.because LC.§ 15-3-111 expressly allows "the estates of both 
decedents [to] be joined f<?r probate in a single proceeding" within three years of the 
"death of the spouse whose death occurred last." If the statute of limitations for the 
first to die is not tolled, then in effect the only estate to probate is that of the second 
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to die. "Constructions of a statute that would lead to absurd or unreasonably harsh 
results are disfavored." State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 690, 85 P.3d 656, 666 (2004) . 
The Magistrate Judge therefore erred in determining that Heinz's claim 
against Hedy's estate is barred by LC. § 15-3-803 because he failed to bring his 
claim within three years of her death. Summary judgment was consequently 
inappropriately granted on this issue. The Magistrate Judge's decision on this issue 
will be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The Magistrate Judge's decision that Heinz's claim was timely disallowed by 
Jadwiga and that the estate was entitled to summary judgment on that issue is 
AFFIRMED. 
The Magistrate Judge's decision that Heinz's claim against Hedy's estate is 
barred by I.C. § 15-3-803 and that the estate was entitled to summary .judgment on 
that basis is REVERSED. This issue is REMANDED for further proceedings. 
f' 
Dated this 2.'f day of November 2016. 
District Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of the Estate of: 
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and 
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CASE NO. CV 13- 0313 
JUDGMENT 
I.R.C.P. 54(b) 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The Personal Representative's disallowance of Heinz Alt's claim, filed 
March 17, 2015, in the above referenced estate was timely filed . 
2. Heinz Alt's claim against the Estate of Hedwig "Hedy" Melton is barred 
pursuant to I.C. § 15-3-8~. ..~----····· ~ 
DATED this 5-· day of Dece/15. ( ,,.---;·---\ 
1 . MEL TON JUDGMENT 
(MWC00153249.DOCX;1/20397.100} 
~--rn:IP ~ · 
,\_USTI N _JlJ(IAN 
MAGHsTRATE 
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RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE 
With respect to the issues determined by the above Judgment or Order, it is hereby 
CERTIFIED, in accordance with Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P., that the Court has determined that 
there is no just reason for delay of the entry of a Final Judgment and that the Court has 
and does hereby direct that the above Judgment or Order shall be a Final Judgment upon 
which execution may issue and an appeal may be taken as provided by the Idaho 
Appellate Rules. 
DATED this 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 6 day of December 2015, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT was mailed via Regular U.S. Mail or faxed to: 
MARY W. CUSACK 
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC 
320 E. Neider, Suite 206 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83815 
(208) 667-0708 - FAX 
2. MEL TON JUDGMENT 
{MWC00153249.DOCX;1/20397.100} 
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON 
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD. 
113 S . Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
(208) 263-0400 - FAX 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
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Supreme Court Docket No. 44 768-20 I 7 
Boundary Count~ No. CV-20 l 3-3 13 
Defendant-Respondent. ) . 
A NOTICE OF APPEAL v as filed in the District Court on Janua1y l 0, 2017. from the OPINJO 
N APPE L entered by District Judge John R. Stegner and file stamped on Novemb r 30. 2016 . A 
JUD MEN I.R.C.P. 54(b) v ith a Rule 54(b) 'ERTIFI 'ATE attached. was entered by Magi"trate Judge 
Ju tin Julian and filed on December 3, 20 l 5, a. this an appeal upon judicial review. It appears the 
JUDGME T I.R.C.P. 54(b) with a Ruic 5-l b) CERTIFI ATE is not in compliance v ith Idaho Rule: < f 
C'i vil Procedure 54(a) in that it contains a c nc lusion of law, i.e. '·I. The Personal Repre cntati c·: 
di ·allo, an c of Heinz Airs claim. filed 1ar h 17. ~015. in the abo e referen~ed e. taw was timely tiled .'' 
Thcrcf re, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that this appeal hall be CO DITIO 'ALLY D.ISMI D as the 
JUDGM ENT LR.C.P. 54(b) with a Rule 54(b) CERTIFICAT is not in compliance with I.R.C.P. 54(a); 
however, proceedings in this appeal SHALL BE SUSP NDED FOR TWENTY-ONE (21) DAYS F TI I ·, 
DA TE OF THI ORDER for entry of a final judb"lllcnt in the Magistrate C9urt, pursuant to I.R. .P. 54(a). 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that in the event proceeding in this appeal continu , coun. el for 
pp llant shall tile an AME OED NOTICE OF APP AL with the Di trict Court Clerk in order t rcncct 
the Jina I judgment entered i~ the Magistrate Court. 
DATEDthi /'D dayofFebruary.201 7. 
For the Supreme Comt 
Stephen W. K nyon ~ 
cc: ounsel f Record 
District ,ourt Clerk 
Court Reporter 
Magistrate Judge Justin Julian 
istrict Judge John R. Stegner 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DIST . . T F 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDAR 
MAGISTRATE 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF, 
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and 
HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON, 
DECEASED, 
) 
) CaseNo: CV-2013-0000313 
) 
) AMENDED JUDGMENT 




JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The Personal Representative's disallowance of Heinz Alt' s claim, filed 
March 1 7, 2015, is sustained. 
ii 
DATED THIS Z day of F ruary, 2017. 
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RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE 
With respect to the issues determined by the above judgment or order it is 
hereby CERTIFIED, in accordance with Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P., that the court has 
determined that there is no just reason for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that 
the court has and does hereby direct that the above judgment or order shall be a final 
judgment upon which execution may issue and an appeal may be taken as provided by 
the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
Dated this 7 ~ of February, 2017,. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, regular mail, 
postage prepaid, and/or delivered, this ·1- day of February, 2017, to: 
MARY W. CUSACK 
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC 
320 E. Neider, Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815 
BRENT FEATHERSTON 
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD. 
113 S. Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
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ORDER TO WlTHDRA W 
CONDITIONAL DISMISSAL 
AND REL STATE APPEAL 
Supreme Court Docket No. 447 18-2017 
Boundary County o. CV-2013-313 
On February 1, 2017. thi. Coui1 issued an ORDER CO DITIONALL Y DISMISSI G 
APPEAL and proceedings in this appeal were S SP : DED for entr of a final judgment in th 
Magistrate Court that complied with J.R.C.P. 54(a). Thereafter. an AME OED J 'DGM ENT 
I.R.C.P. 54(a) was entered by Magistrat Judge Justin Julian and filed on February 7, _OJ 7· 
therefore. 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the ORDER CONDITIONALLY DISML SI G APPEAL 
i sued by thi Court on February I, 2017, shall be WITHDR.A WN and pr ceedings in this appeal 
shall be REIN ST A TED. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that Appellant shall file an AMENDED NOTICE OF 
APPEAL in the District Court in order to specif the judgment from which this appeal is takc.n. 
DATEDthis \t\: da ofFebruarv,2017. 
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
Court Repolier 
District Judg John R. Stegner 
For the Supreme ourt 
Entered on JS! 
By: I~ -
ORDER TO WI THDR W CONDJTlO, AL DISMISSAL AND REINSTATE APPEAL - Docket No. -l-l 768-:!017 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of the Estate of: ) 
) 
ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON and ) 








COME NOW, Petitioner, JADWIGA B. MEL TON, by and through her attorney of 
record, MARY W. CUSACK, of Cusack Law Firm, PLLC, and hereby moves the Court for 
the entry of an Amended Judgment as attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated 
herein by this reference. 
DATED this J~ day of February 2017. 
1. MOTION FOR STATUS CONFERENCE 
{MJT00175404.DOCX: 1 /20397 .100} 
MARYW. ACK 
Cus::=:rm, PLLC 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the~ day of February 2017, I caused a true and 
accurate copy of the MOTION REGARDING AMENDED JUDGMENT to be served by 
facsimile thereon, and addressed to the following: 
Brent C. Featherston 
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd. 
113 S. Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
(208) 263-0400 - FAX 
2. MOTION FOR STATUS CONFERENCE 
{MJTOO 17 5404. DOCX; 1 /20397 .100} 
MAR~~~ 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of the Estate of: ) 
) 
ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON and ) 
HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON; ) 
) 
Deceased. ) 
- -------- ---- ~ ) 
CASE NO. CV 13-0313 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
P.002/016 
NOTICE !S HEREBY GIVEN that on February 27, 2017, at the hour of 10:00 a.m ., 
or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, in the courtroom of the above-entitled 
court, Bonners Ferry, Idaho, before the HONORABLE JUSTIN JULIAN, the Petitloner in 
the above-named matter, JADWIGA B. MEL TON, will cal! on a for hearing the Motion 
Regarding Amended Jf!dqment. Oral argument [s requested. 
DATED this _~ __ day of February 2017. 
1. NOTICE OF HEARING 
{MJT00175399.DOCX;1/20397.100} 
MAR~~ 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ~day of February 2017, I caused a true and 
accurate copy of the NOTICE OF HEARING to be served by U. S. Mail, postage prepaid 
or by facsimile thereon, and addressed to the following; 
Brent C. Featherston 
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd. 
113 S. Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
(208) 263-0400 - FAX 
2. NOTICE OF HEARING 
{MJT00175399. DOCX; 1/20397,100} 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of the Estate of: ) 
) 
ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON and ) 
HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON, ) 
) 
Deceased. ) _ _______ _ ) 
CASE NO. CV 13- 0313 
MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME 
P.004/016 
COMES NOW, Petition, JADWIGA B. MEL TON, by and through her attorney of 
record, MARY W . CUSACK, of Cusack Law Firm, PLLC, and PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. 
7(b)(3), respectfully moves the Court for an Order to Shorten Time to hear the following 
motions: (1) Motion to Shorten Time; and (2) Motion Regarding Amended Judgment. 
The Motion to Shorten Time is made for the reason and upon the grounds that 
there is not sufficient time to give statutory notice; the parties will not be disadvantaged 
in any fashion as there is already a hearing set at that time and date in this matter; and 
further that It would be in the interest of economy and justice. 
Oral argument is requested. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that JADWIGA B. MEL TON will bring this Motion to 
Shorten Time on for hearing on February 27, 2017, at 10:00 a.m. before the Honorable 
Justin Julian. ,J,.. 
DATED this ~ day of February 2017. 
1. MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME 
{MJT00175400. DOCX; 1/20397.100} 
MARM~ 
Attorney for JADWIGA B. MEL TON 
Page 399 of 438
02/22/2017 13:44 Cusack Law Firm, PLLC (f AX)l 2086670708 P.005/016 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the J,,1./{ day of February 2017, I caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing MO~O SHORTEN TIME to be served by 
facsimile or regular U.S. Mail, postage prepaid thereon, and addressed to the following: 
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON 
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd. 
113 South Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
(208) 263-0400 - FAX 
2. MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME 
{MJT00 175400.OOCX; 1 /20397 .100} 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of the Estate of: ) 
) 
ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON and ) 
HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON, ) 
) 
Deceased. ) 
---- - -------- -) 
CASE NO. CV 13-0313 
MOTION TO APPEAR 
TELEPHONICALL Y 
P.008/016 
COME NOW, Petitioner, JADWIGA B. MEL TON, by and through her attorney of 
record, MARY W. CUSACK, of Cusack Law Firm, PLLC, and hereby moves the Court, 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 7(2), for an Order allowing counsel to appear telephonically at the 
hearing set for February 27, 2017, at 10:00 a.m. before the Honorable Justin Julian. 
DATED this_~ _ day of February 2017. 
1. MOTION TO APPEAR TELEPHONICALL Y 
{MJT00175401 .DOCX; 1/20397.100} 
MARYW. ACK 
cu=::::rm,PLLC 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the zz,,J..day of February 2017, I caused a true and 
accurate copy of the MOTION TO APPEAR TELEPHONICALL Yto be served by facsimile 
thereon, and addressed to the following: 
Brent C. Feetherston 
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd. 
113 S. Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
(208) 263-0400 - FAX 
2. MOTION ro APPEAR TELEPHONICALL Y 
{MJT00175401 .DOCX; 1 /20397 .100} 
MAR~Cwatld. 
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MARY W. CUSACK 
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC 
320 E. Neider Avenue, Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83815 
(208) 667-0640 
(208) 667-0708 - FAX 
ISB#: 5332 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of the Estate of: ) 
) 
ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON and ) 
HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON, ) 
) 
Deceased. ) 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - ) 
CASE NO. CV 13- 0313 
ORDER TO SHORTEN TIME 
On the 27th day of February 2017, at 10:00 a.m. came 'to be heard a Motion to 
Shorten Time on the Motion Regarding Amended Judgment, by JADWIGA B. MEL TON, 
by and through her attorney of record, MARY W. CUSACK, of Cusack Law Firm, PLLC. 
The Court, after reviewing the documents filed herein, and after hearing argument 
presented by counsel , and good cause appearing, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECREED THAT: 
1. The Motion to Short;.e "1e is granted. 
IT IS SO ORDERED this :c£+ day of E ruary 2017. 
1. ORDER TO SHORTEN TIME 
{MJT00175403. OOCX; 1 /20397 .100} 
Page 403 of 438
02/~2/2017 13:45 Cusack Law Firm, PLLC (f AX)12086670708 P.OO7/O16 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
",LCM.-
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the O' l day of February 2017, I caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER TO SHORTEN TIME to be served by facsimile 
or regular U. S. Mail, postage prepaid thereon, and addressed to the following: 
MARY W . CUSACK 
Cusack Law Firm, PLLC 
320 E. Neider Avenue, Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83815 
(208) 667-0708 - FAX 
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON 
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd. 
113 South Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
(208) 263-0400 - FAX 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of the Estate of: ) 
) CASE NO. CV 13 - 0313 
ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON and ) 
HEDWIG "HEDY" MEL TON, ) ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
) APPEAR TELEPHONICALL Y 
Deceased. ) _________ ) 
P.010/016 
THE COURT, havin re1 ewe h e ·1; r€4n to Appear Te/ephonica//y, 
and good cause appearing ther fore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDER D AT P . ·oner's Motion to Appear Telephonical/y is 
GRANTED. All Counsel will c ·nto the Courthouse at the start of the hearing on 
February 27, 2017, at 10:00 .in. 
[ ] Counsel will call into courtroom# _~ 
ENTERED this .52$ay of February 
1. ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO APPEAR TELEPHONICALL Y 
{MJT00175402.OOCX; 1 /20397 .100} 
-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on thed lf"- day of February 2017, I caused a true and 
accurate copy of the ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO APPEAR TELEPHONICALL Yto 
be served by facsimile thereon, and addressed to the following: 
Mary W. Cusack . 
Cusack Law Firm, PLLC 
320 E. Neider Avenue, Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815 
(208) 667-0708 - FAX 
Brent C. Featherston 
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd. 
113 S. Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
(208) 263-0400 - FAX 
GLENDA POSTON 




2. ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO APPEAR TELEPHONICALL Y 
{MJTOO 175402.DOCX; 1 /20397 .100} 
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Owid P. })oatherston 
Brent C. Fcatht:rston~ 
Jeremy P. Peathcrstoo 
Jeremi L . Ossman° 
113 S. Se(Ond AW. 
San<lpOln!, ID 8)864 
Phone (208) 263-6866 
Fax (.208) 263-0400 
•L\lltMod in Idaho & w,,hin.s••• 
n LJctn~ in ldoha &: M..,big.,, 
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, COTD. 
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON !SB NO. 4602 
Attorney at Law 
113 South Second A venue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
(208) 263-6866 
(208) 266-0400 (Fax) 
Attorney for Appellant, Heinz Alt 
zn n FEB 27 AM q· t1) 
" , JA1A..---
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
In the Matter of the Estate of 







___ ____ .....:D=ec=e=as=e=d.,_ _ ___ ) 
CASE NO. CV-2013-0313 
NOTICE OF JOINDER IN 
MOTION 
COMES NOW, Brent C. Featherston, the undersigned counsel, for and on behalf of 
the Appellant, Heinz Alt, and hereby joins in Respondent, Estate's, Motion regarding 
Amended Judgment, fax filed February 22, 2017. 
Counsel for Appellant is unable to appear in person at 10:00 A.M. on February 27, 
2017 (though he could appear telephonically). 
Based upon the Idaho Supreme Court's Order Conditionally Dismissing Appeal 
ent~red Febrnary 1, 2017. It is the Appellant's position that the Court should enter an 
amended judgment that either: 
a) Strikes language the Supreme Court objected to, which reads as follows: ''The 
Personal Representative's disallowance of Heinz Alt's claim filed March 17, 2015 in the 
above .referenced Estate was timely filed .'' Merely striking that language from the original 
judgment entered December 3, 2015 would seem to comply with the Coui.i's Order 
conditionally dismissing the appeal. 
b) Alternatively, the Respondent has no objection to the Court entering the 
proposed Second Amended Judgrne11t prepared by Respondent's counsel and submitted to 
the Court by cover letter dated February 7, 2017, which is also submitted with the Motion 
for Status Conference. The Amended Judgment appears to comply with Idaho Supreme 
NOTICE OF JOINDER IN MOTION• 1 
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bllniel P. Peathonlon 
:Srent C. Peathor&1on* 
Jeremy P. Peatllers.ron 
Jeremi L. Ossma~•• 
113 S. Second Ave. 
Shndpoinl. ID 83864 
Fhone (208) 263-6866 
Pax (208) 263-0dOO 
Court's Order of Conditional Dismissal, yet still adequately preserves the issues that are on 
appeal. 
DATED this 27th day of February, 2017. 
FEATHERS D. 
By----e:;~+-~=.,.!'.__--- --=----
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON 
Attorney for Heinz Alt 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 9--1 day ofFebtUary, 2017, I caused a true and co1tect copy 
of the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following 
manner: 
Mru.y W. Cusack, Esq. 
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC 
610 .W. Hubbard, Suite 205 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
By:~-- ~-
NOTICE OF JOl'NDf;R JN MOTION 
[ ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Hand delivered 
[/1 Facsimile No. (208) 667-0708 
[ ] Other: _______ _ 
Page 2 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 




Justin W. Julian 
Jamie Wilson 
CASE NO. 
DATE: 2/27/2017 TIME: 10:00 am 
CLERK: COURTROOM: 001 





Robert Ernest Melton 
Hedwig "Hedy" Melton 
Jadwiga B. Melton 
Heinz Alt .- I 
Attorney 
Mary W Cusack 
Brent C. Featherston 
r. 








'j , ... 
I • 
I I- . . -
I 
I~ .. • 
















PA Petitioner's Attorney 
RA Respondent's Attorney 
DI Direct Examination 
Redi Redirect Examination 
X Cross Examination 
ReX Recross Examination 
Juv Juvenile 
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I 
In session . Calls case. Mary Cusack here for the Personal 
Representative. Featherston not present. Joinder filed. What is wrong 
with the amended judgment entered and why does counsel need 
another one? 
Not familiar with appeals. Mr. Kenyon sent Supreme Court appeal back 
down saying had included findings of fact. Thought it was counsels job 
to create a new judgment. Where at in the case is that there were two 
issues before the court ruled upon. Timeliness of disallowance and 
statute of limitations. Appealing the limitations issue not the 
disallowance. Spoke to Mr. Featherston and he stated had gone before 
Supreme Court and stated if the judgment isn't exactly on point with the 
argued issue that - he was trying to weigh the Supreme Court in his 
argument. Concern is that appealing statute of limitations. Claim barred 
as to Hedy's estate - sentence #2 on initial judgment. Amended 
judgment entered last did not include that sentence. Concerned that 
the issue a ealin is not clear in the amended ·ud ment. 
The amended judgment was made brief because referencing a statute 
in a judgment is beginning to sound like a legal conclusion. Cannot 
have that in a judgment according to rule. Wanted to stay away from 
that and just affirm the PR's disallowance of the claim. If Supreme 
Court wonders why the judgment affirms the disallowance, it would see 
that information in the memorandum and opinion. Think that's how they 
want it to be. The Judgment just does a thing and the reason behind it 
is in a separate opinion. The concern is that if say in the judgment that 
bein done ursuant to a statue it looks like a le al conclusion and will 
COURT MINUTES OF: 2/27/2017 CASE NO: CV-2013-0000313 














































be bounced back a ain. 
Appreciate the input. Have no idea. Just wanted to include the statute 
of limitations issue on the appeal. Deferring to the Court. Trying to err 
on side of caution. Do not want to be bounced back from SC for not 
havin the wordin re limitation 
Understand the catch 22. Supreme Court does not seem to like 
specificity in a judgment or if want them to take minimalist approach. 
Anything beyond there seems to be a problem with. Why worded the 
wa I did 
Had drafted a judgment and sent to Mr. Kenyon . He said would meet 
the standard . 
Ok. Even if the one done by the Court is satisfactory there wouldn't be 
any harm in signing the one presented now if approved by Mr. Kenyon . 
Sur rised the are willin to ive le al advice. 
Because unfamiliar asked if the purposed judgment would meet the 
standard and he said it would . 
That gives the Court come comfort if have already gotten that 
res onse. That's this ·ud ment here? 
Yes 
Will go ahead and enter as a second amended judgment in light of the 
information that preapproved by Mr. Kenyon. Rule 54A is the form of 
the judgment rule. Reviews rule and the items not to be included in the 
judgment. If included it is a poison pill and not a judgment. Find 
interesting that the judgment approved by Mr. Kenyon provides what 
sounds like a conclusion of law. But if they say they'll accept it so I'll 
si n it. 
Do not know the exact rule but if stopped with the wording "is barred"? 
Don't know. 
Saying barred pursuant to the statute of limitations is a conclusion of 
law. That is why go away from that in the judgment and just stated that 
affirmed disallowance. Reasons are in memorandum opinion. Your 
ballgame. The Court will sign. Just having difficulty reconciling how the 
Su reme Court a roved ·ud ment is not a conclusion of law. 
May be speaking to liberally to say approved by Supreme Court. In Mr. 
Ken on's o inion he said it would be oka 
Think he holds a lot of sway. It is his job. It is between you and Mr. 
Featherston. Goin to o ahead and si n the second ·ud ment 
Ad'. 
I I ... - .. 
I • • 
I -
- 1- .. • 
IJ 
• 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of the Estate of: 
ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON and 






Deceased . ) ______________ ) 
CASE NO. CV 13- 0313 
SECOND 
AMENDED JUDGMENT 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Heinz Alt's claim against the Estate of Hedwig "Hedy" Melton is barred 
pursuant to I.C. § 15-3-803. 
2. Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment to Den Creditor Claim is hereby 
granted. 
DATED this __£12 day of __ ~--------r--
1. SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT 
{MJT00174254.DOCX; 1/20397.100} 
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RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE 
With respect to the issues determined by the above Judgment or Order, it is hereby 
CERTIFIED, in accordance with Rule 54(b) , I.R.C.P., that the Court has determined that 
there is no just reason for delay of the entry of a Final Judgment and that the Court has 
and does hereby direct that the above Judgment or Order shall be a Final Judgment upon 
wh ich execution may issue and an appeal may be taken as provided by the Idaho 
Appellate Rules . 
DA TED this 7? day of---=---~.:..-.,,.'--,£- -- - -,,,,--~---
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ;;rr-- day of F&YJD<.v<j: 2017 , 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing SECOND AMENDED JUDG NT was mailed 
via Regular U.S. Mail or faxed to: 
MARY W. CUSACK 
CUSACK LAW FIRM , PLLC 
320 E. Neider, Suite 206 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83815 
(208) 667-0708 - FAX 
2. SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT 
{MJT0017 4254. DOCX; 1 /20397 .1 00} 
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON 
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD. 
113 S. Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
(208) 263-0400 - FAX 
GLENDA POSTON 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
BY: Q,~f J 1),Z0( 
DE TY CLERK v 
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CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC 
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(208) 667-0708 - FAX 
mary@mcusacklaw.com 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of the Estate of: 
ROBERT ERNEST MEL TON and 




) Supreme Court Docket No. 44768-2017 
) Boundary County Case No. CV 13-0313 
) 
) AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
) 
Idaho Appellate Rule 17 
JADWIGA MEL TON'S AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho in and for the County of Boundary 
Mary W. Cusack ISB# 5332 
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC 
320 E. Neider Avenue, Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83815 
(208) 667-0640 
(208) 667-0708 - FAX 
Attorneys for Appellant 
1. AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
{LMH00176188. DOCX;1/20397 .100} 
Brent C. Featherston ISB #4602 
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, Chtd 
113 South Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
(208) 263-6866 
(208) 266-0400 - FAX 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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TO: ALT HEINZ, AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY, BRENT C. FEATHERSTON OF 
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD, 113 SOUTH SECOND AVENUE, SANDPOINT, 
IDAHO 83864, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The appellant, JADWIGA B. MEL TON, the Personal Representative of the 
above captioned estate, by and through her attorney of record, MARY W . CUSACK, of 
Cusack Law Firm , PLLC , appeals against the above named Respondents to the Idaho 
Supreme Court from the Opinion on Appeal , entered in the above entitled action, entered 
on the 30th day of November, 2016, Honorable John R. Stegner presiding. A copy of the 
opinion being appealed is attached to this notice as well as a copy of the Second 
Amended Judgment as this is an appeal from an Order entered after final judgment. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
opinion described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable decision under and pursuant to 
Idaho Appellate Rule 11 (a)(2) and (b) . 
o This is an EXPEDITED APPEAL pursuant to I.A. R. 12.2. 
3. Appellant provides the following preliminary statement of the issue on 
appeal, which the appellant then intends to assert in the appeal. This preliminary 
statement, however, provides only a preliminary issue and shall in no way prevent the 
Appellant from asserting other issues on appeal. The preliminary issue on appeal is: 
a. Did the district court err in reversing the Magistrate Judge's decision 
that Heinz Alt's claim against the Estate of Hedwig "Hedy" Melton is barred by Idaho Code 
§ 15-3-803? 
2. AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
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4. Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? No. 
5. a. Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes 
b. The Appellant requests the reporter's standard transcript as defined 
in Rule 25(c), I.AR. , including preparation of the following portions of the reporter's 
transcript in [ ] hard copy [X] electronic format [ ] both (check one) : 
i. Oral argument on appeal by the parties heard October 7, 2016. 
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the Clerk's 
Record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28 , I.AR.: 
a. The Petition for Formal Probate of Will and Formal Appointment of Personal 
Representative filed on December 9, 2014; 
b. Claim Against Estate filed on December 15, 2014; 
c. Order for Formal Probate of Will and Formal Appointment of Personal 
Representative filed on February 2, 2015; 
d. Notice of Disallowance of Claim filed March 17, 2015; 
e. All pleadings filed in this case on or after April 1, 2015. 
7. No additional charts or pictures offered or admitted as exhibits are 
requested in this Appeal. 
8. I certify the following : 
a . That a copy of this amended notice of appeal has been served on each 
reporter of whom a transcript has been requested , as named below at 
the address set out below: 
3. AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
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i. Name and Address: Sheryl Engler; P.O. Box 6068, Moscow, Idaho 
83843; 
b. That the clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the reporter's transcript; 
c. That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been 
paid including the additional documents requested herein; 
d. That the appellate filing fee has been paid; and 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 20. 
DATED this ~ day of March, 2017. 
MA~ 
Attorney for JADWIGA MEL TON 
Personal Representative, Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the lf"-day of March, 2017, I caused a true and accurate 
copy of the foregoing document to be served by the method and to the addresses 
indicated below: 
Brent C. Featherston 
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd. 
113 S. Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
(208) 263-0400 - FAX 
brent@featherstonlaw.com 
Sheryl Engler 
Latah County District Court 
PO Box 6069 
Moscow, ID 83843 
4. AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
{LMH001761 88O0CX;1/20397.100} 
Sent via e-mail and U.S. Mail : 
Sent via U.S. Mail 
. USACK 
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i 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
ROBERT ERNEST MELTON and 
HEDWIG "HEDY'' MELTON, 
Deceased, 
) 
) Case No. CV-2013-313 
) 
) 
. ) OPINION ON APPEAL 
) 
) ________________ ) 
This is an appeal brought by Heinz Alt ("Heinz"), the Appellant, in which he 
challenges the Magistrate Judge's decision granting partial summary judgment in 
favor of Jadwiga Melton, the personal representative of the Estate of Robert Ernest 
Melton and Hedwig "Hedy'' Melton. The Magistrate Judge held that the personal 
representative's rejection of Heinz's claim was timely and that because Heinz failed 
to bring a claim against the estate of his mother, Hedwig Melton ("Hedy"), within 
three years of her death, summary judgment was appropriate. 
BACKGROUND 
Heinz is the biological son of Hedy and the stepson of her deceased husband, 
Robert Ernest Melton ("Robert''). Appellant's Br., p. 1. Heinz alleges that he loaned 
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money to his mother and step-father to enable them to purchase land and build a 
log home in Boundary County. Id. at 2. At some point, the prope.rty was deeded to 
Heinz. Id.; see also Gift Deed (Ex. B attached to the Aff. of Mary W. Cusack). Heinz 
alleges that the property was deeded to him as security for the money he loaned to 
his mother and step-fathex. Appellant's Br., p. 2. Subsequently, Heinz claims Hedy 
and Robert executed wills in which they bequeathed all of their respective property 
to him. Id. Following the signing of the wills by Hedy and Robert, Heinz and his 
wife deeded the property back to Hedy and Robert. 1 Id. 
Hedy died on August 11, 2008. Id. At the time of her death, Hedy had a will 
directing that all of her property would pass to Rob~rt, and, in the event that Robert 
preceded her in death, to Heinz. Last Will and Testament of Hedwig "Hedy" Melton 
(Ex. G attached to the Aff. of Counsel (Brent C. Featherston)). Hedy's will was 
never probated. Appellant's Br., p. 2, 
In 2010, Robert married Jadwiga Melton ("Jadwiga"). Id. Robert died on July 
4, 2013. Id. At the time of his death, Robert had a new will directing that all of his 
pxoperty would pass to Jadwiga. Last Will and Testament of Robert Melton (Ex. B 
attached to the Aff. of Counsel (Brent C. Featherston)). Robert executed the new 
will in December of 2010 after manying Jadwiga. Id. Prior to December 2010, 
1 The timeline of events regarding when the property was deeded to Heinz, when the Meltons executed their wills, and when Heinz deeded the property back to the Meltons are disputed facts. In the Appellant' s Brief, Heinz claims that "[t]he property was initially titled to [me] and {my] wife as acknowledgment or security of the loan. Subsequently, the Meltons executed Wills leaving all of their estates to [meJ. The real property was deeded back to Meltons." Appellant's Br., p . 2. However, the personal representative claims that the property was originally titled to Hedy and Robert, and was i:iot titled to Heinz until July 16, 1999, after the Meltons' wills were executed. Resp't's Br., p. 6;Aff. of Mary W. Cusack. 
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Robert's will mirrored Hedy's will in that if he preceded her in death, all of his 
property would pass to her, and, if she preceded him in death, all of his property 
would pass to Heinz. Last Will and Testament of Robert Ernest Melton (Ex. F 
attached to the Aff. of Counsel (Brent C. Featherston)). 
On Aqgust 29, 2013, Jadwiga filed a Petition for .Summary Administration of 
Robert's estate plll'suant to LC.§ 15-3-1205. The only assets of the estate are the 
land and home located in Bonners Ferry, Idaho. Heinz maintains that Hedy and 
Robert purchased the land and constructed the home with money he loaned to 
them. On August 30, 2013, a Decree Vesting Estate in Surviving Spouse was 
entered. 
On September 6, 2013, Heinz filed a Motion to Convert Proceedings to 
Supervised Administration and to Determine Testacy based on his claim that he is 
entitled to repayment of the money he loaned Hedy and Robert to purchase the real 
property and construct the home at issue. On October 21, 2013, an Order Setting 
Aside the Decree Vesting Estate in Slll'Viving Spouse was entered. On December 9, 
2014, Jadwiga filed a Petition for Formal Probate of Will and Formal Appoi~tment 
of Personal Representative. Because Hedy's will was never probated, Jadwiga 
requested.that the estates of both Hedy and Robert be joined for probate in one 
proceeding. This was done pursuant.to LC. § 15-3~111. 
On January 13> 2015, Heinz filed a claim for $102,574.50 against the estate 
based on LC.§ 15-3-804. Heinz submitted several documents to support his claim. 
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_on February 2, 2015, Jadwiga was appointed the personal representative of 
the estate of Robert and Hedy Melton. On February 9, 2015, Jadwiga filed a Notice 
to Creditors with the Court. The notice was first published in the Bonners Ferry 
Herald on February 19, 2015. On March 13, 2015, Jadwiga mailed a Notice· of 
Disallowance of Claim to Heinz's attorney. The Notice of Disallowance was filed 
with the Court on March 17, 2015. In that notice, Heinz was informed that his 
claim was being disallowed for the following reasons: (1) the claim was untimely 
because Heinz failed to bring it within three years of Hedy's death, (2) Heinz failed 
to provide documentation that Robert owed a debt to him, and (3) Hedy's signature 
on some of the documents submitted by Heinz had not been authenticated. Notice of 
Disallowance of Claim, p. 1-2. On May 4, 2015, Heinz filed a Petition to Allow 
Claims. 
On June 29, 2015, Jadwiga filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to Deny 
Creditor Claim. A hearing was held on August 24, 2015. On October 8, 2015, 
Magistrate Judge Justin W. Julian issued his Memorandum Opinion granting 
Jadwiga's Motion for Summary Judgment in part. Specifically, Judge Julian 
concluded that J adwiga's disallowance of Heinz's creditor claim was timely, and 
that Heinz's claim against Hedy's estate is barred by I .C. § 15-3-803 because Heinz 
failed to bring his claim within.three years of Hedy's death. Mem. Op., p. 4-7. The 
Magistrate Judge expressly stated that ''Heinz may still proceed with his claim 
against Robert's estate." Id. at 7. On December 3, 2015, the Magistrate Judge 
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entered·a Judgment on the above two issues and certified it as a final judgment 
_pursuant to Rule 54(b), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.2 
On January 13, 2016, Heinz filed a Notice of Appeal. An Amended Notice of 
Appeal was later filed on March 2, 2016, and Appellant's Statement of Issues on 
Appeal was filed May 4, 2016. Heinz identifies the following issues on appeal: 
1. Did the trial court err in granting partial summary judgment determining that the Appellant's claim was timely disallowed by the Personal Representative? 
2. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment that Appellant'e C1·edito1·'s Claim is time bal'red as against the Estate of Hedwig Melton? 
3. Did the trial court err as a matter of law holding that Idaho Code§ 15-3-111 does not toll ·01· extends (sic) the time within which Appellant's Creditor's Claim may be asserted against the joint estate of Robert and Hedwig Melton? · 4. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in granting summary judgment based upon Idaho Code § 15-3-803(a) holding that all claims are barred against Hedwig Melton's estate when that state [sic] is filed for probate after the three (3) year period as a joint estate pel'mitted by Idaho Code§ 15-3-111? 
Appellant's Statement of Issues on Appeal, p. 1-2. 
Oral argument was heru.·d by this Court on October 7, 2016. Brent 
Featherston appeared by telephone and argued on behalf of Heinz. Mary Cusack. 
also appeared by telephone and argued on behalf of Jadwiga. The case is now ready 
for a decision to be issued. 
2 Because the Magistrate Judge concluded that Heinz could still pursue his claim against Robert's estate, this Court questioned whether the Magistrate's decision could be appealed even with a Rule 54(b) certification. Briefing on the issue of jurisdiction was requested. Counsel for both Heinz and Jadwiga argued that this Court had jurisdiction on two independent bases. First, because of I.C. § 17-201 which states an appeal may be brought from a "judgment, or order of the magistrates division of the district court in probate matters: ... 7. Refusing, allowing or directing the ... payment of a debt, cla:im, legacy or distributive share." And second because Rule 54(b) allows for an appeal to be brought under the following circumstances: "When an action presents more than one claim for relief . .. or when multiple parties are involved.'' It appears that jurisdiction is arguably afforded under the statute and Rule, therefore, this Court concludes that it has jurisdiction to proceed. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When an appellate court reviews a trial court's decision on summary 
judgment, it eD?-ploys the same standard as that properly employed by the trial 
court when originally ruling on the motion. Montgomery v. Montgomery, 147 Idaho 
1, 5, 205 P.3d 650, 654 (2009). 
"Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, affidavits, and discovery 
documents on file with the court, read in a light most favorable to the non-moving 
party, demonstrate no material issue of fact such that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter oflaw." Harwood v. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672, 677, 39 P.3d 
612, 617 (2001) (citations omitted); Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c) (2015). "A material fact is 
one upon which the outcome of the case may be different." Peterson v. Romine, 131 
Idaho 537, 540, 960 P.2d 1266, 1269 (1998) (citation omitted). "If the evidence is 
conflicting on material issues, or if reasonable minds could reach different 
conclusions, summary judgment is not appropriate." Id. "The burden of proving the 
absence of material facts is upon the moving pru.-ty." Harwood, 136 Idahq at 677, 39 
P .3d at 617 (citations omitted). However, when a motion ·for summary judgment is 
supported by affidavits, "an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations 
or tlenials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial." Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(e) (2015). 
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An appellate com·t "exercises free review over questions oflaw and matters of 
statutory interpretation." Guzman v. Piercy, 155 Idaho 928, 934, 318 P.3d 918, 924 
(2014) (citations omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
I. Did the trial court err in determining that Heinz's claim was 
disallowed in a timely way by Jadwiga? 
Heinz mailed his Claim Against Estate to Jadwiga's attorney on January 9, 
2015, and filed his claim with the Court on January 13, 2015. Appellant's Bi·., p. 6. 
On February 2, 2015, Jadwiga was appointed personal representative of the estate. 
Letters Testamentary, p. 1. On February 9, 2015, Jadwiga filed her Notice to 
Creditors with the Court and on February 19, 2015, the notice was first published 
in the Bonners Ferry Herald (with the last publication on March 5, 2015). Notice to 
Creditors; Aff. of Publication. On March 13, 2015, Jadwiga mailed a Notice of 
Disallowance of Claim to Heinz's attorney. Appellant's Br., p. 3. That Notice of 
Disallowance was filed with the Court on March 17, 2015. On these facts, Judge 
Julian concluded that Jadwiga's Disallowance of the claim had been timely filed. 
Mem. Op., p. 5. Heinz appeals from this adverse determination. Heinz contends 
that because the disallowance was untimely, the claim should have been allowed. 
Appellant's Br., p. 7. 
Heinz argues that Jadwiga did not disallow his claim within the statuto1-y 
sixty day time period set forth in LC.§ 15-3-806(a). Jd. at 5-7. Heinz wrote the 
following in support of his argument: 
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Measuring the time from Januacy 9th [the date Heinz mailed 
his claim to Jadwiga's attorney), and permitting three (3) day mail rule 
for service on the Estate of the Claim, the Estate's clock for 
disallowance purposes began on January 12th. (Applying a filing date 
of January 13, 2015, one (1) day later, does not change the outcome.) 
The Estate did not disallow Mr. Alt's Claim until it mailed a 
Disallowance on March 13th. Again, applying a three (3) day mail rule 
provided for in LR.C.P. Rule 6(e)(l), the Estate's Disallowance was not 
served upon counsel for Alt until March 16th, sixty-t_hree (63) days 
after service of the Claim. (Sixty-two [62] days after court filing of the 
Claim.) 
Mr. Alt's Creditor's Claim was timely filed, but was not timely 
disallowed. Under LC. § 15-3-806(a), failure of the Estate to disallow 
the Claim has the effect of deeming the Claim allowed. This result 
renders the Estate's Motion for Summary Judgment moot. 
Appellant's Br., p. 6. 
Heinz's argument is predicated on his claim that a personal representative 
must disallow a creditor's claim within sixty days of its presentation. Id. at 6-7. 
Heinz relies on I.C. § 15-3-806(a), which states: "Failure of t1:te personal 
representative to mail notice to a claim.ant of action on his claim for sixty (60) days 
after the time for original presentation of the claim has expired has the effect of a 
notice of allowance." Heinz a1·gues "[t]he use of 'the' [before claim] in the sentence 
makes clear that this provision is specific to the specific creditor's claim, not a · 
general four (4) month provision applicable to 'any' 01· 'all' claims." Appellant's Br., 
p. 7. 
In granting Jadwiga's Mot~on for Summary Judgment on this issue, the 
Magistrate Judge wrote the following: 
While it is true that the local practice has been to disallow a claim 
against the estate within 60 days, ... it is clear from a close reading of 
the statute that the 60 day time limit for denial of a claim does not 
accrue upon its filing, but rather upon expiration of "the time for 
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original presentation of the claim." .. . "[T]he time for," which precedes 
and modifies the reference to "the,, claim, means that the estate's duty 
to disallow begins running after expiration of the deadline for 
presenting the claim. If the legislature intended to craft the statute as 
Heinz urges, it would simply read" .. . 60 days after presentation of the 
claim . .. ", without any need for reference to "the time for original 
presentation" having expired. 
Mem. Op., p. 4-5. Judge Julian concluded that the ''disallowance was clearly 
timely." Id. at 5. 
The Magistrate Judge's finding that the "disallowance was clearly timely" 
will be affirmed for two reasons. 
First, the plain language of I. C. § 15~3-806(a) makes clear that the personal 
rep1·esentative has sixty days after the time for the original presentation of the 
l 
claim has expired to mail a notice of disallowance to a claimant. 
The objective of statutory interpretation is to derive the intent of the 
legislative body that adopted the act. Statutory interpretation begins 
with the literal language of the statute. Provisions should not be read 
in isolation, but must be interpreted in the context of the entire 
document. The statute should be considered as a whole, and words 
should be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings. It should be 
noted that the Court must give effect to all the words and provisions of 
the statute so that none will be .void, superfluous, or redundant. When 
the statutory language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of 
the legislative body mqst be given effect, and the Court need not 
consider rules of statutory construction. 
State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866, 264 P .3d 970, 973 {2011) (quoting Farber v. 
Idaho State Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho 307,310, 208 P.3d 289, 292 (2009) (italics added). 
If Heinz's interpwtation were to be employed, the words "the time for 
01·iginal" and "has expfred" found in I.C. § 15~3-806(a) would be rendered 
superfluous. If the legislature intended the statute to require a personal 
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representative to deny a creditor's claim with sixty days of its presentation, the 
statute could simply read: "Failure of the personal representative to mail notice to 
a claimant of action on his claim for sixty (60) days after presentation of the claim 
has the effect of a notice of allowance~" Instead, the legislature added the verbiage 
"the time for original" and "has expired." Consequently, those words must be given 
effect so that they ro·e not rendered superfluous. 
This interpretation is consiste~t with Idaho Court of Appeals case law. In 
the case In re Estate of Boyd the Court of Appeals wrote the following in 
determining when interest on a creditor's claim would begin to accrue: 
John filed his notice to creditors in compliance with LC. 15-3-801 on 
August 5, 1994, thus starting the four-month period for creditors to file 
their claims. I.C. § 15-3-803. Idaho Code§ 15-3-806(d) provides that 
"allowed claims bear interest at the legal rate for the period 
commencing sixty (60) days after the time for original presentation of 
the claim has expired." Therefore, the inte1·est on BMH1s claim could 
not begin to accumulate until six months after John first published his 
notice to creditors. 
In re Estate of Boyd, 134 Idaho 669, 674-75, 8 P .3d 664, 669-70 (Ct. App. 2000) 
(italics added). Section (d) ofl.C. § 15-3-806, the provision interpreted by the Court 
of Appeals in In re Estate of Boyd, contains language identical to that found iµ 
section (a). Section (d) states: "Unless otherwise provided in any judgment in 
another court entered against the pe1·sonal representative, allowed claims bear 
interest at the legal rate for the period commencing sixty (60) days after the time for 
original presentation of the claim has expired .... " I.C. § 15-3-806(d) (italics added). 
Based on this statutory language, the Court of Appeals concluded that interest on a 
creditor's claim (filed on August 8, 1994) could.not begin to accumulate until six 
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months after the first notice to creditor's was published on August 5, 1994.3 In re 
I 
Estate of Boyd, 134 Idaho at 675, 8 P.3d at 670. This interpretation is consistent 
with the Magistrate Judge's holding that "the 60 day time limit for denial of a claim 
does not accrue upon its filing, but rathe1· _upon expp:ation of 'the time for original 
presentation of the claim."' Mem. Op., p. 4. 
Heinz had to present his claim within four months of the date of the first 
publication of notice to creditors or within sixty days after the notice was mailed or 
delivered to him.4 I .C. § 15-3-803(a); LC. § 15-3-S0l(a) & (b). The first publication 
of the notice occurred on February 19, 201~. Heinz therefore had until June 19, 
2015, to present his claim. The estate then had sixty days after the time for original 
presentation of the claim had expired (i.e., sixty days after June 19, 2015) to mail a 
notice of disallowance. LC.§ 15-3-806(a). Because the Notice ofDisallowance of 
Claim was mailed to Heinz's attorney on March 13, 2015, it was timely. 
Second, even assuming, for the sake of argument,. that Heinz's interpretation 
is correct, Jadwiga did, in fact, mail a timely notice to Heinz that his claim had been 
disallowed. Heinz's claim.was deemed presented on January 13, 2015, the day he 
a Although not at issue in the case, the timeline analyzed in Boyd strongly suggests that Heinz's interpretation of the 60 day time period is incorrect. In B01Jd, the personal representative first published notice to creditors on August 5, 1994. On August 8, 1994, the creditor filed its claim. Notice of disallowance of the claim was not filed until.January 25, 1995, some 170 days after the creditor's claim was .filed. However, the disallowance was .filed within 60 days after the time for original presentation of the claim had expired (i.e., 173 days, or within 60 days after the four month period for presentation of creditors' claims had expired). · 
4 It is unclear from the record whether notice was mailed or delivered to Heinz. (There is not a certificate of service attached to the Notice to Creditors filed with the Court on February 9, 2015.) However, even assuming that Notice was mailed to Heinz at the beginning of February, the Estate's disallowance of his claim was nonetheless timely. Heinz would have been allowed to present his claim within 60 days of the Notice, giving him until the beginning of April, and the estate would have been afforded an additional 60 days after the time for presentation of the claim had expired to disallow the claim (i.e., the beginning of June). 
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filed it with the Court. I.C. § 15-3-804(a) (A "claim is deemed presented on the last 
to occur of: (1) delivery or mailing of the written statement of claim to the personal 
representative; or, (2) the filing of the claim with the court."). On March 13, 2015, 
fifty-nine days after Heinz's claim was deemed presented, Jadwiga mailed a Notice 
of Disallowance of Claim to Heinz's attorney. Appellant's Br., p. 6. Pursuant to the 
plain language of l.C. § 15-3-806(a) a personal representative does not have to 
serve, but rather need only mail, a disallowance within sixty days after the time for 
original presentation of the claim has expired. I.C. § 15-3-806(a) ("Failure of the 
personal representative to mail notice to a claimant of action on his claim for sixty 
(60) days after the time for original presentation of the claim has expired has the 
effect of a notice of allowance.11). 
Consequently, Heinz's assertion that the disallowance was untimely because 
it was not served upon counsel until Mru.·ch 16, 2016, is unpersuasive. Had the 
legislatui·e intended. that service must be compJete within sixty days after the time 
for original presentation of the claim, the term "serve" could have easily been used 
in place of the term "mail" in I.C. § 15-3-806(a). 
The Magistrate Judge coi-rectly dete1·mined that Heinz's claim was timely 
disallowed by Jadwiga. Summary judgment was appropriately granted on this · 
issue because there is not a genuine issue of material fact and the estate was 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The Magistrate Judge's decision on this 
issue will therefore be affirmed. 
OPINION ON APPEAL -12 -
Page 428 of 438
,.,-.,,-..., .. ·- ·";" 
IT. Did the trial court err in determining that Heinz's claim against Hedy's estate is barred by I.C. § 15-3-803 because he failed to bring his claim within three years of her death? 
I.C. § 15-3-803(a) provides in relevant part that: 
All claims against a decedent's estate which arose before the death of the decedent, ... whether due or to become due, absolut_e or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other legal basis, if not barred earlier by another statute of limit~tions or nonclaim statute, are barred against the estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent, unless presented within the earlier of the following dates: 
(I) three (3) years after the decedent's death; or 
(2) within the time provided in section 15-3-801(b), Idaho Code, for creditors who are given actual notice, and within the time provided in section 15-3-801(a), Idaho Code, for all c1·editors bar1·ed by publication. 
The three year limitation for creditors in LC. § 15-3-803(a)(l) parallels the general 
time limit for p1·obating an estate. LC.§ 15-3-108 states: "No formal probate or 
appointment proceeding or formal testacy 01· appointment proceeding . . . may be 
commenced more than three (3) years after the decedent's death." 
Although the general rule requires a probate action to be commenced within 
three years of an individual's death, there are two exceptions to the rule. First, 
pursuant to I.C. § 15-3-1205, upon the death of a person leaving a sul'viving spouse 
as the sole devisee or beneficiary, the surviving spouse (or any person claiming title 
to any property through or under such surviving spouse) may file a petition for a 
decree vesting the property in the surviving spouse, or_ other claimant, with the 
condition that the surviving spouse (or person claiming entitlement through the 
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surviving spouse) assume and be liable for any and all i~debtedness that might be 
claimed against the estate of the decedent.6 
Second,"pursuant to I.C. § 15-3-111, a joint probate may be commenced to 
administer the estates of two deceased spouses. That provision reads: 
In cases in which a marital community has been dissolved by the death of either spouse at any time, the sm·vivor was then entitled to all of the property of the decedent by will, law, or both, and the survivor died before any proceeding had been commenced for the probate of the 
estate of the spouse whose death occurred first, the estates of both decedents may be joined fol' probate in a single proceeding in any court having jurisdiction of the estate of the spouse whose death occurred last. The three (3) year provision of section 15-3-108, Idaho Code, 
applies only to the death of the spouse whose death occurred last. The initial application or petition filed in any such joint proceeding shall contain a statement of the facts upon which such joint proceeding is based, in addition to all other statements required by this code to be made therein. 
Heinz argues that I .C. § 15-3-111 tolls the normal three yeai· statute of 
limitations found in LC. § 15-3-803(a)(l) because it extends the three year statute of 
limitations for probating an estate found in I.C. § 15-3-108. Appellant's Br., p . 7, 11. 
Heinz contends that 
[i]f the legislature provided an exception to the tlll'ee (3) year statute of limitations on probates for summary administi·ations and joint 
probates of husband and wife where the assets are community 
property, it is logical that the same extension of time must be applied to c1·editor's claims in those two (2) exceptions: summary 
administration and joint probate upon surv.iving spouse's death. The 
summary administration, by definition, would have passed the log 
5 I.C. § 15-3-1205 does not state a time limit for the summary administration of estates in which a surviving spouse is the sole beneficiary, and there is no reference to J.C. § 15-3-108 within the provision. Therefore, it appears to be an exception to the general rule that a will must be probated within three years of the decedent's death since itis not a typical probate_proceeding. See J.C.§ 15-3-1205 ("there will be no administration of the estate of the decedent."}. 
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home and property to Robert subject to Hedy's debts and liabilities, just as the joint probate requires administration and accounting of both decedents' debts and obligations to creditors. 
Id. at 9-10. 
In rejecting to this argument when it was made previously, Judge Julian 
concluded that: 
There is nothing in [I.C. § 15-3-lllJ that states or suggests any tolling of a creditor's deadline to present a claim, just because the estate is supsequently jointly probated. Indeed, this section specifically exempts the three (3) year limitation on probate following death of the first spouse, as found in section 108. That fact clearly demonstrates the legislature's ability and willingness to make special exceptions within [I.C. § 15-3-111] where warranted and intended. As there is no exception made to the th1·ee (3) year creditors' bar found in 15-3-803, one shall not be implied by the court. Heinz's claim against Hedy's estate was not filed or "presented" within three years of her death and is now barred by IC§ 15-3-803(a)(l). 
Mem. Op., p. 7. 
I.C. § 15-3-111 was added to Idaho's probate statutes in 1973. In 1995 the 
statute was amended to add the following language: "The three (3) year provision of 
section-15-3-108, Idaho Code, applies only to the death of the spouse whose death 
occuned last." The statement of purpose reads as follows: 
This legislation amends existing Idaho Code Section 15-3-111 to clarify when a joint probate may be used at the second death of a husband and wife. Some courts have held that the three year limit on probates in I~aho Code Section 15-3-108 applies to the first death and therefore bars a joint probate unless both spouses died within three years of the time of commencement of the joint probate. This legislation makes the Code Section clearly state that only the second death need be within the time periods of Idaho Code Section 15-3-108. 
S.B. 1166, 1995 First Reg. Sess. of the 53rd Leg. (Id. 1995). 
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A basic tenet of statutory COI?-struction is that the more specific statute or 
section addressing an issue controls over the statute that is m9re general. Marshall 
v. Dept. ofTransp., 137 Idaho 337, 341, 48 P.3d 666, 670 (Ct. App. 2002) (citation 
omitted). "[T]he more general statute should not be interpreted as encompassing an 
area already covered by one which is more specific." Id. (citation omitted). It is 
undisputed that I.C. § 15-3-111 extends the general three yeru.· timeframe in which 
to file a probate action. Consequently, in cases such as this one, LC. § 15-3-111 is 
the specific statute, while I.C. § 15-3-108 and I.C. § 15-3-803(a)(l) are general 
statutes. Because the three year provision of I.C. § 15-3-108 only applies to the 
death of the spouse whose death occurred last, it would follow that the tm:ee year 
timeframe set out in I.C. § 15-3-803(a)(l) would also only apply to the death of the 
spouse whose death occurred last in probate actions filed pursuant to I.C. § 15-3-
111. 
Additionally, interpreting LC. § 15-3-803(a)(1) as barring creditors' claims 
against the "estate of the spouse whose death occurred first" in probate actions 
commenced pursuant to LC.§ 15-3-111 simply because the death occuri-ed more 
than three years prior to the commencement of the probate action would produce an 
absurd result. This is.because LC. § 15-3-111 expressly allows "the estates of both 
decedents [to] be joined for probate in a single proceeding'' within three years of the 
"death of the spouse whose death occtUTed last." If the statute of limitations for the 
first to die is not tolled, then in effect the only estate to probate is that of the second 
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to die. "Constructions of a statute that would lead to absurd or unreasonably harsh 
results are disfavored." State u. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 690, 85 P.3d 656, 666 (2004). 
The Magistrate Judge therefore erred in determining that Heinz's claim 
against Hedy's estate is barred by J.C. § 15-3-803 because he failed to bring his 
claim within three years of her death. Summai-y judgment was consequently 
inapp1·opl'iately granted on this issue. The Magistrate Judge's decision on this issue 
will be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The Magistrate Judge's decision that Hei..z;iz's claim was timely disallowed by 
Jadwiga and that the estate was entitled to summary judgment on that issue is 
AFFIRMED. 
The Magistrate Judge's decision that Heinz's claim against Hedy's estate is 
barred by I.C. § 15-3-803 and that th~ estate was entitled to summary judgment on 
that basis is REVERSED. This issue is REMANDED for further proceedings. 
ff-' 
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